00027575

BOMBAY BRANCH

OF THE

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

TOWN HALL, BOMBAY.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 09 March, 2016

R1211

'EXERCISES,'

POLITICAL AND OTHERS.

27575 ac .

By Lieut. Colonel T. Perronet Thompson.

---

isting of matter previously published with and without the author's name, and of some not published before.

IN SIX VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

Second Edition.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE.

1843.

05 2
Tho/Exe
27575

London: W. Clowes and Sons, Stamford Street.

PREFACE

TO ALL THE VOLUMES.

THE first impression on review of this publication, part of which dates from a considerable time back, is the very slight degree in which circumstances are substantially altered. Like the mounted sentries at the Horse Guards, they might be taken for the same instead of a succession; so like in all important points is the new face of things to the old. It may not be John, it may be Robert, whose feet are actually in the stirrups; but Robert and John are one, in the eyes of the rustic spectator who looks only to the general effect.

Scarcely any great quarrel existed at the earliest period referred to, of which the roots are not as much in the ground as ever, though some of the stalks have been pulled up. The argument on the Catholic Question, may be re-read with a transference to Church Monopolies of other kinds; and the agitation preceding the Reform Bill, may hold a lantern to show how little has been accomplished, and how much thrown away.

In the department of Political Economy, something like a manual for one side of the struggle at this moment at its height, may be collected from the subjects and quotations introduced.

On what has obtained the name of the "Greatest-Happiness Principle," a continued discussion will be found kept up. The writer would be glad to think he had availed to make the subject clearer, to any of those who profess to find difficulties in the style or matter of the original propounder.

On the Military System of Napoleon, he has endeavoured to collect and compress, what might be sought and perhaps missed, in the pages of bulletins and the comments of friends and foes. On some military questions of detail, articles and observations will be found, which must owe any interest, to having been framed under the guidance of experiment, and published generally with some view to the advancement of the liberal cause.

On the principles of Geometry as connected with the *vexata quæstio* of the Theory of Parallels, inquiries will be found which, like those of the alchemists, lead to useful results though without implying a claim to general success. On the mathematics of Music, observations and experiments will be met with, which when the tide shall set in that direction, may be turned to the improvement of the executive branch of Harmony.

The documents connected with Sierra Leone point to remarkable facts in the history of that colony. The Treaty of January

1820 in the Persian Gulph, is a transcript of the first public act in which the Slave Trade was written down Piracy.

The "Letters of a Representative" were written to the constituency of Hull, during a short period of sitting in parliament. That the consequence on the first opportunity was permanent exclusion from the House of Commons, by the exertions at different times and places of the leaders of almost every class assuming the name of Liberals, may be not without its value to such as may ever employ themselves in raking among the characteristics of the times. *Eight* Conservatives, with more or less directness, were introduced in part of process; of whom five were on the benches at once, making a difference of ten upon the votes, being within two or three of some of the majorities by which the Whigs were expelled from office.

On Irish questions, the author has gone as close to the enemy, as any sane leader could desire. The return made him, was fierce attack from the "boys" of Kilkenny, when he was seen ridden over as in the way of the compact by which three kingdoms were turned over to the Tories.

Both in those Letters, and others to various portions of the public press which follow, useful references will be found to gone-by events, and to the feelings and arguments by which they were attended. If proof is sometimes presented of the prudence of dealing with enemies as if they were some day to be friends, and with friends as if they were to be enemies, there can be nothing surprising in finding a precept of antiquity confirmed by the experience of the passing hour.

On one point, an observation may be serviceable. The writer adhered to the people called Chartists, till they denounced him in their gazette and added the enormous childishness of telling the House of Commons they wanted an edge tool and wanted it to cut the givers' throats. On such adhesion, there will of course be a diversity of opinions; but there are always enough to quit the party of the poor, the moment abiding by it will make an unfavourable balance of twenty votes at an election. The observation intended was, that much of what the Chartists did not use, might be found cut and dried for any other portion of the public, who should apply themselves to compass a substantial and not a mock Reform.

To A. S., J. S., and S. B., Esqs., the survivors of the friends mentioned in the Appendix, the thanks of the writer are due, for the readiness with which they permitted the use of Articles in which a mixture of hands was concerned.

Blackheath, London. 1 *August*, 1842.

INDEX TO ALL THE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

Page

Articles from the Westminster Review, 1829—1831; as follow.

Catholic Question (republished as "*Catholic State Waggon*") . 1
Béranger's *Songs* 36
Absenteeism 52
System of Fagging 58
Banking 63
Disabilities of the Jews 70
Poor Humphrey's Calendar 79
Forty-Shilling Freeholders 82
Corn Laws 87
Quipos, or Peruvian Knot-Records 96
"*Greatest-Happiness Principle.*" No. I. 121
Slavery in the West Indies 136
Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, &c. 152
Desirableness of the Re-union of Belgium to France . . 165
Edinburgh Review and the "Greatest-Happiness Principle." No. II. 180
Free Trade 191
Radical Reform 219
Edinburgh Review and the "Greatest-Happiness Principle." No. III. 229
Taxes on Literature, The "Six Acts" 247
Le Représentant des Peuples 261
Religious Disabilities 269
Distress of the Country 278
Great Britain and France 287
Geometry without Axioms 306
Revolution of 1830 313
Defensive Force 328
East-India Trade 344
Machine-Breaking 353
European Revolution 373
Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society 381
Parliamentary Reform 413
Poland and France 429
Annals and Antiquities of Rajast'han 437
Military System of Napoleon 440
Belgium and the Holy Alliance 453
Quarterly Journal of Education 462
Appel aux Représentans de la France 473
Prospects from Tory Reaction 478

Programme's to various Nos. to be found in their order.

VOL. II.

Articles from Westminster Review, 1832—1833; as follow. Page

Archbishop of Dublin on Political Economy 1
Adjustment of the House of Peers 23
Saint-Simonianism, &c. 34
Improvement of Condition of the Clergy 75
Silk and Glove Trades 95
Enharmonic of the Ancients 99
French Commerce 159
Dr. Chalmers *on Political Economy* 167
Renewal of Bank Charter 200
Supplement to Article on Silk and Glove Trades . . . 218
Prospects of Reform 225
McCulloch's *Edition of the "Wealth of Nations"* . . . 238
Gardiner's *Music of Nature* 282
Second Supplement to Article on Silk and Glove Trades . . 303
Wainewright's *Vindication of Paley. Fort Risban* . . . 306
Supplement to Article on Renewal of Bank Charter . . . 314
Viscount Milton's *Address to the Landowners on the Corn Laws* 316
The Fall of the Constitution 320
Report of Secret Committee on Bank Charter 329
Harmonics of the Violin 337
Bishop of Bath and Wells *on Commutation of Tithes* . . 345
Colonel Torrens's *Letters on Commercial Policy* . . . 351
Third Supplement to Article on Silk and Glove Trades . . 358
Policy, Justice, and Consequences of the Dutch War. . . 368
Equitable Adjustment (with Tables by Mr. J. Childs of Bungay). 374
Booth's *Free Trade as it affects the People* 392
Effects of Abolition and Commutation of Tithes . . . 401
Fourth Supplement to Article on Silk and Glove Trades . . 406
Colonel Torrens's *Additional Letters on Commercial Policy.* . 409
Musical Periodicals 414
Ireland 417
Property Tax 433
Whewell's *First Principles of Mechanics* 441
Nathan *on the History and Theory of Music* 459
A Free Trader's Defence of the "Mercantile System" . . 466
London University Magazine. Note on Austin's Jurisprudence . 479
Otto *on the Violin* 482
Question of Absenteeism reducible to the Principles of Free Trade 486
Notes and Additions to various parts 496
Programmes to various Nos. to be found in their order.

VOL. III.

Articles from Westminster Review, 1834—1835, with Appendix; as follow.

	Page
Dr. Chalmers's *Bridgewater Treatise*	2
Jews' Harps, &c. Life of Eulenstein	22
Importance of Belgian Independence	36
Economy of paying twice over	43
The Suffering Rich	70
Royal Society and M. Legendre	79
Use of the Subjunctive Mood in English	89
Impressment and Flogging	93
Quarterly Review, &c. in Support of Corn Monopoly	100
Bentham's *Deontology*	108
Pamphlet in Modern Greek and French, on Out-post Cavalry	126
Do. on Telegraphers for Field Service, horse and foot	134
First Report of Messrs. Villiers and Bowring	137
Cab and Omnibus Nuisance	148
Bordwine's *New System of Fortification.*	153
John Hopkins on Political Economy	159
Enharmonic Organ	165
Contre-Enquête	177
Lady Morgan's *Princess*	216
Jacquemont's *Letters from India*	239
Table-Talk of S. T. Coleridge	248
Mrs. Loudon's *Philanthropic Economy*	254
Woolhouse's *Essay on Musical Intervals, &c.*	290
Programmes to various Nos. to be found in their order.	

APPENDIX.

Instrument of Exchange	295
Arabs and Persians	344
Prospects of the Coloured Races	406
Stuart's *Three Years in North America.*	416
Present Posture of Affairs	430
Banim's *Canvassing*	447
Extract from Article on *Military Law*	463
Extract from Article on *Sugar without Slavery*	464
Miscellaneous Extracts from Westminster Review	466

VOL. IV.

	Page
Sierra Leone.—1808	1
On Morals and Law.—1813	4
What is a Constitution?—1814	23
What is a Rightful Government?—1815	26
Treaty in Persian Gulph. 1820. (Copy in Arabic and English).	29
Correspondence on Slavery, &c. (Arabic and English)	40
Respective Values of a good and bad Harvest.—1830	44
Letter to Earl Grey on the Adjustment of the House of Peers.—1831	47
Letters of a Representative to his Constituents, during the Session of 1836	61
Do. during the Session of 1837	195
Collections of Addresses, &c. 1837—1840	303
Lectures on various subjects	365
The True Theory of Rent (Pamphlet republished)	399
Catechism on the Corn Laws (Pamphlet republished)	459
Mirage on a Heated Wall in Greenwich Park	580

VOL. V.

Letters to various Journals, between March 1840 and the end of the year	1

The Letters are orderly arranged, and the subjects stated in the running head at the top of each page.

VOL. VI.

Letters to various Journals, in the years 1841 and 1842	1
Addenda. Geometrical	433

ERRATA.

In Vol. I. p. 368, *line* 25, *for* nigh *read* high.

In Vol. II. p. 136, *line* 5, *for* Chapter XVII. *read* Chapter XVIII.
p. 217, *last word, for* ou *read* no.
p. 224, head line, for *Supplement to Article on* read *Supplement to Article on Silk and Glove Trades.*

In Vol. III. p. 97, bottom line, for *Imprisonment* read *Impressment.*
p. 175, *line* 36, *for* inferrible *read* inferible.
p. 292, *line* 21, *for* useully *read* usefully.
p. 433, *line* 35, *dele* * *at the end.*

In Vol. IV. p. 63, *line* 2. *for* 1838 *read* 1836.
p. 309, *line* 21, *for* 1837 *read* 1838.

In Vol. VI. p. 67 *and p.* 90, two Letters to the *Editor of the Statesman* should be transposed; as is apparent from their dates.

END OF INDEX.

1808.

DECLARATION

BY THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF SIERRA LEONE.

WHEREAS by an Act passed in the 47th Year of His present Majesty's Reign, intituled, an Act for transferring to His Majesty certain Possessions and Rights vested in the Sierra Leone Company, and for shortening the Duration of the said Company, and for preventing any dealing or trafficking in the buying or selling of Slaves in the Colony of Sierra Leone, it was amongst other things enacted, That it shall not be lawful for any Person or Persons whatsoever, inhabiting or being, or who shall at any Time hereafter inhabit or be within the said Peninsula or Colony of Sierra Leone, either directly or indirectly to deal or traffick in, buy or sell, or to be aiding or assisting in the dealing or trafficking in the buying or selling of Slaves, either within the said Peninsula or elsewhere; And whereas certain Natives of Africa, treated, dealt with, carried, kept, or detained as Slaves on board of certain Ships or Vessels, which Ships or Vessels were afterwards detained or seized by His Majesty's Sloop Derwent, and brought into the Bay or Road of Sierra Leone on or about the 19th day of March last, were landed within the Peninsula or Colony of Sierra Leone, and were directly or indirectly sold within the said Peninsula, the sum of twenty dollars or other monies having been paid and received in return for each of the same, and were supposed to have been thereby apprenticed and received as Apprentices within the said Peninsula, contrary to the said

Act; every such direct or indirect Sale or Purchase is hereby declared to be null and void.

And whereas by an Act made in the 47th Year of His present Majesty's Reign, intituled an Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, it is amongst other things enacted, that all Slaves and all Natives of Africa, treated, dealt with, carried, kept, or detained as Slaves, which shall be seized or taken as Prize of War, or liable to Forfeiture under that or any other Act of Parliament, made for restraining or prohibiting the African Slave Trade, shall and may, for the purposes only of Seizure, Prosecution, and Condemnation as Prize or as Forfeiture, be considered, treated, taken, and adjudged as Slaves and Property, in the same manner as Negro Slaves have been heretofore considered, treated, taken, and adjudged, when seized as Prize of War, or as Forfeiture for any Offence against the Laws of Trade and Navigation, respectively; and that it shall be lawful for His Majesty, His Heirs, and Successors, and such Officers Civil or Military, as shall by any General or Special Order of the King in Council, be from time to time appointed and empowered to receive, protect, and provide for such Natives of Africa as shall be condemned, to bind the same, or any of them, as Apprentices, for any term not exceeding fourteen Years, to such Person or Persons, in such Place or Places, and upon such Terms and Conditions, and subject to such Regulations as to His Majesty shall seem meet, and as shall by any General or Special Order of His Majesty in Council, be in that behalf directed and appointed: And whereas on the 16th Day of March, in the Year of our Lord 1808, His Majesty in Council was pleased amongst other things to order and appoint, that the Governor or Person having and exercising the Chief Civil Command for the time being, at the Colony of Sierra Leone on the Coast of Africa, do receive, protect, and provide for all such Natives of Africa, as have been, or shall be condemned, either as Prize of War or Forfeitures to His Majesty's Use, pursuant to the said recited Act; and that he shall have full Power and Authority to receive, protect, and provide for all such Natives of Africa as shall be condemned as aforesaid, and to bind the same Apprentices, pursuant to the Power given by the said recited Act, upon such Terms and Conditions, and subject to such Regulations as His Majesty shall from time to time think fit to prescribe by His Order or Orders given in that behalf; and to make and execute Indentures of Apprenticeship for that purpose; And whereas certain Natives of Africa, treated, dealt with, carried, kept, or detained as Slaves on board of certain

Ships or Vessels, which Ships or Vessels were afterwards detained or seized by H. M. S. Derwent, and were brought into the Bay or Road of Sierra Leone on or about the 19th day of March last, were landed within the Peninsula or Colony of Sierra Leone, and were supposed to have been apprenticed and received as Apprentices within the said Peninsula, such Natives of Africa not having been condemned either as Prize of War or Forfeitures to His Majesty's Use, as directed by the aforesaid Act of Parliament and His Majesty's Order in Council; every such supposed Apprenticeship is hereby declared to be null and void.

T. PERRONET THOMPSON, GOVERNOR.*

Fort Thornton, Aug. 1, 1808.

---

* For the gratification of any curiosity for further information, the following particulars are added. The professed objects of the Sierra Leone Company are pretty generally known. When the Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was passed, the Company made a transfer of the government of their Colony to the Crown, and applied themselves to the system of introducing slaves under the title of apprentices, in the teeth of three Acts of Parliament of their own procuring and providing. The following is an extract of a Letter from the Secretary to the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, to their Governor on the spot, which was handed over to his successor for his guidance.

"London May 7, 1807. § 6. You somewhat misconceive our ideas in this country on the subject of African Slavery. While the Slave-Trade lasted I certainly felt very averse to the giving any direct encouragement to the purchasing Slaves with a view to the benefit of their labour for a certain given period. But I always looked forward to the event of the Abolition as removing many objections to that System."

The Slaves captured on the coast for infringements of the Act of Abolition, were placed by virtue of the Act at the disposal of the Governor of Sierra Leone for the time being; and that functionary, acting upon the suggestions of the above letter, found insuperable obstacles to disposing of the captured Slaves without a public sale, and they were sold accordingly, at what was proved to be a fair trade price, and the transaction called apprenticing. Others were bought openly from the neighbouring Natives, and brought into the Colony with the Governor's previous permission and assurance that the purchaser would not be hurt. The King's Governor, to the dismay of all parties, brought all the cases of sale and purchase into the Vice-Admiralty Court: and the Slaves of different kinds, amounting in the single case alluded to in the Declaration to 167, were after full hearing and noting of the evidence, condemned to the Crown, without defence on the opposite side. Of course the Governor who executed three Acts of Parliament, was ordered home as fast as possible. Lords Castlereagh and Liverpool were personally civil to him; but an Under Secretary, since grown into a man of some importance, was as supercilious as he knew how. Some years subsequently, a demand was made in the House of Commons for the proceedings in the Vice-Admiralty Court; and return was made that they *could not be found* The writer has them, with the original documents produced in evidence; and could publish them, if there was any public opinion that cared about such things.—*Added in Sept.* 1840.

1813.

(FRAGMENT*.)

CHAPTER I.—Of Morality, and the Obligation to obey its rules.

1. Morality, *what it is.*

Morality is that system of general rules for human conduct, the general observation of which is ultimately most conducive to general happiness.

For all the teachers of morality have professed to give a system of rules proper to be observed by men in general, and not be observed by some and broken by others. Therefore they have all intended a system of general rules, and for general observation.

Also they have all professed, either that it was wiser, safer, more honourable, or in some way or other more desirable and advantageous at the present or some other time, that those to whom their rules were addressed should obey them, than the contrary. Which is the same as to assert, that obedience will ultimately in some way or other be most conducive to the happiness of those to whom their rules are addressed.

But those to whom the rules are addressed, are men in general. Therefore the happiness which is to be ultimately promoted by obedience, is the happiness of men in general, or the general happiness.

Hence it may be concluded, that all teachers of morality have intended to teach what has been defined above.

2. Our *Duty*, what it is.

That conduct which is prescribed to us by the rules of Morality, as being ultimately most conducive to the general happiness, is called our Duty.

3. *How men have proceeded to determine* what rules are ultimately most conducive to the general happiness.

Men have proceeded to do this in one or both of the following ways.

1. By acknowledging the supernatural authority of some teacher, and of certain general rules delivered by him.

* The following exercise may have interest, as having been written in the intervals of military service in the European Peninsula, by a subaltern of Light Dragoons who had never heard either of BENTHAM or the "Greatest-Happiness Principle." There is perhaps enough to account for his subsequently joining the ranks of the prophet.

2. By comparing the experience of past and present times, on the effects of different general rules.

In their determinations from each of these sources, men have frequently erred. Thus some nations have held human sacrifices, and others the destroying of those who differed from them in religion, to be meritorious; from a mistaken belief in a supposed supernatural authority, or (it may be) the perverted application of an authority really supernatural. And others have permitted the killing of infants and of aged parents, from an erroneous judgment of its expediency. Hence it is not wonderful, that the accepted rules of morality have been different in different countries and under different teachers.

4. *The Obligation to obey* the rules of Morality after they have been determined,—in what it consists.

This Obligation consists in

A persuasion that at some time or other, and in some shape or other, a greater quantity of happiness will on the whole be accruing to *ourselves individually*, through our observing the general rule, than by our breaking it.

This obligation to obey the rules of morality, is what has sometimes been denominated *Moral Obligation.*

5. The persuasion that to obey the general rule will be ultimately conducive to our individual happiness,—*whence derived.*

This persuasion is derived from one or more of the following sources.

1. A belief that to obey the general rule will be pleasing to a Supreme Being, and that the contrary will be displeasing; and that our own happiness will be at some time increased or diminished, in consequence of our pleasing or displeasing such a Being.

2. A sense of the advantages to be derived to ourselves from the preservation on our part of the general rule; or an apprehension that the obeying or breaking of the rule by ourselves, may, by the consequences of our example, or in some other way (not included in the last-mentioned source), ultimately affect our own happiness.

3. An habitual feeling of shame or horror, from some cause or other attached to the infringement of certain general rules, and of contentment or self-complacency attached to their preservation. Which feeling is by habit become so strong, that the mental pain or pleasure

arising therefrom, is sufficient to overbalance the desire of considerable present good, or the dread of considerable present evil, even in cases where the original cause or stimulus may appear to lose its efficacy.

The first of these may be called, a sense of Religious Obligation.

The second may be called, a sense of General Expediency*.

The third may be called, a sense of Honour, or of Heroic Obligation.

As in the determination of the rules to be obeyed, men have frequently erred, so each of these three kinds of Obligation may be directed to the preservation of a correct or of an erroneous rule. But the nature and construction of the sense of Obligation remain the same, whether it be applied to a correct rule or to an erroneous.

6. Of the sense of *Religious Obligation.*

A sense of Religious Obligation may be founded on one or both of the following grounds.

1. On an acquiescence in some accredited supernatural authority, which asserts among other things, that our happiness will depend on our pleasing or displeasing a Supreme Being, who is pleased by the observation of certain rules, and displeased by the contrary.

2. On conclusions drawn from the exercise of our natural faculties.

The first of these is, Belief in a Revelation of some kind.

The other is what has been called Natural Religion, or the Religion of Nature.

7. Of the sense of General Expediency.

The sense of General Expediency, as it regards our *individual* happiness, seems to arise from experience, and examination of past and present events; or from observing that the breach of certain rules conducive to the general happiness, has generally in times past ultimately brought unhappiness upon the aggressor, and therefore probably will do so again.

Among the ways in which unhappiness has been produced, may be classed the probability of discovery and consequent

* This seems to be BENTHAM'S *utility*, applied to a limited class of objects. Both terms (and it seems impossible to invent any that will not) are liable to purposed misconstruction, founded on using them in a partial sense. Thus we shall hear of a man's committing murder because it was *expedient*, and perhaps going to hell for it afterwards. BENTHAM would have told him, that to go to hell was not *expedient*.—1840.

misery, and the misery actually produced by the contemplation of this probability.

8. Of the sense of *Honour*, or of *Heroic Obligation*.

By the sense of Honour is not here meant a principle of action professed by any particular portion of society, or order of men; for such a principle of action is only the sense of Honour of that particular portion or order. And by the sense of Heroic Obligation, is not meant a sense of obligation which applies only to Heroes,—any more than by the Heroic ages are meant ages in which there were nothing but Heroes;—but the term is used because this principle of action appears to have been particularly strong in those ages which are called the Heroic, and in situations where the circumstances of men have been in some degree similar.

The peculiarities of the sense of Heroic Obligation according to the definition (§ 5), are that it depends upon *habit*, and that this habit outlives the sources from which it sprang, and *acts independently of their existence*. From what then has the *habit* originally arisen?

It may have arisen from one or both of the other sources of Moral Obligation, namely a sense of Religious Obligation, and a sense of General Expediency; or it may have arisen, from the existence of a compact among mankind, entered into for the sake of encouraging or preventing certain modes of action which are thought to affect the general good, by which compact, public estimation or contempt is attached to certain modes of action;—which public estimation or contempt constitutes to some minds the highest degree of pleasure or of pain. In any or all of these ways, there may have arisen an *habitual* connexion between mental pleasure or pain, and the performance, or contemplation of the performance, of certain actions.

What has been called the sense of Heroic Obligation, is then an adventitious or factitious principle, founded indeed primarily upon some other principle, but capable of acting by itself, and without positive recurrence to any other.

The Greeks and Romans, who never bring a principle of Religious Obligation strongly into view, do not seem to have very clearly made out a sufficient reason for the preservation of a general rule in the extreme case,—as for example, why a person threatened with death and future misrepresentation with consequent infamy on one hand, and offered life, reward, and perfect secrecy on the other, should persist in refusing to break a moral rule. They would perhaps say, that such refusal would be honourable, decorous, just, fitting, or proper; but they seem deficient in any powerful reason why the honourable, the

&c., should be chosen in such circumstances. They appear even to concede the point; as in the case of Lucretia. So long, as Lucretia was threatened only with death, they seem to have been able to conceive a principle of obligation (quite independent of religious obligation) which might induce her to resist. But when Tarquin added the threat of placing the body of a slave by her side and declaring that he had killed both to avenge the honour of his friend, they seem unable to conceive any obligation which could withstand the temptation. The ancients appear therefore to have had imperfect ideas of the nature of a species of obligation, which they the more needed as their power of enforcing a sense of religious obligation was weak.

But it does not seem impossible to imagine, that a virtuous woman should by unvarying habit have attached so much of mental pain and horror to the idea of unchastity, that this mental pain should outweigh even the temptation to which Lucretia gave way. The truth is, that the mental pain of Lucretia was attached to the idea, not of unchastity, but of the consequent dishonour, (a defect to which that species of heroic obligation which rests on public estimation, will always be subject); and therefore when dishonour itself was presented as the threat, her principle failed. The question here is not, whether the principle of Heroic Obligation ever did or ever will, by itself resist a trial like that of Lucretia. But it is clearly possible to imagine its doing so; which is all that is wanted for the distinct perception of the principle intended to be described.

Where a present and positive evil is encountered through a sense of Heroic Obligation, there is generally at the same time a certain degree of shame or other future suffering attached to the means offered for escaping; and particularly in cases where the evil to be endured is death. Thus in the case of an Indian widow, the contumely which would attend all her future life if she should decline burning with her husband's body, tends to reduce the value of the life she is tempted to preserve, and so far diminishes the value of her sacrifice to Heroic Obligation. The most unmixed instances of the power of this obligation, are where a voluntary and undemanded death has been chosen from the effect of some preconceived principle. The case in antiquity which is most in point, if the facts may be assumed, is that of Curtius*. In this, there seems to have

* Some of what follows, will be found to have been introduced elsewhere. But it has not been thought necessary to make any interruption of continuity on that account.—1840.

been nothing to point out such a sacrifice as the particular duty of the individual, and therefore no disgrace or other positive suffering consequent on the non-performance. What was it then, that outweighed in the mind of Curtius the natural love of life? By the very circumstances of the case, all chance of enjoying future honours was to be at an end; and though it is possible he might possess some degree of belief that deeds of patriotism were rewarded in Elysium, it has never been imagined that Curtius was a martyr to religious expectation. Curtius then, in consequence of the distinction with which public and extraordinary acts of patriotism were rewarded in Rome, had through all his life connected the highest degree of mental pleasure with the performance of such actions; and this pleasure, roused to the highest pitch by the idea of the unparalleled exertion he contemplated, was more than sufficient to outweigh any pain which he might feel from the apprehension of dying. The object here, is not to inquire into the merits of the principle of Curtius, but solely to examine its origin and construction.

But these extreme cases are only taken for the purpose of exhibiting the principle. It does not follow that the principle itself is not extensively diffused. Indeed it may be doubted, whether all men according to their several habits of life and thinking, have not a greater or less degree of this habitual* principle; derived indeed originally from some or other of the sources which have been described, but operating independently or without positively calling into action the original motives on which it was founded. As man's life has been called "a bundle of habits," which though generally arising from some necessity at first, yet soon become real wants though the first necessity has ceased to act; so his moral habits, though moulded originally on certain principles, grow up into a mass capable of producing great effects without having absolute recourse to the original principles, except on the occurrence of some great occasion, some "*dignus vindice nodus*," where it is necessary to summon all the primary motives to assist. The Creator appears to have surrounded the great sources both of moral and physical feeling, with a cloud of subservient sensations and precautionary irritabilities, which must be broken through before the primary principles are brought into question. And to have recourse to the primary principles for what may

* The *habitual* principle will probably turn out to be the true name of the thing pursued. But the mode in which progress was so far made, appears to be worth preserving.—*Added in* 1840.

be satisfactorily explained by the subordinate sensations, may be suspected to arise in morals from the same defective information, which among uncivilized nations refers all physical diseases to affections of the heart or of the brain. True science will probably show, that in both cases the secondary feelings are those most frequently called in question, and that in very rare instances are the primary ones endangered without the others having been previously affected. And the same analogy seems to exist in the methods of treatment. For a man will no more exist under the continual irritation of the fear of hell or of the gallows, (which for popular use may be considered as the *ultima ratio* of religious obligation and temporal expediency), than he will exist under the continual irritation of any powerful physical stimulus. The stimulus may be applied, but it will lose its power of irritation, and the consequence will be insensibility to stimuli of every kind.

Not that it is maintained, that man's moral emendation is not to be attempted by applying to the primary and grand sources of moral action; on the contrary it is probable, that it is originally by some application of this kind, by introducing some strong new principle or remodelling old ones, that great alterations in men's moral habits are always to be produced. But what is contended is, that these alterations are effected, not by the constant and trivial application of the new or altered principle, but through the medium of an habitual way of acting and of determining, which as it gathers strength diminishes the necessity for drawing hourly upon the grand principle which is in the heart, and thereby saves the wear and tear of the whole machine, and the derogation of the grand principle by familiarity. For the most august and awful principles, if continually brought forward as the objects of vulgar and ignoble familiarity, will infallibly in time be viewed with the same unconcern with which a grave-digger beholds mortality.

Nor can any change be imagined so perfect and complete, as that which takes place through the medium of the habits in consequence of some affection of the principles implanted in the mind. For the habits, which insinuate themselves into the thousand inconsiderable acts of life, do really constitute by far the greater part of man's moral conduct. And when these habits are moulded by the introduction of some new principle, nothing can more nearly approach to the making of a new man: nor can any stronger distinction be drawn, between a principle which may be said to be vital or actually living and flourishing, and one which is only matter of dead and fruitless speculation, than that one insinuates itself into the habits and

manners, while the other remains in the shape of a barren and theoretic assent.

Few people have not in some shape experienced the fact, that when they had once begun to parley with some believed moral principle, when they had once worn away the habitual and prompt sentiment with which it was hedged about, the infringement of the principle was not far distant. Man seldom resists a temptation, when once it has begun to be a temptation. When the servant has once got to casting a gloating eye upon his master's gold, the day of dishonesty is not far off; for he has lost the proud repulsive principle, the unarguing unsyllogizing instinct, which felt even the capability of being tempted as a dishonour. It is proved by daily experience and the common occurrences of society, that this habitual principle, the efflorescence of the primary principles rooted in the soul, is the grand security and defence of moral principle in all the ordinary shocks of life.

It is indeed in the very nature of all strong principles to translate themselves into the habits, and produce an habitual and unconscious manner of acting in things which would be otherwise indifferent. The affection of a child for its parent, or of a virtuous and honourable man for his mistress, diffuses itself into a thousand unpremeditated actions, in which it is certain that there has been no actual reference, in the shape of a syllogism or logical proposition, to the principle on which they are primarily founded. And the affection which could only be spurred into action by the application of such syllogistic references, would to say the least be very imperfect and contemptible; as contemptible perhaps as in the eye of the Deity may be that species of service, which is only extorted by the fear of hell, or the barefaced longing for the delights of heaven.

But as no men have lived all their lives without moral principles of some kind, so it is probable that in all men there exist some sparks of the habitual principle. For perhaps it is in the very nature of moral principles of any kind, to produce some degree of this habitual sense. And this sense will survive even the corruption of the principle which produced it; a fact which sets in a strong light the independent nature of the sense when it has been once created. A highwayman will abstain from shedding blood, not from any actual reasoning upon religious obligation or temporal expediency, for both these principles have been sufficiently got the better of; but from an habitual, instinctive abhorrence, the remains of better days and other feelings.

As the habitual sense is the most general agent in protecting

our moral principles, so perhaps by its operations it is the most effectual expositor of what our moral principles really are. For being founded on general and distant maxims, it is a blunt and honest sense, whose decisions have not time to palter with the actual case, and are therefore not exposed to the sophistry which attends an interested scrutiny. It cannot be doubted, that women generally possess a more acute and impartial sense of the moral tendency of complicated actions, than men; and this may be accounted for, by their being all their lives accustomed to pay a more rapid obedience to various habitual obligations, of which they rarely proceed to question or tamper with the sources. And this acuter sense, may be one reason of the general compact entered into by men, to exclude women from their political concerns.

It may be useful to repeat the warning against supposing, that the sense of Honour or Heroic Obligation here intended, is identical with what is termed a sense of honour by a particular portion of European society. If the sense of honour, as exemplified by the particular portion of society alluded to, does really contain the result and cream of the whole of their moral principles, it indicates a most lame and miserable state of moral principle indeed. Those who have had most opportunities of observing the persons who profess to be guided by this rule, best know how emptied of all good the majority of its professors are, and how completely their rule itself is reducible to that of "leaving undone any act of which the probable effect will be immediate public infamy." To so meagre and imperfect a limitation does this boasted rule reduce itself; within which limits, there is no species of base and unworthy action, in circumstances not likely to be attended with the public punishment described, which is not practised by its followers. Nothing can be more superficial and false, than the boast of refined honour supplying the place of moral principle. Some pretensions to glaring and doubtful virtues, like those which constitute a brilliant assassin or magnanimous freebooter, may have been kept up to cover the general inanity; but it is probable that no description of men, on examination, would be found more completely swept of the greater part of what mankind in all ages have agreed to be truly virtuous and respectable.

CHAP. II. Of the different divisions of Morality.

9. Morality may be divided into *Negative* and *Positive*.

Negative morality is that part of the system of general rules, which goes to prevent a diminution of the general happiness.

Positive morality is that part, which goes to effect a direct and positive augmentation of the general happiness.

Happiness and misery are relative terms like heat and cold, and the presence of one is concomitant on the absence of the other. But warmth may be produced, either by shutting out the cold air, which is a negative way of warming,—or by making a fire, which is a positive one; and whether these two methods are used separately or both together, the distinction is clear and tangible. In the same manner the distinction between Negative and Positive Morality is clear and tangible.

Such conduct as is prescribed by the rules of negative and positive morality, may be called *negative* and *positive* duties.

10. Morality may be divided in reference to *its object.*

It may be divided into three parts, according as the conduct which it regulates, relates

1. To a Supreme Being.
2. To ourselves.
3. To other men.

And each of these may be divided into negative and positive.

11. Our Duty towards *a Supreme Being*, what it is.

Our Duty (§ 2) is such conduct as is ultimately most conducive to the general happiness. And as we cannot conceive of a Supreme Being as though he needed anything, the question may be confined to the effect on the happiness of ourselves and other creatures.

But the way in which our own happiness may be affected by our conduct with respect to a Supreme Being, is reducible to our doing what shall procure his favour, and avoid the contrary, if we can ascertain or gather how that may be done.

Also, it cannot be proved that to obtain the favour of a Supreme Being by our own particular conduct, has any tendency to diminish the happiness of other people. On the contrary it may have a tendency to increase the happiness of others; inasmuch as our example may recommend a conduct which shall produce an increase of happiness to them likewise.

It may be concluded therefore, that such conduct in respect of a Supreme Being as shall obtain his favour if we know how, will be to increase the general happiness; and is consequently our Duty.

12. Our Duty towards a Supreme Being may be divided into

1. The avoiding all which we can gather may be displeasing to him;—which is the *Fear of God.*

2. The positive endeavour to serve and please him;—which is *Devotion* or *Piety*.

13. Our Duty towards *ourselves*, what it is.

Our Duty towards ourselves, is such conduct with respect to ourselves as is ultimately most conducive to the general happiness. And this will consist in pursuing such conduct in respect to our own persons, as considered in its effects both on our own proper happiness and on the happiness of others to whom it may be introduced by our example, is ultimately the most conducive to the general happiness.

It may therefore be divided into

1. The avoiding of all which has a tendency to debase or injure the mind or body, through the pursuit of harmful gratifications, or the indulgence of unworthy passions;—which is *Temperance* or *Self-Government*.

2. The endeavour, by the cultivation of personal habits and dispositions, to advance ourselves in whatever has a tendency to increase the general happiness;—which is *Active Virtue* or *Goodness*.

14. Our Duty towards *other men*, what it is.

Our Duty towards other men may be divided into

1. The avoiding of all conduct towards other men by which the general happiness may be ultimately diminished;—which is *Justice*.

2. The endeavour, in our conduct towards them, positively to increase the general happiness by all the means in our power;—which is *Benevolence* or *Love*.

Whether these divisions of Morality are of any use or not, will be determined by seeing whether they lead to any useful consequences.

CHAP. III.—Of *Laws*, and the effects they are capable of producing on men's moral conduct.

15. What Laws are, and what is the moral authority for making them.

Laws are notices of a combination entered into by certain portions of mankind, for the purpose of enforcing certain general rules

Hence Laws may in their origin be either *General* or *Partial*.

General laws are those which are framed by the governments of independent states, for the general observation of all the members of the state.

Partial laws are those which are formed by subordinate associations of men, who enter into a compact to

abide by certain rules, and to submit to certain penalties in the event of breaking them.

Laws for regulating men's moral conduct are for the most part made and supported through an opinion that their enforcement is conducive to the general happiness. And to make laws which are conducive to the general happiness, is clearly within the definition given of Morality, or there is moral authority for the making of them.

What is true of General Laws, is applicable also to Partial.

By Laws are ordinarily meant General Laws, when the contrary is not expressed.

16. Laws can act effectually upon men's moral conduct, only by means of *Punishments* and *Rewards*.

For few general rules can be enforced by a mere combination to restore things to the condition in which they were before the wrong.

It is often, by the very circumstances of the case, nugatory or impossible to attempt it.

And in cases where complete restoration should be effected, the rule would not be powerfully impressed, nor any strong action created upon the moral conduct of any man. The offender has simply failed in his intended purpose.

For example, if the Mosaic law had required that he who stole should simply make restoration, the thief would make a clear profit of all the cases he could conceal. But when it required the restoration to be sevenfold, it became necessary that the thief should be able to conceal six thefts for every one that was discovered; which is sufficient to do great damage to the trade of a thief.

In the same manner, the merely leaving a man that which is his own, can produce no powerful effect towards exciting him to certain actions. For in fact no effect is produced at all. To produce a strong effect, some positive good must be proposed to him, in addition to what he possessed before.

Laws must therefore act by means of something more powerful than the mere restoration of the *status quo ante*, or the mere preservation of the *status quo*. They must further inflict an absolute loss, or confer an absolute advantage. That is, they must act by means of *Punishments* and *Rewards*.

17. In what ways it would be abstractedly possible to direct the action of Laws to men's moral conduct.

It would be abstractedly possible to assign Rewards by legislative enactment

1. To certain duties of Positive Morality, or the performance of certain meritorious actions.
2. To certain duties of Negative Morality, or the abstinence from certain actions destructive of the general happiness.

It would be abstractedly possible to assign Punishments

1. To the omission of certain duties of Positive Morality, or the absence of certain virtues.
2. To the breach of certain duties of Negative Morality, or the commission of certain crimes.

18. The duties of Negative Morality cannot be practically promoted by a system of Rewards.

For these duties amount in fact only to an absence of crime. And it is practically impossible to reward all the non-criminal.

19. The duties of Positive Morality cannot be practically enforced by a system of Punishments.

For no society ever thought of punishing men for the absence of positive and remarkable virtues,—as for not being eminently charitable, or not being zealously devout. To punish all the non-eminent, is in practice as impossible as to reward all the non-criminal.

20. *Rewards* can in practice only be applied to the encouragement of meritorious actions; and *Punishments* to the depression of actual crimes.

For if from the whole imaginable number of ways, be subtracted those which cannot be applied in practice, there remain these.

Men appear to have more frequently run into the absurdity of endeavouring to enforce virtue by punishments, than into the other of trying to depress crime by rewards.

The reasons of this appear to be

1. That the experiment is much the cheapest of the two.
2. That men are more disposed to construe into crime the absence of virtues which they think they themselves possess, than to construe into merit the absence of crimes to which they themselves have probably no temptation.

The greater part of religious persecution is reducible to the above absurdity. It has not been in general pretended that the persecuted committed positive crimes; but they were

punished for being less humble, less devout, and less orthodox than their persecutors.

21. Rewards and punishments are applicable only to that part of Morality which relates to our conduct *towards other men.*

For there is only one circumstance in which the good sense of modern legislators and the practice of enlightened nations permit human laws to take cognizance of men's duties towards a Supreme Being or towards themselves; and that is, when the breach of these duties or supposed duties is carried to such a point, as to be a substantially-existing cause of irritation and pain to other men. In many enlightened nations there are the vestiges of laws made in times of less information, professing to direct men's duties in these kinds; but it is observable that they are virtually repealed and remain a dead letter, in proportion to the extension of intelligence and knowledge.

And the reason of this is, that human laws were not invented for the protection of a Supreme Being, to whom such protection is superfluous: nor for the protection of men from such private evils as, being dependent on their own conduct, they are at liberty to invite or to decline; but for their protection from such evils as they are liable to suffer involuntarily from the misconduct of other men. And, this being the primary object of human laws, it is found by experience, not only that they are with difficulty and very imperfectly to be adapted to other objects, but that when this is done, the ill effect on the general happiness created by the introduction of an inquisition into men's privacy and other causes, is greater than any effect in the opposite direction.

22. A system of Rewards is *exceedingly more confined* in its application, than a system of Punishments.

For the dangers to which men are exposed, from the actual crimes of other men, are incomparably more immediate and pressing than those to which they are liable from the absence of positive virtues. A society has a more distinct idea of the danger arising from a single murderer or housebreaker, than from all the deficiency in charity or in devotion which may exist among its members.

And as the effects of crime are more marked and distinct, so they are also much more capable of being weighed and fitted with punishments, than meritorious actions with rewards. For the history of all nations furnishes an unhappy facility and variety of punishments; whereas the only method of reward

which has been found capable of extensive application by legislative enactment, appears to be the very imperfect one of pecuniary donation.

This being the case, the further consideration of legal Rewards will be in great measure omitted. What is said of Punishments will in general be found applicable by a simple analogy to Rewards.

23. The principal business of Laws is to *restrain injuries by Punishment.*

For, subtracting the cases to which Laws have been shown to be applicable in a very inferior degree or not at all, this is what remains.

It is curious to discover, to how small a portion out of the divisions into which Morals may be classed, Laws are substantially applicable.

Chap. IV. Of Punishment.

24. The object of Punishment is *prevention.*

For Punishment (so far as possible) is always intended to be greater than the simple profit of the crime (§ 16). Its object, therefore, is not to affect the present state of things; for that would be done (where practicable) by simple restoration.

And it cannot have in view the affecting of the past; for that is unalterable.

Therefore it can only have in view the future; or the prevention of future breaches of the rule.

25. On *whom* Punishment may produce its effect, and *how.*

It may produce the effect

1. In some cases, on the present offender.
2. In all cases, on the witnesses of his punishment.

And it operates on all by the same means, namely by producing a sense of the unadvisableness of breaking the general rule, or a dread of the overplus of suffering risked thereby.

26. Of the circumstances which operate to *increase the efficacy* of Punishment in the way of prevention.

Some of these circumstances are

1. That the Punishment be as *public* as possible.—For then it operates in the way of warning to the greatest number.

2. That the punishment be made to approach the nearest possible to being *certain* and *immediate.*—For

if it were absolutely certain and immediate, scarcely any would offend*.

3. That punishment be assigned to crimes according to a fixed and known scale.—For the want of this, is a species of uncertainty.

27. That certainty and promptitude in Punishment, *are of greater effect than severity.*

For a very small addition to what will balance the pleasure of the crime, would be sufficient if the certainty and promptitude could be absolute. Whereas the greatest severity could not effect the same.

In some countries the selling of light bread, is said to be punished by roasting the baker in his own oven. It may be concluded that this punishment is not *certain.* For a fine to the amount of twice the bread deficient, would be effectual if it were certain to follow the commission of the offence.

To avoid complication, in what follows, Punishment will be supposed to be applied in the best manner for producing its preventive effect.

28. Of the *measure* of Punishment.

The authority for making Laws at all, is founded on the supposition that their operation is to produce an aggregate and final increase of the general happiness. Hence those laws may be concluded to be best, which make this final increase the greatest.

The proper measure of punishment therefore is, that the general happiness be finally promoted thereby to the greatest possible degree.

But all punishment is in itself an evil; for it consists of suffering.

Hence the proper measure of punishment is

That the excess of the increase of happiness produced by the prevention of crime, over the misery produced by the actual punishment, *shall be a maximum.*

29. Of determining the measure of Punishment for *any particular species of offence.*

For this purpose it is essential to consider

1. The degree in which the general happiness is diminished, or likely to be, by the occurrence of the species of offence in question.

* If C represents the gain of a theft, P the suffering from the punishment, and the chances of escape are to the chances of punishment as m to n; $mC \sim nP$ represents the inducement or discouragement to a prudent thief, according as the first or second quantity is greatest.—*Added in* 1840.

2. The probable degree of prevention which will be the effect of assigning a particular measure of punishment.

3. The magnitude of the increase of the aggregate happiness arising from the probable prevention, after deducting the misery arising from the punishment.

Each of these elements may vary in different circumstances, times, and countries; and the proper measure of punishment will vary accordingly.

30. Circumstances tending to *augment* the injury to the general happiness from any particular species of offence.

These appear to be

1. If the injury inflicted on the actual sufferer be *great and serious.*

2. If, as the means to this, it be *irremediable,* or there be no possibility, by any human exertion or compensation, of restoring the sufferer to the *status quo ante.*

3. If the injury affect also in a high degree the friends and connexions of the sufferer.

4. If the injury is capable of being directly or indirectly extended to great numbers.

There are perhaps only two crimes, in which all these circumstances are combined in a super-eminent degree,—*murder* and *violation.* These two crimes therefore appear to constitute a class by themselves.

31. That it is advisable to lean to the side of *lenity,* in assigning the measure of Punishment.

For the misery produced by the actual punishment, is always a very certain affair, and liable to no obscurity.

But the increase of happiness which will be produced in consequence of assigning the punishment, is not equally free from uncertainty. On the contrary, there is great probability of mistakes.

It is therefore wisdom to lean towards keeping down the certain evil.

CHAP. V. Of other meanings of the words *Laws* and *Law;* with some connected terms.

32. *Laws* (§ 15) may be divided into

1. Such as are intended to influence men's moral conduct. Which may be called laws *of moral intention.*

2. Such as direct matters neither morally good nor the contrary, except as they happen to be temporarily expedient. As laws regulating taxation, highways, and the like. Which may be called *political* laws.

33. *Law*, is used to signify laws in the aggregate.

Law therefore may be divided into

1. *Actual* law; which is the collection of laws actually in force at any given place and time.

2. *Abstract* law; which is law as it ought to be, or the system to which the actual law ought to be made to approach, and which it is the object of the *Science of Law* to discover.

When lawyers call law the perfection of reason, it is presumable they mean the Abstract law; for the other is sometimes the perfection of unreason.

34. Actual law may be divided into

1. *Written* or *Statute* law. Which is in force by virtue of the written declaration of some public authority, of acknowledged power to make laws.

2. *Unwritten* or *Common* law. Which is maintained by common consent and custom, without being formally enacted in the shape of statutes.

Common or unwritten law rests upon experience, precedent, and above all upon an approach to the system of law as it ought to be, which it is the object of the Science of Law to discover. For without such an approach, it is under general circumstances impossible that a law which is not written in the form of statutes, should assume or preserve a consistent shape; the only way to prevent continual fluctuation, being to approach to something which is abstractedly perfect, and therefore permanent. Hence great deviations from the abstract rules of justice are more frequently found in Statute law than in Common law. The Common law is liable to perpetual corrections and retouchings, which take place in spite of all that can be done to hinder it; so that there is a tendency to get rid of what does not accord with the good sense of mankind in different ages. But Statute law depends only on the good sense of those who made it; and if it be erroneously made once, may continue for ages without repeal*.

* Many will call this too favourable a description of Unwritten Law. But there is probably a great deal to be said on both sides.

Since no statute can provide for all future doubts and shades of distinction, it appears impossible that there should not be an under-growth of what may be called unwritten law, dependent to wit on reference to the past arguments and decisions of courts, under any system of codification that the world should be able to contain.

And if the judges (as they undeniably do) attempt to make a whip of the common law for purposes not in accordance with the spirit of the statute law, the fault is in the makers of statutes, for not pulling up the judges with a statute, and so sharply as should take from them all stomach for repeating the provocation. A judge would have been burning his heretics at this hour by common

35. *Right,* what it is.

Right, is the relation in which such things stand to a man, as he cannot be forcibly deprived of without a diminution of the aggregate happiness. And *a right,* is used to express a particular instance of right.

Wrong, is the violation of right. And *a wrong* is used to express a particular instance of violation.

There may therefore be *protected* rights, and *unprotected* rights, and *assailed* rights. There may be rights which human laws are endeavouring to secure; and there may be rights to which human laws, as they exist in any particular place and time, are indifferent; and there may be rights which human laws are endeavouring with all their might to take away. There may be *enjoyed* rights, and rights which men *never enjoyed,* and rights which they *never will enjoy;* for there is no more absolute reason why any set of men should succeed in putting down all that keeps them from their rights, than why they should succeed in putting down all small-pox. But one set of these are not on that account less rights than another.

The fraud propagated by lawyers is, that rights are only such things as *they* set themselves to defend. Whereas the great objection to bad laws and lawyers is, that they leave rights undefended, and open the door to wrongs.

The men therefore who have spoken of "unalienable rights" and "imperscriptible rights," did not talk nonsense as some of the lawyers would have it; for they were under no obligation to use the words only in the lawyerly sense. They spoke for mankind, and not for lawyers*.

36. Law may be divided with reference to the classes of cases concerned.

As for instance into the following

1. That which relates to the conduct of individuals

---

law, if 29 *Car.*2. c.9. had not prevented. And if he had, the fault would not have been in the judge, but in the absence of the statute.

It would appear then, that common law may be a useful and perhaps unavoidable accessory to statute law; but that to endeavour to keep up the idea of something peculiarly awful and venerable about the common law, is only endeavouring to withdraw the law as a whole, from the effects of the reforming hand of time.—*Added in* 1840.

* *Unalienable* rights, are such as a man could not rid himself of if he were to try. Thus if he were to try to make a slave of himself, either alone or with the company of others, it would not the less be true, that it was for the advancement of the aggregate happiness, that neither he nor those others should be slaves.

Imperscriptible rights, are such as are neither made by registration (*perscriptio*), nor unmade by the want of it. There is no wonder lawyers do not like the mention of imperscriptible rights; it is a simple abrogation of their trade.

Our predecessors, however, were not fools, when they talked of such things. Nor will the coming generation think them so.—*Added in* 1840.

in a single state or country; which may be called *Territorial* law. And this again may be divided into *criminal* and *civil*.

2. That which relates to the conduct of independent civil societies towards one another. Which is *International* law.

3. From the collection of men into independent civil societies or nations, there arises the necessity for the military state, and for an additional description of law for the regulation of military bodies. Which is *Military* law.

In all these, the increase of the aggregate of happiness which is in the world, or the prevention of its diminution, is the object in view.

Memoranda for future comparison with the rule.

TOLERATION	WAR	SMUGGLING
OBEDIENCE	SUICIDE	CONSTITUTION
RESISTANCE	POLYGAMY	CONSCIENCE.

1814.

(*Fragment on a Constitution.*)

'—— By which it was stipulated that in every place where a threefold majority of class-leaders, stewards, and trustees, desired it, the people should have preaching in church hours, and the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper administered to them.'—*Adams's View of Religions.* Art. *Methodist.*

An instance of the application of a *threefold majority*. Applicable to a *Civil Constitution*.

On what does this system rest in the instance taken? On the conviction of the society at large or the majority of its members, that the utility of a certain rule is so well established by general experience, that it is only when the expediency of departing from it is proved by the consent of a threefold majority *of certain parties in trust*, that the rule can be safely sacrificed to the expediency of the moment. And thus the system of a threefold majority of representatives, does itself depend on the previous will and conviction of the absolute majority of the represented.

By analogy, in the case of a law of *Habeas Corpus*, it would be practicable for a free country to declare by a solemn act, that so strong was the conviction of the necessity of such provision, and of the danger resulting from the sacrifice of such an institution to temporary feelings and over-rated perils of the moment, that it held it reasonable that no infringement should be made on the institution, till circumstances were such as to

induce three-fourths of the active component parts of the government to coincide in demanding its suspension. Nor is this the unreasonable thing which some have represented. For it is not as has been urged, a demanding of the supreme existing power of a state to submit its will to that of some imaginary or non-existing power. The persons who are to compose the three-fold majority, are *not* the supreme existing power; they are only the delegates or organs of the supreme existing power. The supreme existing power is in the society at large. And though it is not only unadvisable but impracticable, that the society should from time to time assume the direct determination of particular questions otherwise than by its appointed organs; it does not seem either impracticable or unadvisable, that the society at large should once for all secure itself against the unnecessary violation of certain leading principles, by demanding that these principles shall not be violated except when three-fourths of its organs or delegates will come forward and say they agree in believing the necessity.

For it is not true that any society can be so closely united with the delegates (whatever their title) to whom the administration of its affairs is entrusted, as that the will of the majority of delegates shall necessarily be the will of the society. Also all forms of government (even the most popular) have from the very nature of man an inherent tendency to the formation of a distinction of interests between the delegates and the society which sends them. The delegates are always tempted to imagine, that *they* possess the fee simple of the government, and to forget that they are only put in trust.

Hence every free society has a right to make provision against the effects of this distinction of interest. It is not bound to say, "We are ready to give up our securities whenever a majority of our delegates think we ought." But since it is necessary to have delegates or representatives of some kind (for no extensive people can govern in their proper persons) there seems no reason why the society should not begin by making a composition with its delegates, and saying, "However great our confidence in you, we do not mean to submit everything to you. There are certain reserved principles closely concerning our particular well-being, which we will not have broken in upon, even though a majority of you our delegates should agree in recommending it. And the reason is, that *we* are to be the main feelers of the consequences, and not you; and therefore we think it possible, that you may have a less lively feeling of their importance than ourselves. But, for convenience, we will make this composition with you. Whenever three-fourths of your number will agree to come

forward and tell us there is a necessity for the suspension of our reserved principles, we will admit that a case has been made out, and it shall be done."

And it is notorious that the principles proposed to be thus reserved, will be only such as the society considers to be indispensable, or nearly so, to its existence at all. It is nothing but the conviction that the necessity of suspending them is an extreme case, requiring the extreme of proof, which is at the bottom of the whole proceeding. But as the necessity cannot be proved to be impossible, the society desires to provide a legal outlet for meeting the occurrence.

If it be asked, what is the force which is to prevent the violation of the rule as soon as a numerical majority of the administrators can agree to demand it; the answer is, the force of the society which delegates. The mistake is always in supposing that the delegates or visible holders of the power of the state, are the real holders; whereas they only possess it by delegation, and there is the state itself behind. The reason why, in ordinary and unreserved cases, the will of the majority of representatives is binding, is only because the society which is behind has agreed it should be so. And the same agreement of society might support the necessity for a three-fold majority in the cases provided for.

Not but that an increased watchfulness and preparation might be called for, of the same kind but in increased degree, with what assure the society of the execution of any other compact with its administrators. The avowed reason why any sovereign does not ride down the public liberties with his horse-guards, is because he knows there is a power and a will in the society which would ultimately get the better of him. And an increased preparation might be wanted here. But if a society is to have an advantage, it must make exertions for it. The society has the option, of making such exertions as shall secure the good, or going without.

There are many cases where the same principle is seen in ordinary practice. The House of Commons excludes strangers on the motion of a single member; even though all the other members desired the contrary. The explanation of which is, that it has been previously recognised by the act of the majority, that it is better on the whole to follow this rule. It is not one member that controls the House, but the majority that made the rule. In the ballot for clubs, ten or some other number of black balls exclude. Why should ten black balls exclude, against a hundred opposite? Because the majority of the society have previously determined that it was expedient. A Court-martial can only condemn to death by the

voices of two-thirds of its members. Why not a numerical majority stand up and demand to have their way? Because they know it is not given to them, and there is a power beyond.

The reasonable means for promoting the security of a "Constitution" or system of reserved laws of this kind would be

1. That the construction of the government itself should include as much of the feeling and opinion of the society as possible. For the nearer the feeling and opinion of the administrators can be brought to those of the society at large on general questions, the less danger will there be of an attempt to violate the reserved rules.

2. That the reserved rules themselves be as few and as comprehensive as possible, and such only whose utility and practicability has been proved by the long experience of our own or other nations. And since what is practicable can only be known by practice, it would be wise in a nation desiring to give itself a free constitution, to institute the practice first, and confirm it by declaration afterwards.

3. That the reserved rules be all *negative*, or confined to preventing the breach of some pre-existing rule. For there would be an evident absurdity (though it is not without examples) in making both sides of a question depend on the agreement of more than a majority; because it may happen to be decided neither way. Such an arrangement, would be only a provision for having nothing done where most was wanted.

4. That the consequences of the violent or fraudulent breach of such a Constitution on the part of the trustees and administrators, should be distinctly recognized and set before them. Of which the very mildest form should be, that the society should *ipso facto* be called upon to appoint new trustees. And this is in fact what has been done before, and may be done again. And the more society familiarizes itself with the nature of the remedy, the less chance there is of its being in actual demand.

1815.

An *independent political society*, is an association of men acting together and regulating their own concerns, for the purposes of defence and internal regulation.

Political power, is the admitted right of being a party in deciding what shall be done or ordained by the united force of such a society.

Political power is the rightful property of every member of the society. For he contributes to the united force; and like contributors in other cases, he has a right to some share in the direction.

But in all large political societies, it is found necessary that the actual direction shall be delegated to a number smaller than the whole society.

Nevertheless the assent or delegation of the society, is and always continues to be, the source of all just political power.

A *Government*, is the person or persons possessing the direction of the force of the society for the time being.

A *rightful* Government, is one which directs the force of the society, by the actual or implied assent of its members or the majority of them.

A *Tyranny* or government without right, is one which exists against the consent of the society or its majority; whether this be effected by the operation of a foreign force, or by the violent action of a portion of the members of the society who hold the others in undue subjection.

Whether a government is rightful or not, does not depend upon its form. For the despotism of a single individual may be a rightful government, if the society is in such a state that its will is that one should be despotic. And a tyranny may be administered under the form of a republic, if it be supported by foreign or undue domestic violence.

A government may be *mixed* or *unmixed;* that is, it may consist of one class of governors, or of a union of several classes. And this without connexion with its being rightful or not. Though when the powers of the several classes are not collusive, the chances are in favour of the mixed government being rightful; because if it were not, the probability is that some portion would take against the tyranny.

A government may be either *limited* or *unlimited;* and this without reference to its form.

An *Unlimited* government, is where the society has surrendered the entire power of direction and regulation, absolutely and without limitation, to some person or persons holding authority either with its consent or without.

A *Limited* government, is where the society has not committed this entire power to anybody; but has committed only the power of deciding on the every-day operations of government, reserving the maintenance of certain declared rules or principles, the power of infringing which, it has not entrusted to any, or only under conditions of its own appointing.

A *limited* government is often confounded with a *balanced* government, or one depending on the combination of different parts. But they are not identical; though it may be true that the fact of a government being formed by a combination of different parts, is favourable for its being also limited. Take

for example the British government; which is well known to be founded on the balance (not meaning *equilibrium*, but mutual action, and operation of the side that overweighs) of three parts. Is it, then, limited or unlimited? It is limited in talk; but very little in fact. When men talk of "the constitution," as they do when it is their interest, they mean, if they mean anything, to intimate that there are certain points or questions, on which King, Lords, and Commons united, are bound by some rule, which implies a superior. And this superior can be nothing but the nation; which, as history shows, has set them all to rights with a high hand in turns when certain rules were infringed, and would possibly do the like again. The reference is indistinct and mystical; and great pains are taken to prevent its being less so. But there is enough to show, that the fact of its being a government of balance, is not identical with its being limited. It might be more or less limited, without being more or less balanced.

There is a reason for constitutional reservations, totally distinct from the supposition of any ill design on the part of actual administrators. And that is, the unreasonable effect which present dangers and difficulties produce upon the actually concerned. Because scarcely any man ever killed himself without its being proveable afterwards that he had better not, it is reasonable to make what might be called a constitutional provision against suicide. And if no nation ever suspended, for instance, the right of *Habeas Corpus*, without its being proveable afterwards that this was just the time when the security was most wanted, it would be equally reasonable to make a constitutional provision against the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus*. Little men,—and the Houses of Lords and Commons cannot be all great ones,—are not to be trusted in times of terror with the safety of their neighbours' persons. And if their neighbours cannot secure themselves on all points, it is no reason they should not where they can.

It has been argued that the administrators of the government must always possess a plenary power for the time being, because a government in one age has no right to legislate for a government in another, or to make laws which like those of the Medes and Persians (a rude attempt, by the way, in all probability, at something like constitutional stability) shall not be altered. But there is a fallacy here, consisting in assuming the government to be the owners of power, whereas they are only the trustees. It is not a government in one age legislating for a government in another; but it is the society at large which continues to be of the same opinion in one age

that it was in another. A Constitution is a reserved right, which was never transferred with the rest of the estate; and the present holder is bound by it, not by virtue of anything that was done or not done by his predecessor, but because the original owner has never thought fit to part with it to either.

If it be objected that most constitutional rights are dated from the positive act of some government,—as in England reference is made to Magna Charta, which was an act agreed upon by the King and his Barons, and therefore, it may be urged, might be annulled by another King and his Barons if they were the government for the time being;—the answer is, that the constitutional authority of Magna Charta is derived, not from its having been agreed upon by the King and his Barons in their character of a government, but from something almost directly contrary, namely its having been a composition between the King and his Barons when they were in arms against each other, and when the society at large and its interests were for the time connected with the Barons, and as such might be considered as entering into the composition with the regal power. The force of which composition has been extended to our times, by the continual and notorious assent of all the members of the society as they arrived at years of understanding.

GENERAL TREATY in 1820, with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulph.

In consequence of complaints of piratical acts committed against the vessels of Indian subjects of Great Britain, an expedition under the command of Major-General Sir William Grant Keir was sent from Bombay in the latter part of 1819, to attack the holds of the maritime Arabs on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulph. Râs al Khyma, their strongest place, after being attacked for some days by land and sea, was evacuated by the inhabitants. The surrender of one or two places of inferior strength, put an end to resistance; and the following is the General Treaty to which the Tribes were invited to agree.

It is remarkable for being the first public act in which the Slave-Trade was written down Piracy; the American act to a similar effect having been in the May following, though known first in Europe, And as an instance of the advantages of a humane and moderate policy, it is believed that the good effects of this pacification continue to the present hour.

The author of the present Work was the active negotiator of the Treaty; and is glad of an opportunity of increasing the publicity of its contents.

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate.

Praise be to God who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to his creatures. There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab Tribes who are parties to this contract, on the following conditions.

ARTICLE I.—There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy*, by land and sea, on the part of the Arabs who are parties to this contract, for ever.

ART. II.—If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting, shall attack any that pass by land or sea, of any nation whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy, and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind, and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods; and acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by government against government; and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of the government, is plunder and piracy.

ART. III.—The friendly Arabs shall carry by land and sea a red flag, with or without letters in it at their option, and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white in the border being equal to the breadth of the red; and this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it and no other.

* It may be interesting to some to be told, that the word in the Arabic for piracy, or more strictly piracies, *ghârât*, is from the same root as Mungo Park's *tegria*, (*Travels*, p. 292); which may be assumed to be تغرة *teghîra*.—*Added in* 1840.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله الذي جعل الصلح خيراً للخلق قد صار الصلح الدائم بين سركار دولة الإنقريز وبين الطوايف العربية المشروطين علي هذه الشـــــــــــــــــــــــروط

الشرط الاول أن يزال في كل الازمان النهب والغارات في البر والبحر من جانب العرب المشروطيـــــــــــــن

الشرط الثاني وان يتعرض احد من قوم المشروطين علي المترددين في البر والبحر من كافة الناس بالنهب والغارات بلا حرب معروف فهو عدو لكافة الناس فليس له امان لا علي حال ولا مال وان الحرب المعروف هو الذي منشور مبيّن مأمور به من دولة الي دولة وان قتل الناس واخذ المال بغير نشر وتبيين وامر الدولة هو النهب والغـــارات

الشرط الثالث ان العرب المصالحين لهم في البر والبحر علم احمر فيه حروف او بلا حروف علي مرادهم وهو في كفة ابيض كبر الابيض الذي في الكفة يعادل كبر الاحمر وان هذا هو علم العرب المصالحين ولا غيـــــــــــــــــــــــره

ART. IV.—The friendly Tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations one with another; with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government and shall not fight with each other. And the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further; and no alteration is made in their relations one with another, except as above.

ART. V.—The Vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper (Register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the Vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many *karahs* it holds; and they shall also have in their possession another writing (Port Clearance) signed with the signature of their chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the Nachodah (captain), the number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound, and if a British or other vessel meets them, they shall produce their Register and the Clearance.

ART. VI.—The friendly Arabs, if they chuse, shall send an Envoy to the British Residency at Bushire, with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business; and the British Government, if it chuses, shall send an Envoy also to them in like manner, and the Envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (Register) of their Vessels, the signature of the Envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such Envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

الشرط الرابع ان الطوايف المصالحين كل منهم علي حاله الاول بعضهم علي بعض الا انهم صار الصلح بينهم وبين الانقريز ولا يحربون بعضهم الي بعض وان العلم شاهد علي ذلك فقط ولا علي غيره ولا يتغير حالهم بعضهم علي بعض الا في الامر المذكـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــور

الشرط الخامس ان مراكب العرب المصالحين كلها صغير وكبير بايديهم قرطاس مرشوم بخط اميرهم فيه اسم المركب وطوله وعرضه وبكم كاره كبير وايضا مكتوب اخر مرشوم بخط اميرهم فيه اسم النواخداة وعدد الرجال وعدد السلاح ومن اين يسير وفي اي وقت والي اي بندر يتوجه فان يتعرض لهم مركب من الانقريز او غيرهم يعرضون عليه القرطاس

الشرط السادس ان العرب المصالحين ان يريدون فيرسلون رجلاً رسولاً وما يحتاج اليه الي سركار دولة الانقريز في بندر ابو شهر يسكن فيه حتي يقضي غرضهم من السركار وسركار الانقريز ان يريد فيرسل ايضا رجلاً كذلك عندهم وهو يعطي لخشبهم خطًا بيده والخط الي سنة وكل من الرجال خرجة علي قومـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ

ART. VII.—If any Tribe or others shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances; and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British, at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

ART. VIII.—The putting men to death after they have given up their arms, is an act of piracy, and not of acknowledged war. And if any Tribe shall put to death any persons, whether Mohammedans or others, after they have given up their arms, such Tribe shall be held to have broken the peace, and the friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease, until the surrender of those who performed the act, and of those who ordered it.

ART. IX.—The carrying-off of Slaves, men, women, or children, from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in Vessels, is plunder and piracy, and none of the friendly Arabs shall do this.

ART. X.—The Vessels of the friendly Arabs bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports, and into the allies of the British so far as they shall be able to effect it, and they shall buy and sell therein; and if any should attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it.

الشرط السابع اِن يكون طايفة او غيرهم لا يزالون من النهب والغارات في البرّ والبحر فالعرب المصالحون يقومون عليهم علي قدر حالهم ويصير بينهم وبين الانقريز كلام في ذلك في وقت النهب والغارات هـــــــــذه

الشرط الثامن انّ قتل النّاس بعد تسليم السّلاح هو من الغارات ولا مِن الحرب المعروف وان يكون طايفة يقتلون النّاس مسلمين او غيرهم بعد تسليم السّلاح فتلك الطّايفة قد نقضت الصّلح وانّ العرب المصالحين سيقاتلونهم مع الانقريز فلا يزال الحرب اِن شاء الله تعالي حتي ان يتسلّم مَن فعل ذلك ومَن امر بـــــــــــــــــه

الشرط التّاسع انّ نهب الرّقيق الرّجال والنّساء والاولاد في اطراف السّودان وغيره وحملهم في المراكب هذا النّهب والغارات فلا يفعلون ذلك من العرب المصالحيـــــــن

الشرط العاشر انّ مراكب العرب المصالحين حاملة علمهم المذكور يدخلون في كلّ بنادر سركار دولة الانقريز وفي بنادر رفيق الانقريز علي قدرهم يشترون ويبيعون فيها وان كان احد يتعرّض لهم في البرّ والبحر فهذا علي الانقريـــــز

ART. XI.—These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all Tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto, in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present. End of the Articles.

Issued at Râs al Khyma, in triplicate, at mid-day on Saturday the twenty-second of the month of Rebi al Awwal in the year of the Hejra 1235 (8th of January, 1820), and signed by the contracting parties at the places and times under written.

Signed at Râs al Khyma, at the time of issue, by

L. S. *W. GRANT KEIR*
Major General

L. S. *HASAN BEN RAHMA*
Sheikh of Râs al Khyma
and Mahârah.

L. S. *KADHIB BEN AHMED*
Sheikh of
Jezîrat al Hamrâ.

(*continued*)

الشّرط الحادي عشر انّ هذه الشّروط المذكورة فهي علي كلّ الطّوايف الّتي في الزّمان المستقبل ستقبلونها سواء الّتي قبلتها في وقت الحين تمّ الشّـــــــــــــــــروط

انّ تحرير القول في راس الخيمة بثلاثة نسخ في تاريخ نصف نهار يوم السّبت اثنين وعشرين من شهر ربيع الاوّل في سنة ١٢٣٥ الهجريّة مايتين خمس وثلاثين بعد الالف ورشموه المشروطون في الاماكن والتّواريخ المذكورة ذيـــــــــــلاً

رشموه في راس الخيمة في تاريخ تحرير القـــــــول

خاتم
السّردار

W. Grant Keir
Major General

خاتم
حسن بن رحمة
شيخ راس الخيمة
والمحاره

كتبه حسن بن رحمة بيده

خاتم
قضيب بن احمد
شيخ جزيرة الحمراء

كتبه قضيب بن احمد بيده

ورشموه

And signed at subsequent periods by

Sheikh of Shargah, Eymân, and Umm'al Gywŷn.	*Sultân ben Sugour*
Sheikh of Dubey, a minor; and with him Ahmed ben Futeis.	*Mohammed ben Haza ben Zâal*
Sheikh of Abou Dhaby.	*Shakhbout ben Dhyâb al Fulâhy*
Sheikh of Dhâyah.	*Hasan ben Ali*
Sheikhs of Bahrein.	*Soleyman ben Ahmed and Abd Allah ben Ahmed.*

The following extract from a communication to the Imâm of Maskat on forwarding some recovered prisoners, will show the tone in which the question of Slavery was handled in the Persian Gulph. Another extract to a similar purport is from a communication to the Sheikhs of Bahrein, who were treated with great moderation, and in fact kindness, on the occasion in question. The Bahreinees were a rich and unwarlike race, great traffickers, in the proceeds of piracy and slaves among other

فرشموه من بعـــ

شيخ الشارقه
وعيمان
وام القيوين

الشيخ سلطان بن صقر

شيخ دبي
وهو صغير
السن ومعه
احمد بن
فطيس

الشيخ محمد بن هزاع بن زعل

شيخ ابو ظبي

الشيخ شخبوط بن ذياب الفلاحي

شيخ ضايه

الشيخ حسن بن علي

شيخا بحرين

الشيخان سليمان بن احمد
وعبد الله بن احمـــــــد

---

things; and they would have been trampled out of existence by their own Ishmaelitish kindred, if the British authorities, acting under an impression of the importance of supporting a people who had considerable capabilities for the pursuits of honest commerce, had not in some sort taken them by the hand.

The Arabs must have thought the days of military apostleship come back. But there is nothing like speaking to everybody in the way that will be understood.

EXTRACT. (*After the titles of the Imâm, &c.*) We* have before addressed a letter to Your Highness on the 29th of Rebi al Awwal (15 Jan. 1820) which we hope may have arrived safely. In it were five copies of Treaties of Peace concluded with the friendly Arabs, the result of which it is trusted will be good. One of the first of the fruits has been the liberation of a number of the subjects of Your Highness who were prisoners; and they will arrive for Your Highness's service accordingly. But such of them as were slaves will return or not return, at their choice; it not being the custom of a British authority to deliver over slaves unless at their own request. For it is in our religion and creed, that God has made of one blood all men that are on the earth. And there are no slaves in our own country, and it is contrary to our laws to carry them by sea; in our country every man is free, and that is the root of our strength and of our power which God has favoured us withal, and if we were to do anything contrary thereto, we are afraid He would make us descend from our present estate.—*From a letter written at Shargah, on the 22nd of Rebi a' Thâny*, 1235. (*7 Feb.* 1820.)

EXTRACT *from a letter to the Sheikhs of Bahrein.*—And on the subject of slaves, [which it was prohibited by the Treaty proposed to them to transport by sea,] it is the religion and creed of the British that the traffic in slaves, and transporting them in vessels, is not lawful; and it is out of the possibility of things, for the British to make peace with anybody but on this condition. (*Râs al Khyma, 26th Rebi a' Thâny*, 1235. 11 *Feb.* 1820.)

* In Arabic *We* instead of being the style royal, is the sty e complimentary. Even down to the form of a petition, what was meant to be respectful would be conveyed under the terms *We* and *Us.*—*Added in* 1840.

وبعد سابقًا كتبنا لجنابكم كتابًا في من شهر ربيع الاوّل
عسي الله نرجو وصوله بالخير اليكم وفيه خمس قراطيس
شروط الصّلح مع العرب المصالحين فالمرجو من الله تعالي
اَن يحصل من ذلك خير ومن اوّل ثمرة ترخيص كثير
من رعايا جنابكم الّذين هم صاروا اسراء وهم يصلون في
خدمة جنابكم ولكن الرّقيق منهم يرجعون او لا يرجعون علي
مطلوبهم وليس من دأب سركار الانقريز اَن يسلّمون الرّقيق
الّا بمطلوبهم وانّ هذا من ديننا وائمانـنا اَنّ الله تعالي قد
خلق من دمّ واحد كلّ النّاس الّذي في الارض وليس
عندنا من الرّقيق ولا يجوز لنا حملهم في البحر وكلّ النّاس
عندنا حرّ وانّ هذا اصل قوّتنا واقتدارنا الّذي تفضّل الله
علينا به وان كان نفعل خلاف ذلك نخاف من الله تعالي
اَن ينزّلنا من حالنـــــــــــــــــــــــــا

حرّرة في شارقه في من شهر ربيع الثّاني سنـــــــة ١٢٣٥

وكذلك امر الرّقيق انّ دين الانقريز وائمانهم اَن لا يجوز
شراء الرّقيق ولا حملهم في السّفن ولم يمكن الانقريز يصالحون
احداً الّا بهذا الشّـــــــــــــــــــــــــرط

جري في راس الخيمة في من شهر ربيع الثّاني سنـــــــة ١٢٣٥

Reported Proceedings of a Council of War of Arab Chiefs*.

Sultân ben Suggur spoke first, and said,

'The simple man desires war twice.'

Ali ben [son of] Hosein son of the Sheikh Abd al Wahhâb, Chief Cadhi, said,

'If you call to a living thing, it will answer;
'If you blow upon fire, its light shines out;
But things without life, what are you to call to?'
But my blowing was all upon ashes.'

Hasan ben Rahma, Sheikh of Râs al Khyma, said,

'Though you were of my blood relations or the stock of the sons of my father,'
'You are a shabby fellow, even though you were a valiant one approved.'

Râshid ben Hamîd, Sheikh of Eymân under Sultân ben Suggur, said,

'If you would draw out your sword with your five fingers boldly,'
'Disgrace would not come upon you on every side.'

Sultân ben Suggur replied,

'If you were not riding upon the points of spears!'
'But what is a horse, pushed to ride against such things as those?'

* It is to be understood, that all the parties speak in quotations from Arabic poetry. The date of the meeting, was after the main body of the British force had left the Gulph; and the question on foot, was that of attacking the garrison of eleven hundred Indian troops left in Râs al Khyma. Sultân ben Suggur was the most powerful of the Arab chiefs, and though he had been roughly handled, about half what could have been taken from him had been left him, as security for his good behaviour. The Chief Cadhi was a grandson of the Mohammedan Luther the founder of the Wahhabees. Hasan's town was the place proposed to be recovered; and Râshid's had been abandoned and destroyed. The account was copied from the report brought in writing by the head spy. On which it may

قال سلطان بن صقر من قبل

انـرّجـل الـعـاجـز يـتـمـنّي الحـرب مرّتـيْـن

قال عليّ بن حسين ابن الشّيخ عبد الوهّاب

لو دعيتَ حيًّا يجاب ولاكن لا حيّات لمن تنادي
لو نفختَ ناراً لضاء نورها ولاكن نفخي صار في رمادي

قال حسن بن رحمة

لو ان تكن لي عصبة او نسبة من بني ابي
ذللتَ ولو تكن شجاع مجربي

قال راشد بن حميد

لو ان تجرّ السّيف بالخمسة جاسر
ولا بداك الذّلّ من كلّ جاني

قال سلطان بن صقر

إن لم تكن لِلأسنّة مركب
وما خيلة مطار الي ركوبها

be useful to remark, that the spy system is carried to great perfection in Arabia, all the spies being double, or acting for both sides with great impartiality, so as to amount as nearly as possible to everything being public; a consequence probably of the great multiplicity and crossing of interests in the country.

For a specimen of the military energies of the Arab tribes, see *London Gazette* of 18 May, 1821.

1830.

(UNPUBLISHED.)

On the question whether the whole quantity of corn produced in an abundant harvest, will be sold for more or less than the whole produced in an unfavourable one.

Mr. Tooke states that,

'The fact that a small deficiency in the produce of corn, compared with the average rate of consumption, occasionally causes a rise in price very much beyond the ratio of the defect, is obvious upon the slightest reference to the history of prices at periods when nothing in the state of politics or of the currency could be suspected to have had any influence.'—*Tooke on High and Low Prices.* p. 284.

Mr. Ricardo appears to avow the same opinion.

'No one has said that abundance is injurious to a country, but that it frequently is so to the producers of the abundant commodity. If what they raised was all destined for their own consumption, abundance never could be hurtful to them; but if, in consequence of the plenty of corn, the quantity with which they go to market to furnish themselves with other things is very much reduced in value, they are deprived of the means of obtaining their usual enjoyments; they have, in fact, an abundance of a commodity of little exchangeable value.'—*Ricardo on Protection to Agriculture.* p. 21.

These authorities appear to allow, that the farmers are likely to get less money for an abundant crop than for an average one.

To this Mr. Joplin replies, that

'The reverse is proved to be the fact. All farmers rejoice in a good season, though it may extend over the whole world, and lament a bad one. They say let us only have a plentiful crop: for if we get less for it per quarter we shall get more for it on the whole,'—*Views on the Corn-Bill of* 1827. p. 38.

'Of the correctness of this principle [Mr. Tooke's] there could be no doubt, if it were true that, in ordinary years, the population are adequately fed. But if this were the fact, there would be no truth in the principle universally admitted, that population is only kept down by want, to a level with the means of subsistence, nor yet would there be any need of poor laws. The fact, however, is, that the population is not only not adequately fed in ordinary years, but is, on the contrary, very inadequately fed, of which some proof is afforded in the annual payment of six or seven millions in poor rates. Instead, therefore, of the population not being able to consume more than the produce of an average crop, it would be more near the truth to assert, that it could consume two average crops instead of one. No principle could be founded on a fact less true and more easily refuted, than that, in ordinary years, the population is adequately fed.'—*Id.* p. 35.

This reasoning is certainly strong against the accuracy of the opponent's *mode of proof;* but his proposition may be true after all. The fact perhaps is, that the matter in dispute may be divided between both parties, and that farmers may sell an increased crop for less than a smaller *for a single year, but cannot do it for a succession of years or in the long run.*

The reason why a certain supply of corn and other agricultural produce, is sold by the possessors for a certain quantity of the commodities which the other part of the community has to offer them in return,—or, which comes to the same thing, why it is sold for the money which will purchase these commodities,—is because nothing short of parting with that quantity of commodities will induce the consumers of the corn to agree about the division. As long as corn is below this price, somebody will be willing to bid a higher, sooner than acquiesce in such a portion as is compatible with a division at the price supposed; and consequently the price will rise.

If the supply of agricultural produce were less, somebody must be content to have less than before; and the engine by which people would be induced to acquiesce in such a division, would be a rise of substantial price. And the individuals on whom this necessity would personally fall, would be those who have little or nothing in which they can economize except corn,—or in other words, who are working for their daily bread. But it is clear that where a labourer of this kind finds himself pressed by a necessity of trying, for instance, to make six quartern loaves support his family for a week instead of seven, —it will not induce him to diminish the quantity of his own exertions and toil, but on the contrary to increase it. There will be a question of equilibrium, between the inconvenience of increasing his labour, and the inconvenience of doing with less bread. And the result will be, that he will do something like dividing the difference, and will both do more work than before, and do with less bread after all; though he will have more than would have fallen to him if his labour had not been increased. It may not be strictly true that this will take place with every individual labourer; but it will be true in the main. It is also certain that the efforts of each individual to obtain more bread, will be counteracted by the efforts of his neighbours to do the same; and that they can only divide the corn that there is, after all. But this will not diminish the necessity for each to increase his labour; for if he did not, it is clear that he would be left behind and get less than his share. On the whole therefore, there will be an increase of the substantial labour exerted for the sake of getting corn; and consequently,

without perplexing the case with the question of money at all, there must be an increased quantity of what men are willing to give for corn,—or in other words the smaller quantity will substantially sell for more than the greater. And by the converse of all this, it may be shown that a greater quantity would substantially sell for less.

This looks dangerous; but nature has not left us without remedy. If the smaller quantity of corn were to be permanent, a diminution of population would consequently begin to take place; and this, by diminishing the competition, would finally reduce the receipts of the growers to their being paid for the smaller quantity *at the old price.* And conversely if a larger quantity were to be permanent, the population would be consequently encouraged to increase; and this, by increasing the competition, would finally raise the receipts of the growers to their being paid for the greater quantity at the old price. It is true that a fractional alteration in the price of the quartern loaf, cannot produce or prevent a fractional part of a marriage in any quarter. But it will find out one man in a hundred or in a thousand where it will turn the balance, or find somebody in the state where another feather breaks the back; which will come to the same thing in the end.

Hence if all the growers of corn could be possessed of a perfect unity of will,—or to put the case more strongly, if there were one universal grower,—he might gain for a single year by diminishing the quantity of corn, but he must lose in the end. And conversely if any improvement were discovered in the mode of raising corn, he might lose for a single year by its introduction, but he would gain in the end. Nature has therefore taken care, that the cultivators shall have no permanent interest in keeping down the quantity of food*.

* Another question of the same class, is whether good or bad land is best for the farmer. Of the individuals whose opinion the writer has asked, the greater part seemed unable to comprehend the question, or else jumped to what they thought the necessary conclusion, that the good land must be best. But between Lincoln and Hull he once travelled with a farmer or what he took for one, who said his belief was, that in that part of the country, the largest farmers and the richest, held poor land.

Several reasons may be assigned for such a tendency. The cultivation of poor land having more of risk, offers greater comparative advantages to large capital, and leaves more room for the exercise of any superiority in professional knowledge which the farmer may have over the landlord. For these reasons, the man of small capital will be attracted to the good land where returns are comparatively certain, and will bid a higher rent to get it; and *vice versâ*.

To put a parallel case.—If whale-fisheries were let out to rent, there seems little doubt that the outfitters to the Greenland Seas, with all their risks, would make a better trade for themselves, than the trade which was carried on in cobles, hiring permission to stick a sucking whale in a home bay where such fish should be as thick as herrings. The rent would eat the little men up; and for all that they would outbid the great ones for the work in question.—*Added in* 1840.

1831.

*A Letter to Earl Grey on the subject of the Adjustment of the House of Peers**.—London; Ridgway. 1831.

My Lord,

The composers of themes at Eton could assure your Lordship, that nothing is so justly applauded as justice, and nothing so improper in a minister as arbitrary measures.

Whether they could state with equal clearness, that justice is the rule of action which would be laid down by an individual who knew not on which of the contending sides he was afterwards to be placed, and that arbitrary measures are such as break through this rule for the sake of some advantage to the possessors of power,—must depend on the extent to which, in that ancient seminary, the knowledge of things is superadded to the science of words.

It is plain, however, that by the application of this rule, an act may be simple justice in consequence of having been preceded by some other act, which would not have been just without. For example, to take a certain number of pounds sterling from an individual or a collection of individuals, with no cause assigned but the pleasure of the taker, would by common consent be declared unjust and arbitrary. But it is not difficult to imagine previous circumstances, which may make the taking of these pounds sterling not only an act of justice, but of imperious obligation;—an act not to be done furtively or in a corner, but to be prefaced with sound of trumpet, and executed with all the solemnity of the ermine and majesty of the crown.

On the same principle, it may have been a shocking and arbitrary proceeding in a minister to create peers for the purpose of carrying certain measures; particularly if those measures were injurious to the community. But it does not follow that when this has been done by one minister or set of ministers, it is a shocking and arbitrary proceeding in another to set things right. Let the case be put that past ministers, to obtain certain favourite objects, had sold seats in the House of Peers at the price of two boroughs per seat, and that the influence in this manner introduced was still operating there in opposition to the removal of the system. Does it follow, that it would be culpable in a minister to advise the exercise of the

* This pamphlet is inserted from the belief that its contents may yet come into use. Mr. Cobbett paid it the compliment of inserting the whole of the Letter from the words "The question," in his Weekly Register of 22 Oct. 1831. *Added in 1840.*

constitutional power of the Crown to effect a correction? Or does it not follow on the contrary, that in as much as no means could be in existence for ejecting such an influence except by neutralizing it by the constitutional power provided in the Crown, the exercise of that power would be called for by the same imperious necessity, which commands the interference of the King by his courts of law to redress a pecuniary wrong?

The question which at this moment agitates the country from side to side, is whether a system of governing by means of the fictitious constituencies technically called rotten boroughs, shall be continued or not. Those who are interested in them say Aye; and everybody else says No. The case has been brought before the Peers, and the Peers have given a majority of their voices to the former.

The inquiry consequently set on foot, is, What are the descriptions of Peers that constituted this majority, and in what degree does justice demand that they should severally be neutralized by the exercise of the constitutional power of the Crown.

The exercise of this power, to the extent which justice shall be found to demand, is what is intended by the title of ADJUSTMENT of the House of Peers.

The first requisite for the inquiry, is to find a test by which to measure the extent of what will for clearness be denominated the *rotten borough* influence among the Peers of the United Kingdom. And here the course must be, to take a period from which the marked expansion of the influence in question may fairly be dated; and then judge of the different effects upon the Peers created before and after such epoch, by comparison of the *votes of the two classes on the present question.*

No objection can be made to assuming for this epoch the conclusion of the year 1792. There may be disputes whether the entire system was not a good;—whether it was not a thing to thank heaven for, and a wonderful invention of human genius for the advancement of a nation's welfare;—but waiving questions of this nature, there can be no dispute that at all events it made a prodigious start at the conclusion of 1792. The French war, which was a war for the preservation of the rotten boroughs, was the immediate exciting cause. Which ascertains with chronological exactness the æra of the effect.

An analysis, then, of the votes on the Second Reading of the English Reform Bill in the House of Peers (*See Lists A and B in the Appendix*), presents the following results.

	AGAINST.	FOR.
Of the Peers of the United Kingdom of creation antecedent to the conclusion of 1792, there voted	79	81
Of the Peers of the United Kingdom of creation subsequent to 1792 (including the latest creations)	66	66
Of the Archbishops and Bishops	21	2
Of the Representative Peers of Scotland	12	4
Of the Representative Peers of Ireland	19	4
Of the Royal Dukes	2	1
	199	158

It appears, therefore,

1. *That among the old Peers of the United Kingdom there was a majority of two in favour of the Second Reading.*

2. *That among the new Peers of the United Kingdom* (including the creations under the present ministry up to the time of voting) *there was an exact balance; and consequently the creations made under the present ministry were precisely and to a unit the number required to balance the influence of the peculiar system under which the new Peers, or part of them, had been created.*

3. *That* (after adding the votes of the three Royal Dukes, which leave a majority of 1 in favour of the Second Reading) *the* 42 *votes which finally made the majority of* 41 *in the opposite direction, were the votes of*

21 *Bishops against* 2; *being above* 10 *to* 1.

12 *Scotch Peers against* 4; *being* 3 *to* 1.

19 *Irish Peers against* 4; *being nearly* 5 *to* 1.

The inference from the whole of which, is

That the people of England cannot have their Reform, *because it does not please the Bishops and the Scotch and Irish Peers.*

The question which consequently arises is, whether

First, the Bishops,

Secondly, the Scotch,

Thirdly, the Irish Peers,

are or are not in the category which demands,—not as an act of favour, but of fairness,—not in the character of a *coup d'état*, but as a portion of that every-day justice which the Sovereign is bound to execute on every day when the occasion may present itself,—their immediate neutralization by the exercise of the power lodged for that purpose by the constitution.

There are some powers lodged by the constitution which never have been exercised; from which a strong argument

might be derived against their exercise at the present time. But this is not one of them, for it *has* been exercised, and exercised *one way*, viz. against the people. There is no reason therefore in the outset, why it should not in turn be exercised in their behalf.

And first, of the Bishops, it may be asked, whether as conscientious and honest men they will deny, that they or most of them are individuals picked for their zeal and talents by former ministers, to be placed in the House of Peers for the express purpose of upholding the system of those ministers by their votes whenever the occasion should arrive. It is not mentioned as matter of blame to them; the sin and duplicity would be, if it were possible it should be denied that they are the *élite* of the troops of former administrations, distinctly posted where they are, for the purpose of acting against the present. And if so,—is the country bound to submit a secular question to their votes, when the constitution has provided the moderate and perfectly pacific measure of neutralizing them by the introduction of new Peers?

Of the Representative Peers of Scotland a different view must be taken. It is not intended to deny, that they are a highly respectable, and even venerable, remnant of the feudal ages; possessing much of the interest attached to the relics of gone-by greatness, and the dignity of decay. It is not intended to assert, that, though they undoubtedly gratified their own inherent notions by falling in with the opportunity the borough system offered them, they were the creatures of the ministry for the time being, or are to be viewed in any light but as a race of faded territorial sovereigns, whom the progress of the times has happily deposed. But what it *is* intended to assert, is that the Peers of Scotland are not the men to settle an English question,—that they were not brought into the House of Peers for any such purpose, and that the mode and instrument through which the constitution provided against their being ever applied to such an end, was the authority lodged in the King to neutralize their power by making Peers in the event of the case arising. If at the period of the Union with Scotland, the question had been asked of the English people or government, "Do you then intend, if ever the sixteen Peers of Scotland or a majority of them should be opposed upon some English object, that the carrying of the English object shall be prevented by the Peers of Scotland?"—the answer would instantly have been "No; there is a provision for such a case as that; there is the power of the King to make sixteen new Peers." Without an understanding of this kind, the Union with Scotland would have been totally impracticable and un-

reasonable; no man durst have proposed it, no man would have submitted to it; the existence of the Union is evidence of the existence of the right.

If it should be asked whether Peers will be created to support the Peers of Scotland in resistance to Scotch Reform; the answer is, that the necessity of Scotch Reform is conceded on all sides. The parallelism of the case is a *non est inventus*.

Of the Irish Representative Peers, the most moderate, conciliatory, and tranquillizing thing that can be done or said, is to point to their names and ask them whether it is not the boast and glory of the greater part of them, that they were selected for their personal merits and capabilities in support of one side of the great question now at issue; and whether they can in honour aver, that in this light they are fair referees for the English people, without an equal number being put in on the other side. It may, in the actual circumstances of a country, be avowedly proper and expedient that the decision of a question should be referred to the ancient magnates of the land. But it never can be fair, that it should be referred to a portion of them selected by the influence direct or indirect of one of the parties at issue, without the other party having the opportunity at all events to put in an equivalent. It would be like deciding by a jury where a known portion of the jurymen had been nominated, it matters not how many years ago, by one of the parties to the case. If this portion cannot be removed, let the other side put in an equal number in its turn; and then there will be a chance that the remainder, who were neither put in by one side nor the other, will effect a fair decision. But till this is done, it is plain that justice does not stand straight upon her legs.

This last operation with a jury, if a case can be conceived where there should be no other resource, is what in the metaphor that has been facetiously put forth, would be called by those interested in the old state of things, *swamping* a jury. It is left to the common sense of mankind, whether the proper phrase would not be, that it was *bringing it to an even keel*.

The claim, therefore, on the part of the people of the portion of the United Kingdom called England, is for the immediate neutralization of the Spiritual, Scotch, and Irish Lords, by the creation of *forty-two* more Peers; and when this piece of naked, abstract justice has been performed, it will be time to debate the expediency or non-expediency of creating new Peers to carry a particular Bill if required. There can be no mistake. What is advanced is, that till this is done, the English people labour under a denial of justice; and that where justice ends, and not before, the question of expediency begins.

There is another claim, of smaller magnitude, but still of some; and that is, for an adjustment of the *promotions* in the Peerage since 1792. The balance sheet marked *C* in the Appendix, will show a balance of 2 Marquesses to be raised to Dukes, 3 Earls to Marquesses, 5 Viscounts to Earls, and 3 Barons to Viscounts, due to the popular side. The people have therefore a right to expect, that promotion to this amount should be held over the heads of the peerage, as to be conferred *after* the passing of the Bill. If the peerage is inaccessible to considerations of this nature, there is no harm done; and if it is not, the people only claim a balance *in futuro*, for what has been bestowed on the other side already.

If the opponents of the Bill should represent, that it is a shocking thing to treat the rewards of eminent services as if they were cotton or tallow,—and if, (as in the persuasion that the result would be in their favour they would be likely enough to do), they should demand that the honours attached to great names in the military, naval, legal, and diplomatic or civil lines of service should be struck out of the reckoning, the List marked *D* in the Appendix will show that the result would be to require the creation of one more Peer on the people's side, and in the promotions one Marquess to Duke *less* and two Viscounts to Earls and one Baron to Viscount *more*; a conclusion probably unexpected by either of the parties concerned,—and which might afford matter for meditation in various ways. It is evident that if the opponents push for this particular improvement, it will be conceded.

No hurtful precedent can be derived from such an adjustment; any more than from that created by a legal award. The precedent cannot take effect, without the previous circumstances being repeated; and if it does, it ought.

To resist such an adjustment on the ground of the inconvenience of increasing the number of the House of Peers, would be a sacrifice of the greater interest to the less, like declining to take cognizance of a majority in the House, to save the trouble of writing down the names.

If the reasonable, limited, and moderate demand for an adjustment is not acceded to, the people of England must sit down under the consciousness that their reform has been withheld because it displeased the Bishops and the Scotch and Irish Peers; and because the Whig ministry, for reasons known to itself, refused to go forward after being lifted to the top of the rampart on the shoulders of the people, and declined advising the exertion of the constitutional power provided for the case.

Why an administration which has hitherto led gallantly and been gallantly followed, should in this manner turn round when all the enemy's defences are at its mercy, is what, if the case happens, time will bring to light, and posterity assuredly inquire.

The only conceivable excuse is, that the ministry has not been asked, or not been asked sufficiently. *There is time left for the people to correct this want.* If they do not correct it, and effectually, in a fortnight, the Reform Bill may be held to be withdrawn with the consent of the English nation.

A mode of arrangement that may suggest itself to some, is that if the Bishops and Scotch and Irish Peers would agree not to vote, the necessity for creating Peers would be removed or reduced to something of inconsiderable amount; while any number of individual recusants might be balanced by creations as before. And it is not clear, that when we are told to shut our eyes and open our mouths and see what heaven will send us, some expectation of this nature is not at the bottom of the advice.

To such a plan the objections are,—

First, That there is no reason why the Whigs,—who though not the abstract idols of the people's worship, are undoubtedly more the friends of the people than the opponents of the Bill, —should lose the advantage of permanently establishing a battery of forty-two Peers upon the breach.

'Hei mihi! rusticitas, non pudor ille fuit.'

Secondly, That such arrangements are sure to end in discontent and charges of misconduct on one side or the other; and therefore the wisest way is to use the power in hand, and court no arrangements for the comfort of the enemy.

Thirdly, That it would cut off the effect the creation of Peers would produce in foreign countries; where the character of the English nation is at this moment traduced and vilified, in a way which nothing but a vigorous movement can put an end to.

Fourthly, which is of vastly more importance than all the others together, That if it is not done, and that without delay, the people of England will conduct themselves as on the certainty of final disappointment, with all those evils to the country which are the necessary consequences. *Give us our forty-two Peers*, and then ministers may take a month or two of recreation without danger; and the nation will be content to have Reform when it can get it. The pretence that the Peers would reject the Bill in revenge for their numbers being increased, is an invention of the enemy; they would no more do it, than they

would jump overboard to revenge being crowded in a steam-packet. Refuse it, and whatever may be the consequences, let it be stipulated that one is, that there shall be no ill-will against the people for believing, that as sure as man ever cheated woman, they are going to be deceived. The perils of delay are great and manifest. There never was a British sovereign to whom the people would more gladly say, "O King, live for ever;" but the King will not live for ever, and if he should die now, it would be hard that the nation should be deprived of the legacy of his good-will. The cholera may come, and put the people beside attending to their temporal concerns; which would be a perfect god-send to the opponents of the Bill. The test is, whether the Bill shall be anchored in safety now. If it is not, the plan is clearly that it shall be cast adrift.

There may be plain speaking in all this, but no man has ever suspected your Lordship of any of the qualities to which plain speaking is abhorrent. No apology, therefore, is required in saying,

I am, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant.

October 19, 1831.

APPENDIX.

A.

IN THE MAJORITY

That voted *against* the Second Reading of the English Reform Bill in the House of Peers, were

PEERS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CREATED SINCE 1792,

DUKES.
Wellington.

EARLS.
Beauchamp.
Bradford.
Eldon.
Harewood.
Howe.
Lonsdale.
Powis.
Rosslyn.
Vane (Marq. of Londonderry).
Verulam.
Wilton.

VISCOUNTS.
Beresford.
Combermere.
Exmouth.
Gordon (Lord (Aberdeen).
Melville.
Sidmouth.

BARONS.
Arden.
Bayning.
Bexley.
Bolton.
Calthorpe.
Carrington.
Churchill.
Clanbrassil (Ld. Roden).
Clanwilliam.
Colchester.
Cowley.
De Dunstanville.
Delamere.
Ellenborough.
Farnborough.
Feversham.
Forester.
Gambier.
Harris.
Hopetoun.
Ker.
Lauderdale.
Loftus (Marq. of Ely).
Lyndhurst.
Manners.
Maryborough.
Meldrum.
Melros.
Northwick.
Penshurst (Ld. Strangford).
Prudhoe.
Ravensworth.
Redesdale.
Ribblesdale.
Rivers.
Rolle.
Ross (Glasgow).
Saltersford.
Sheffield.
Skelmersdale.
St. Helen's.
Stowell.
Stuart de Rothsay.
Tenterden.
Wallace.
Wharncliffe.
Wigan.
Wynford.

ARCHBISHOPS AND BISHOPS.

England and Wales.			Ireland.
Canterbury (Archbishop).	Durham.	Oxford.	Tuam (Archbishop).
Bangor.	Exeter.	Peterborough.	Cloyne.
Bath and Wells.	Gloucester.	Rochester.	Cork.
Bristol.	Lichfield.	Salisbury.	Leighlin and Ferns.
Carlisle.	Lincoln.	St. Asaph.	
	Llandaff.	Winchester.	

REPRESENTATIVE PEERS FOR SCOTLAND.

Marquesses.	Viscounts.
Tweeddale.	Arbuthnot.
	Strathallan.
Earls.	
Elgin.	**Barons.**
Home.	Colville.
Leven and Melville.	Forbes.
Morton.	Gray.
Selkirk.	Saltoun.

REPRESENTATIVE PEERS FOR IRELAND.

Marquesses.		Donoraile.
Thomond.	Longford.	Gort.
	Lucan.	Lorton.
Earls.	Mayo.	
Caledon.	Mountcashel.	**Barons.**
Carrick.	Wicklow.	Carbery.
Charleville.		Dufferin.
Enniskillen.	**Viscounts.**	Farnham.
Glengall.	Clancarty.	

In the Majority.—Peers of the United Kingdom created since 1792 66

Archbishops and Bishops { England and Wales..17 / Ireland.....4 } 21

Representative Peers for Scotland..... 12

Representative Peers for Ireland 19

118

By adding 2 for the Royal Dukes, and subtracting the whole from 199, it will be shown that the Peers of the United Kingdom of creation antecedent to the conclusion of 1792 who voted against the Second Reading, were 79.

B.

IN THE MINORITY

That voted *for* the Second Reading of the English Reform Bill in the House of Peers, were

PEERS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CREATED SINCE 1792,

(*The 23 last creations are distinguished by a* *)

Marquesses.
Ailsa.
Breadalbane.

Earls.
*Burlington.
Camperdown.
Cawdor.
Grey.
Lichfield.
Manvers.
Minto.
Mulgrave.
*Munster.
Nelson.

Viscounts.
Goderich.
Granville.
Hood.
Lake.
St. Vincent.

Barons.
Abercromby.
Alvanley.
Auckland.
Barham.
Brougham.
*Chaworth (Earl of Meath.
*Clements (Earl of Leitrim).
*Cloncurry.
Dawnay.
*De Saumarez.
*Dinorben.
*Dover.
Dundas.
*Dunmore (Earl of).
Durham.
Erskine.
Fife.
*Fingall (E. of).
Gardner.
Granard.
*Howden (Ld.)
*Kenlis (Marq. of Headfort).
*Kilmarnock (E. of Erroll).
Lilford.
*Ludlow (E. of).
Lynedoch.
Lyttelton.
Melbourne.
Mendip.
Monteagle.
*Mostyn.
*Oakley.
Ormonde.
*Panmure.
*Poltimore.
Ponsonby (of Imokilly).
Plunkett.
Ranfurly.
*Rossie (Lord Kinnaird).
Rosebery.
Seaford.
*Sefton (Earl of).
*Segrave.
Selsey.
Somerhill (Marq. of Clanricarde).
*Templemore.
Wellesley (Marquess).
*Wenlock.
Yarborough.

BISHOPS.

Chichester.
Norwich.

REPRESENTATIVE PEERS FOR SCOTLAND.

MARQUESSES.	BARONS.
Queensberry.	Hamilton.
	Napier.

VISCOUNTS.
Falkland.

REPRESENTATIVE PEERS FOR IRELAND.

MARQUESSES.	BARONS.
Westmeath.	Dunally.

EARLS.
Charlemont.
Gosford.

In the Minority.—Peers of the United Kingdom created since 1792 ...	66
Bishops	2
Representative Peers for Scotland.....	4
Representative Peers for Ireland.....	4
	76

By adding 1 for His Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex, and subtracting the whole from 158, it will be shown that the Peers of the United Kingdom of creation antecedent to the conclusion of 1792 who voted for the Second Reading, were 81.

SUMMARY.

	Voted against the Bill.	Voted for the Bill.
Peers of the United Kingdom created previously to the *end of* 1792.....	79	81
Peers of the United Kingdom created subsequently to 1792 (including the creations during the administration of Earl Grey)	66	66
Archbishops and Bishops.....	21	2
Representative Peers for Scotland	12	4
Representative Peers for Ireland.....	19	4
Royal Dukes.....	2	1
	199	158

C.

PROMOTIONS in the PEERAGE of the UNITED KINGDOM, since 1792.

(Where a Peer has been promoted by more than one step at a time, each step is noted as if the steps had taken place separately.)

(Where a Peer at creation has been placed in a higher rank than that of Baron, the additional steps are noted in the same manner.)

IN THE MAJORITY AGAINST THE BILL.	Mar. to Duke.	Earl to Mar.	Visc. to Earl.	Bar. to Visc.
Buckingham	1			
Wellington	1	1	1	1
Ailesbury		1		
Bath		1	1	
Bristol		1		
Bute		1	1	1
Camden		1		
Cholmondeley		1		
Exeter		1		
Hertford		1		
Beauchamp			1	1
Bradford			1	1
Brownlow			1	1
Carnarvon			1	1
Digby			1	1
Dudley			1	
Eldon			1	1
Falmouth			1	
Harewood			1	1
Harrowby			1	1
Howe			1	1
Liverpool			1	1
Lonsdale			1	1
Malmesbury			1	1
Orford			1	1
Powis			1	1
Rosslyn			1	1
St. German's			1	1
Vane (Londonderry)			1	1
Verulam			1	1
Wilton			1	1
Beresford				1
Combermere				1
Exmouth				1
Gordon (Lord Aberdeen)				1
Melville				1
Sidmouth				1
	2	9	24	27

IN THE MINORITY FOR THE BILL.	Mar. to Duke.	Earl to Mar.	Visc. to Earl.	Bar. to Visc.
Ailsa		1	1	1
Anglesey		1		
Breadalbane		1	1	1
Cleveland		1		
Northampton		1		
Westminster		1		
Amherst			1	1
Burlington			1	1
Camperdown			1	1
Cawdor			1	1
Chichester			1	1
Craven			1	1
Grey			1	1
Lichfield (Lord Anson)			1	1
Manners			1	1
Minto			1	1
Morley			1	1
Mulgrave			1	1
Munster			1	1
Nelson			1	1
Onslow			1	1
Ranfurly			1	1
Romney			1	1
Goderich				1
Granville				1
Hood				1
Lake				1
St. Vincent				1
	0	6	19	24
	2	9	24	27
Difference, showing the promotions which ought to be made now, to set things fair.	2	3	5	3

D.

LIST OF PEERS of the UNITED KINGDOM

Elevated since 1792 for Military, Naval, Legal, and Diplomatic or Civil Services, who voted on the Second Reading of the English Reform Bill.

Showing the effect of striking out their names on both sides.

IN THE MAJORITY.	*Mar. to Duke.*	*Earl to Mar.*	*Visc. to Earl.*	*Bar. to Visc.*	IN THE MINORITY.	*Mar. to Duke.*	*Earl to Mar.*	*Visc. to Earl.*	*Bar. to Visc.*
Wellington . . .	1	1	1	1	† Anglesey . . .		1		
Beresford				1	Lynedoch				
Combermere. . .				1	Abercromby				
Hopetoun					Howden				
Harris					Lake.				1
Howe			1	1	Nelson			1	1
Exmouth				1	Camperdown . .			1	1
Gambier					St. Vincent . . .				1
					Hood				1
† Rosslyn			1	1	Mulgrave . . .			1	1
Eldon			1	1	Anson (Lichfield)			1	1
Tenterden					De Saumarez •				
Redesdale					Gardner				
Ellenborough					Barham				
Lyndhurst									
Stowell					Plunkett				
Wynford					Alvanley				
Manners					Brougham				
					Erskine				
Sidmouth				1					
Gordon (Lord Aberdeen). . .				1	Wellesley (Marquess)				
Melville				1	Grey			1	1
Bexley					Minto			1	1
Cowley					Goderich				1
Colchester					Granville . . .				1
St. Helen's					Melbourne				
					Auckland				
Creations 23.									
	1	1	4	10	*Creations* 24.				
						0	1	6	11

Hence if it was agreed to strike out these names on both sides, the result would be to require the creation of one Peer *more;* and in the promotions, one Marquess to Duke *less*, and two Viscounts to Earls and one Baron to Viscount *more*.

† The Marquess of Anglesey and Earl of Rosslyn are peers before 1792. Their *promotions* only, are therefore counted.

To the Secretary of the Hull Reform Association*.

Sir—As the only communication I have received from Hull since the abandonment of the petition against the election, has been through the newspapers, I feel apprehansive that we may have been waiting for each other; and so proceed to put an end to it.

On the subject of that petition and its consequences, I have no hesitation in stating my personal conviction, that I have been laid down and robbed at the door of the House of Commons, with the single object of holding out an example of the punishment to be inflicted on an individual who is bold enough to allow himself to be returned to Parliament by a majority of his fellow townsmen. The smallness of our majority in the first instance, was effected by subornation of perjury on the part of our opponents; for which I refer to the evidence before the Committee of the House. And they afterwards rendered it impossible that I should avoid the contest, by advancing against me disreputable charges, of no one of which did they attempt any proof before the Committee. There are few terms of disgrace which public opinion would not justify me in applying to such conduct; but I chuse, for conciseness, to comprehend them all, by stamping each and every of the parties concerned, with the elaborate infamy of robbing by means of charging with disreputable offences.

As your Representative, I take the opportunity to point out to the Hull Reform Association, and through it to every association of the same nature throughout the country, the insulting falsehood contained in asserting that you, or any other set of

* The writer was returned to Parliament for Hull on the 20th of June 1835, by 1428 votes against 1423.

electors, have freedom of election. You are free to elect whom you please, under the understanding that he shall be mulcted in his personal property to any extent the adversaries may chuse to effect by the expenditure of perhaps a much inferior sum of their own. To take the present case; here am I, a man of comparatively small property, and no means of increasing it,—one, in fact, who could just, consistently with prudence, produce the moderate sum necessary to defray the legitimate expenses of an election,—robbed of the provision of my children to the amount of, I suppose, several thousand pounds, by possibly a conspiracy of the richest and most powerful individuals in the kingdom,—men, for aught we know, not confined to the rank of Members of the Commons House of Parliament, but extending upwards to the very footsteps of the Throne. For that the ostensible instruments are not the substantial ones, is matter of public evidence and notoriety. And this is *your* freedom of election.

But the inference I want to draw from the exposure of this falsehood, is the practical inutility, in the existing state of the laws, of you, or me, or anybody, attempting to arrive at political amelioration through the instrumentality of the House of Commons. Calculate, for example, how much the money and trouble which have been extracted from you and from me in the present attempt to obtain one vote in the House of Commons, would have effected if applied in the way which was our natural channel,—the raising up that "pressure from without" which is daily recommended to us by the terrors of our opponents. I do not advise you hastily to lay aside altogether the pursuit of improvement by the first and feebler mode; but I do advise you to make it entirely subordinate to that more politic and useful mode in which your natural strength lies, and to give no effort to the one, except what you have not the means or opportunity of applying to the other.

It is scarcely necessary for me to say. that the power lodged in a Committee, of finding a petition "frivolous and vexatious," is no security against the recurrence of a case like ours. We had the option of expending perhaps ten thousand pounds more, for the chance that the Committee would give us a claim on, it may be, half that sum lodged as security.

Trusting that we shall all learn from experience,

I remain, Sir, your very obedient servant,

T. Perronet Thompson.

13, Hanover Terrace, Regent's Park, 1 August 1835.

Letters of a Representative to his Constituents, during the Session of 1836.—London; Effingham Wilson. 1836.

To the Liberals of all denominations,

in

KINGSTON UPON HULL;

by their affectionate friend and townsman,

T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

PREFACE.

The LETTERS which follow, were written in discharge of an engagement volunteered in the earliest period of candidateship.

To the constituency concerned, they conveyed a tolerably complete account of the conduct of their representative; being forwarded generally twice a week, and published in each of two local newspapers.

With the public they will possibly possess some interest, as a record of parliamentary proceedings set down upon the instant.

As exercises in Political Economy, particularly on questions of Free Trade, portions of them may be found worth notice by the industrious classes.

London, 31 *Oct.* 1836.

LETTERS OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO HIS CONSTITUENTS.

To the Secretary of the Hull Reform Association.

House of Commons, 4 *Feb.* 1836, 2½ P.M.

Sir,

I have just heard the King's Speech; and as there were some unusual circumstances attending its delivery, you will perhaps be interested in receiving my account upon the spot, for the purpose of comparing it with any others that may be given. In consequence of the total absence of accommodation for the Members of the House of Commons beyond what is afforded to the crush outside the rail at an Assize, and my being as you know like Zaccheus short of stature, it was vain for me to attempt to *see* anything at a lower elevation than the tops of the Peeresses' feathers in the galleries. But I heard the King read, in a slow, distinct, old-gentlemanly voice, with something of the sonorous tone that is acquired by reading in a Cathedral. He frequently hesitated, in the manner of one who sees imperfectly what he is to read; and the place, in spite of the hour, was considerably obscure. On arriving at the conclusion of the Speech, the King said, with great plainness and simplicity, and in the same voice and manner as before, "I am afraid, my Lords and Gentlemen, I have not been able to read the Speech in a manner that claimed your attention; and therefore I will read it to you again." Whereupon, a candle having as I am told been brought and held before him, he read the Speech again, with great clearness, and much less of hesitation than before. The effect on the whole was striking; and exceedingly favourable to the feeling of personal attachment, in which the strength of monarchy so extensively resides. The reading was not once interrupted by cough; and I heard some of the by-standers say, it was frequently interrupted from that cause on the last occasion. Little as our trade at Hull lies in flattering monarchs, I apprehend there are few, in the actual situation of the country, who would wish the King's coughs to last.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

London, 5 Feb. 1838.

MINISTERS, after all the boasts and whipping-up of their opponents, were last night in a majority of 41 on the Address. I suspect this may be considered as the turning-point of the game; and that we have only to hold together, to make as complete a clearance of abuses as heart can desire. In particular, I have lively hopes that we shall end in seeing Hull restored to trade, by the removal of the prohibition of commerce by Act of Parliament; and that your agriculturists of the middle classes will have the chance of seeing their sons rise to wealth by the exercise of foreign traffic, as you know was eminently exemplified in the case of my own father. The speech of the seconder of the Address, which must undoubtedly in some sort be considered as the declaration of the Ministers, will be found to contain strong allusions in this direction.

After the mover and seconder, Sir Robert Peel opened the debate. His manner struck me as unwontedly feeble; so much so as to suggest the idea that he was suffering under some physical infirmity. He appeared to be tossed upon a sea of doubt, between an intense desire to avoid an Amendment, and an irrepressible wish to be the mover of one himself. As I was informed, (for I did not at the instant notice it myself), some communication was made to him, which had the effect of composing the struggle in his mind; and his ideas arranged themselves collectively in favour of an Amendment. The calculation of times and distances suggests, that the purport of the communication was that an Amendment had just passed the Lords, agreeing word for word with that afterwards proposed by the orator.

Lord John Russell replied with firmness, and others of the ministers followed. On the whole, however, the debate went on languidly, till taken up by the member for St. Alban's (Mr. Ward), who for the first time infused some spirit into the proceedings. O'Connell's concluding speech was superb. He began evidently under the effects of agitation, arising from some remarks which might probably as well have been dispensed with, directed to him from the Treasury bench. But when he cooled down into self-possession, he broke into one of those floods of eloquence with which a great actor sometimes astonishes an audience, though in the latter case there is the difference, that the subject matter has been prepared beforehand and in print for ages. One Irish point with which he varied the scene, amused the House much, and seems to have been missed by the reporters. Speaking of the Corporation of Dublin, who with an income of 28,000*l.* a-year spend 30,000*l*, he said, that

for all this they were in such want of money for all reasonable purposes, that "even if a man's picture was put up in their Hall, *they left him punctually to pay for it.*" I am also not certain whether the reporters have noticed the part in which he expressed his hope, that if Ministers were in a minority they would immediately dissolve Parliament; a passage which was loudly cheered by such members as do not live in fear of meeting their constituents. On the whole I felt proud of my townsmen, for the tact and spirit they have evinced in discovering the connexion between the Liberator of Ireland and the progress of everything which honest and intelligent men in England hope for*.

On one subject arising out of the King's Speech, I should be glad, as the Quakers say, to have *friends' opinions.* An increase of the Navy estimates was mentioned; and the understanding is, that Ministers are to ask for an addition of five thousand seamen. One boast of arbitrary governments is, that they are not obliged to explain their operations inconveniently; the friends of a free government, therefore, should not be too urgent with their questions. It is sufficient for us, if we think the augmentation generally prudent. For my own part, I cannot help saying, that when I consider the following facts,—

1st, That all reasonable men, out of the camp of our enemies,—who of course have an interest in concealing and denying it to the utmost of their ability,—believe there is a powerful faction in the country actively engaged in a plan for changing the succession to the Throne, in favour of arbitrary principles.

2ndly, That we know and have the evidence, that the Army has been tampered with; and in fact the individuals who were the agents in it, advance no excuse except the trumpery one (which I leave you to judge how far it would serve you, or me, or any President of a Reform Association, if we broke the law), that they really did not know what it was they put their hands to.

3rdly, That close and personal communications have been carried on with the assemblage of arbitrary sovereigns in camp at Kalisch; and that the same active and powerful party are carrying on a war of extermination against our brothers and countrymen serving in compliance with the desire of their Sovereign in Spain; hounding on a sanguinary outlaw there to the "deliberate murder," as expressed in writing by the King's Minister for Foreign Affairs, of such of their fellow-

* The liberal papers at Hull, already contained indications of some public demonstration in this direction.

citizens as may fall into his power; corresponding with the King's enemy through their gazettes, and debauching the enlisted soldiers of the General there commanding, to act as spies for the Spanish Pretender, and communicate with him through the instrumentality of his friends and supporters in England;—in all which they seem to me to come as near to levying war against the King, as a steer is to a bullock, and in fact give us an express image of the kind of war they hope to wage at home.

When, I say, I consider all these things, and the immense importance it is of, to cut off the remotest chance of these designs being backed by any co-operation of foreigners, I can see no extravagance in securing ourselves by an increase of five thousand seamen at home. How you would look some morning, if you found a fleet with fifty thousand men from Cronstadt in White-Booth Roads, yourselves best know. The probability of it may not be very immediate; but neither is the scale of preparation inordinate. The blame of the whole must be thrown on such of those who are unfortunately our countrymen, as are at the bottom of the necessity. For my own part I am bound firmly to believe, that those who uphold the murder of British soldiers in Spain, would not stick a moment at bringing a Russian to upset, for instance, your Municipal Corporation Reform. There is nothing like a reasonable care and caution, and shutting the stable door before the horse is stolen. I shall be glad, therefore, if on this subject you would collect opinions.

London, 10 *Feb.* 1836.

A very important question was broached in the House of Commons last night,—the ministerial plan for the Commutation of Tithes in England and Wales. It may not strike you how this is immediately interesting to a commercial community like ours; though I think it may be proved to be so to an extent not easily described. But as there would hardly be time to complete the subject by the present post, I will content myself to-day with the demonstration that I have not been inattentive to your interests in this matter.

I regret that through a defect in our arrangements, I was not present to support the Petition of the Lath-renders; but my colleague informs me there could have been nothing done but to say "I second the Petition." There will probably be an opportunity soon, for putting forward the case of the Lath-renders, in a way that may render them more service than the utterance of the words aforesaid.

London, 10 *Feb.* 1836.

THE Ministers last night opened their plan for the Commutation of Tithes in England and Wales. On the first essential point,—that of the Commutation being (with a certain drawback to be hereafter mentioned) perpetual, or to be made once for all, to endure *in secula seculorum*,—the Government appear to be right at last. Their proposal will make a clean sweep of the evils which Tithes inflict on the country by repressing its production; to say nothing of the evils of levying a tax in the *most* irritating way instead of the *least*. For this (and I wish it had not a fearful drawback, as was intimated) let us remember we owe gratitude to the Whigs.

The first objection to the plan as I understand it, (and I depend principally on the sort of abstract contained in the leader of the *Morning Chronicle* of the 10th January, which may probably be considered as possessing something like official authority),—is, that it appears to be marvellously unfair to the Church. You will ask me how long it is since I have become a stickler for that establishment, and why. I will tell you. It is because Providence has so ordered things in this world, that there is no committing a wrong or a hard action on any class in society, without its coming round in the shape of punishment to the classes that permit it, either through the direct agency of the injured classes, or through the absence of their assistance at a time when we might otherwise have had it. This is a problem which some people can see, and some people cannot see; and those who see it are "the wise virgins," and the others "the foolish."

Nothing can be more undeniable, than that the property of the Church is as much public property, as the property of the Colonels of the Life Guards in their regiments. The Church is not stones, but men; and so are the Colonels in the Life Guards. It is, therefore, just as much matter of arrangement by the community through the organ of their government, whether there shall be twenty bishoprics, or ten, or none, and whether their pay shall be so and so, or not,—as whether there shall be three regiments of Life and Horse Guards or only two, and what shall at any time be the pay of the functionaries that command them. In both cases a decent regard is to be had for existing interests; neither the colonel nor the bishop is to be turned into the streets; but neither of them has any claim to demand the existence of future bishops or colonels, except to the precise extent the country may think it wants their services.

Neither would I at all "shy" the fact, that a time must come, and that speedily, when either a distribution of the pro-

perty assigned by the State for religious purposes must be made fairly among all sects, or (which is much the readier process of the two) the property now assigned to the Church must be resumed by the State, and applied to diminish the taxes of you, and me, and everybody,—leaving each and every of us to pay religious teachers for ourselves, as the unfairly treated sects are obliged to do at present. On either of these points I should be sorry to be misunderstood. But I would not, therefore, in effecting a Commutation of Tithes, attempt to take the fragment of a farthing from the clergy by a side wind. When the question comes, let it be fairly met without disguise; and the clergy will be nothing the stronger for having been candidly treated before. Among other reasons also, is one which was urged with great force last night by Mr. Whittle Harvey; namely, that if anything is taken from the Church in the present state of the question, especially from the working members, the only consequence will be that a demand will be made upon our pockets to replace it. In this way it is pretty plain, that to allow the landlords,—who are the opposing interest, and the ruling power in the State as unfortunately left to us by the age of dishonest corruption which is just passed,—to take anything at the Church's expense, is exactly the same thing as giving it to them ourselves.

The proposal of the Ministerial bill appears to be, that after professing to try various modes of allowing the parties interested to agree voluntarily, if at the end of six months no agreement takes place, then any landholder, or tithe-owner, may call on the Commissioners to make a general award as to the amount of tithes in the parish, and the tithes as paid for seven years, with the charges of all kinds, are then to be ascertained; that if the sum actually received for the seven years shall be ascertained to have been *above 75 per cent* of the gross value, then the amount to be paid in future shall be declared by the Commissioners *to be 75 per cent of that value, and no more;* and if the tithe received was less than 60 per cent of the gross value, then the amount is to be increased to sixty per cent; and where the tithe received has been between 60 and 75 per cent of the gross value, then the amount shall be taken unaltered.

Now, what I want to know upon this, is, why if the clergyman shall be found to have been in the habit of receiving 80, 90, or 100 per cent of his legal rights, the alteration is to be to 75 per cent. Why not to 125? If that was proposed, we know what the landlords would immediately say;—"Why are we to pay 125, when the legal claim is only for 100?" Parody that for the clergy, and ask, "Why are they to receive only 75, when

their legal receipts have been 80, 90, or 100?" The reason of the proposal is simply this,—that the landlords are the overwhelming power in the State, and have been so since the Norman Conquest; that it is part of the Norman slavery, and we must all submit to it till we are strong enough to cast it off; that they have got possession of the avenues to justice and to law, and allow no man to partake in the making of laws for you, who does not take an oath that he has a direct pecuniary interest in doing wrong to you and all the rest of the community. I was obliged to take that oath when I became your representative; and I would have sunk into the earth sooner than have done anything so personally dishonest and degrading, if I had not been supported by a strong consciousness that I came there to do my endeavour towards blowing up the conspiracy, by the best means that are actually within our reach. It is therefore perhaps undeniable, that they will have something from everybody, and something from the clergy among the rest. No good of any kind can be got, without paying something as a sop to those who have got the avenues to law into their hands. Our case is like that of a negro slave who bargains with his owner for the terms on which he shall be permitted to work for himself; we have no more chance, at the present moment, of doing anything except by sufferance. I would therefore advise the clergy to yield like other men, and pay *something*. But I submit that 25 per cent is too much. I advise them to try to modify it; and to endeavour to get the other classes of the community to join with them in resisting, by the promise of assistance in return. Tell our friends,—the country ones in particular,—to ask their clergyman if he does not think 25 per cent is too much;—if he can give any reason why 25 per cent is not too much;—and if he cannot, then if he can give any reason why it should not be attempted to be reduced. It is useless to talk of voluntary agreement; no man will get a fair price voluntarily, where it is known he can be robbed of 25 per cent by law.

But here I come to a point in comparison of which the other sinks into insignificance. The commutation of Tithes is to be permanent—as I said, with a drawback. And how is it to be permanent? What think you of a permanent commutation into *a corn rent?* Yes,—the tithe is to be commuted, not into a permanent payment in money, but into a permanent payment of so many quarters of corn or the value thereof. And what is the effect of this? Manifestly to attach the interests of the clergy for ever and for ever to the conservation of the Corn Laws. A clergyman is to receive annually the value of,

say 100 quarters of corn. If corn is at 80 shillings a quarter, he is to have 400*l.* a-year; and if it is at 20 shillings, he is to have 100*l.* But perhaps somebody will say, this is only making the substantial value of the clergyman's income permanent, or the same under all variations of the price of corn. No, simpleton, it is not; it is giving him a great deal more when corn is dear, and a great deal less when it is cheap. It makes it all the same to him, *with respect to that portion of his income which he expends on corn;* but with respect to all the rest, it makes him partake in the great plot to pillage every industry in the country for the benefit of the owners of rent of land. If the clergyman when he has 400*l.* a-year spends 100*l.* of it upon bread or agricultural produce, he gets exactly the same bread which he would for 25*l.* when corn was a quarter the price and his income 100*l.* But for the remaining 300*l.* does he get no more than he would get under the other circumstances for the 75*l.*? Is it not plain that he receives just the same advantage as any other corn-lord?—in other words, that he has the same interest in keeping up the pillage of the commercial and manufacturing community? Do the wages of industry and the price of manufactured goods rise fourfold, when corn rises fourfold? If they did, what temptation would there be to the landlords to maintain the Corn Laws? It is because they do *not* rise in the same proportion, that the landlords persist in their iniquity, and that Hull must be half a Hull, till we can muster sense, and spirit, and union, to bring them to a composition.

I want to ask the Clergy what will become of them, if this bill goes on, and *after all* the people succeed in putting down the Corn Laws. Robinson Crusoe stowed his gunpowder, some in one place and some in another, in order that at all events it should not be all blown up at once. Had not the clergy better do something of the same kind? Had not they better beg the ministry to give them an income that shall be exposed to no chance or change, from the Corn Laws being altered or from their being not? The Bishops are able men many of them, and capital mathematicians; I wonder they cannot see into this brief piece of algebra.

I should have thought the Government too, would have had strong reasons for not throwing itself into the arms of either of the two parties, which when things have a little settled will be found to be the two really conflicting parties left in this country, —the *dishonest* agriculturists, and those who, with the help of the *honest* ones, mean to bring them to submit to reason. Why had not they the genius, if not the justice, at least to strike the balance in this instance fairly between the two? Half to the

honest men and half to their opponents, is certainly not a very hard bargain. But you will ask me how this is to be done. By the simple measure of lodging the income of the clergy proceeding from the commutation of the Tithe, *half in corn and half in the public funds* or some other mode of making a fixed money payment. In this manner the clergy will be balanced between both events; it will be indifferent to them, in the main, whether the Corn Laws are continued or are not. If they are continued, then the receipts of the clergy from each of the two portions of their income will remain as they are. If they are removed, then while their income from the corn rent falls in value, their income from the money payment will rise; and the contrary.

Do you endeavour, therefore, to pass the word along, among the commercial and industrious classes, that the ministry, whether they know it or not, are taking side against us;—that there is a simple way of remedying the evil, and that we ought to ask for it. And try to bind the clergy into this union,—in the first place by treating them justly in the affair of the 25 per cent deduction, and in the next place by demonstrating to them how much their peace and security are concerned in disentangling themselves from all the perils of the Corn Laws. The clergy are in general quiet men, with numerous families, and averse to gambling. Why should they speculate upon the Corn Laws?

Finally, endeavour to ascertain for me, whether notice ought not as soon as possible to be given of an Amendment on the ministerial bill, to the effect that the income of the clergy arising from the Commutation of Tithes shall be lodged half in a corn rent, and half in a fixed money payment. Why are we to have the weight of the clergy thrown into the scale against the interest of the community? We do not ask to have it thrown in its favour; but to have it *split.*

London, 17 *Feb.* 1836.

I HAVE to-day given notice, to move as an Amendment on the Bill for the Commutation of Tithes in England and Wales, "That of the amount awarded by the Commissioners according to the provisions of the Bill, *one half* shall continue to be a Money rent for ever, and the other half shall be turned into a Corn rent on the principle set forth in the Bill." To those who are in possession of the Bill, or of my former letter to you upon the subject, I believe this will be sufficiently intelligible.

I have now to request the attention of the commercial and

manufacturing interests, to the importance of making a stand on the present point, if they wish to prevent their prospects of the liberation of commerce from going backward instead of forward. If a demand had been made on our part, for vesting the whole amount of Commutation in a money rent, the agricultural interest would not have failed to declare themselves attacked. It remains to be seen whether the ministry have resolved on attacking the commercial and manufacturing interests, by refusing to make a fair division of the matter in dispute. If those interests do not take up the question, and support it by petitions and all other constitutional means of making an impression on the government, a fortress and strong-hold will have been established for our adversaries, at the moment when we thought we were advancing towards relief.

At the same time, there may be reason to hope, that the proposition on the part of the government may have proceeded from inadvertence, or from an ill-digested notion that it was necessary for preserving the position of the Church. The pressure on men engaged in the cares of empire is necessarily so great, that there can be no discredit in their giving at least a most serious consideration, to the representations of other men whose attention, like yours, has been directed to a particular part.

Upon reading the Bill, there is no necessity for any such complication as vesting the money in the public funds. The arrangement upon that point, is simple and perfect; and it was only in consequence of the Bill not having been before me, that anything was said in my last letter of such a mode of investment.

London, 20 *Feb.* 1836.

On Wednesday night, there was a debate on a whimsical question, being no other than whether the Committee appointed to consider and report on the plans for the two new Houses of Parliament, should also receive *estimates* of the expenses of the several plans from the architects proposing them. And it was finally settled against us, that there should be *no* estimates. The Committee, therefore, is to revel among plans resembling Martin's imaginings of ancient Egypt, and to fix on the one that is most like the new Jerusalem, with a romantic contempt for such beggarly elements as the cost of masonry.

On Thursday, there was a great point gained for the people in a quiet way, in the shape of Resolutions for facilitating the

taking of names upon Divisions. This has hitherto been done, by dint of great efforts and much trouble, by the Liberals for their own side; and their practice has obliged the Conservatives to do the same. It is now to be attempted to be performed with greater ease and more regularity by authority; and, though there are apprehensions of an endeavour to create failure by voluntary obstacles, it is probable that in one way or other the Liberals will attain their end.

Last night, there was a long debate on Russia, Poland, and Turkey; arising out of a motion for papers by Lord Dudley Stuart. The House was very thin, and the proceedings languid on the whole. The Member for Birmingham (Mr. T. Attwood) was all for active measures; and his speech would have been received thirty years ago with immense applause as a specimen of the "truly British spirit." The ablest speech of the night was that of the Member for Bath (Mr. Roebuck), who was all for peace; but went, in my estimation, as much too far in one direction as the Member for Birmingham in the other. It really does not seem difficult to trace the proper line between the two, by a simple reference to the duties of private life. A man is not to go out "colonelling," and run his head into scrapes in search of remote wrongs and dubious grievances. But neither is he to sit at home in his veranda, with his hookah luxuriously before him, and hear the cries of "murder" and the rest of the "five pleas of the law," contenting himself with what he calls his "moral influence,"—and trusting to the height of his garden wall, and the difficulty the ill-favoured ones without might find in making an inroad on his particular person. Nations, like individuals, are, within certain limits, bound by a common interest on this point of repressing injustice. If England luckily has a high garden wall, or what is better a deep fish-pond all around, the inference is that England is bound to apply these advantages to the general good;—to be the citadel and last reserve of European freedom;—and to view all distant struggles for liberty, as so many battles fought upon the out-posts of her own security. Happily the contest need not be one of arms; the extension of the principles which make Britain strong, is the true weapon with which the mixture of barbarism and civilisation the world calls Russia, is to be baffled and kept down. Whatever Russia may boast, she will not long prevent the apparition of these principles within her borders. She occupies, it is true, the position unfortunately occupied twenty years ago by England, as the head and patroness of despotism throughout the world; but in twenty years more, the same causes will have produced the same

effects, and Russia will no longer vaunt herself the only state that has been able to shut out "disorganising doctrines." I should have been glad to have said something on these matters; but in the first place, the audience was especially ill-disposed for hearing, and in the next, I was burthened with an oppressive dread of being coarsely put down upon some point of form, for lack of experience in the usages of the House. By a movement of this kind I was prevented on Thursday from giving any explanation of the bearing and nature of my Amendment; but I do not mean my "unfledg'd virtues" to be always "cuff'd down" in this manner. In the mean time, I only turn it over to my constituents, and to that larger constituency which I may in some sort be said to have *in partibus exterorum*, as a specimen of the difficulties to be encountered by anybody that takes up their cause. In fact, by laying some little things together, I have arrived at a suspicion that the Whigs are desperately sore upon the subject of the Corn Laws, and have probably made up their minds to carry their Bill through in a hand canter, as a peace-offering to the landed interest. In which I can only the more heartily pray for their disappointment; but it must be effected by the people in the manufacturing and commercial towns rapidly and energetically taking up the case. If you wish to continue to be allowed to bring home *sticking-plaster*, or anything else except what people want to buy, lying still at the present moment will effectually accomplish it.

I promised to say something of the "German commercial league;" but it would be inexcusable to say more now, than that if, as I apprehend to be the case, the Germans are willing to remove their prohibitions on British manufactures as soon as we remove ours on German produce, I have the most lively hope that in this dreaded league itself we see the beginnings of the liberation of the commerce of our good town; though possibly we may be led through some smaller evil, to arrive at greater good. If the Germans have really done what I suppose they have, you may begin to put new ships upon the stocks, for it will be impossible for foreign trade much longer to be prohibited by Act of Parliament.

P.S.—Among local matters, I observe you have something like a feud at Hull between the Licensed Victuallers and the new Beer-house keepers. The Victuallers should try to remove their grievances without throwing blame upon other people; and I beg to note, that when I engaged to put in a word for the Victuallers, I distinctly declined taking any part against the Beer-houses. Judging from the description of

politicians who make an outcry against Beer-houses, there would seem reason to believe they must be very useful to the people. I understand that all mischief among the poorer classes, is concocted at Beer-houses. Where would they have it be?—at the Carlton Club or Crockford's? I cannot comprehend, that the poor must be prevented from gathering together, lest they should do mischief. Or if they must, I could at least point out some places, where claret as well as beer should be stopped on the same principle. I hope the poor will ere long be strong enough, to keep the claret-drinkers in order by a hint of reciprocity. If the Beer-house keepers have anything to urge, I shall be as ready to move in their case as in the other.

London, 24 *Feb.* 1836.

On Monday in the debate on the second reading of the Tithe Commutation Bill, I took the opportunity of endeavouring to state the way in which preserving half the amount of Commutation in a money instead of a corn rent, would be an act of naked justice to the industrious classes of the community, who are interested in preventing the accumulation of strongholds for the supporters of the Corn Laws.

It will sound strangely to you when I state, that this contained the only reference to the interests of industry, commerce, or manufactures, in the whole course of the debate. It was literally true, that in the language of scripture, "none peeped or muttered" upon the subject. As the Catholics of Ireland preserve the memory of the day when the Catholic Association, afterwards so powerful, consisted of five men, so I would propose that we should take the period of this debate, to represent the moment when the interests of all who live by industry were at the lowest ebb possible in the Commons' House of Parliament

Much was said in the course of the debate, of the Bill's being "a clergyman's Bill," and "a farmer's Bill;" but take my word for it, as sure as we are landlords and have all taken an oath that we have a substantial interest as such, it will come out "a landlord's Bill" and nothing else. There is manifestly no justice, in the clergy having any deduction made at all, for the charges and inconveniences of collection arising out of the old practice. Why would it not be quite as fair to demand, that the landlords should have no benefit from the change of system, but should be charged with the exact amount of any inconveniences they may escape, *the Church* taking the difference? And is not the equitable division, that each party

should enjoy the advantages respectively accruing to them from the improved mode of collection directed by the Bill? Instead of this, the landlords hold themselves out as the necessary recipients of all savings; and in a packed assembly of landlords there is nobody to offer effectual opposition.

On Tuesday, a great point was carried for the security of the community, by the Orange Lodges being put down without a division. The Member for Middlesex read letters containing matter enough to have hanged a dozen Corresponding Societies; and it was in truth a shocking sight, to those who remembered that unfortunate men of the industrious classes are actually undergoing transportation for having unguardedly exposed themselves under a forced and violent interpretation of the law,—to see a collection of individuals, merely because they were great and powerful, treated to the last with every imaginable deference and compliment, and with a distinct declining on the part of the actual government, to agree in declaring that they had brought themselves within the verge of the law.

After the mover and his very powerful seconder (Sir William Molesworth) sat down, Lord John Russell rose, and commenced by, to a certain extent, running a tilt against them both. After this, the Noble Secretary produced his own plan, which was for an Address to the King, praying him to take measures "for the effectual discouragement of Orange Lodges, and generally of all political societies excluding persons of different religious faith, using secret signs and symbols, and acting by means of associated branches." In this the Liberals of all classes of course were disposed to concur; and then the Orange-men were reduced to an effort to get rid of the mention of their societies by name. Lord Stanley made astonishing efforts to effect this result; and was previously seen carrying a note across the House to the Noble Secretary. The report in the House was, that Lord John Russell had at one time decided on conceding the point, when the Member for Tipperary (Mr. Sheil) went to him and produced convincing reasons to the contrary. However this might be, the Noble Secretary maintained his ground; and I cannot help believing his constancy was in some degree assisted, by the loud cries of "No, No," and "Divide," with which every successive plea for concession was met by what are technically termed "the Tail," and a number of the English Radicals. After Lord John Russell's refusal to concede, Sir Robert Peel exhausted every arrow in his quiver, in trying to make some impression on the House in favour of the overmatched Orange-men; returning to the

attack again and again in different shapes, as each successive attempt was repulsed by the obduracy of his audience. After his final failure, several of the Orange-men endeavoured to put forward a dying plea, or to take credit with their party for pronouncing a decent elegy on their approaching end. And even after the Speaker had put the question, there was "a tiny flourish still," which was met with cries of "Order" from the House.

The result was in fact the triumph of the union of the Irish and English Radicals; who will doubtless live and learn.

London, 27 *Feb.* 1836.

On Thursday, Mr. Lennard moved for a return of the number of soldiers who have suffered corporal punishment or imprisonment since 1830. The Advocate General, if I made no mistake, gave a curious reason for delay;—he said the cases *amounted to thirty thousand.* The motion brought on a debate on Flogging in the Army; and from the whole tenor of the attack and defence, it is plain the practice must speedily go off.

After this came on a debate on the late election of the municipal council at Poole. It appears that a Mayor there, had chosen to try how much he could run in the teeth of the Act of Parliament for conducting municipal elections; and the object of Mr. Blackburne's motion was to get the whole proceedings annulled. Of course the Tories were up in arms; and they had recourse to that strange rule of the House, by which a minority may stop proceedings as long as they chuse, by moving adjournments one after another. My only wonder is, that they did not in this manner stop the Reform Bill till the Russians could come up.

Last night was a debate on the Spanish policy of ministers; brought on by the motion of the Member for Oxford (Mr. Maclean) for papers. A wonderful change has taken place in the tone of the Opposition since the last debate on the same subject. No more treasonable outbreaks, on the *dishonour* incurred by the King's officers, through accepting commands in a force raised by the King's desire. No more abuse of our countrymen in the ranks of the Queen of Spain, whose principal crime I take to be having contributed to prevent the Carlists from getting to Madrid. The Tories have manifestly gotten light. I hope more preparations are in course, for making the scales fall from their eyes.

London, 2 March, 1836.

On Monday, the Irish Municipal Corporations Bill was read a second time without a division, after a very long and interesting debate. The Tory policy is, to try to prevent the Irish Corporations from being made useful to the community, by destroying them altogether. After upholding them with all their might for so many years, they now declare them to be so bad in principle, that nothing but their removal can leave the community in safety. Their principal argument in support of this is, that as the Corporations gave support to *one* faction injurious to the community before, so any alterations that should leave them in existence, would only enable them to give support to *another* faction now; forgetting that the question is not between faction and faction, but between a faction and the commonwealth. As well might it be said,—so far as I can see,—"Be careful how you allow your Police to rout out the nests against which it is directed; for it will only be putting the power into the hands of new nests, who will be just as great a nuisance as the old. And above all things take care you do not bring the matter under popular control, for popular control is everywhere the mischief of mischiefs, which nobody has been able to endure since the foundation of society."

This procedure of the Tories reminds me of the conduct of some of them in respect of franking. While the House of Commons was almost all Tory, it was held the most natural and proper thing in the world that Members should have the power of corresponding without expense with their constituents and others. But when the majority of the House became Liberal, and it was discovered that franks were flying in all directions to Political Unions, and to other societies and individuals engaged in supporting the interests of the people at large, it was found out that franking was a most culpable privilege, and highly discreditable to those who could think of continuing it. Just so it is with the Irish Corporations. So long as they could be used in support of existing injustice, they were good and to be sworn by; as soon as they are likely to be opened to the public, they are bad and to be suppressed.

Last night (Tuesday) was given almost entirely to the arrangement of a general plan for proceedings in the matter of Rail-roads. The only curiosity of the evening, was the undisguised hostility to rail-roads in general, displayed by some of the anti-reforming interest, on the ground that they were to seduce men into attending to distant concerns, instead of staying to mind their own business like good people at home*. Was

* The expressions of this hostility were so amusing, that they appear to have come back again from America in the shape of a burlesque paragraph purporting

Providence quite right in giving us two legs a piece? Might it not have been better, if we had each hopped on one?

London, 5 *March*, 1836.

On Wednesday in Committee on the Prisoner's Counsel Bill, a curious scene occurred upon a point of form; and not without danger of damage to the infant principle of publishing the votes by authority, in which I hope the country by this time has begun to take some interest. When the Committee came to divide, it was discovered that the Resolution of the House declared that upon "every division" the House should be cleared, after which the doors to be opened "by the Speaker's order;" but omission had been made of the words "or Chairman's;" whence it was apprehended, that if the Members once got into the two lobbies, most dangerous consequences might ensue, from the absence of any earthly power to cause the doors of the House to be ever opened again for their admission. This of course was a great triumph for the enemies of the publication of Divisions by authority; and as usual, the point of form went against the Liberals. For my own part, I cannot see why the Chairman should not have followed his orders as far as they were distinct and clear, and left the consequences to take care of themselves. The direction was plain, that on "every division" the House should be cleared. If this had been complied with, the irregularity must have been afterwards committed, of introducing the Members again, without the express words "the Chairman's order" appearing on the Resolution, though that was evidently the spirit of the direction. As it was, the much greater irregularity was committed, of breaking both the letter and spirit of the Resolution, by not obeying the direction to clear the House. But so it is; on all points of form and trials of skill, the Liberals are immeasurably inferior to their opponents. Their enemies act under old and tried leaders; and not a dog gives mouth, but as the seniors of the pack direct. The Liberals have no weapon but their superior hold upon the country, which sends them in a majority to parliament.

After this matter had been settled, disadvantageously to the Liberal side, the Clause in the Bill which gave to prisoners the right of making a full defence by counsel in court, was carried by 134 to 50; but the Clause which proposed to allow parties

to contain the complaints of a citizen of the old school; which lately went the round of the English newspapers. At all events if the American wit was not taken from this source it might have been. Many of the sentiments were identical.—*Editor.*

to be heard by counsel or attorney before justices of the peace, was rejected by 110 to 93. It might be very agreeable to you and others of my constituents, to know from authority what Members voted and on which side; but this luxury you must be contented to forego, by the decision of the House.

The debate was then resumed on the Poole Municipal Election; and after an amendment from the Tory side had been disposed of by 188 to 70, a Committee to inquire was appointed without a division.

On Thursday, in consequence of a question put by Mr. Roebuck, the Secretary for the Home Department was understood to let out some further driblets of hope for the Dorchester labourers. These men, it appears, have some chance of being brought back from New Holland in three years; and the incalculably greater offenders of the Orange lodges, have not yet got there at all.

On the same evening, the Second Reading of the Bill for disfranchising Stafford on account of bribery and corruption, was carried by 53 to 6.

Yesterday (Friday) the Supplies for the Navy, including five thousand additional seamen, passed without a division. The most interesting circumstance attending it, was the strong and general opinion expressed on the necessity of providing against the recurrence of the practice of Impressment.

A motion, by a strange use of a privilege admitted in cases of urgent public interest, was forced into the debate on the Supply, for discontinuing the practice of dividing in two lobbies; which necessarily involves the practice of publishing the Divisions by authority. You see therefore, that this system of publication by authority, in which I doubt not that you and others had begun to rejoice, could not exist a fortnight without being assailed as a great public grievance to be thrust into the debate on the Supplies. The Tories, as usual, had all the skill and science on their side. They felt the pulse of the House; and finding the numbers against them, drew off without allowing themselves to be damaged by a Division, to renew the attack at the time they may see best. Indeed a notice of such attack is put on the list for April 26. It may be hoped the Liberals will employ the interval well; and nothing would probably conduce more forcibly to the effect desired, than that Liberal constituencies in general should require their representatives to transmit to them the printed Divisions as they appear among the Votes, for the purpose of being regularly filed, and that Liberal representatives on the other hand, should prompt their constituents where it may be requisite, to file the lists of

Divisions, and give them currency in the provincial papers, or by any other means attract the attention of the public to their contents. In this way, a mass of interest would be accumulating, which would make it harder day by day for the Tories to succeed in their object of cutting off your knowledge from authority, of how the Members vote.

I must not conclude without saying, that I believe the Liberals mean to stick to their point of carrying the publication of all Divisions by authority; and in the mean time they will be glad of any backing that can be given to them by their constituents and the public at large.

London, 9 March, 1836.

At five minutes after three this morning, upon an adjourned debate, the House of Commons divided on Lord Francis Egerton's Amendment on the Irish Municipal Corporation Bill, the purport of which was to destroy the Irish Corporations with a view to prevent their existence in a reformed state. The numbers were for the Amendment 243, against it 307; majority for the Government 64. The number of the Tories, 243, is precisely the same that voted for the Amendment to the Address on the 4th of last month; the majority against them having increased in the interval, from 41 to 64, or something more than one-half.

The debate on the first day was dull; with the exception of the concluding speech from Lord Howick, who is always good when he is not aristocratic, and on this occasion turned the question round with a new face, as an able counsel does before a *nisi prius* jury at York.

The second day proceeded like the first, till *Jeune* O'Connell (the nephew, Morgan John) enlivened the debate by the display of powers that did no discredit to the name he bears. Another out-spoken and energetic Irishman (Barron of Waterford), was ill supported by his countrymen and his side; and I could not avoid surmising some local jealousy. To men whose trade it is to sit hour after hour, listening with sheepish patience to the feeblest of the feeble and the dullest of the dull, zeal and courage should be too precious, to be allowed to run to waste because they appear a little out of fashion.

O'Connell was in his strength; and boldly launched the declaration, that if the Irish were refused equal laws, they would demand the dissolution of the Union. One deficiency I remarked; which was, that he did not say, the people of England would aid them in the demand. He might have

learned, that the people of England are coming over to him in bulk. and that the great and final reason why Ireland will not be oppressed, is that they, the people of England, are not disposed to stand still and see it. Perhaps you will instil into him whatever may be lacking on this head, when you have the good fortune of receiving him at Hull, as I understand you are to do before long.

Lord Stanley was good in his way; but forced by the necessity of his situation, upon small points and feeble attempts at effect. For example, he made a great effort by pronouncing "here*ticks*" in a ludicrous manner, as distinguished from "heresy;" the fact being all the while, that it *did* make a considerable and substantial difference, whether a Catholic priest to his congregation, had asserted that "heresy" in the abstract was coming down, (which is what all priests, of all possible denominations, take the liberty of doing in their turns), or whether he had pointed their animosity against the *persons* of their neighbours, by saying "the heretics" were in the same state of tumbling to the ground. He ended by quoting thirty lines of Shakspeare (if the newspaper is right in which I counted them); with a most unfortunate tail-piece concluding with the word "party," which brought to all minds the Orangemen who were *not* intended, instead of the Liberals who were.

Sir Robert Peel quoted the Mirror of Parliament and Virgil: and ended with an allusion to "the Protestant mind of England," intended for a threat. I can only trust, that the Protestant mind of England will read him an unexpected version of the history.

The final result is one to be received with satisfaction in all families; as being another step towards the removal of the evils with which the folly and corruption of our ancestors have compassed us about.

London, 12 March, 1836.

On Thursday, Mr. Divett made his motion on the subject of the removal of the additional duty of 50 per cent on retail spirit licenses. The Chancellor of the Exchequer begged the House to wait, till he should propose his general plan for the arrangement and alteration of duties in April; and as there appeared something fair in this, Mr. Hume and others of the Liberals were disposed to acquiesce in the proposal. But as some still held off, there was evidently the chance of a split; and the Tories poured into the House, in hopes of getting a majority against the Government. Dr. Bowring moved as an

amendment, that the question should be postponed till after the Report of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; which we only carried by 165 to 155. Had my senior colleague and myself been able to see one another, I have no doubt that we should have voted together,—and that as it was, the decision of each depended on his having been told or not told, of the tactics the Tories were practising on the occasion.

On Friday, I voted in two minorities with Mr. Hume; one for a reduction of 5,000 men in the standing army, where the Ayes were 43 and the Noes 136; and the other for placing the Foot Guards on the same footing as the troops of the line, where the Ayes were 46 and the Noes 217. I mention this because I believe I have an engagement with certain honest men at Hull, on questions of military finance to vote with Mr. Hume. "If it would be agreeable to anybody to know the different voters on these occasions, I am sorry to say it is not yet the pleasure of the House that the divisions in Committee should be published by authority.

I inclose a copy of a letter addressed, at the request of a friend, to the File-makers of Sheffield, through the medium of the *Sheffield Iris**. Any progress towards a community of

---

* THE FILE TRADE.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE SHEFFIELD IRIS.

London, 5 *March*, 1836.

SIRS,—Seeing in a copy of your paper lately sent to me, an account of the disputes between the working File-makers and their employers, I cannot but feel great regret, that a well-intentioned body of men such as I have invariably found every portion of the operatives to be, should in any degree run counter to their own interests, and play into the hands of that gigantic oppression under which they and every other part of the industrious community have for twenty years been suffering. The real state of the case I take to be this. The File-makers of Sheffield might have made and sold files to all the world that ever heard of one, if the law would have allowed it. But the landlords conceiting they had an interest, which has turned out to be no interest at all, put themselves in the way to stop it. They got possession of the avenues to law;—they got to be the law-makers;—they made every man swear, before he could be a law-maker, that he had a distinct pecuniary interest, or one they thought so, in deciding *against* the interests of the community at large, and *in favour* of the particular interest which intended to rob, and has only burnt its fingers after all. They did what a jury would do, which should determine that no man should be admitted into their number, that had not 300*l.* or 600*l.* a-year connected with one side of the question in hand, and against the other; and then they passed a law, not exactly that a File-maker should not be allowed to send his files across the sea, but that he should not be allowed to bring home in return the thing which would sell here for as much money as would pay him with a profit. He might bring home anything he liked *that would not pay*; but the thing that the people abroad had more of than they could use and therefore could afford to sell cheap, and the people here had less of than they wanted and therefore would be glad to pay for high, this thing the File-makers were not to bring, nor others for them.

Now suppose there were no hope whatever of the File-makers ever escaping from this horridly unjust state of law;—suppose it were quite clear that foreign

feeling upon the subject of it, between the maritime and the manufacturing towns, must have a tendency to be useful to both.

London, 16 *March*, 1836.

THE most remarkable occurrence in the House of Commons on Monday, was the announcement of Lord John Russell, in answer to a question from that very active member Mr. Wakley, that the King had been advised to grant a free pardon to *all* the Dorchester labourers. This, I imagine, may be considered as one of the fruits of Mr. Hume's victory over the Orange Lodges.

On Tuesday the table of the House was loaded with Petitions for the total abolition of the Stamp on Newspapers. Seldom has man seen such a muster. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in reply, came down with a proposition for reducing the Stamp to a penny, to include the postage; but stated that he did not mean in any degree to prejudice or prevent the full

---

commerce was for ever and for ever to be prohibited by Act of Parliament; would that make it reasonable that the File-makers should aid their oppressors in cutting up such diminished trade as the present state of the law allows them? It is plain that the prohibition to import bread in return for files, is a bounty offered to foreign File-makers. If the people on the Continent might pay for files in corn, that is to say with the corn which would sell here for the same money as the goods with which they are now obliged to pay instead, they would save, say 20 per cent. This 20 per cent therefore, would be cut off from what they can now afford to offer to a File-maker in their own country, by *allowing* the importation of their corn; *and* is kept added by the *refusal*. But will the File-makers oblige their employers to give up the share they might have in this diminished trade, by endeavouring to impose on them unjust restrictions as to what men they shall employ, and what apprentices they shall take? The object of the File-makers must be supposed to be, to cause files to be made by ten men instead of twelve, in hopes that the ten will get the wages of the twelve. But how if the rise in the price of files which first or last must be the consequence, should reduce the quantity that can be disposed of in the foreign markets, in the proportion of ten to twelve? Have the File-makers thoroughly considered all the probabilities of this?

I can have no hesitation in saying, that all these disputes between the masters and the employed, act as only so many tubs for the whale, and distract the attention of all from the great source and origin of the mischief. So long as the operatives and their employers can be kept squabbling on these twopenny differences, the land-owners feel safe that they will not combine to put down the million grievance that oppresses both. Why the employers, who have more leisure, more access to knowledge, than the operatives, should be so supine as they always have been:—why they should sell the great birthright of commerce for such miserable messes of pottage as can befal them in return, is more than I ever could explain. Why the maritime towns, which ought to carry out the files and bring home the corn, should all be asleep, is equally inexplicable. Let us hope that the evil may be corrected, by the operatives getting the start of their employers in knowledge, as they are already the foremost in the suffering.

I am, Sirs, your obedient servant,
T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

discussion of the question on a future occasion. It struck me there was a softness in his eye, which indicated that like Virgil's nymph he had at least imagined the possibility of being followed up in his retreat; and therefore, were I to advise, it would be to agitate the question to the utmost in the period that is to intervene. The only argument I heard advanced from this quarter, much resembled one of those defences which do not contemplate ultimate success. It was, that it was not fair to make the man who received a London newspaper at Edinburgh, pay a postage for it, while the man who read it in London paid none. If this is equity, why is not the Twopenny Post rate increased to pay for the transmission of letters to Edinburgh?

Disputes of this kind are generally settled by a compromise. I should like to know what sum the Chancellor of the Exchequer calculates upon from his penny Stamp on all newspapers, and what imposition upon the portion of newspapers sent by post would bear him harmless, leaving the rest free. If a fair offer was made him upon this point, would he come forward and declare, that his object was not revenue, but the prevention of the circulation of cheap information among the poor?

The agriculturists, or the unreasonable part of them, had a great defeat the same night on their proposed increase of the duty on Foreign Tallow. They were to raise the duty from 3*l.* 10*s.* a ton to 10*l.*; and by this they were to put 300,000*l.* into the pockets of the agriculturists, or as was further explained, a sheep was to be increased in value by 2*s.* 8*d.* and an ox by 19*s.* Now invite our friends at Hull, to follow me through the way in which this gain to the agriculturists was to be raised, and where it was to come from. In the first place there was to be an end to the trade of Manchester, Wigan, Blackburn, &c., which is now engaged in furnishing the cotton-twist or other goods with which tallow is bought from Russia. And next there was to be an end of the shipping trade of Hull or London, which is now engaged in carrying the goods to Russia and bringing back the tallow. All this trade was to be put an end to, and the precise amount or value of it transferred into the pockets of the agriculturists. How far this may be just;—what right the agriculturists were born with, to take *your* honest trade out of your mouths and put it into their own by Act of Parliament;—is what I leave to yourselves to settle. But I do not see why it should not be equally just, that *you* should put a tax on English tallow, for the sake of increasing the quantity which would be bought with the manufactures of Manchester, Wigan, and Blackburn, and

transported out and home in your ships. I say I cannot see why one should be a bit more unjust than the other; and therefore I advise you to apply to parliament to have it at least turn and turn about.

But this is not all—nor half of it. This accounts only for the old price; but it is no part of the intention of the agriculturists that tallow should continue at the old price. Their avowed object is to raise the price of tallow, say from 2*l.* to 3*l.* for a given quantity. We have accounted for the 2*l.*; it is to be taken out of the pockets of the people of Manchester, Wigan, Blackburn, and Hull, and put into the pockets of the agriculturists instead. And this perhaps you will say,—according to the Negro proverb I learned on the decks of a Hull ship,—is "only *changee* for *changee*." But where is the additional 1*l.*, which is to be the increase of price, to come from? I will tell you. It is to be taken once from the people who burn tallow candles, and once over again from the shop-keepers or others, with whom the tallow-burners would have spent the money if they had been let alone. So that 1*l.* is to go into the pockets of the agriculturists, and the value of 2*l.* is to be taken out of the pockets of other people to get it for them; the difference, or second 1*l.*, being utterly wasted and thrown into the fire, in the same way as if a man should allow himself to be persuaded to have his fire-wood cut with a blunt axe instead of a sharp one, on the pretence of the benefit it was to be to wood-cutters. Indulge me with going through this simple case; for it is the simplest of all, and exactly analogous to the other. You are advised to hire two wood-cutters, at a shilling a-day each, with blunt axes, to do the work that would be done for you by one wood-cutter with a sharp axe for a shilling. And you are told that if *you* lose a shilling by the process, the wood-cutters gain one. But I ask you, whether this is all. Suppose you had been in the habit of spending these daily shillings on a gardener to grow you cabbages. Is or is not the loss of trade to this gardener, quite equal to the increase of trade to the wood-cutters? And if it is, then do not this loss and gain balance each other exactly, and is not the necessary consequence that *your* loss,—your loss of the shilling or of the cabbages,—is a *second* loss, and that there are on the whole *two* shillings-worth of loss, for one that is to be gained by the fraternity of wood-cutters? Apply this rigidly to the question of the Tallow; and then say whether I was or was not right, in telling you the agriculturists were to gain 1*l.* by taking 2*l.* from other people.

Two or three things I heard asserted in the debate, were so

curious, that I cannot help wishing to set our shop-keepers, and fore-mast-men on Dockside, talking upon them that we might have their opinions. But as time runs short, they shall be deferred to another letter.

London, 19 *March*, 1836.

IN Tuesday's debate on the question of stopping the trade in Russian tallow, there were some points which I promised to bring forward for the amusement of our friends at Hull.

The first, was the assertion, that our imports from Russia are three times as great as our exports to it; which was gravely offered as a reason why our trade with Russia should be stopped by Act of Parliament. Before going any farther, what does this assertion mean? Does it mean that two-thirds of the goods brought to Hull from Russia are never paid for, but the Russians in their bounty make us a present of the same;—or that if it was so, this would be a reason for giving over the trade, and not rather for trying to increase it with such kind-hearted customers? But if nobody is found silly enough to say it means this, then let us try to lay down what it really *does* mean; and let us suppose two or three rising young clerks from merchants' counting-houses, and two or three of the better class of forecastle-men who hope to rise to the rank and station of second mate and thence to mate and master, to be called to form a committee to decide whether we have talked sense or nonsense when all is over. I say then, that the assertion that the imports from Russia are greater than the exports, means nothing but this;—that the goods received from Russia are not all paid for by goods that are entered in the Custom-house books as going to Russia, but many of them by goods that go some other way. And the ways in which they go, I submit are these.

1st, There are the goods that go to make a roundabout trade. For example, the Russians get wine or brandy from Portugal, and a Hull ship carries Leeds cloths to Oporto, which are sold there for the good bills of Portuguese merchants, and these bills are transferred to a Russian in payment for hemp brought by one of your ships to Hull. Is there anything in *this* trade, that ought to be stopped by Act of Parliament? When anybody will pretend to show why, it will be time enough to answer.

2ndly, A part of the payment to Russia may be made in hard money; or if you please, in sovereigns. And where, let me ask, is the harm of that? Sovereigns are not found in

parsley-beds, or under apple-trees; but made of gold bought in Peru or elsewhere with English manufactures either directly or in some roundabout way, just as much as gold watch-cases or drinking-cups. If gold plate went out to Russia in payment for hemp brought to Hull, nobody would stand up in parliament, and say it must be stopped to prevent a scarcity of gold plate at home. And why, but because it is plain to the weakest capacity, that there is nothing about a trade in gold plate that is not common to all other kinds of trade; that either the gold plate must come in on one side as fast as it goes out on the other (bating only the small rise of price that may be necessary to give a fillip to the gold trade and set it in motion), or the transit of gold plate to Russia must speedily stop of itself? To stop such a trade in gold plate for fear of making a famine of plate at home, would be as senseless as to stop the transit of Port wine or coffee for fear of making a famine of those articles at home; as senseless, in short, as it would be to prohibit all transit trade by Act of Parliament, by way of increasing the quantity of goods consumed at home. If anything so inexorably stupid was carried into effect, would not the immediate result be, that the merchants would order a proportionally less quantity of goods from their foreign correspondents? Would any man in England get a pint of wine the more, or a cup of coffee, from this childish attempt to dam up drinkables at home by prohibiting transit trade? But if this be true of coffee and gold plate, it is equally true of sovereigns, which are nothing but bits of gold with a public mark upon them to save weighing and assaying. If a thousand sovereigns are sent to Russia to pay for hemp brought to Hull, this will in a slight degree raise the value of the sovereigns left at home, in the same way that the transmission of a thousand bags of coffee instead, would have slightly raised the value of the coffee left at home. And this will give a fillip to the British trade with Peru or elsewhere, for gold to make more sovereigns of, just as sending the coffee would have given a fillip to somebody's trade, with Turkey it may be, for coffee. If it is said, that the value of the sovereign will be raised in every man's pocket at home, till the gold flows in from Peru, and that this will be great loss and damage to somebody;—so will the value of the pound of coffee be raised in every man's locker, till the coffee flows in from Turkey, and where is the harm of that? The argument if good for anything, would stop all transit trade; and if it is not reasonable that all transit trade should be stopped, then the argument in the case of gold is good for nothing. The

first light I ever happened to get on this subject, was from an old French merchant at Sierra Leone, who on being consulted on some question connected with the currency of the colony, replied, "*Sare,* money is one merchan*dize.*" Depend upon it, the principles that regulate the commerce in gold, are the same as those of any other "merchan*dize;*" and all that goes to the contrary, is only "Currency" nonsense, or part and portion of the fallacies with which the world has been abused upon that subject.

3rdly, There is the portion that may be paid for by goods smuggled into Russia through some other country, and which of course do not appear among our exports to Russia. I do not know whether in the particular case of Russia this quantity is small or great; but I do know that many of the smaller manufacturing towns in England subsist almost entirely on the manufacture of articles which are exported to one foreign country for the sake of being smuggled into another.

These three ways are all I know of, by which the difference between the imports and exports entered in the Custom-house books may be accounted for; but it is not impossible there may be more. Whether there are more or not, I stop to submit to our committee before alluded to, that there is not made out a reason which would satisfy a boy of five years old, or girl either, that the trade of Hull in Russian tallow ought to be stopped because the imports under the head of Russia in the Custom-house books are greater than the exports.

The next thing that struck me as amusing, was the assertion, that the trading and manufacturing part of the community were rapidly coming to a consciousness of the interest they have in the prosperity of the agriculturists,—meaning thereby, their interest in giving the agriculturists more for a given quantity of produce than it could be procured for from abroad. The proposition, put into plain English, is briefly this. "Give us sixty shillings instead of thirty for a hogshead of tallow or a quarter of corn, and then we will buy sixty shillings-worth of your manufactures instead of thirty." In other words, you shall give us sixty shillings-worth of manufactures for a quarter of corn instead of thirty, or have half as much corn for a web of cloth as you used to have. I should not have believed there were men so "soft" as to be taken in by this, if I had not seen it. But it is quite true, that there are men calling themselves traders and manufacturers, who every now-and-then beg of the House of Commons to be allowed to represent the interest they feel in "agricultural prosperity," meaning thereby the agriculturists' obtaining increased prices through

stopping foreign trade. I *doubt* these men being all so "soft;" there is another way of accounting for the phænomenon. They may be little jobbers in some hole or corner, who think they see a chance, that if the agriculturists levy a tax upon the whole community, a greater quantity of it will come into their own particular tills, than will pay for their own particular shares in the general damage.

I am sorry to trouble you with all this. But if it is true, I cannot help believing the people of Hull are interested in it, and that it may count towards showing our political opponents to have been wrong, (as I dare say they have been elsewhere), when they said you had a representative who would never contribute his mite towards the welfare of a commercial town.

On Thursday the House adjourned at a quarter before eight o'clock, in consequence of the resistance made by the Liberals in the House to the introduction of a clause authorising imprisonment for debt, in the Macclesfield Small Debts Bill. The secret of their weakness, was that most of the Irish Brigade were keeping St. Patrick's Day; which, as St. Patrick comes but once a year, can be no great source of triumph to the enemy. It had this bad effect however, that the Liberals were beaten by 23 on the motion to leave out the clause; and on the next day, as there appeared no alternative between throwing out the Bill and allowing it to pass with the clause, the objectionable clause was conserved.

On Friday there was a long debate on the subject of the occupation of Cracow; with no result except the demonstrations of hostility to the arbitrary principle which were made in the course of it. The House in Committee was occupied till half past one, with the Irish Corporations bill.

London, 23 *March*, 1836.

My account of the proceedings in the House of Commons on Tuesday ought not to conclude without noting, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave such an abrupt and decided refusal to any entertainment of the plot for putting an end to the trade in Russian tallow, as may be construed to hold out considerable security against new encroachments of the "agricultural interest" in that *or any immediately similar* direction. I suspect that, between his speech and the strength of the Division, *that* earth is stopped, and there will not be a speedy repetition of the demand for cutting off any *new* portion of our trade, to put a fraction of the loss into the pockets of other people. But in other directions, I am far from feeling any confidence of the

same kind. Through that mixture of corruption with the ignorance of early ages, which passes by the ludicrous name of the "wisdom of our ancestors," the legislature is formed of individuals who have taken an oath that they have what was conceived to be a strong pecuniary interest one way, and that way *against you;* and however true it may be that some individuals may be disposed to decide wisely and well in spite of such an attempt to bias, it would be perfectly miraculous if the bias did not tell upon the whole. Depend upon it, the "agricultural interest" as it calls itself,—and I use the words in sarcasm, because there is not wanting in the House of Commons a portion of the agriculturists whose eyes are open to the ultimate failure of all schemes of injustice towards others,—is destined to eat up all that can be eaten; and then I hope it will bite against a file. There has evidently been a shuffling, about the ministerial Tithe bill; and you may be agreeably disappointed, as I shall be, if it does not end in the land-owners getting an increased slice out of the Tithes, and coming upon the public in a year or two for a bill to support the clergy. Their next attempt will probably be upon the fund-holders, through a debasement of the currency; and though they may here appear to meet with a check from the fact that an artificial rise of money prices would go to annihilate the present provisions of the Corn Laws, it does not seem to be beyond either their cunning or their power, to effect some arrangement which should secure the one object without letting go the other. Like a fever, they will run their course; but if the constitution can only hold out, the time must come when they will be got under, like other evils in the body politic. After cutting off you and your fellow-citizens from foreign trade by Act of Parliament, they will go on declaring themselves to be the suffering interest; and the same tribunal from which the mischief sprang, will listen to them with partial ears. After shutting up you and themselves in one common injury, and making the country a fraction of the country which in wealth and strength and happiness it might have been, they will produce their own share of the general misery, as reason why they are to be exempted from one tax after another; and thus they will go on filling your gaols with debtors and the Gazette with bankrupts, till the progress of knowledge opens the eyes of the public, and then their history will be bequeathed to posterity, as an example of the peril of allowing one overbearing interest to get possession of the avenues to law, and ride rough-shod over the rest till the common misery effects abatement of the nuisance.

Against Tallow-plots, however, the Whig government was

stark. And another great step towards justice was proclaimed by it on the same day, in the determination to lay the Stamp Duties of different kinds, according to an *ad valorem* rate, instead of a rate increasing upon the poorer classes and diminishing systematically as it is extended to the rich, as the usé and wont in such cases has been. The doing men right, is like the letting out of water; and God only knows how far this piece of Whig justice may go before it has done.

On Monday, the consideration of the Tithes Commutation bill was put off till Friday. The Municipal Corporations Act Amendment bill, the Irish Constabulary bill, and the Naval Supplies, were considered in ridiculously thin Committees, arising out of the resolution that the voting in Committee shall take place in "huggermugger,"—(a good word, as I note for the benefit of our friendly critic of the *Packet*, and illustrated by Johnson as follows,—"Secrecy; bye-place.—There's a distinction between what's done openly and barefaced, and a thing that's done in *huggermugger*, under a seal of secrecy and concealment. *L'Estrange.*") The fact is, that men will not attend, where they are told by a direct Resolution, that their names shall not be published for their constituents; and so jobbery flourishes. This is the more important, because it is understood that a dead set is to be made from various quarters, against the abominable innovation of publishing Divisions by authority.

On Tuesday Mr. Fowell Buxton moved for a Committee to inquire into the working of the apprenticeship system in the colonies; which was agreed to by the government. The West-Indian party made a slight show of opposition; but not enough to provoke anybody to rip up the general badness of their case.

London, 26 *March*, 1836.

As there does not happen to be anything of great length to report, I take leave to continue the examination of the plan for stopping your trade in Russia Tallow, in the way of tracing its effects on the different classes of individuals of whom your community is composed. It cannot be necessary to tell your merchants, that a trade put an end to by a tax, is a trade lost; and that they *would* have lost a trade in tallow, to the exact amount of the tallow they imported and sold before the tax, and could not import afterwards. Nor will they be slow in finding out that this stoppage to their trade must have displayed itself, in a proportionate number of bankruptcies, or else retirements from

business to avoid them, the exact amount of which, they are much more likely to be able to guess at, than any other parties that could be named. And these failing or retiring merchants, must of course carry with them a proportionate number of clerks and subordinates of all kinds. A proportionate number of young men designed by their parents for business, must be returned upon their parents' hands, to be a burthen instead of an assistance. A number of these must be baulked in their honest prospects of settling in the world by marriage as their fathers did before them. There must be grief in families, among mothers, sisters, wives, and those that hoped to be. And all this, because a stupid and unjust law had been made, to take away your honest trade with an Act of Parliament instead of with a pistol, and give it to somebody else, with a huge loss to the community at large during the process.

And could it be any more necessary to tell your ship-builders and ship-carpenters, that if the tallow goes, the shipping that carried it must go with it? That there must have been silence of the mallet in your dock-yards, to the exact extent of the shipping this tallow had employed? Or to tell your seafaring men and all their kin, that there must have been fewer boys apprenticed to the sea, more of those who had served their time unable to find ships, fewer foremast-men rising to be mates, fewer mates to masters, and more masters eating up their money in the banks at home because there were not ships to go to sea? All this seems plain enough; but is this all? When all these merchants, ship-builders, sailors, clerks, and servants, have been laid upon the shelf, will your tailors make more clothes, your druggists sell more rhubarb and diaculon, your watch-makers more watches, will your lawyers have more deeds to draw, your doctors have more to cure, your clergy more children to christen or couples to marry, your bankers more accounts to keep? Will anybody show me one living man in Hull, who directly or indirectly will not be the worse?

But if all this would be the consequence of raising the duty on tallow from 3*l.* 10*s.* to 10*l.*, is it not clear that a proportionate degree of mischief must have been done by laying on the duty of 3*l.* 10*s.* at all?—that in consequence of this duty, you must at this moment be so much worse than you might have been?—that there must have been just so many traders in the list of bankrupts, who might have been now holding up their heads on 'Change; so many youths thrown back upon their parents; and so many men and women, young and old, sinking under the misery of having been what is called "unfortunate in life"? And if all this comes by tallow, is it not just as plain, that it

would have come, and did come, by everything else in which your foreign trade was prohibited or checked by duties? Can it then be any secret, why year after year the language of distress has been heard from your town;—why there was nothing but complaints,—and I am sure they came to me in India,—that Hull was pining, pining, and honest men could not get a living in the place? There may have been better times since: but if there have, assuredly they did not come by the duties that check your foreign trade, but in spite of them, and would have been so much better still, if the duties had been away.

Besides all this, there is the mischief of raising a farthing candle to a halfpenny, for all the burners of candles; and taking all this amount over again, from the traders of various kinds, with whom the candle-burners would have spent the difference if they had been let alone.

Now what have the Tories in Hull to urge, for their constant fighting for the destruction of your trade by all manner of foolish prohibitions, and most of all, that giant folly, the prohibition of trade in corn? What do they or any of you get by it? Ask them if they can show you. Will they buy you up, by offering to build two or three ships for some of the monopolies they intend to leave? This is the way men gull themselves and one another. They have got into their heads that the destruction of your trade is part and portion of "good government;" that the freedom of your commerce is a "disorganising doctrine." There is no help for it; you must not quarrel with them, except when they ask for your vote: they will have children that will be wiser, if they never mend themselves.

In my next, if opportunity serves, I will try to show how little real reason an honest and sensible agriculturist has to fear the restoration of your commerce; and how utterly untrue it is that God has made one set of men to be finally benefited by the oppression of another. And in this lies your hope. When men are of a certain strength, there is no beating them but by recruiting in their own ranks against the rest.

On Thursday Mr. Robinson presented eight Resolutions on Taxation to the House of Commons; according to, I believe, his annual custom. They were neither very good nor very bad. But as there was nothing positively objectionable in them, except in one relating to the Currency, I regret they did not meet with more acceptation from our side of the House. The Liberals do not seem to understand the policy, of accepting all the good the other side may lapse into.

On Friday progress was made with the English Tithe Commutation bill in Committee, as far as the 12th clause. Lord

John Russell appeared in feeble health; contradicting the intimations from some quarters, that he was suffering under *indisposition* of another kind.

London, 29 March, 1836.

I ENGAGED to show that the agriculturists have no real interest in suppressing our foreign trade. Let us take a case, then, in those countries which have been much before the minds of all our friends in consequence of late events. If it should turn out that *Boothia Felix*, or any other part of the coast of the Polar seas, was all made of alternate layers of coal and iron, (and I am not sure that there are not appearances of both these substances being abundant in those regions),—such a country would be very likely to be at some time the seat of extensive manufactures, population, and wealth. And if it should also happen,—which is not impossible,—that coal and iron should fail in the rest of the world, the consequence would be inevitable, that our Manchesters, Sheffields, and Glasgows, would all have to migrate northward, and there would be as great a change as when wealth and political power removed themselves from Rome to bleak and savage Britain, a prophecy of which would have been just as incredible to an ancient Roman, as a similar one with respect to the Polar regions might be to some English of our day. Towns would be built with covered roads warmed by steam; and railways would in time be tunnelled under the ice, from one great cotton-factory to another all the way to the North Pole. But what are the people to live on? Manifestly, foreign corn. The country might produce "small salad" in August; or new potatoes and green peas might be got under glass, and gooseberries be made about as plentiful as pine-apples are here. But the great staple of food, must be brought from other countries, as certainly as the cotton which they span. Suppose then, that after some progress had been made, Sir Felix Booth, if he be the happy land-owner, should be persuaded to say he would have a Corn Law;—that he would confine the people of the country to such corn or other vegetables, as could be grown in chinks and crannies with a south aspect, or in other ways be created at a greater expense than importing from abroad;—with the idea that he should get more rent from the miserable in-dwellers. And first, what would the Parliament of Boothia say to such a plan? Would there be any persuading them, that the great gains to the lord of Boothia, were to be shed abroad upon them in fertilising showers, and the last state of their country was to

be better than the first? Or if the process of restriction had begun, would they allow Sir Felix to produce himself as the great suffering interest, and recommend himself in a King's speech for relief by tightening the laws, or diminishing his contributions to the public purse? And next, is there any probability that the lord of Boothia himself should not perceive, that to execute such a law, would be to cut down his rents to what they are at present—*nothing?* He would never be gulled by the notion, that all the foreign corn brought into the country, was so much taken away from what he would grow himself; because he would know with a perfect knowledge, that make Corn Laws as he pleased, he would never grow it at all. He would know that he should not grow, not only the corn, but the rein-deer mutton that would have been eaten along with it. He would be fully aware, like a sensible owner of icebergs as he is, that though in the new state of things he might receive higher rents for some nooks and corners which under famine prices might be made to produce what men could eat, he would lose enormously upon the whole, by the absence of what he used to make of his lands in various ways arising out of the country's being covered with a flourishing commercial and manufacturing population. In short he would beg and pray, that the country might not be carried back to what it is at present. He would be the very last man,—unless, what nobody believes, he is demented and incapable of taking care of his own affairs,—that either now or at any conceivable period, would go to the trouble of hatching a Corn Law.

And what is true of him, would be true of all that in any shape lived by land. There would not be a man in Boothia, gentle or simple, that would put his head out of his pea-jacket to ask for such a foolish thing as having the foreign trade in corn prevented by Act of Parliament. The farmers, if such there were, would ask what was to be done with their sons, if employment in manufactures and foreign trade were stopped. A farmer may have one son take his own place, but he cannot have a dozen; or if they try, they must only bid one against another, and so starve the whole, as men are doing now; and a labourer the same. If, by purchase from the great owner, there were petty landlords, they would be in exactly the same predicament in respect of their children; their tall idle sons, and gaunt unmarried daughters, must all come and live on them at home as so many miserable annuitants. None could go forth to make a fortune by trade; for there would be a law against trading to make fortunes by. All these classes would see themselves threatened with being shut up as in a cage;

and all would have the pinching consciousness, that to cut down the trade and manufactures of Boothia to what could be kept on Boothian corn, would be the maddest of all follies for the landed interest of Boothia in the end.

You will say, this is an extreme case; and so it is. But will anybody show me, how the same effects shall not arise in due proportion, in a situation where the circumstances shall be less extreme? Do the landlords about Hull, for instance, really think that it is for their interest that Hull should be cut off from all the trade and commerce that would arise out of a free trade in corn? Suppose they grew less corn;—would not gardening do for them as well; and does not this change always take place in the neighbourhood of large and flourishing towns, and nobody complain? Sift this; try to work it out. Some of your farmers told me at the last election, that their state was really so bad, that they had a mind to try whether the removal of the Corn Laws might not make it better. Invite them to consider, whether the Boothian farmers would not come to exactly the same conclusion.

When a Corn Law was first laid on, either in Boothia or here, it is likely enough that a spirt of encouragement might be given to the farming trade, by the rise of prices which at the time ensued. But the farmers would soon multiply, and the demand come down, till the two ends met, and the farmers were in exactly the same condition as before, except that there were four of them bidding against one another for farms instead of three, and that there was moreover this new feature in their case, that they were cut off from employment for their children in other directions, in consequence of the check put upon the general industry of the country. In short they would find, that they had baked a cake for other people, and had to eat it themselves. And their only way of getting with any comfort out of the scrape, would be simply this;—they must ask to have foreign corn admitted into Boothia again, not all at once, but by such gradations as shall allow the good they will derive from the openings made for the employment of their children in industry of other kinds than farming, and from the general prosperity of the country, to something like keep pace with the temporary depression which may arise to the farming trade during the process of returning to an honest system,—such depression being in fact the converse or counterpart to that spirt of improvement to their trade, which was stated as the temporary consequence of laying on the prohibition. And when they have got out of the bog, the next thing they have to do is to take care never to come there again, and to eat off their own

fingers sooner than think of employing them in trying to take money out of their friends the manufacturers' pockets by a Corn Law. This is what they must come to at last; and there is no occasion for any quarrelling, any ill-will. The process is going on fast enough. The harpoon is in their backs, and they know it. They may thrash for some time with their tail, and spout a little yet through their blow-holes in Parliament; but they must turn the white up before long, and then they will come alongside and be ours.

On Monday the Third Reading of the Irish Municipal Corporations bill was moved in the House of Commons. Except a very brilliant speech from Sheil, there was little but repetition of former debates. At two in the morning the Third Reading was carried by 260 to 199; majority 61. In the last division on the same Bill (on the morning of 9th March) the numbers were 307 to 243; majority 64. So that if the present majority were increased in proportion to the number in the House on the preceding occasion, it would be 73.

To-day (Tuesday) the Report of the Hull and Selby Railway was brought up; and notice was given by Colonel Sibthorp that he would oppose the Third Reading, which takes place to-morrow.

London, 31 *March*, 1836.

On Tuesday, after the proceedings noticed in my last letter, a lively debate ensued on the ministerial appointments to the magistracy. The Tories maintained, that though they had appointed Tory lieutenants in the counties, and Tory magistrates everywhere else where they had the power, they now were "sensible 'twas very wrong," and *their* error was no excuse for Lord John Russell's rejecting six Conservatives at Bristol. This is of a piece with their attempt to destroy the Irish Corporations.

The remarkable point in the evening, was Mr. Roebuck's attack upon Sir Robert Peel, and the way in which the late prime minister was brought out in reply.

On Wednesday the Third Reading of the Hull and Selby Railway bill was carried by 128 to 9; and the bill passed the House of Commons.

On the same day I sent to the committee of your Municipal Corporation for watching Parliamentary proceedings, a notice by Mr. Balfour for obliging Whale Ships to carry out twelve months' provisions, and a Bill brought in by Mr. Baines and Dr. Lushington for relieving certain classes of Dissenters from

the Declaration required for becoming members of a Municipal Corporation, and substituting another Declaration.

The House at rising adjourned till Monday 11th April. And so I take my leave for the holidays.

London, 13 *April*, 1836.

On Monday night I made one with Mr. Hume in a division of 9 to 53, against keeping up the "volunteer corps" in Great Britain and Ireland. I apprehend that you will find the corps thus designated are principally if not entirely yeomanry cavalry; and that you will agree with me, that the real effect of these corps, is to arm the agriculturists who ride horses, against the manufacturers who generally do their work on foot. In short, the "Corn-Law Guards," would perhaps be the appropriate title to which they should be gazetted for their services.

As the division was in Committee, the people will not have the satisfaction of being officially informed of the way in which their representatives severally voted. And I can further tell them, that the Tories have a motion before the House, for involving all our divisions in the same kind of discreditable secrecy.

On Tuesday Mr. Ewart (Liverpool) moved for leave to bring in a Bill for the equal division of landed property among children in cases of intestacy; and was *refused* by the votes of the ministry. I wish these ministers would not throw dirt upon our beards, the night after we come up from trying to keep the people in the country a little to their standard. The Member for Truro (Mr. Tooke) opposed the leave to bring in the Bill, by intimating that it would injure the House of Lords; and because the member for Bath (Mr. Roebuck) replied to this, the ministers took advantage of it to say, that if the discussion had been confined to a question of political economy, they would have voted for the motion, but because an opponent of the motion had introduced the House of Lords, they would not. The sum and substance of the arguments against us, amounted to this;—"The House of Lords cannot be supported but by keeping up a habit of injustice, therefore a habit of injustice must be kept up that the House of Lords may be supported." Subsidiary arguments of other kinds were used. One said an alteration of the law would be nugatory and produce no effect at all, and another said an alteration of the law would bring down the whole frame of policy established by our ancestors. But striking off the arguments that cut against each other,

I think what is given above, was the substance of what remained.

Leave was refused, by a majority of 45 to 29. As was shrewdly intimated, in respect of the question of Primogeniture this is only "the beginning of the end."

London, 16 *April,* 1836.

On Wednesday the question of Military Flogging was brought before the House of Commons, and with the very unexpected result, of the ministry taking the most decided part in insisting on the continuance of the practice, producing thereby a majority of 212 to 95 in favour of keeping us what Mr. Cobbett denominated "a flogged people." To us who remember how bitterly the mere inactivity of the government on this question was thrown in the faces of the Liberals at the last election, the fact must seem peculiarly deplorable; and my constituents at Hull will probably all join in the feeling, which induced me to tell the ministers in as plain terms as I was able, that I believed the section of the Liberals in our part of the country whom we sometimes distinguish by the name of Whigs, would be heartily ashamed of the way in which their nominal leaders had fallen behind the spirit of the times on this occasion.

But there is some secret. It is not in the nature of things, that men of good families and decent education, should exhibit themselves hour after hour, pouring out the obsolete commonplaces which their party has risen to power by exploding, risking the attachment of their followers, and running at every moment against the memory of some great man among their predecessors who lives in the hearts of the community for having trampled on the very absurdities to which they are now contented to appeal,—without some reason, gross, palpable, and capable of being defined. Shall I attempt the definition? They have submitted to a compact, which it would not be difficult to bring within the limits of what in the cases of unprosperous men is denominated treason, for excepting the regulation of the Army from the constitutional responsibility and direction which apply to the other branches of the government. They have consented to undertake a fragment of the administration, and to allow the remaining fraction to lapse into the state of irresponsibility in which it may have existed under the Tudors and the Plantagenets. Instead of a responsible administrator of the Army, the ministers (with my ears I heard them say it) are to be responsible for the selection of the

irresponsible; and with this kind of "responsibility once removed," and next of kin to no responsibility at all, the people are to be cheated of a fraction of the constitutional monarchy they thought they had secured. The Army is to be a *casus omissus;* it is to be out of the constitution, or to be a constitution to itself. The British government is to be a party to the Quadruple Treaty; save always St. James's and the Horse Guards, and they are to be with the camp of Don Carlos. We have not a government; or we have two governments. We have an ostensible ministry producing themselves on certain benches of the Houses of Lords and Commons; and we have a *camarilla* sitting God knows where, intending God knows what, and educating the army in such habits and expectations as may be best suited to their purpose. This is a state of things which cannot last; but it *is* the state, and it is as well to know it.

On Thursday the same question was brought on in another form, by Mr. Lennard's motion for the abolition of Flogging in time of peace. This was carried against us by 135 to 62; in which by a nice process may be detected the adhesion of as many as *three* timid gentlemen, who could vote for this motion and could not for the other. Flogging, it seems, is the pivot on which our existence as a nation turns. It has turned on every "damned thing," which from time to time the progress of civilisation has enabled us to throw from us into everlasting contempt.

Mr. O'Connell, in whom we have now a sort of domestic interest*, made one of his "turns-out" on this occasion. He scouted the mincing phrase of "corporal punishment," and plainly called it "a dog's treatment," which "decent dogs" themselves do not submit to. Lord! Lord! that the English people, who fought at Marston Moor and Worcester, and shut their gates on kings, should to this hour be scourged like hounds at the pleasure of their aristocracy!

On the same day a motion by Mr. Robinson, for the appointment of a Committee to consider under what regulations foreign corn and flour might be admitted and exported without interfering with the tyranny of the landed interest, was rejected by 77 to 40. Suppose the manufacturing interest had laid a tax for twenty years on home-grown corn, and the farmers were found begging to be allowed to export some miserable fragment of their corn to the West Indies or elsewhere, under the assurance that the greatest care should be

* Since the public reception given to him at Hull during the Easter recess?

taken it did not injure the monopoly of the manufacturers. How would this look in the eyes of posterity; and do you think those eyes will look with a bit more of veneration on ourselves? It might make a man laugh "under the ribs of death," to see how on these occasions the commercial and manufacturing interests come meekly forward with all manner of self-denying ordinances, and beg the landed oppressors to believe they have not the slightest intention of shaking their supremacy. "*Me poor black man; can't live without white Massa,*" is but a type of this servility or ignorance. I wish somebody would give me a mission, never to allow the Corn monopoly to be alluded to, without a few hard words indicative of the discredit of submitting to it, and chop off my parliamentary head the first time I failed. But no man goeth a warfare any time, without somebody at his back.

On Friday the Navy Estimates were passed. I was told to be prepared in case of opposition on the subject of the expense of the Cove*; which was the more likely as some of the Tories have expressed their displeasure at it. But nothing was said.

London, 20 April, 1836.

The Petitions from the Methodists and others, in Hull and the neighbourhood, on the subject of Sunday Observance, were presented at an early period by Mr. Hutt; and nothing prevented me from adding my testimony to the high respectability of the Petitioners and the claim they had to be heard with attention, except the difficulty, greater I think than is justified by either necessity or convenience, of getting a word in edgewise on the presentation of the Petitions of the people.

But though I shall at all times be ready to give this testimony, either in support of such Petitions when presented by other Members, or in the case of any that should be entrusted to myself, I cannot conceal my opinion, that Petitions of this nature are likely to produce a directly contrary effect to that desired by the Petitioners. In fact they *have* produced it; for it is mainly owing to the pertinacious efforts of portions of the community to coerce the rest upon this point, that a spirit of inquiry has been set on foot, ending in a widely spread conviction, supported by the active adherence of some eminent persons in the religious world and the admissions of others, that there is not the historical or theological basis for the claim

* The vessel fitted out under the command of Capt. James Ross, to go in search of the missing whale-ships.

27575

advanced, which the claimants assume;—that it is in fact a case of the same kind as if the Catholics should put forward a request to Parliament to have all the world coerced into keeping Friday as a fast-day, or the Jews their Sabbath. Such at least, I am persuaded, is the conviction of the great majority within the House of Commons; and if attempts of the kind lately exhibited are persevered in, they will only end in leaving a stronger example of the impolicy of not letting well alone, and of the interest all classes of religious persons have in confining themselves to the defence of the right of propagating their own opinions by argument, and not grasping at the power of forcing others to conform to their faith or practice by law.

The real state of the case is, that the public is no more convinced, that because the Jews were prohibited travelling beyond a mile on Saturday, therefore our rail-roads must be shut on Sunday, than it is persuaded that the payment of tithes to Melchizedek or to the Levites is binding on the House of Commons now. There is no direction, and no evidence, for the transfer of either of these Jewish burthens to ourselves. On the contrary, what is known is, that it was only in the later and corrupted periods of the Church, that the ecclesiastics bethought themselves of referring to these Jewish ordinances, as means of establishing their power. There is evidence that the early Christians practised certain religious observances on the first day of the week; but none that they attempted to transfer the Jewish ceremonial burthens, still less that they applied to the Emperors for power to coerce their neighbours into the endurance of them.

Not a whit more attention, I apprehend, will be likely to be gained from Parliament, by advancing under cover of the plea of securing to every man a day of rest. It is a subterfuge upon the face of it; and subterfuges never prosper. The object is not to secure to men a day of rest, for experience has shown that there is much more danger of their taking two; but to get the power of forcing them to employ it in particular ways agreeable to the Petitioners, and not in others. It will have just as much chance of success, as if a prayer were advanced for giving to all the community by law, the advantages spiritual and corporal, of the Catholic fast-days. It will be stopped at once, as religious intolerance walking abroad under a cloak. The public will not endure it; and if the sectaries are obstinate, the public will take a leaf out of the sectaries' book, and be obstinate too; if the sectaries are enthusiastic, the public will be enthusiastic; and if the sectaries go as much further as

they please, there will be no reason why the public should not meet them with the same. The community has not gone to the pains it has in securing to all sects the liberty of private opinion in religious matters, to allow itself to be bullied now, by the disposition of any sects to make their own opinions law.

The Methodists know very well, that if any man thought of injuring a hair of their heads, or cutting them off from the smallest fragment of their liberty of holding any doctrine or practice which their consciences approve, I must at any moment be "first turn" for taking up their cause. But they will not quarrel with me for telling them, that they do not promote their own objects, by asking for the power of coercing others, on questions where the opinion of the community is far from being united on their side.

On Monday the House went into Committee on the Registration of Voters bill. An Amendment proposed by Mr. T. Duncombe, for repealing the portion of the Reform Act which requires the payment of poor-rates and assessed taxes as a qualification for voting in boroughs, was rejected by 154 to 51. The House seems to have no notion of allowing the voters the chance of stopping the supplies.

On Tuesday Mr. Daniel Whittle Harvey brought on his motion for a Committee *to inquire* into the merits of what he called the "he and she pensioners" upon the Pension List. Be assured that this is one of the last matters the House will ever inquire into; meanwhile it cannot be denied, that the "poor sufferers," as we say at York in assize time, are made to eat their bread with as much annoyance as if it was baked by the ugly process proposed to the unhappy prophet. The motion was rejected by 268 to 146.

London, 23 *April*, 1836.

On Wednesday there was a discussion in the House, of an importance very disproportioned to the small attention it appears to have attracted from the public. It was, in plain terms, a struggle between the Speaker and certain Members of the House, upon the limits of the right of speaking on Petitions. The question undoubtedly presents considerable difficulties; but I am disposed to be among those who think it has not been settled the right way, and must be settled in another way, even though at the expense of a sturdy resistance directed to a quarter where any contest is far from being abstractedly desirable. It is quite true, that if every Member on presenting

a Petition were to make a long-winded speech, followed by another from the supporter and half a dozen others on both sides who chose to enter into debate, the result must be, that only one Petition in twenty could ever be presented at all. But on the other hand it is also true, that if the Petitions of the people are to be presented with only the announcement of their names and objects, and then be huddled into a bag, they may very nearly as well be huddled into a bag without. The case seems to be one not to be settled by any absolute rule; and least of all by a rule prohibiting, in the main at least, the speaking on Petitions. And one great objection to such a rule is, that certain interests which are powerful in the House, set it at complete defiance, and not the slightest attempt is made to enforce it upon them. For example, let an agriculturist get up, as the Member for Bath said, "in an agony about taxed carts," and he shall go on and be followed by his compeers, without rule or limit; while half a dozen men who are instructed to say a few words in explanation or support of the wishes of their constituents, are frowned down to make him room. The plea that Members should reserve their observations for the solemn discussion of the question at some future time, is of no substantial weight; it only goes to cut off a useful instrument from Members in the gross, to pour the whole into the scale of some overbearing interest. The truth is, that on the presentation of Petitions, there ought to be a *petite guerre*. No reasonable Petition of any importance should be introduced, without a few words from both the presenter and seconder; and no unreasonable Petition, as for instance of the kind so common for pillaging the public by monopolies of various kinds under the title of "protection," should find its way without a word from somebody in exposure of its tendency. It would certainly be a very useful understanding, that none of these speeches, except under peculiar circumstances, should exceed one minute; but this would be a rule to be enforced by that *ultima ratio* the impatience of the House, rather than by the direct interference of their organ in the chair. Petitioners would do well to insist on their representatives always saying *something*, both on presenting their Petition and in support; and if the public would put forward this demand, any theories which may have been formed in opposition to it would rapidly give way. I dare say the public think it is idleness or treachery, when their Petitions are put under the table and they hear no tidings of any word being mumbled in support. But they are not aware of the artillery of frowns their representatives must face, to get in as much as would fill two lines of type, upon a subject which may

involve their own credit with their constituents, and the interests of myriads.

On the same evening there was a rather brisk debate whether the vote of a Member should be disallowed upon a railway bill because he was a holder of shares. I voted against it, or as near it as the case allowed; and for this reason,—that if you disallow such a vote, you ought also to disallow the votes of twenty Members on the other side, who may hold shares in canals or other undertakings hostile to the railway; and since you have no chance of doing this, the other is a one-sided disallowance in favour of the enemies of railways. And besides, it is leaving unbalanced biases in various other directions. I should like to know what the House would say to a proposal, that no man should vote upon a railway question that had not 7500*l.* (which I take to be the equivalent of 300*l.* a-year at 4 per cent) vested in shares. Yet this is the exact parallel to what is, and is to be, the rule of the House upon the great question between the agriculturists and the commercial community.

The night was closed by another debate on the subject of Russia, as unfortunate in its conclusion as those which have preceded it. I am thoroughly grieved at the line taken by some of the Radicals upon this question. These men are nursing a war; and the Member for Bath I take to be little less than an instrument in the hand of Providence for bringing on the great battle of Armageddon. All history shows, that the progress of overbearing powers has been mainly forwarded by the petty policy of states and countries at some distance from the immediate danger, shutting themselves up upon the sagacious principle of waiting till the evil came to their own doors. I disbelieve the position, that there is such a thing as an "insulated" individual, or an "insulated" country, in the universe; there may have been in the days of Nimrod, but can be none since the printing-press and steam have levelled all boundaries and made common all interests. I cannot believe either, that the common interests of civilized countries are advanced, by the Emperor of Russia's agent on the back benches of the House of Commons (and I understand he had one there last night) drinking in the information, that the barbarities to the Poles are not to be resisted, "because it is the bargain in every revolution that men are to gain by it in the event of success, and be sufferers if they fail." What is this but saying, that if you are cruelly treated by cutpurses, it is fitting nobody should interfere, because it was part of your bargain when you risked walking in the streets? It is the Tory argument for the murders

of our countrymen by Don Carlos:—"They knew they were liable to it, therefore it is right." You will stamp with vexation, at seeing Radicalism in such company. But the end of the whole will be this. The truckling to the barbaric power will at last be carried a step too far; and then the popular spirit on the Continent will cast off its *juste milieu* rulers, who will rightly be regarded as partakers with the enemy; and the odds are that there ensues an outbreak not very dissimilar in some points to that which convulsed Europe at the commencement of the French Revolution, with the just and well-defined object of driving Russia from all interference with Western Europe, and if possible dividing and revolutionizing her own territory. This is the only extensive war with which Europe is likely to be afflicted; and this it is which the "selfish" school of politicians are doing their best to bring upon our heads, instead of staving off the evil as they might, by rallying opinions and showing front to the barbarians which would deter them from advance. What do we mean by a selfish individual in private life? We mean one who grasps at petty and immediate comforts, and loses more than he gains, in the loss of estimation and assistance from his fellows in their turn. And the same might be the definition of a selfish politician. What should we think of a man who declared, he would do nothing to stop robbery till he found it knocking at his own door? Could the fraternity of thieves wish for a better customer?

It is true that England may to a certain extent be sheltered; that is to say, she may always be the last to be eaten. But this does not prove, that she has not unnumbered interests bound up with the general liberty and prosperity of the Continent, which it is the great business of men calling themselves politicians to pursue. When your Mechanics' Institute has gone on a few more seasons, its members will be able to read a lecture on this point to some in the House of Commons.

Having written at such length, I will defer any observations on Thursday's and Friday's debates till my next. And there was nothing but what will keep.

I will only notice, that on Monday, I believe will come on the motion on the part of the Tories, for abolishing the printing of the lists of Divisions which you have been accustomed to receive almost daily, and returning to the old imperfect, partial, and disgraceful method of voting in secret on the part of the pretended representatives of the people.

London, 27 *April*, 1836.

On Thursday Sir Andrew Agnew brought forward his motion on Sunday Observance; the debate on which you will have seen in the reports. But I would especially warn you against giving way to an idea, not unlikely to be formed on inspection of one side of the debate, that there was anything in the conduct or temper of the House on this occasion, different from what it displays on other subjects. The supporters of motions of this kind, have a disposition to represent themselves as coming before the House under circumstances of ridicule and opposition, for which I assure you, on the credit of any qualifications for giving evidence you may ever have ascribed to me, there is not the slightest foundation in fact. By which I do not intend a charge of designed misrepresentation, but to mark the importance of preventing a great country from falling under the guidance of those bitter feelings of sectarian bigotry, which disqualify their possessors from forming a judgment on what passes in their presence. It is utterly untrue that any violence or ridicule was put on the promoters of Sunday bills; but they present themselves to the House with an air of insolent assumption that every man who is not with them is scarcely fit for decent society, which could hardly be surpassed by the most bigoted Catholics in the height of their supremacy, and which it is certainly very hard to endure with equanimity. Lord Sandon among other things said, "there was an intolerance against religious observances." Have we not, then, the right our fathers had, to be intolerant of the religious observances of other people being forced upon us with a faggot or a treadmill? If *I* believe that there is double the scriptural and authoritative evidence for Transubstantiation, that there is for the Judaical observance of Sunday, where is the difference between my father's resistance and my own? I foresee we have not got to the end of this question, and that the Judaizing bigots have been permitted to run into that pride which "goeth before a fall."

The ministers, contrary to the expectation in the House, voted for the leave to bring in; which was carried in consequence by 200 to 82, a minority tolerably indicative of the final safety of the public.

On Friday we chewed the cud of the Carlow County Election over again. Time was, that when the brains were out, the man would die. The questions were carried in favour of Mr. O'Connell, by 243 to 169, and 238 to 166.

On Monday the Whigs announced their intention of standing to their guns on the question of the Appropriation of the super-

fluities of the Irish Church; which was received with immense cheers. The House afterwards went into Committee on the Registration of Voters bill, and there were two divisions. But as the voting in Committee of the House continues, through a verbal error as I stated at the time, to be a mystery and a job, I shall not trouble you with the statement of the numbers.

In the mean time, the motion for returning to the old corrupt practice of secrecy in the other divisions of the House, is put off till the 21st of June. As long as any motion to this effect appears upon the notices, the public will do right to keep their eyes upon the question. Liberal constituencies should demand of their representatives the regular transmission of the printed Lists of Divisions by post; for which purpose the Member has only to inclose the List, (which is sent to him every morning), in an open cover like a newspaper, writing "*Parl. Pro.*" at the top of the direction, and his name at the bottom as in a frank, but without being counted in the number of his franks; and in the same way he can send any other Parliamentary Proceedings, though as large as a folio volume. And when the constituencies have done this, it will probably not be long before some of them demand of Parliament the abolition of the disgraceful secrecy in the case of voting in Committee of the House.

On Tuesday, motion was made and question put, "That it is the opinion of this House, that the attendance of the Bishops in Parliament is prejudicial to the cause of Religion." The motion was prefaced by a speech of extraordinary mildness and beauty from Mr. Rippon. It is to be hoped the party opposed do not intend to announce themselves persecuted; though they threw out the usual dirt, about "not to be wondered at from such a quarter,"—by which they always mean that the speaker ought to be hanged. They mustered, however, powerfully; and as they refused, with the exception of a straggler or two, to enter into debate, the question was brought to the vote with a precipitancy that shut out many on the opposite side who intended to be present. O'Connell arrived just as the Speaker was going to put the question. Mr. Hutt desires me to say, he had gone into the House of Lords to hear the attack on the Irish Municipal Bill, and the division was over before he expected the subject to be brought on; which prevented his being with us. Dr. Bowring was prevented voting by a similar misapprehension. For my own part, I have no rancour against the Bishops, but on the contrary many associations and intimacies of an opposite tendency. But knowing that there is a strong feeling among the people, arising out of the Bishops hitherto having been among the staunchest supporters of war, the slave-

trade, and misgovernment of all kinds, not unaccompanied by suspicions that the sources of their appointment have not always been of the purest nature, even to being open to the influence of ladies who (in Mr. Whittle Harvey's phrase) have "humbled themselves that they might be exalted,"—I do not see how one of the people's poor officers could do other than vote against them. At the same time the Whig ministry have it in their power to take down this feeling if they like. They will not do it if they merely appoint one another's tutors, respectable men it may be, and good at a quotation from the classics; but they would do it if they appointed men that fill up some space in the public eye, and who would make a barrier for good government instead of against it in the House of Lords. For instance, why has not Sydney Smith been made a bishop? has not he been working for the liberal side, ever since any of those preferred to him could say *amo amas?* What has been done towards recompensing the liberal clergy of all ranks, who to their own manifest loss and hindrance have stood by the liberal cause in the worst of times? They may be as bald as an ostrich's egg; but still a man likes some symptom of recognition in his old age. If the Whigs chose to mend these things, I doubt whether they need be much troubled with motions against the Bishops.

The numbers on Mr. Rippon's motion were 53 to 180.

London, 30 *April*, 1836.

On Wednesday the Marquis of Chandos brought forward his motion on Agricultural Distress; a declaration to wit, that the agriculturists having had all their own way, and ruined the rest of the community by prohibiting foreign commerce in hopes of appropriating the difference, have only brought themselves and their retainers, to the necessity of coming to the House of Commons as sturdy beggars for more. "God's Judgments upon Murder and Adultery" in the Arminian Magazine are nothing to it; it is a living instance, working before our eyes, of the activity of a retributive Providence on earth.

The majority against the motion was not so great as I expected; being 208 to 172. But there were various signs in the House, of the subject making progress in the public understanding.

On Thursday the House was engaged in a variety of business of secondary importance, and was counted out at half past ten. I had an opportunity of risking the reproach of being a friend

of publicans and sinners; on which point I have an old-standing engagement.

On Friday, the Registration of Voters bill was gone on with in Committee. A motion by the Member for Finsbury (Mr. T. Duncombe) for preserving the right of voting to tenants who agree that the landlords shall pay the poor-rate, provided such tenants pay a rent not less than 10*l.* *plus* the poor-rate, was thrown out by the outrageous majority of 135 to 38. As this, like all the divisions in Committee, took place in secrecy, I cannot send you a list of the voters; but I should like to see the Hon. Member try his motion again on a distinct Bill. As an instance of the gross unreasonableness of the present state of things, a townsman sitting near me, the Member for Cambridge, told me he rented a house for 60*l.* a-year, and because the landlord paid the poor-rate for him, he had no vote. Query then, is my right of voting to depend upon possessing a certain degree of property as evidenced by living in a house of a certain rent; or is it in some way politically connected with my taking hold of so many dirty pennies in the pound, and putting them *meâ manu Pauli* into the overseer's box? To such strange absurdities will men agree, when a great public right is to be invaded or destroyed.

I yesterday presented the petition from Hull received the same day, praying for the total abolition of the Stamp Duty on newspapers; and took occasion by the expression of the Petitioners, that the subject had "assumed a fresh aspect," to imply a hope that the subject would assume two or three more fresh aspects yet. The ministers have made a great blunder; and like the rest of heaven's creatures, they must be answerable for their own mistakes. If the people take up the question properly, they will be obliged to back out; and the quicker they perform that evolution, the better. Was it decent, after the people had helped them to power and held them there, to come down to the representatives of the popular party and tell them, that they not only would preserve a penny Inquisition on the press, but that they would introduce the odious provisions of the Excise into every house that takes a newspaper, and tempt the man that brushes our coats, to turn informer on the contents of his master's pockets? If the other side of the House have a pint of the blood of the old Tories among them, they will join us in resisting this new Excise, as their fathers did the old one. The old Excise was to raise a revenue to establish a new dynasty; and it was only submitted to because the people were eager in the cause, and because the nuisance was limited to a certain number of trades. The new Excise is to be brought to

all our hearths, to turn a penny for an ugly purpose. I wanted, long ago, to get thirty or forty men, including Irish, to engage to walk across the House upon some given question; and then this mischief would have been prevented. The newest plea of the ministers is, that they *cannot* carry the total abolition through the House of Commons. They made the giants first, and then they cannot kill them. From the beginning they were coquetting with the Tories;—tantalizing and tempting them to take up this ground. They must wait till they saw the surplus; they must hear what were the demands of other interests; glass they understood was in a bad way, and pewter not much better. What was all this but saying "Dilly, dilly, dill," come here and be helpful? And their next reason, which I heard the Chancellor of the Exchequer utter myself, was that they could not bring their consciences to make a man at a distance from town pay a postage for his paper, when a man in town pays none. Why do they make a man at Edinburgh pay thirteen-pence for a letter, and one at Cambridge eight-pence? Why do they not make the people in the country subscribe for the people of London, to equalize the price of mutton? Why but because every man is to pay the cost of bringing what he chuses to have? The truth is, they see that taking off the penny from printing, and laying what would produce an equal amount of revenue upon the postage, would enable the country editors to print their thousands, and this is what they are anxious to prevent. The proposal has been made to them, and they kick at it. Never ask me again whether the present ministers are the friends of the people or of public liberty, till they have retraced their steps on this and on the Flogging question. I advise the Radicals to try the case, —they can never have a prettier quarrel; and above all things not to give in, till they have got off the whole of the Stamp.

And how do you think the ministers proceeded to frame the rules of the Inquisition, that for the sake of their penny fee they are pushing to each of our fire-sides? They sent for the editors of the London newspapers, and asked them what amount of infliction they thought would secure them in their monopoly. Such was the information I received last night, from a Member not likely to be wrong. To day I find Petitions, ticketed a dozen, lying on my table; not altogether such specimens of calligraphy as were sent from Hull on the subject of Mr. Buckingham's claims, but with marks of haste about them which make it not unlikely the lion is going to give a roar. By the bye, I hope some of the electors' wives, will send me a pitcher

of tea, when I go to prison, as they say I am to do, upon this business.

London, 4 *May*, 1836.

I TAKE the opportunity of introducing a subject to your notice, which has been for some time in my mind.

As you know, I have made a practice of sending down the Lists of Divisions on the day they are received, and of noting those Divisions which, being in Committee, were wrapped up in discreditable secrecy as concerned the names of the voters. And I have had occasion to know in return, that these Lists have been matter of no inconsiderable interest among our numerous friends. Wagers have been decided by them, touching the comparative attendance of different Members; and in various other ways they have been the sources of both information and amusement.

What I want to determine is, whether this practice could not be usefully extended to all the Votes and Proceedings of the House. A Member wants them on the first day; but on the second, there can be no substantial impediment to his transmitting them to his constituents. They form not only a record of what has been done in the House, but a notice of that which is to be done for several days, or even weeks, to come. With them in their hands, a constituency might not only look at the past, but might frequently prompt their representative most usefully as to the future. What everybody occasionally wants, is to have the spur stuck into his sides; it throws him on his haunches, and makes him carry his head well in the House. Besides, a representative, except where he is either a man who drives instead of following the public, or else is considerably gifted with conceit, has really no strength but as it is put into him by his constituency. Could you not dispose of the Votes and Proceedings, in such way as to make them generally accessible to the three or four Liberal associations which exist in Hull, and to as many more on the other side of the question, if our adversaries can produce them?

On Monday the House was engaged in Committee with the Tithe Commutation bill; but stopped from weariness just as it reached the important clauses.

On Tuesday the Hon. C. Berkeley moved the adoption of the Report of the Committee of last session for the construction of a Ladies' Gallery; which had been lost by a minority of three, in consequence of the unfair and absurd method of division at that period practised in the House, and to which the Tories

have now a notice of motion to return. Gallery carried, by 132 to 90.

The House of Commons has thus, by the perseverance of a gallant young aristocrat, been put in the way of being relieved from a stigma which attaches to no other representative assembly in Europe; that of conducting its debates in a manner which the debaters are afraid of exposing to the criticism of their families. It is proposed to prepare a portion of the present Strangers' Gallery for the reception of ladies; who it may be presumed will be admitted on previous insertion of their names in a book, under the nominal direction of the Speaker, in the manner now practised for admission to the benches in the House. In the new House of Commons great improvements will be at the command of the architect; and the most complete and respectable plan would probably be, to build a gallery under the name of the Speaker's Gallery, for the ostensible purpose of accommodating the Speaker's family, as is done for the accommodation of the Master's family in college chapels; such gallery having its entrance through the Speaker's house distinct from the other avenues, thereby allowing the ladies to enter under the safeguard of the Speaker's hospitality. It would be indecorous to suppose, that where a liberal appointment and splendid residence are to be provided by the public in return for being the ornament and organ of the House, any private judgment could interfere with a compliance with the wishes of the majority. *A* Speaker is as a flower of the field. But *the* Speaker is immortal, eternal in the chair; and it is to this Speaker the wishes of the House of Commons are addressed.

On Sir William Molesworth's motion*, only the *elixir* (which in Arabic is *al iksîr*, the fraction that contains the strength) of Radicalism voted with the Baronet. The mode of judging I proposed to myself and friends, was by asking whether the Hon. Baronet would ever have been troubled for his motion, *if the individual removed from his command had been myself.* The numbers on division were 42 to 322.

London, 7 May, 1836.

On Wednesday the House was counted out at a quarter before eight o'clock, to prevent proceeding with the second reading of Mr. Buckingham's Bill for enabling the Inhabitants of Towns to make Public Walks.

On Thursday the House was counted out at half past four

* On the case of Lord Brudenell.

o'clock in the afternoon, to prevent the coming on of Mr. Grote's motion on the Ballot. I have heard there were a hundred Members in different parts of the House; but as nothing was going forward but private Petitions, there was little general interest to keep men together, and so advantage was taken of it.

Some of our friends may require to be told, that by a rule of the House, no business is to be done with less than forty members, if any individual chuses to notice the fact, and desire that the House may be counted. When this is done, and the number found less than forty, the House immediately adjourns; which is what is called being counted out.

In this way nearly half of the gone-by week has been thrown away as regards public business. The member for Greenock (Mr. Wallace) proposed that before the Speaker counted, the Division bell should be rung; which is as reasonable as in the case of any other Division. But this was refused. It is easy to imagine, that close attendance on the House may produce a school-boy delight in anything that makes a breaking-up for a holiday. But this feeling should be resisted when the business of the public is at stake; and probably will be, when public affairs are conducted on principles a little more like those which regulate private. And the same application of common sense would further direct, that when the House is counted, two Tellers should be appointed by the Speaker (who would naturally be the Member that demands the counting, and the Member that made the motion attempted to be suppressed), and the Members present should go forth into one lobby, their names being taken down by the clerks as they re-enter, and published next morning in the proceedings of the House as in any other Division, whether the number found be less than forty or not; with notice of the hour, and the name of the Member that called for the counting, and of the Member whose motion (with description of the same) was then before the House. Any Member of good standing, who would put a notice of motion to this effect on the proceedings, would carry his point in the end, and effect a great saving to the public business.

On Friday the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward his budget. There was a nominal understanding that the question of the Newspaper Stamp was to lie over for a debate of its own; but it was plain to be seen he was clearing his ground. Perhaps there may yet be a storm before him he does not expect. The point to pinch him on, is why he will not be content with a postage instead; and then it must out,

that he dares not encounter the full light of the press, because his deeds are to be evil.

As a commencement of the plan proposed in my letter of the 4th, I have sent you the Votes and Proceedings from the beginning of the present month, and shall continue to transmit them from time to time, so that with a little sorting you will find yourself in possession of the whole. I shall only send such of the Reports and Bills as appear to have a bearing on some known interest at Hull; but any that may have been omitted, shall be sent on the first application made either through you or from private hands.

London, 11 *May*, 1836.

On Monday the President of the Board of Trade moved the Second Reading of the Factory Act Alteration bill. Several persons have expressed their surprise, that after decrying the Factory Act to the extent of my power, I should now have voted against the removal of one of its provisions. But the explanation is this. I opposed the Factory Act as a fraud upon the working classes, a tub for the whale, thrown out by parties who were engaged in supporting the Corn Laws and all kinds of restrictions upon trade, as the means of leading off the operatives from the true source of the whole distress. But when this mischief was once done, I confess I did not see very distinctly any motive I could afterwards have, for making children under thirteen, work twelve hours instead of eight. *That* would have no effect in removing the objection which I had to the Factory Act. The manufacturing capitalists dwell upon the consequences that may arise from their inability to meet the competition of foreigners. But if they do not chuse to bestir themselves to prevent the meat being taken out of the mouths of our manufacturing operatives by the premium held out from year to year to foreign manufacturers by the operation of the Corn Laws, what use is there in their pretending anxiety for the scarcely visible crumb of increase to the evil, that may arise from factory children under thirteen being worked only eight hours instead of twelve? Their concern is altogether for a nonentity; and if the factory children like better, as I dare say they do, to work eight hours than twelve, there is nothing to make a reason why they should not have their way. I would go in the face of the masses, the rank and file, for a great object; and any confidence they may have in me, depends on knowing I would do so. But I will not for a trifling object; still less for none at all.

Sir Robert Peel made answer with a pun of the smallest. I hope I may never return him evil for evil.

The Second Reading was carried only by 178 to 176.

On Tuesday the House in Committee proceeded with the Tithes Commutation Bill; but only got through one or two clauses, stopping in the middle of the first that can be considered as of primary importance. Several Divisions took place; in which you would doubtless be gratified by knowing how particular Members voted. But this, by the pleasure of your representatives, is still a sealed book to their constituents.

I did not know till after the Division, that friends at Hull were interested one way or the other on the Dublin Steam-Packet Company. But it would have been of no use, as the Dublin men carried their motion by 106 to 65.

London, 14 *May*, 1836.

On Wednesday Mr. Hutt presented the Petition from the Younger Brethren of the Trinity-House at Hull, praying for reform of that body.

On Thursday an attack was made from the Tory side, on the mode of taking the Divisions in the House by which the public are furnished with Lists of the way in which particular Members vote. I have so often alluded to this subject, that I will do no more here, than claim the attention of the Liberals throughout the country to the struggle that is going on, and assure them that the secret voting in Committee has so injurious an effect, both on the number that attend and on the zeal of individual Members to exert themselves in the public cause, that it would not be labour thrown away, if the people in places where political information is extensive, would petition for the privilege of knowing what their respective representatives may do or not do, in Committee as well as in other meetings of the House.

Mr. Clay brought forward his motion on Joint Stock Banks. My own opinion on the general question of which this is a part, is one in which I believe I have not many followers; though if I were to whisper to you that the head clerk at Smith, Payne and Smiths, says I am the man that has hit the nail on the head, you would perhaps think I should reasonably have more. If I have an opinion on this subject, it certainly has neither been lightly formed nor wantonly put forward; for I worked at it eleven years before I published it (in the First number of the Westminster Review, Article "Instrument of Exchange,") and have been working at improving it from time to time, for eleven

years since. My creed however is, that an upright government may take its choice between having a metallic circulation, or one of public paper which shall put the value of the metal into the public exchequer; but that it has no right to give away this amount to private manufacturers of paper, any more than to give away the tar out of the Dock-yards, or the beef and pork out of the Victualling Office. A private banker's business should be, to lend his own money and not other people's; and he *does* lend other people's every time he issues one of his own notes, for he takes the value of the note out of what the government out to have taken for itself and put to the public account, and lodges it (it may be) in the four per cents, for his own private use and benefit.

You will perceive, therefore, that I have no more notion of the propriety of Joint Stock Companies being allowed to carry away what ought to go to the credit of the public, than I have of their being allowed to wheel the tar out of the Dock-yards. Whether the tar may be best wheeled away by public companies or private individuals,—whether, for instance, the carts of the one may be less liable to break down and spill upon the passengers,—is another question still, and to something like this it is that the public have at present arrived. Whether they will ever arrive at the other at all, may be uncertain; but there is a satisfaction in thinking one knows the truth, even though it may be yet at the bottom of the well.

The House afterwards went into Committee on the English Tithe Commutation Bill; and the same subject formed the principal part of the business of Friday.

London, 18 *May*, 1836.

On Monday the principal debate was on Mr. Roebuck's motion for taking into consideration the present constitution of the Executive and Legislative Council of the Canadas, for the purpose of rendering the same efficient to the good government of those provinces. This Executive and Legislative Council professes to discharge the same part in the government, as the House of Lords at home; but with this remarkable difference, that the Council is entirely or mainly without those kinds of influence, derived from the possession of great property and hereditary rank, which may to a certain extent be pleaded in defence of the existence of the House of Lords. The object and substantial effect of the Canadian Council appears to be, to prevent the Canadians from having the power of self-government, or in other words preventing them from governing for

their own interest, and forcing them to submit to be governed for the interest of somebody else. The struggle in Canada therefore, is only part and portion of the struggle which is going on all over the world.

The most remarkable circumstance attending the debate, was the attack made by a Tory Member on the propriety of Mr. Roebuck's holding the office of paid agent for the Canadas. No objection that I am aware of, was ever made to the West-Indian islands or Ceylon having paid agents with seats in Parliament. It is when one of these agents shows signs of taking up a popular cause, that the danger is protested against. The case is something like that of franking. There was no objection to franking, as long as the people had little or nothing to do with it in their political capacity. But when franks were found to be flying about to Political Unions and Reform Associations, the discovery began to be made that franking was a most improper privilege.

Mr. Roebuck's motion was finally withdrawn; as was probably intended from the beginning. There is a certain class of motions, which may be denominated feelers; as being designed to draw out opinions, and afford indications of the strength of parties, rather than to lead to any absolute conclusion.

On Tuesday, Mr. Morrison moved a Resolution for giving Parliament the power of revising the tolls upon railways at stated periods. He afterwards withdrew it, for the purpose of substituting a motion. From the temper of the House, I should imagine the measure likely to pass.

The remainder of the evening was principally taken up with more of the Carlow affair. A motion for an Address for a Royal Commission to inquire, was negatived by 123 to 52.

London, 21 *May*, 1836.

On Wednesday an occurrence was witnessed on occasion of the Over Inclosure bill, which is perhaps of some importance as a sign of the times. The bill was thrown out on the Third Reading, by two successive divisions of 64 to 61 and 88 to 84*, on the ground of its pressing hardly on the vested rights of the poor. The rich have so many ways of taking care of themselves, that no man's conscience need trouble him for having been concerned in these majorities.

The motion for the Second Reading of Sir Andrew Agnew's

* After the first motion, that the bill be "now" read a third time, had been negatived, the Tories took the unusual course of dividing again on the question that the Bill be read "on this day six months."

bill, entitled the Lord's Day bill, came on the same evening. There was a repetition of the old misrepresentation about "ridicule and ribaldry;" which I should mark as an instance of notorious bad faith and intention to deceive the public out of doors, if it was not soluble upon the principle formerly advanced, of the entire incapacity of the heated bigots who engage in this cause, to form a sound judgment on what passes in their presence.

The Liberal party on this occasion, or a portion of them sufficient to be effectual, adopted the absurd policy of allowing no argument upon the question from their side. The consequence was, that they had to endure with the patience of beasts of burthen, all that could be advanced by the other party, without anything in reply. Every successive speaker on their side that made the attempt, they cried down; thus making a contest of brute numbers, of what ought to have been a victory of reason. It is painful to be obliged to march through Coventry in such company; and I wish I could give you the names of the inventors of this policy, that the public might determine the quality of their claims to be arbiters of when the public cause shall be defended and when not. The next time a Sabbath bill is brought before the House, I shall (with the leave of those whose leave is necessary) vote for the First Reading. We shall see whether the Liberal side is always to lie under the imputation, of being managed by those whose strength is in their throats and not their heads.

In the mean time I apprehend the *right string* has been stricken on, in disabling the capacity of the bigots to produce the authority they pretend. Our Protestant forefathers might have talked long enough, upon the impropriety of forcing one man's religious opinions on another. But they took a more substantial course. They said plain out, "The doctrine which you would force on us as being in a certain book, is not there at all. Your claim is founded on a question of black and white; and we deny that the words and letters to support you, are in the book from Genesis to Revelation." And this was the argument that told; not nice fence about religious liberty.

On Thursday the Irish Municipal Corporations bill was brought back with the Lords' Amendments. From what was said by ministers, I imagine their plan is to make a compromise of some kind;—to give up a great deal, on condition of getting a little. They tried to clothe this in sounding words; and by taking insulated parts of what they said, it might be concluded they intended to be stout-hearted But the other, I imagine, will be the upshot of the matter.

On Friday Mr. O'Connell took his seat*, amidst great cheering. His first operation was to present a petition against the sitting members for Dublin; which gave rise to a debate, that was finally adjourned to the 30th.

The cloven foot has again made its appearance in the Tithe Commutation bill. A clause is proposed for diminishing the rate imposed in lieu of tithe on ground now in cultivation of hops or as market gardens, which shall hereafter cease to be so cultivated; and for laying an increased rate on grounds which now are not so cultivated, and hereafter shall be. Here we have the old mischief of tithes starting up again. The ministers have had resolution to get rid of it in the main; but hops and garden grounds were too good to be included. We must be oppressed by the system of tithes upon our beer, if not upon our bread. Perhaps as the ministers got into the difficulty without much knowledge, they will get out of it in the same way.

I take my leave till after the 30th.

London, 1 *June*, 1836.

On Monday 30th May the Dublin Election Petition was withdrawn, after a debate which was tantamount to an acknowledgment that the charge of bribery against the Sitting Members remained unexamined and unrebutted, and an assurance from the Attorney General that the evil was irremediable under the existing constitution. Mr. O'Connell therefore loses his seat through a process which may not unaptly be compared to a game at back-gammon; where the adroit management of such parts as are under human control, is found in scientific combination with the throws turned up from time to time from the dice-box of a blundering Committee. Happy is the man, whom blind fortune and sharp wit thus play into each other's hands to steady in his seat.

In brief, it matters not with whom the fault lies, but Mr. O'Connell is unseated because the powers above would have it so. There has been no trial, or none that does not carry on its face the evidence of nullity. History tells of an individual who had his eyes scratched out in one thorn-bush, and by jumping into another scratched them in again. We shall see when the blunders of a Committee will perform this inverse kind of operation in behalf of Mr. O'Connell.

---

* For Kilkenny; after being unseated for Dublin by the decision of an Election Committee.

On Tuesday the Member for Finsbury (Mr. T. S. Duncombe) brought forward his motion for an Address to the King, "to beseech His Majesty to use his good offices with His Ally the King of the French, for the liberation of Prince Polignac and others" late ministers in France. I am sorry to say cold water was thrown upon the motion to a considerable extent, by the part of the House to which I believe I am considered to belong. Had I conceived myself furnished with authority to represent the opinion of the Radicals, I should have taken the opportunity of stating the high degree in which the popular cause is everywhere advanced, by all that indicates the absence of vindictive feeling. That the people are born to be injured and deceived, is as true as it has sometimes been said to be of women. But such remedy as is within their reach, is by the exertion of caution for the future; not by the exercise of vindictive retribution for what is past, and what will not be the less repeated, if the caution, which is the true remedy, is omitted.

London, 4 June, 1836.

On Wednesday the Order of the Day was read for the Second Reading of the Irish Church bill; and Lord Stanley moved as an Amendment, "that leave be given to bring in a Bill for the conversion of tithe composition into rent charges, and for the redemption thereof, and for the better distribution of ecclesiastical revenues in Ireland."

Instead of going through the debates on this subject which are in all the newspapers, I will try to make a statement of the general question, for the benefit of such of our friends as love to take their politics in a small dose rather than a basin-full.

The main question, then, I take to be, whether the contributions in one form or other levied on the public for the support of religion, are to be expended with some degree of equality among the different sects and parties from whom they are levied; or whether there is to be a scramble for the whole cake, and it is to be carried off by that description of Christian professors, who happen for the time being to have the longest arms and heaviest cudgels. The Irish Church calling themselves Protestant, are the people who have at this moment got hold of all the cake; and the present dispute is, whether they shall give a little bit which is not wanted for themselves,—(mind I do not say, which they cannot eat themselves, but which does not appear to be wanted to keep them in health and wholesomeness),—whether they shall give this little bit, not

absolutely to keep and feed the church of some of the other sects that pay for it, but to do something for their children in the way of education, as the least offensive mode of returning them a morsel of their own. And here the great fat children that have got the cake, bluster and roar, and declare that if the cake is more than they ought to eat, their Pa's and Ma's should have more of them to help to eat it;—that because they are not enough for the cake, and that even for some slices there is nobody at all, is no reason why anybody else should have any, but on the contrary is the very reason why the cake should be kept for those that are to be hereafter;—cake is not for the religions that exist and that have paid for it, but for those that are to be and ought to be, and therefore they will hold fast and squall.

Now it is quite plain that whenever the power gets into the proper hands, to be whipped and sent supperless to bed, will be the remedy which will set all these brawling babies to rights. It is only another branch of that question, which has been in the main so happily settled in respect of ordinary property. Is money to be expended for the benefit of the owners and contributors, or is there to be a scramble for it by the strongest arms? The question has been pretty well determined at common law; but a Church is an engine for setting up an exception to common rules.

Note too the extreme moderation with which the government has proceeded to aim at an indirect and fragmental bit of justice, and the fierceness of the opposition. The opponents fear, that if they learn *A* they must learn *B*; the doing of right is like the letting out of water, the owners of a wrong are always anxious to stop the earliest leak.

What I wish is, that it was possible, with a view to their own benefit and nothing further, to take the party that at present ride the high horse, and put them for one good twelvemonth in the situation of the people they trample on. Nothing but some process of this kind, will ever bring us to peace on earth and good-will among the different divisions of mankind. It is by rough lessons of this nature, that in law, and to an inferior extent in politics, men have been brought to the recognition of that rule for the common good, which goes under the name of *justice*.

After three nights' debate, the House divided at half after one on Friday night, or more properly Saturday morning. For the ministerial measure 300; for Lord Stanley's amendment 261.

London, 8 *June*, 1836.

On Monday the *trop bons Catholiques* of the Established Church were labouring again in their vocation, of trying to pull down an old house upon their heads. Knowing as you do that I have no personal feeling against the sect calling itself the Establishment, I feel the greater freedom in addressing you without disguise; for which I shall probably be called "Jew, Turk, Infidel, and Heretick," according to the formula the Member for the University of Oxford was pleased to select, from the well-meant orisons of our forefathers, composed at a time when the theory of the thousand-and-one sects as the only true fountain of religious quiet was much farther from being understood than it is at present. By the way (but this is an episode) what would have become of O'Connell, if he had blurted out the word "heretick" as a reason for cutting a man off from his political rights? It would seem therefore, that one man's "heretick" is not as good as another's; so we may live in hopes of coming at the true "heretick" in time. And "heretick" after all, between ourselves, means only a man who "makes a choice;" so that our worthy forefathers prayed for "all Jews, Turks, and men that make a choice,"—an inviting prospect for religious peace, if we their successors, instead of limiting our wishes to the conversion of all that "make a choice," were to insist upon doing battle with them till they consent to surrender their equality of privilege as citizens of a free state. The truth is that heretick is the old word for dissenter; and whenever the plan which has been sometimes threatened is carried into execution, of modernizing the Scriptures and the Common Prayer, the Church will perhaps be persuaded to pray for "all Jews, Turks, Infidels, and *Dissenters*," as more accordant with later forms of speech.

The object of the over "true Churchmen" in the present instance, was to cut off the remainder of the thousand-and-one sects from the benefit of civil registration, by declaring that great damage would ensue to the Church's ordinance of Baptism. Now, as a man puritanically descended and accustomed from my youth up to the sound of religious controversy, I should like to know on what particular portion of either the letter or the spirit of anything left by the founders of Christianity, the Anglican sect undertakes to found a right of cutting men off from civil advantages, as the engine of increasing the number of baptisms. In the order to go forth "baptizing all men," I am sure you will find no mention of cutting them off from civil advantages if they decline. And I feel a strong suspicion, that great difficulty will attach to pointing out the

period at which any order to that effect was inserted, as we should say, in the orderly-book. Did Peter do it, or did Paul? or if these did not, who did? And to go further, how do they establish the connexion between baptism and giving names at all? There may be reason for believing, that when the early Christians baptized a full-grown heathen, they sometimes gave him a new name, as a token probably of the newness of life to which he was called. But even this, it is plain, they did not always do. For among the names preserved in the writings of the apostles, are many, like Hermes, Nereus, Olympas, Silvanus, and perhaps Phebe our sister, which modern ultra-christians would have thought formidably heathenish; while Epaphroditus and Narcissus they would probably have *Bowdler*ized. And if they did not connect the giving a name with baptism in the case of the full-grown, still less have they done it in the case of the newly-born; for the question of infant baptism altogether, is one on which all the controversies that have taken place, have not discovered any precise direction or authority.

This attempt, then, to cut men off from civil advantages for the increase of baptisms to the Established Church, is another instance of that tendency of all things established by human power to run to mischief, which our forefathers thought they were combating when they "protested" against an older church we wot of, and successfully carried their protest through. The modern church, like the elder one, might hold for ever if it would let well alone. But when a church's time approaches, it would seem as if it became what the Scotch call *fey*, and showed it by insisting on riding over the bodies of its neighbours. Men in these days must be governed civilly, not ecclesiastically; they will not submit to it.

On Tuesday the motion for confirming the Report of the Committee on Mr. Buckingham's claim, was negatived by 92 to 60. I am afraid Mr. Buckingham's claim, like many others, must lie over in that limbo, where unredressed wrongs wait for the deliverance that is to come.

London, 11 *June*, 1836.

On Wednesday the House went into Committee on the Bribery at Elections bill. I vehemently suspect everything on this subject, which is supported by the side of the House that this is. The effect produced will be, to multiply the opportunities for bringing sham charges against the successful candidate, and thus subjecting him to the process of being "laid down and robbed at the door of the House of Commons," as

happened to myself. There is not the slightest necessity for the charge to be true; there is not the slightest necessity that there should be the smallest intention on the part of any of the individuals who put it forward, to offer a tittle of evidence in support; they may come, as they did in my case, with a stinging knowledge of the falsehood of the assertions they have made, and be sickening all the way with the consciousness that they are to withdraw the moment the process arrives at the point of asking them for proof; but still, so miserably constructed is the Election law bequeathed to the existing House of Commons by its more corrupt predecessors, that a Committee has no option but to sit and be a party to the proceedings, to the point to which the adversary from the beginning intended to carry them. Everything introduced by the Tories, I apprehend will go to facilitate this process. At all events they will make the law novel, where it is now pretty well understood; we now know tolerably well when we are safe, and they will make it gloriously uncertain. It will be no matter to them, that decision should finally be given in favour of their antagonist; what they want is, the opportunity of stripping the antagonist before arriving at the decision. They want to have the power of taking from him a thousand pounds for every thousand the Carlton Club may think proper to expend; and thus to bring the real question, to that of the longest purse. As one evidence of a feeling of this kind, they last night rejected, by a majority of seven, the insertion of a prohibition of payment of travelling-expenses; a practice which, though not of the nature of bribery, is one way of putting elections into the hands of the parties disposed to carry them by expenditure. For these reasons I cannot help likening the Tory proposals for preventing bribery at elections, to the plums described by honest John Bunyan as hanging over the walls of the devil's garden; and should not be sorry to see the chance of griping pains to the incautious eaters, removed by the withdrawal of the bait,—which in the present case I have heard it stated is not unlikely to be the end.

On Thursday Lord John Russell moved the Order of the Day for taking into consideration the Lords' Amendments to the Irish Municipal Corporations bill; and it was settled that the contest should take place on the restoration of the 4th clause. After two days' debate the ministers carried their point by a majority of 324 to 238. Twelve men are understood to have come over; which gives promise of more hereafter.

Notwithstanding the repeated complaints of the exhausted state of the subject which were made during the debate, there

were some points omitted which may usefully be stored for future service. For instance, nobody that I observed, hit upon the really weak part of the Lords' position in the contest they insist upon inviting. It may do very well for the purposes of speech-making, to represent the Lords as an abstract of the higher orders of society, and to claim the attention of the country and Europe to their opinion, as that of the aristocratical classes expressed through their representatives. But the naked truth is, that they are *not* such an abstract and *not* such representatives. There may be a portion of them that would answer to the description; but another portion, and that the active and decisive one, are a reserve, a *poire contre la soif*, a detachment of the best troops of the Tories and their descendants, put in garrison for the express purpose of holding out after the other posts should be carried by the people. They are what a garrison of the *Garde Royale* in the heart of Paris, would have been after the Three Days of July; or what a body of the adherents of Charles Edward would have been in the Tower of London. Men's opinions as to the positive desirableness of their being there, will vary according to the political predilections of the framers; but nobody will be found to say they came there as an abstract of the opinion of the classes they were taken from. They may have come there by virtue of some past opinion; but at all events they are a past opinion domineering over a present. It might or might not be very well that the appointees of Mr. Pitt or Lord Melville should domineer in their day; but if they are to domineer now, it is at all events not by virtue of their being an abstract of the present opinion of the country. They are a redundancy and an excrescence on it; machines and instruments worked by dead men putting their hands out of their graves, to strike at the progress of reforms which the prime agents died resisting.

It may be quite true that the time is past, when the mischief might have been cured by the simple application of the constitutional remedy for such cases made and provided. There *was* a moment;—but there also was Earl Grey. It is given to no man, to cure by the remedy to-morrow, he ought to have applied yesterday. To the credit of the British constitution be it remembered, that there was a resource provided by it, which timely employed would have quashed the mischief. And this is not disproved because it will not quash it now. The constitution had provided a sufficient remedy, if used in time; it never undertook to provide against the possible chances of man's unwisdom and delay. A trivial scratch with the knife, scarcely leaving a scar behind, would once have let out the peccant mat-

ter, and restored the body politic to health. The tenderness of a prime minister for "his order," could not face the infliction of the minor suffering, and now the whole limb may be lost. Nothing truer was ever said by man, than that no creation can now set the lordly opinion to rights. But it *would* have done; and the knowledge that it will not now, is the first step to all speculation on what is to follow.

The supposition that an hereditary body formed out of the higher classes of society, can ever constitute a safe element in a free government, must be dependent on the further condition, that the formation of opinion in that hereditary body, and in the classes from which it is taken, has something like fair play. It was *not* fair play, to turn the scale by the introduction of a garrison of the anti-popular party, recruited from time to time and drilled by a century of misgovernment, and thus to repress and misguide the genius of the rising generation of aristocracy. Ill weeds grow apace; and it is nothing wonderful, that the crop which a few years ago might have been extinguished or neutralized by the introduction of some sixty or seventy new stocks, should now be past dealing with, by all that it is practicable to suppose attempted in that direction.

The evil therefore will go on, till it is cured some other-way. And, as was stated, the knowledge that the Peers are not an abstract, or at all events not a fair abstract, of the upper classes, will be the reason why the public will not endure for ever, and why there will some time be a cure. What the cure will be, it is at least permissible to speculate upon. And here, it will *not* be in any popular commotion, or any single and distinct popular effort. The cry of a "crisis" is nonsense. We were all of us born in a "crisis;" have lived in a "crisis;" and shall die in a "crisis," leaving the world a "crisis" for our legacy. There will be no more of "crisis" than there has been hitherto. The age of "glorious Revolutions" in England is past. The thing will be done, in the same way that the reform in the House of Commons was accomplished. Popular opinion will grow, and get increased influence in its proper place the House of Commons. At last it will find itself strong enough, to bid for a ministry. Not a ministry that will speak valiant words now and then, and at other times turn round upon its supporters, as the present ministers have done in the case of the freedom of the press, showing themselves so many Cordovas, as much or more afraid of their own followers than of the enemy. But a ministry that will have at heart the carrying of the enemy's positions, and keeping them for the people; a ministry that will use one popular success as the means of obtaining another; that will

cultivate the affections and the interests of the numerous classes of the community, showing itself among them as a good colonel does in his regiment, anxious only to be the honoured instrument of directing the general movement and advancing the general cause.

When a ministry of this kind appears, it will do much that has never been done yet, and leave undone much that has. Aristocracy will probably be at the head of it; for there is no intrinsic feud between the people and the better-informed part of their natural leaders. It is not so foolish as may be thought, to make way for a man because he has all his life worn epaulettes; it puts down many a dispute, and honest men are glad to show the example of submission for the general good. The object is, not to quarrel who shall lead, but to have somebody that will lead the people's way.

A Dissolution would do much towards such an end; and it is not in human power to defer a Dissolution long.

London, 15 *June*, 1836.

In my last letter I tried to point out the weak, that is the weakest, point in the position of the Lords. But independently of this, their whole condition is one of comparative feebleness. Strength can only be derived from two sources; brute force, which is power in action,—and opinion, which is power, or if you will, brute force, in reserve. For what is called the power of opinion in public affairs, means only the power which opinion would have of bringing force into he field if pushed to that extremity. A criminal allows himself to be hanged without resistance, because public opinion directs it; but the real explanation of the matter is, that he knows the same public opinion would bring forward an overwhelming number of supporters of the law if need were, and therefore he hangs quietly.

Now compare the quantity of interests connected with an average member of the House of Commons, with those which surround an average member of the House of Lords The first is appointed after a contest which of necessity places him in the situation of a chief and leader of *somebody*, and those the majority of some particular town or district;—to say nothing of the fact, that in the case of Members on the popular side, a bare majority may be considered as involving at least two-thirds of the good-will, the difference being kept down by the exercise of foul influences of various kinds. The appointers may chuse well, or chuse ill; but there is no denying that the man they appoint, stands in something like the situation of an

elective colonel, and that any attempt to put him down by violence, would at all events be a kick given to the majority of the regiment. Of this majority, there is not a man that has not in some sort pitted his credit upon his choice, and upon a certain degree of success to be obtained as its result. There is not one of them that has not had some honest interest of his own, or of his neighbours, or of both, which he wished to see compassed or secured; and in proportion as this gratification has been procured for him by any particular representative, is his adherence to the individual. When political disputes run high, or in other words when men are conscious there is much to recover and to secure, the representative has further functions to perform. He has often to decide among the clashing opinions in the battalion, none of them perhaps absolutely bad or without a certain portion of foundation, yet requiring instant reduction to one course, on the part of the agent appointed to be the organ of the common effort. It is his business to soften feuds, to keep down rivalries, by showing how each party may advantageously exert itself for the general good: to amalgamate those whom in his heart he may think disposed to go too slow, with those who would go too fast; to temper the caution of the one, with the fire of the other; to encourage the zeal for every useful alteration, without affronting the honest friends of things as they are established; and thus to produce the maximum of power, out of the elements committed to his charge. In the course of this, it is impossible that he should not render services to individuals, which though on his part only duties, are received as kindnesses; and be gratified with instances of support, which though originating undoubtedly in the necessity for political union, carry with them all the flattery of personal attachment. In short the situation of an honest representative with a sound constituency, presents marked features of resemblance to that of a chosen leader at the head of a devoted following; past all dispute the most powerful combination, for good or evil, which the history of mankind displays.

Imagine then that a House of Commons composed of members all involving more or less of the elements of power here described, was brought into what is called *collision*, with a House of Lords composed of members of the power and influence of an average peer. Fancy that there was a fair stand-up fight between the masses of interests that one would bring into the field, and the other. It is true that the House of Commons could be said to act only by its majority; but so also would the Lords. It is true that the majority one way in the Lords, may be numerically and proportionally greater than the majority

the other way in the Commons. But what chance would the balance of interests brought forward by the majority in the Lords, have with the balance that attends on the majority in the Commons? And what in fact are the interests attending on the Lords? They have the interest of the dependents connected with them in consequence of their possessions; but the Commons have the same, over and above all the other sources of influence that have been ascribed to them. Setting these then to balance one another, what is the remaining power of the Lords? It consists in a certain quantity of reverence felt for them as the representatives of gone-by physical force, not very much unlike the respect which may be paid to the descendants of a *quondam* native prince in India; but sorely diluted in the main, by the consciousness that the greatest and most active portion of them do not come under this category at all. In a certain quantity of belief, that their education and position in society make them good judges of what is for the public benefit; modified and reduced, of necessity, by everything which extends the belief that they are bad judges, and more fit on the whole to be taken care of than to take care of others. In a certain quantity of attachment to institutions merely because they are old, and dread of improvements merely because they are new; a sentiment well befitting the infancy of society, but weakening with every day that passes over our heads. Under all these circumstances, fancy the question fairly, resolutely, obstinately forced on the country for decision, whether the House of Lords or of Commons was to be the ruling power in the State. Calculate the number of individuals in any society and in all society, who would take one side and who would take the other. Examine the relative degrees of organization, of union, and of communication, under which they respectively exist. Take anything like an impartial and artist-like view of the whole case, and then determine what chance the Lords would have in an absolute collision like that proposed.

The truth is, that the Lords can do something, and not much; and that for every stride they attempt to take beyond their true point, they will fall back two. They might long continue to retard, to obstruct, and perhaps sometimes usefully to modify. But by snatching at the visionary gain reflected to their hopes, they will only lose the substantial possession which with moderation they might have kept. A mistake of the Lords upon the question of their strength, would be the grand desideratum for the advancement of democratic power.

Another deficiency, partial if not total, observable in the debate, was the want of repelling with sufficient force the

intimation perpetually conveyed, that the formation of political power is an improper object of Corporate establishments. It is not true, that Corporations are established to regulate scavengers. They are established that they may be depositories of political power, and of power that shall be exerted for the good of the community and not against it. There is no doubt of their being fortresses; and therefore it is that the adversary wants to pull them down, when he can hold them no longer for himself. And therefore precisely it is, that the community, if guided by common sense, will insist upon another course.

From the Monday's debate it may be concluded, that the idea of further opposition at present to the Irish Municipal Reform Bill in the Commons, is given up.

On Tuesday the House restored a part of the clauses altered by the Lords in the Irish Municipal Corporation Bill. Mr. Sharman Crawford moved for the restoration of sixteen towns whose names stood in the original Bill; and Bandon was taken to try the question on. He was much pressed not to divide; but he persisted, and as I could see no just cause for voting against him, I found myself with him in a minority of 8 against 148.

London, 18 *June*, 1836.

On Wednesday there was not a House; that is, there were not forty Members present at the hour appointed for the Speaker to take the Chair.

On Thursday night a discussion arose on the question of continuing the debate after twelve at night; and ended, I am afraid, rather in favour of the practice. This is one of the points, on which the House, when a resolute muster is made, can always be made to decide formally for the advantageous and reasonable course, though its practical leanings in the sequel shall seem to be all the other way. And it is not to be concealed, that some valuable popular members join in the opposition to "the outcry made against what it is chosen to call Midnight Legislation." But the evil of "Midnight Legislation" is this; that it goes to put the party of popular resistance, into the situation of a sentinel who should be sixteen hours out of twenty-four on duty, in opposition to a succession of men who relieved each other as often as they pleased. Hence the sweet of the night, for jobs, was always after twelve o'clock. When the House had dwindled down to a sleepy and exhausted few, recalling in some points if not in others, the figures in Hogarth's Midnight Conversation,—then was the time for a

concerted sally from the Club-house or the Opera. The House of Commons became the "Finish," where gentlemen of loose political lives and conversations made their last effort, on the chance that "Rigour now was gone to bed," or Joseph Hume "with scrupulous head."

And I apprehend the principle does not stop here, but may be extended to all proposals for increasing the time of sitting of the House. If the House of Commons were to undertake to sit eighteen hours a-day, the result would only be, that more and longer speeches would be made. And if it were determined to reduce the sittings to six hours, the thing that is to be done would be done, only with less waste of words. But the difference to the power and efficiency of the popular party, between sitting eighteen hours and six, would be serious and important;—as may be illustrated by supposing the hours of sitting extended to four-and-twenty, a thing involving no physical impossibility, nor indeed any difficulty beyond the necessity for a relay of Speakers,—but which would evidently deprive the party of the people, of the advantage they now derive from being, as the complaint of their adversaries is, "always there."

In this view, the abolition of the old custom of keeping holiday on Wednesdays, is a thing to be regretted. It is a move entirely in favour of that portion of the House who do duty by detachments, and against those who are to be always upon guard. A man who goes to the House once or twice a week on a call from the whipper-in, may have plenty of time to see his friends and pay his debts; his opponent who is to be there always, has hardly time for either.

Yesterday I was present at the Conference with the Lords; which appears to have received an unexpected interest to-day, from the assertions in the morning papers that there were deviations from previous forms. After the deputation from the Commons had taken their places, standing, round three sides of a table covered with a Turkey carpet or what might pass for one, the Lords came in, to the number of eight or ten, including one bishop, and sat down on a bench at the head of the table against the wall, in the attitude, as it appeared to me, of men sore pressed for room: and as they sat down they put on their hats, an operation in no way remarkable, inasmuch as it is the custom in both Houses of Parliament for people to put on their hats when they sit down, and take them off when they stand up. When Mr. Spring Rice began to give utterance to his mission, the Lords stood up and took off their hats, and continued so till he had finished; upon which they faced to the

left, and made their exit with the rapidity of men who are glad to have done, what it was hardly worth coming to do. I saw nothing in their deportment but what was proper and decorous; and if we can escape collision upon substance, I think we shall upon forms.

London, 22 *June*, 1836.

On Monday the House went into Committee on the Stamp Duties. The Chancellor of the Exchequer persevered in adhering to every point of his unpopular and impolitic provisions. I term them impolitic, because everything which makes one division of the Liberal party view another as having turned round upon them after having had their assistance at the expense of great sacrifices in the common cause, is a violation of that prudence by which the ordinary affairs of men in society are conducted. The division, of 241 to 208, showed that a mere handful of the friends of the freedom of the press, (as it turned out, only 17), would have been sufficient to bring the Chancellor of the Exchequer to terms or throw him over. This in the eyes of some people may look very desperate; but *on ne fait pas des omelettes sans casser des œufs*;—which does not read quite so well in English, "There's no making pancakes without breaking of eggs." If a thing is wanted, the price of exertion must be paid for it. It certainly is not absolutely for want of suggestion, that something of the kind has not been done; for I have for many weeks endeavoured, both verbally and in writing, to put forward a plan to this effect, in quarters where it might be likely to attract attention.

The mode in which the question has been conducted, you will perceive to have been highly unfavourable to the popular side. A debate is brought on, not whether there shall be a newspaper tax of a penny at all, but whether the tax of a penny shall be superseded by the removal of a tax on soap. At least this is the substantial effect of the proceedings; and cannot be removed by any nominal reservation which may exist, that the question of tax or no tax shall not be prejudiced hereafter. The question of penny or no penny, has virtually been begged. There are few instances on record, where the unrighteous Mammon of Toryism has come so opportunely in aid of the objects of the Whigs.

I yesterday submitted a Petition from the Radical Association and other inhabitants of Hull, in number above fourteen hundred, against the Poor-Law Amendment Act in conjunction with the Corn Laws, and other grievances; one not drawn up,

it may be, in language to be held out as a model on similar occasions, but in language extremely likely to be the accurate expression of the feelings of the Petitioners. My business as the agent of the Petitioners, was to obtain for their Petition the *maximum* of attention in spite of its short-comings, and keep it in sight the greatest possible time. In this I was tolerably successful; for a Petition upon which eleven members speak, may be considered as worth eleven times as much as an ordinary Petition.

London, 25 *June*, 1836.

On Wednesday a substantial step was taken on the road of commercial justice, by the equalization of the East and West India Sugar duties. That there was no good reason, why the people of England should not have cheap sugar from the East Indies if they could, was a truth which one might have thought should have made its way a little earlier. But why are not the people of England to have cheap sugar from the Mauritius* too? The answer is an amusing one;—because the inhabitants of the Mauritius are of French origin. Let it be remembered then, if ever the people of England are invited to enter again upon the wretched trade of conquering foreign colonies, that one part of the bargain is, that they are not to enjoy the advantages that might be derived from them, and for this reason to wit, that the inhabitants are foreigners. Now fancy a single man or a small collection of men, Robinson Crusoe for example with his man Friday, setting out to conquer an island that produced capital sugar-canes, but with a resolution that they would not eat them if they could help it, because the inhabitants were foreigners. The staring absurdity there is in this, leads to the demonstration of the difference which exists in our case. In the example of Robinson Crusoe, the men that make and pay for the conquest, are also the governors who are to settle whether the sugar is to be eaten. In our case, one set of men are to be at the expense of conquering, but another set are to have the power of saying whether the sugar shall be eaten; and because they have sugar from other quarters which they wish to sell dear, they are to settle that we shall not eat of the new. We the payers do not govern ourselves, or for ourselves; but we lie tied and bound in the hands of other

* This was a mistake, founded on a report in a public print. The object of jealousy should have been Siam; see conclusion of subsequent letter of 2 July. The duties on Mauritius and West-Indian sugar were equalized some years ago.

people, who fleece us for their own interest and not ours, as the sheep in a few weeks hence will be fleeced of their wool. Something, it is true, has been done, and is doing, towards curtailing processes of this kind and substituting wiser; but how tedious is the march of intellect in this direction, and above all how slow are men who must in their hearts know better, in joining in any general declaration against the folly to which we submit!

If the government did a good thing on this day in the case of the Sugar Duties, it did a bad one in supporting the piece of insolent injustice which goes under the name of Sturges Bourne's Act; always excepting the case, that the government keeps it up by way of directing popular attention to the desirableness of Universal Suffrage. The principle on which Universal Suffrage is abstractedly just, and which will necessitate the approximating to it as rapidly as the conciliation or disappearance of the interests opposed to it shall admit, is that when all have equal suffrage, the rich have precisely the quantity of influence which is their due, neither more nor less. Suffrage, is the right of entering into the great market of political influence; and to say that if all men enter equally, the rich will be defrauded of their due, is the same fallacy as to say that if all men enter the gate of the market equally, the rich will be deprived of the proper influence of their wealth. The question is not of their entering, but of what their respective influence will be afterwards. A rich man, if he is not a bad man, can always carry with him the votes of some dozens, or it may be hundreds, of the poor; just as he can obtain the venison and pine-apple which may cost as much as a hundred meals of the poor man who enters by his side. And what would be thought of him if he maintained, that the only way for him to enjoy the privileges of his wealth satisfactorily was, that the poor man should be kept out of the market altogether,—that he should not pass the door,—that Universal Market-Suffrage should be considered as akin to treason,—that the man of farthings should be kept out, in order that Dives clothed in purple and fine linen, might make his money go farther in faring sumptuously every day? Yet this, through one illusion or another, is very much like the state of things which exists, but which of necessity will be altered.

Now if anything could hasten the alteration of a rule which kept the poor man out of the market to please the rich, it would be the addition of another rule which decreed, that of those who did enter, the guinea of the man who had two guineas in his pocket, should buy twice as much as the guinea of

the man who had only one. And this is precisely the kind of thing which has been done by what is called Sturges Bourne's Act, and which the Parish Vestries Bill brought forward on Wednesday and put down by the opposition of the government, was intended to remove. That insulting Act, one of the slaves' collars slipped on our necks in the Tory times and which the existing government refuses to remove, gives to the voters in certain Parish Vestries a number of votes increasing in proportion to their wealth. A poorer man is to have one vote, and a richer is to have twenty or thirty; for to this difference at least, must the inequality be surmised to amount, which can produce the final result stated by Mr. Wakley, that "one-fifth of the population have a majority of votes over the other four-fifths."

Sensible people everywhere, see that such a state of things cannot last, and set themselves against it. The more numerous and poorer of its opponents, who as having the keenest feeling of the evil are probably the most active, go by the name of Radicals. Those among the rich who have the intelligence to foresee the inevitableness of change, and the virtue to resist the temptations held out to individuals in their situation to maintain an interest distinct from that of the community, are commonly called Whigs. The two together, make the mass which is moving irresistibly to the conquest of every useful reform; and the only matter of complaint, on which a man may be allowed to look sulkily upon occasion, is that the government denominating itself Whig, should be so often behind the tone of those who in the country are known by the same cognomen.

On Thursday came on Mr. Grote's motion for leave to bring in a Bill for establishing the Vote by Ballot. Why does Mr. Grote insist upon the phrase, "that Votes be taken *secretly* by the way of Ballot?" In the first place, it is tautology; in the second, the aristocracy when they employ the ballot, as they always do, for their own convenience, know better than to thrust forward unnecessarily the word which gives the cue to the opponent to revile. Truly the "children of light" in some degree maintain their old character. I took occasion, for the first time I believe in the House of Commons, to put in the strong facts displayed in the military law. Lord John Russell says voting is a trust, and *therefore* cannot be done secretly; and there is staring him in the face all the time a law he has helped to pass in twenty successive years, by which men discharging the most serious of all trusts, are directed and obliged to give their votes secretly. Tell our friends to buy, borrow,

or beg, a copy of the Rules and Regulations for the better Government of His Majesty's Forces, and read in Article 90 the oath required to be taken by the President, Members, and Judge Advocate at General Courts Martial; not forgetting to look at Article 88 for the Declaration required from Medical Officers constituting a Military Medical Board. These last, in addition to declaring that they will not disclose the vote or opinion of any particular member, declare in express words that they will not disclose or discover *their own*. No mention here, of the difficulty of a doctor keeping secrets from his wife, or any other of the common-places resorted to when the interests of the people are at stake Doctors, when they wear epaulettes at least, are not people. A meek, defenceless Captain of Dragoons must be protected by the ballot, that he may discharge his trust with advantage to the public; a fierce, independent father of small children in a pig-stye, is to be left open to all chances, that he may have the opportunity of showing himself a man. I surmise there will be another state of things, when the lions are the sculptors. In the mean time the cry is, that there is no demand of the people for the Ballot. There is nothing to be done therefore, but advise all who ever suffered from their vote being known, to set up their throats in concert. You see how the thing goes; what the people bawl for, they will get; and what they do not, they will go without.

Mr. Grote's motion was negatived by 139 to 88; and the year before by 319 to 146. The way to compare two divisions, is to bring them to a common term. Imagine the numbers on the late division to have been increased on both sides (preserving the present proportion) till the smaller term was 146, and the two divisions would have stood 231 to 146, and 319 to 146; or the two majorities would have been 85 and 173, one of which is more than double the other. So that the relative majority against the Ballot has in a single year come down by more than one-half. This says a good deal for the progress of the Ballot.

On Friday came forward the clause in the Tithe Commutation bill, by which the mischief of Tithe is to be preserved in the case of Hops and Market Gardens. Lord John Russell thought it an excellent joke, to lay the blame on the member for Middlesex; who it seems did (unfortunately, as I should say) go with a deputation of the owners of old garden grounds about London, to ask for a provision to release them from the full rate of compensation in the event of their land being wrought out. A man less pressed with infinity of business, and

with more opportunity of concentrating his attention on a particular case, would probably have foreseen, that a strong force of hop monopolists and others was already weighing on the ministers, and that any appearance of his junction would be snapped at to authorize the re-introduction of the general abuse; for this clause has already been put in and out, how often I am not able to define. But all this makes no compensation to Lord John Russell for going down to posterity as the man who tried to get rid of the evil of Tithe and could not. He will be pointed at as the legislator who knew all the mischief of Tithe, but found hops and cabbages too strong for him. We were told that the object of the removal of Tithes was to secure a great benefit to the agriculture of the country now depressed by them. But it appears the agriculture of hops and gardens is to remain as it was. Every man who has land which he could profitably cultivate in hops or gardening if it were not for the institution of Tithe, is to remain as before. The Home Secretary has no bowels for him; he had a week ago, but since that, he has had a joke against Mr. Hume. Every land-owner therefore, who has land that may at any time be capable of improvement by garden cultivation,—which seems to include the owners of all land in the neighbourhood of great towns,—should lift up his voice or for ever hold his peace. The edict is gone forth against him, and there is very little time for getting it removed. His rivals and antagonists the owners of the old garden lands, have been too many for him; they have shuffled off the burthen from themselves in the event of their land being wrought out, and they have laid the burthen of Tithe upon *him*, by way of keeping him from engaging in uncomfortable competition.

London, 29 *June*, 1836.

On Monday the unhappy clause in the Tithes Commutation Bill which preserves the misery of Tithes on hop and garden grounds, passed by a great majority, as always happens when the Whig government hauls down its flag before the Tories, and consents to be towed in their wake. The process of these demonstrations of debility, is worth observing. The government first gives out, that it is going to lay the axe to the root of some acknowledged evil; and loud flourishing of trumpets takes place in the country to that effect. All men are wrapt in admiration of the vigour of the government; and the good easy public goes to sleep in the conviction of its security. But when the Bill has got some three-fourths of the way through the House

of Commons, the resolution of the government oozes out, and discovery is made that some petty clause has been inserted, at a period when there is no opportunity for rousing the attention of the country to it, and when indeed half the Members of Parliament who oppose it appear never to have heard of its existence till that hour; and this miserable little interloper is sure to take away all grace and favour from the remainder of the Bill, like the cranching of a stone in plum-cake, or the flavour of onions where that savoury vegetable was not the thing immediately in request.

In the present case, there has been no general Commutation of Tithe. The Bill ought to be called a Bill for effecting a commutation of Tithe where it is least wanted, and withholding it where it is most. The thing is to do over again; for the magnitude of the evil preserved will, as the country advances, be found to have speedily surpassed the expectation of the present time. It must therefore lie over for the appearance of that Radical-Whig government, which is manifestly at some time to supersede the Whig-Radical.

It is curious to observe, how under the existing state of things, the interest of the community at large, the great interest to which in comparison of amount all the other interests concerned are only a pitiful per-centage, is overlooked by all parties. We find nice discussions, and exquisite adjustments, of the ways in which the opposing interests of the tithe-owner and the tithe-payer will be affected by the different arrangements; but nothing, or next to nothing, except perhaps in the speech of some abandoned Radical that nobody attends to, concerning that great interest which the country has in Tithe being got rid of in one way or another, and which is the real oyster in danger of being swallowed while the other parties are battling for the shells. In this case of hops and garden grounds, the important question was, whether the country was to have the increase of hops and vegetables which would arise from admitting the lands now kept out by the barbaric imposition of tithes. And this increase of hops and vegetables, the real prize the nation should have had its eye upon, is put down in cold blood, to suit the monopoly of the owners of old hop and garden grounds, and serve them at the expense of the owners of the new. These two classes are seen struggling for a penny, and the government settles it in the way that robs the public of a pound.

On Tuesday the interests of religious liberty had an escape almost fortuitous, from undergoing an operation of a similar kind. The government introduced a Marriage Bill, professing

to make marriage a civil act, leaving all parties to confirm it by religious ceremonies as they might chuse; and it "uttered brave words at the bridge," against imposing on Dissenters the stigma (for the majority always intends it for a stigma) of submitting to any Test or making any Declaration. But before the bill had got through the House, it was discovered that the government with a *coup de plume* had insinuated a tiny test, in the shape of a Proviso imposing a Declaration on that small portion of Dissenters who may be for no religious ceremony at all. Nobody seemed to have any previous knowledge of the fact; and the mischief would have been consummated without alternative, if the powers that watch over Dissenting liberty had not dressed up a cloud for the Member for the University of Oxford, and tempted him to grasp at the plea, that as the government had consented to the invasion of every principle of its Bill in the case of these little Dissenters, it could in reason do no less for the great. This he urged with much force of language and precision of logic. But the Home Secretary took alarm; and being further pushed by the spirited assertion of the Member for Leeds (Mr. Baines) that he would as soon go without the Bill as see it debased by such a Test, he declared for expunging the objectionable Proviso. The Tories struggled to the last; and after the motion for imposing a general Declaration upon Dissenters had been negatived by 132 to 68, and the tiny Declaration by 108 to 67, they divided on the question that the Bill do pass, which was carried against them by 104 to 54.

London, 2 *July*, 1836.

On Wednesday Mr. Gillon moved for going into Committee on the Bill to enable the sellers of spirituous liquors to recover debts under twenty shillings: which was negatived by 52 to 15. I mention this, because I have a kind of engagement to parties at Hull and elsewhere upon the subject, and because I have the strongest conviction that all the efforts to make men sober according to law, have a tendency directly contrary to the end proposed, and are in a great proportion of instances only blinds for the purpose of averting attention from measures directly hostile to the improvement of the numerous classes.

On Thursday a matter was noticed, of trivial importance perhaps in appearance, but of more weight than it looks, if only because it goes forth as a specimen of the logic of the House. The servants of the House of Commons had been in the habit of exacting half-a-crown for admission to the

Strangers' Gallery. This by a vote of the preceding night had very properly been put an end to. But was there anything like a *sequitur*, in posting up an order, that because the Commons were no longer to be shown like wild beasts by their own servants, the admission of strangers *gratis* was to be refused? Last week the debates of the House of Commons were held in public; clogged it is true by the exaction of half-a-crown. This week the House of Commons debates with a closed gallery, except so far as admission may be procured through the privilege of Members of the House. The Member for Liverpool (Mr. Ewart) with great justice complained of this; but without effect. I doubt whether in any other great house in the land, the discovery would have been made, that because the servants were to be stopped in the exaction of fees for admission, the channel of admission was to be cut off.

The most remarkable feature in the debate on the Lords' Amendments on the Irish Municipal Corporation bill, was the *dictum* let slip by the ex-minister and leader of the opposition, that the Lords were responsible "to God." He was manifestly aware, the instant after, of the consequences of the expression; and did all that man could do, with the aid of friends to cheer him in the right place, to qualify and soften down the obnoxious phrase. But a *verbum emissum* of this kind, is and ought to be an *irrevocabile verbum*. "Words," as Dr. Neverout says, "are the indices of our ideas;" and no qualification or addition will ever persuade the majority of the hearers, that the idea present in the mind of the utterer, was not of the same kind that is attached to similar words when used by Nicholas of Russia or Mohammed Ali of Grand Cairo. The Lords rule by right divine; and as our forefathers crushed and squashed the pretension to divine right in one branch of the legislature, so it would appear they have left to their successors the business of squashing it in another. The words were most fortunately unfortunate. We have double the light to guide our march, we had the day before. It is to put down the theocracy of the Second Estate, and substitute some good plain principles of earthly government;—it is to disable the "right divine of *lords* to govern wrong," as gone-by generations did to kings;—that the people of England are now summoned by the incautious frankness of the ex-minister.

On Friday Mr. Sharman Crawford brought forward his Resolutions, "That it is expedient that Tithes, and composition for Tithes, in Ireland should cease; compensation being first made to all vested interests, whether lay or ecclesiastical; and that no man ought to be forced to contribute to the support of

a church which is not his own." It was negatived by 51 to 18. I voted with Mr. Crawford, because it is painful to vote against that which is abstractedly right, however remote may be the chance of practical accomplishment; and because every vote, in the actual instance, might be considered as having a certain tendency to spur on the government, to exert themselves towards getting the question of Irish Tithes out of its present dangerous position.

The *Morning Chronicle* of this day, with somewhat more of violence than was necessary, demonstrates that I was wrong in assuming that it was Mauritius sugar which was to be prevented from coming to us as East-Indian. I was misled by a report of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech now before me, which contains the following words: "It would be necessary to provide that no East India sugar should be admitted into the country without a certificate of the origin of its cultivation, such a certificate as might easily be obtained. If the Mauritius was allowed to import coffee into this country there were other advantages to which they were not entitled." I find that the object of jealousy, instead of being the Mauritius, was Siam. I shall therefore endeavour to take an opportunity of showing, that my parable of Robinson Crusoe is with a few alterations equally applicable to Siam.

London, 6 *July*, 1836.

I AM to try to show, that if one of our Hull sea-captains could take out a cargo to Siam and exchange it there for sugar, which sugar on his return could be sold for him by Messrs. Todd and Popple in the Market-place with a profit, there is not the smallest reason why this in policy or common sense should be prevented, to please the West-Indians or anybody else;—and if it is prevented (which will only be because the Siam sugar is cheaper than the other) there is a clear loss to the nation of the difference of price of the sugar consumed, in the same way as if it pleased our rulers to decree, that we might use the cheaper sugar, but upon condition that for every pound, the difference of price between it and the dearer kind was thrown into the Humber.

This may be "silly" in some places; but it is not silly on Dock-side, if Hull merchants, owners, masters, and seamen, could make a profitable voyage to Siam and may not. And whether we could trade from Hull to Siam or not, the case will serve for all the others in which our freedom of trade is interfered with on similar grounds.

The argument advanced against us, then, is briefly this. "The West-Indians are your countrymen; they are a detachment of your own flesh and blood, gone forth to gain a livelihood by toil under the tropic, and to extend the strength and commerce of the nation; and therefore you are bound to give them your custom, in preference to the Siamese, whose pig-tails nobody cares for."

I will give up to this argument instantly, if it cannot be proved, that there is another detachment equally your own flesh and blood, whose custom and employment are dependent on your importing the sugar from Siam. But if this should be made out, I think you will allow that it follows, that whether sugar to the same amount of value is imported from the West Indies or from Siam, is a pure matter of equilibrium, a thing indifferent in the main, so far as patriotism is concerned; unless indeed it should ever be set up and proved, that one portion of our flesh and blood ought to be more dear and precious to us than the other.

Suppose then in the warehouses of the highly respected firm just mentioned, (who, I fear, on recollection, live only in the memories of their countrymen; but I once helped to bring a cargo of currants for them from Zante, so their names were naturally impressed upon my mind), there stood to the value of 100*l.* sterling of West-Indian sugar, and to the same value of Siam. Examine narrowly, whether British interests have not been promoted just as much by one as by the other. When our eminent grocers paid for the West-Indian sugar, they put a profit into the hands of a West-Indian Briton, and the remainder he paid away, or which comes to the same thing had paid away already, in the shape of food, clothes, or support in one way or another to divers kinds of labourers, and in purchase or payment for various kinds of tools, machinery, and raw and manufactured articles, incidental to the processes concerned. And when they paid for the Siamese, did not they put exactly the same sum into the hands of some other kind of Briton, to wit the merchant, it may be at Manchester or Sheffield, who advanced the cargo forwarded to Siam for purchase of sugar; and did not this merchant keep a profit for himself, and pay away the remainder, or else had paid it already, in the shape of food, clothes, or support in one way or another to some other kinds of labourers, and in purchase or payment for the various kinds of tools, machinery, and raw and manufactured articles, engaged in the processes of getting up the cargo for Siam? And are not the values concerned in the two cases precisely equal? If it was proposed that next year there should be no West-

Indian sugar bought. but a double quantity of Siamese, would there not be joy at Manchester or Sheffield in all the departments concerned in the trade to Siam, the merchant included; and equal grief it may be at Liverpool, in all the departments concerned in the West-India trade, the West-India owner included? And if the change were the contrary way, would not the grief be at Manchester or Sheffield, and the joy at Liverpool? The fallacy is in keeping out of sight, that if the Siamese trade is put down to please the West-Indian, somebody is injured in one place to exactly the same extent that anybody is benefited in another; and that the people whose injury is thus kept out of sight, are the people interested in getting up the goods which are to be sent to buy the sugar in Siam. If (which may be among possible things) the people injured on the one hand, should be the same identical people that are benefited on the other;—in other words if it should be exactly the same thing to them whether they work for a trade to Siam or the West Indies;—we still come at the same result, which is that it does not make a pin's difference to British interests in the aggregate, and that consequently all the outcries about the justice and propriety of putting down this trade and giving "protection" to that, are only so many efforts to serve one man at the expense of his neighbour.

The way in which attention is distracted from the interests at Manchester or Sheffield which form the counterpoise to the interest of the West-Indians, is by directing notice to the fact that Siam would gain, from which it is rashly inferred that Britain must lose. Perhaps something may be done, by placing the scene a litte farther off. If it were possible to send cutlery to the moon and receive sugar in return, would anybody say "Don't give custom to the Man in the Moon, for it will do him good, and therefore Britain harm." Would it not be found out, that this was no better than the argument advanced in some parliament of our forefathers, where a member prayed the immediate stoppage of a trade in lean Irish cattle to Bristol; for, said he, "the Irish would not do it if they did not gain by it, whence it follows that Bristol must lose." Would it not be found out, that the real dispute lay only between the West-Indians and the cutlers for moon exportation, and that the gain of the Man in the Moon was no more evidence than in the case of Bristol? The gain of the merchants in Siam has just as little to do with the question; except so far as it may by possibility promote in the end the making of better and cheaper sugar in Siam.

Or, to return to my old illustration as was promised, suppose

the question were whether Man Friday should go forth and establish a sugar-plantation upon the continent, and send his sugar for sale to his master's island after the mouths upon it had multiplied by various chances as recorded,—or whether he should stay at home and employ himself in creating knives out of old iron, for which the wonderful discovery of the grindstone gave him great facilities, the demand for the said knives being such as to induce the surrounding natives to send sugar to market at exactly the same cost of toil to tradesman Friday. Would any man be found to say it was of the slightest consequence which of the two courses was pursued; or that if in process of time sugar was found to be obtained cheaper in one way than the other, the smallest perceptible difference of price would not be good reason why Crusoe if he was wise should decide the employment of his friend and subject in that way in preference? Or if Friday had already gone out and established himself as a planter, but his kinsmen by making knives were getting sugar to market at home at a cheaper rate than he,—would Friday have the smallest chance of convincing his master, of the duty of "protecting" him in his colonial occupations, by putting a stopper on the proceedings of the rival sugar-men at home? Such political economy may do for the House of Commons, but would not do for a man like Robinson Crusoe who had his wits about him to look after his own affairs.

The Siamese sugar could only continue to come in, as long as it was as cheap or cheaper than the other; for if it was not as cheap in proportion to its goodness, the other would be voluntarily used in preference. And if it happened to be convenient to a Hull merchant, Hull ship-owner, or Hull crew, to import such sugar and they are prevented from it by law, they are wronged in the same manner as if money was taken out of their pocket because their name was John, and given to an individual whose name was Thomas. Men join together and form governments, to hinder injustices of this nature, and not to lay them down by Act of Parliament. And if in addition to stopping one man's honest trade to please another, the consumers of sugar are made to pay a higher price for the sugar they eat than they would have done if trade had been free, then the difference of price of all this sugar is lost and taken from the nation without any compensation in the aggregate, as completely as if by Act of Parliament it had been thrown into the sea. For nobody believes that the consumers if they had been let alone, would not have laid out this difference of price on something and somebody, to whom and to their dependents the benefits of this custom would have been just as great as

the benefits to the sugar monopolists and their dependents when it is given to them perforce. So that the winding-up of the whole is, that in one case the consumers of sugar get nothing for this difference of price, and in the other they do; all the items besides, being found in the aggregate to balance. And this my High-Street knowledges tell me, amounts to the nation losing the difference of price as if it was thrown into the sea.

You see then what an opening we have in prospect, when we can get rid of the regulations invented to give one man money out of another's pocket, with a loss to the nation in its quality of consumer besides. And if I have done anything here to make this clearer, you will say there was not much to regret, in having been led by a wrong report into a belief that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was thundering against Mauritius sugar, when he was thundering against Siam.

On Monday came on in Committee the Appropriation Clause in the Irish Church bill. This is the sorest pinch of all; and ministers were not particularly successful in their majority, which was only of 290 to 264. Their last majority on the same subject I understand to have been 34. They have had some losses by county elections since; and there were some absences, but nobody gone over. So that upon the whole I believe the question is considered as standing mainly where it did.

It is impossible to pass over this Division, without noticing the wretched impolicy of such an important decision taking place without publication of the names by authority, merely because it took place in Committee of the House. Even the Tory newspapers cry out against the practice.

On Tuesday Mr. Plumptre's motion for an Address to prevent religious intolerance in the Army, was lost by 44 to 38. Four men coming over would therefore have carried it. It is impossible in looking over the list of the Division, not to see more than four men whose vote against the motion can only be accounted for on the supposition of imperfect understanding of the question;—and not to think of the names of several leading Tories and professors of religion, like Brutus's statue, by their absence from where they ought to have been seen.

London, 9 *July*, 1836.

On Wednesday the House was counted out at an early hour.

On Thursday the same was attempted twice, but failed. A curious circumstance was reported to the House, by

Mr. Wilks; namely that the Proviso for imposing a Declaration on certain Dissenters, which had been struck out of the Marriage Bill, had re-appeared in the other House, and was in the printed Proceedings of the Lords. On inquiry it had been ascertained, that in engrossing the Bill after the last alterations, the Proviso was inserted by mistake. I believe everybody thinks that mistakes of this kind always take place against his own side. The House finally determined to wait till next day, to look for a precedent.

On the next day (Friday) Mr. Wilks announced that he had found two or three precedents; and thereupon a Message was sent to the Lords, announcing the misadventure. The Lords engaged to send an answer by a messenger of their own.

On the English Church Bill, the Amendment to prevent the translation of Bishops, was negatived by 124 to 44.

The Shipwrecks Committee is going forward, with prospects of good results. I shall be glad to be the means of promoting any representations from Hull.

London, 13 *July,* 1836.

On Monday the House proceeded with the Report on the Stamp Duties Bill. The Chancellor of the Exchequer denied in the most unqualified manner, that the Bill was intended to impose additional restraints upon the freedom of the press; only he must have the means of enforcing the duty the government determines to impose. Now I maintain, that the introduction of new and grinding severities, for the purpose here designated, *does* constitute additional restraints upon the freedom of the press. Every instance of grievance, suffering, or insult, to which the public is exposed in consequence of the determination that there shall not be a free newspaper press, is an additional departure from the natural and happy state which is intimated by the term of "freedom of the press." The Chancellor of the Exchequer's *cheval de bataille* appears to be this;—"It is settled that there is to be a tax; all efforts to secure the payment of that tax, however violent, are part of a different question, and have no connection with the other subject." This reasoning reminds me of a scene I witnessed thirty and odd years ago at Venice; and I think an old friend and shipmate, then holding the rank of second mate and carpenter, whom I saw at the Hull election, was with me at the time. A boy went through the fruit-market flourishing a switch, and every now and then jerked a pear from a stall.

While we were wondering what this might mean, a second boy appeared, and quietly gathered up the pears. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's determination to support the law, is the second boy. A bad law is made first; and then he appeals to the public for the necessity of supporting it. He overlooks the fact, that there are many of us who wish him failure at either end, and by either half of his process;—who believe that the only practical limit to bad laws, is the sufferance of the people, and who would rejoice greatly if on this point the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be mistaken in his calculations. It is astonishing how constantly public men part with the greater good for the less, the substance for the shadow. Here is the government calling itself Liberal, putting it out of the power of its friends among the people to represent it as other than a voluntary extinguisher on public knowledge; offending those who would willingly be its supporters, not less by the manner than the matter of its determinations; accumulating unpopularity from sources which it might have been supposed the first business of statesmen to avoid; offering itself as proof and example of the impolicy of our allowing one part of the Empire to be treated as "aliens in language, aliens in religion, aliens in blood," in order that what a Tory Government sowed, their successors may reap, and give us the benefit of the harvest. The mode of enforcement is to be imported upon us from Ireland. This comes of allowing Ireland to be made an experimental garden of misgovernment. The Irish law is to be transferred here, and we deserve it; or shall deserve it, if the Irish law and the rest of the injustices to Ireland are not sent before long into oblivion together.

On Tuesday the government ran into an impolicy of the same kind in a small way. A clause was moved in the Committee on the Established Church Bill, for "empowering the Commissioners to make regulations by which no Clergyman, not fully conversant with the Welch language, shall be appointed to any See in the Principality, nor to any Benefice in Wales, the inhabitants of which are not acquainted with the English language." And against this very reasonable demand, the leaders of the government contrived to be in the minority of 64 to 74. Surely no establishment was ever so ill cared for as the Church of England. Neither the Catholics nor Methodists ever think of conducting the cure of souls through an interpreter. The Church of England alone can tolerate such wasteful processes.

London, 16 *July*, 1836.

On Wednesday the House went into Committee on the Hackney Carriages (Metropolis) bill. The motion for going into Committee was opposed by Mr. Warburton; but in consequence, as I imagine, of the resistance being made at the wrong end, or *before* members had got warmed by consideration of the Bill instead of *after*, he had only 2 votes against 118. For all this, it is not improbable that there will be an effort made to throw out the Bill; for it contains many clauses derogatory to the comfort and respectability of the poorer and middling classes. The fact is, that the people who ride in carriages of their own, never know when they put scorn enough upon the people who do not. They would never tire of loading them with badges, and tickets, and nomenclatures, before, behind, and round about. At last Mr. Wakley stood up, and moved that all private carriages should carry the names of the owners, in letters of like dimensions, ground, and colour, as proposed for hired carriages; upon which the Member for the University of Oxford demanded that the House should be counted, and so the House was adjourned at half past eight. Some men think, however, that there is an end of the Hackney Carriages bill for this session.

On Thursday the principal debate was on the Established Church bill; and though much was not done, much was said, which may lead to doing hereafter. The reading of the Amendments was opposed by 43 against 90. A clause to preserve 10,000*l.* a-year to the Bishop of Durham, was negatived by 133 against *nobody*. To understand this, it must be recollected, that the Tellers, who are in fact the mover and seconder, are not counted. The Member for Liskeard (Mr. Charles Buller) moved a clause, which he supported with great eloquence and power of reasoning, that "until provision has been made for the adequate payment of the parochial Clergy, and for the supply of religious instruction to those parts of the country stated in the Reports of the Commissioners to be destitute thereof, the Archbishop of Canterbury shall receive 8,000*l.*, the Archbishop of York 7,000*l.*, the Bishop of London 4,500*l.*, and the other Bishops 4,000*l.* per annum." And this was supported by 44 against 82. These may be considered as among signs of the times. But I believe a Liberal ministry might at any time quell the storm, by bringing forward men of really popular opinions as the heads of the Church. It is hard to say why a Reform of the House of Lords, as far as it goes, might not be made in this way as well as in any other. And a Re-

form, though to the extent of only one in twenty or thirty, might be made without preventing the Reform of the remainder in any other way.

On Friday Mr. Clay's motion for referring the Petition on the Danish Claims to a Select Committee, was negatived by 59 to 51. On looking over the lists of the Division, you will easily distinguish four or five names whose votes are to be regretted; and they would have been sufficient to carry the question the other way. The Danish Claims must lie over, for that government to come we have sometimes dreamed of.

London, 20 *July*, 1836.

THE most important business on Monday was the further consideration of the Stamp Duties Bill in Committee. There is no denying that a great many of the most prominent violences in the Bill are omitted or softened down; whereon the query will arise, upon what principle within the whole range of a statesman's craft, were these points inserted to be softened down? It is like giving a lively animal a blow, for the chance of making it up with him afterwards. Some people will think there might have been a better calculation made, of what could be attempted and what could be carried through. Upon which I am afraid the truth is, that the people of England is *not* a lively animal. At all events, it has not been treated as if anybody had the fear of it before their eyes.

A question arose, whether the English Stamp duty on newspapers should not be reduced to Three Farthings like the Irish; and the Irish Members, or such as were in the House, voted against us. O'Connell, if he had been there, might from his previously expressed views on the subject of the Corn Laws, have been expected to take a different course. If there were exceptions, I have not heard of them; and the wretched custom of concealing the votes taken in Committee, prevents me from having recourse to any list. Now it would be improper to represent the Irish Members in this, as guilty of any unparalleled enormity; for Englishmen might easily be found to do the like upon occasion. But there is nothing to prevent remark, of the extreme poverty of the reason for which Englishmen are to pay 33 per cent more tax. They are to pay it that Irishmen may be obliged to read bad newspapers; that is, worse newspapers than they would do if the tax was absent. For it is evidently part of the assumption, that Irishmen would prefer English newspapers if they had their choice;—that the

tax must be increased 33 per cent to hinder them from doing so. Englishmen, therefore, are to have their tax increased 33 per cent, not that the Irish may have good newspapers, but that they may have bad;—not that the Irish people in general may receive a benefit, but that they may receive a mischief, to wit by every one of them being deprived of this 33 per cent in the value of his newspaper;—that they may be made to read the bad newspaper which they would fain avoid, unless they like to pay this 33 per cent more for the better newspaper which they might have had at the same price. And all this, is to benefit—whom? Not the Irish people, for they are to lose this 33 per cent in the quality of their article. Not the English people, for they are to pay a tax in order that the Irish may lose. But certain printers and publishers in Ireland, who want to print and publish bad newspapers and escape from the competition of better. And this is called "protection to the press of Ireland." Such a poor naked thing does "protection" turn out everywhere when looked into.

On Tuesday the most important debate that arose was on the Established Church Bill. Mr. Hume, followed by several other Radicals, attacked the Bill as a measure of only colourable reform. Lord John Russell made a very stout defence. He said the measure, though it might not go so far as he could have wished, was one that implied a great concession by the other party;—a concession such as in former years had never been heard of;—a concession too, which could be carried with the concurrence of those from whom opposition to other reforms was to be expected. He intimated also (though this is a topic on which it is always politic to touch lightly, unless a man is anxious to raise up opposition to his own plans), that this step in reform involved no pledge against any other. On the whole, my impression from his speech was, that there is a great deal to be said upon both sides; and if he speaks again on Friday, I should not wonder if he brought me over. We Radicals shall have cause of complaint enough against ministers, not to want to quarrel with them where it can be helped. If the fact is, that public opinion has made such enormous alteration in the state of things that men are obliged to give their full consent to partial reforms which a few years ago they would have resisted as monstrous and insufferable, it does seem policy to take advantage of their disposition quietly. It is what your Hull sailors would call, taking in the slack. Because it *is* the slack, are we not to take it? My advice therefore is, to "take in the slack," and then "heave and pall." Whether it be little or much, it will never be got back again. And we shall not be

the worse for it, when the time comes for urging our friends and allies to heave in a little more.

On Wednesday (this day) there was no House.

London, 23 July, 1836.

On Thursday there was a wearisome and fruitless debate on the plans for the new Parliament-houses. A million, or perhaps two, are to be spent to give gentlemen who do not pay for it, the pleasure of thinking they have raised a building "proportioned to the greatness and glory of the country;" which mean their own. I have held architecture in suspicion, ever since I saw the Pyramids. It is always a proof, that there were one set of men who planned and amused themselves, and another set who paid. Examine any country or age, and in proportion to the servility or corruption of the people will be the splendour of the public buildings. Sometimes the presiding power has been religious, sometimes political; but it is always manifest there has been a caste, which has had the faculty of taking the people's money, and giving them a stone.

The site too, is likely to be the worst that could be discovered, namely the old one. Sir Robert Peel is of opinion, that the House ought to be on the circumference of the circle, and not in the centre, because exercise is good for man and beast. More romantic gentlemen are enraptured with ancient recollections. It might have been thought that these would have in some sort balanced. If a man is overpowered by the popular grandeurs of the Civil Wars, that ale-born business the Restoration is at hand to moderate his ardour. If he is hurried away by the Glorious Revolution, there is Sir Robert Walpole, with the American and French wars in his train. Or if his loves and hates are all reversed, there is still the same unhappy alternation, to reduce his enjoyment to a *caput mortuum.* But perhaps it is Guy Faux that turns the scale, and hallows the spot to the antiquarian legislator. I wonder how many Acts of Parliament will be mended by these recollections; and what would be the discount of deterioration, that would arise from a mile's difference in latitude or longitude.

In the Committee on the Newspapers Postage bill, great efforts were made from various quarters to induce the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give up or modify the absurd rule that says a newspaper shall not pass if a paragraph is marked down the side to attract the attention of the receiver. It would be a total misrepresentation to say that anybody asked him

for any diminution of the Post Office revenue: but merely for the abandonment of that gratuitous tyranny which oppresses literary and political communication without advantage in any quarter. But he was a deaf adder that stoppeth its ears; and I do not believe that even the proof that the revenue was injured by the diminution of the purchase of newspapers, would weigh against the technical habit of believing that all that does anybody else good, must do the revenue harm. Surely individuals so far advanced in knowledge and liberality as the country Whigs, must see how they are discredited by this kind of narrowness; and must be preparing themselves in secret for the advent of a government which shall make the public convenience the measure of its policy.

On Friday there was a meeting of the Liberals in Downing Street, on the subject of the Church Bill; ending in all classes determining to maintain their several opinions as before. There was no breach of the peace; but there was no union. And when the meeting was adjourned to St. Stephen's, the Radicals refused to enter, and there was no House. This at all events to a certain extent obtained their object, which was delay.

London, 27 July, 1836.

On Saturday the House met, for the purpose of adjourning till Monday. If there had not been Members enough to make a House, I am informed the process must have been repeated on Sunday, and so on from day to day till a House could be obtained. The friends of the Speaker therefore probably made a muster in defence of his Sunday's dinner.

On Monday the Stamp Duties on Newspapers Bill passed, by 55 to 7. I do not know whether it ever occurred to you to be afraid, that nothing should be left for future Reformers to do. If it has, here is an opening charitably left, which by itself is sufficient to set up a new ministry in business.

The Newspapers Postage Bill was read a third time, and passed. Renewed efforts were made to obtain some modification of the unreasonable rule which charges newspapers a prohibition price at the post office, if a paragraph is marked to attract the attention of the receiver. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, if I understood him rightly, signified that in practice the rule should be modified so as to allow of Members of Parliament receiving newspapers with such marks, but he must have the whole letter of the law on his side. How long is it, that Liberal governments have asked to be trusted with bad laws, on condition that they broke them? And what

security have we, that somebody shall not start up, who shall stand upon the imperious necessity of executing the law; as was in fact, if I mistake not, done a few weeks or months ago by the Secretary to the Post-office on the very point in question. See also, how valueless is the quantum of liberty accorded. To be of any use to Members, they must have not only the power of receiving papers, but of sending; for the cases where an active Member wants to receive, are few in comparison of the cases where he wants to send. And why is the privilege, such as it is, to be confined to Members? I long for the day, when the lions shall be the sculptors, and the people shall really constitute themselves the judges, of what is for their own interest and what is not. We shall see a strange sweep of revenue laws, constituted to obtain a shilling for doubtful purposes at the expense of a pound in convenience and profit to the people, whenever that day arrives.

Take now my own case. I used to order a dozen copies of a London newspaper for the sake of some paragraph contained in it, and send these to the same number of country newspapers, who reproduced the paragraph. And I should not be wrong in saying, that I received at the rate of nearly half a dozen newspapers a-day from the country, for the sake of these or other paragraphs contained. In the whole course of this, I can say distinctly, that there was no one occasion on which the sending a letter to the post was prevented, or on which the transmission of a letter would have been produced by the omission of the newspaper. All these papers paid a stamp duty to the government; and this is to be cut off, because a grocer's apprentice once attempted to correspond with a milliner's, by sending a newspaper with the letters of "My dearest love" marked underneath with dots. The attack is not against loss of revenue, but against political communication; and it springs from part and parcel of the same fear, which dictates the refusal to accept a postage on newspapers instead of a stamp duty.

On Tuesday the Member for Kilmarnock (Dr. Bowring) submitted a Petition from an individual in Scotland, who had been deposed from the rank and dignity of an Elder of the Kirk for the crime of having taken the chair at a public meeting whose proceedings were not in unison with the interests of the powers ecclesiastical. Scotch Members hereupon stood up one after another, and talked of what their fathers had conquered with their good broad swords. I suppose their fathers conquered the right of being bullied by their clergy. The petition ended by being withdrawn; I cannot tell exactly why. The attempts at denying the power of the House of

Commons to interfere, reminded me of a story that used to be current of a near countryman in India. The commander of a field force near the coast, found himself without medical assistance, and in consequence engaged the services of the surgeon of a country ship. Our friend, as usual in that employ, had brought out an assortment of articles for sale on his own account; and it was announced to the commander of the force, that his surgeon was selling pen-knives in the bazâr, which was *infra dignitatem*. He remonstrated; but the doctor answered in our good East-Riding accent, "I tell you what, Colonel! if you *waun't* let me sell *my* knives, I *waun't* look after *your* sick." And he beat the colonel.

Now if the Scottish Kirk won't behave herself with moderation on the subject of public meetings,* we won't look after her wants the next time she comes for a grant from Parliament. And so I think we have her in our power, as completely as the doctor had the colonel.

London, 30 *July*, 1836.

On Wednesday the Lords' alterations in the Prisoners' Counsel Bill were taken into consideration. The Lords have struck out the clause which enacted, that if after the close of the case for the accused, the counsel for the prosecution shall make any reply, the counsel for the accused shall be admitted to answer it. The debate ended in referring the subject to a Committee; who have since pronounced against the omission of the clause.

In the course of the debate, a great deal of breath appeared to be thrown away, in demanding that the accused should have the last word. The thing to be demanded, and which justice evidently points at, is that no party should have two speeches to another's one; or more correctly still, that the number of speeches should be equal. It may be possible that the best of all would be, that each party should make no speeches at all; which still comes within my rule. But if the best cannot be had, the next best is, that if the prosecutor makes a speech, the accused should be permitted to answer it; and so on *toties quoties*. As to the terror so forcibly expressed in some quarters, that there may haply sometimes be four speeches, it appears to come within the scope of the poet's line,—

"And wretches hang that jurymen may dine."

It is better that a judge should hear four speeches, than an innocent man be irrecoverably hanged.

Some of the lawyers,—"Woe unto them,"—gave us strange

advice. According to them, the way for prisoners to be in good condition, was to be put into a bad one. An alteration of the law would prevent our being objects of sympathy to judge and jury; and so we should be hanged for want of their conviction that the odds for hanging were against us. Counsel would make such replies, as would leave the judge and jury in a state of exasperation against the prisoner; as if this was a bit more likely, than that the counsel should plead for the execution of his client. What counsel would get salt to his pottage, that ever fell into one mistake or into the other? As one of the classes who are not to drive the harrow of the law but to be harrowed, I beg to protest against these niceties whenever my own turn may come.

On Thursday it was my fortune to have two Petitions from Radical Associations (save the mark), for inquiry into the case of a private soldier; and when the moment appeared to be approaching for presenting them, it was announced by the Speaker that the time for receiving Petitions public and private, had by a new order been limited to half an hour *per diem;* which is exactly a quarter of an hour for each kind.

Think of the boasted right of petitioning the House of Commons having come to this,—that the Petitions of this great country, public and private, may be crammed into a bag under the table to as great an extent as can be accomplished in a quarter of an hour for each kind.

I returned my Petitions to the places from whence they came; with letters intimating that I could not be accessory to the farce of pretending to present Petitions under such circumstances.

When a basket is placed outside the door of the House of Commons for the reception of Petitions, I will put into it any which the Petitioners shall signify in writing they desire to be so presented. But I must decline any concern with the intermediate kind of process at present proposed.

Any man that reads the newspaper reports of the proceedings of the House of Commons, must have observed that the presentation and speaking on Petitions is in reality, so far as the people are concerned, one of the most important parts of the business of the House. It is in Petitions and the discussions consequent upon them, that a constant fire of agitation is kept up, on subjects which are finally introduced in a more imposing form. It is here, in fact, that a nation's pulse is felt, and a government forced to keep within those bounds which give it a title to the name of free. Compare the value of the time spent in this way, with the value of what is spent in

making baddish Acts of Parliament. That the process may be disagreeable to some, is not to be disputed; but for that very reason the community ought to insist upon the right. The effect of the course now taken, is to prevent one set of men from speaking five minutes each on subjects very useful to the people, in order that another set may speak two hours each for no use at all.

If public opinion should declare itself upon the question (and not else), I should be glad to be the instrument of putting a notice of motion on the books, that on every day of sitting of the House, two hours be given to the reception of Petitions, if so many there be. Judge for yourself, whether this is a reasonable portion out of the eight or nine hours the House sits daily, or not.

The moment any debate was attempted upon the subject, it was stopped on the point of form, of there being no question before the House. There being thus no legitimate issue for discussion within doors, it naturally breaks forth for the consideration of our masters outside.

On the same night, I went with ministers, on the question of paying a further instalment of the Greek loan. I hate Prince Othos; but I voted against the Russian Ambassador. Let us hope the Greeks will finally get rid of German kinglings; but in the mean time they may as well have the remaining ten per cent of a regime that seems to keep them tolerably quiet for the present. I will any time go against ministers for a great reason; but not for a little one. If an agreement had been made to oppose them on the first suitable opportunity unless they conceded the liberty of the press, five-and-twenty men might have delivered Israel.

On Friday, the County Election Polls Bill, which reduces county elections to one day, was read a third time by 93 to 54, and passed.

At nearly two o'clock the Member for Wigan (Mr. Potter) attempted to make a stand for the small proprietors of land, by moving the insertion of "a majority in number and value" instead of "two-thirds in value," in the Common Fields Inclosure Bill, on the further consideration of the Report. He knew the fate of everything brought forward at that time of night, and endeavoured to put it off; but the other side knew their hour. I tried to urge the propriety of assimilating the law to that of bankruptcy; to wit, that a certain proportion both in number and value, should be required to constitute a legal act, and that proprietors of less than twenty shillings annual value (corresponding to creditors under 20*l.*) should be struck off.

Buccland will have a law of its own, in a House constituted like ours. Nobody else supported him. When the question was put, Mr. Potter said, "The Ayes have it;" but he being an old man and not very nimble of speech, the Speaker said he was not soon enough, and refused to let us divide. And so we were not allowed to record our names. It is sickening to see the interests of the many and the poor, thus made away with. Remember that every man that thus "burked" the poor proprietors, had sworn that he was a proprietor of land to the amount of 300*l.* a-year. Truly if the people knew all about our doings, they would be tempted to sweep us away with the besom of something sharper than Reform.

London, 3 *August*, 1836.

On Monday, I voted differently from a number of those who are wont to be my fellows, by supporting Mr. Walter's motion for an inquiry into the working of the Poor-Law Amendment Act. At the election I was asked a pointed question on the subject of this Act; and I declared, that though the limitation of the relief to the poor might be a very good deed if accompanied by the removal of the Corn Laws, I thought it a very bad one if it was to come by itself, and that my hope was, that those who had done so would have let themselves into a good thing, and would find themselves under an increased necessity of removing the Corn Laws afterwards. And I still stick to the expectation, that the first time the feelings of the poor become excited by one of those fluctuations in the wrong direction which must some time or other happen, they will discover the grotesque injustice that has been done them, by taking away the claim they had on the rich for support, and leaving them tied and bound from maintaining themselves by the produce of their own industry. The world is growing in knowledge daily; the man can read *a*, *b*, *ab*, who did not know *a* from *b* a few months ago; and to this it must come in the end. Under these impressions I think you will be of opinion that I could not vote otherwise than I did.

In the Lords' alterations in the Tithes Commutation Bill, the Lords have re-introduced the Oath in lieu of a Declaration. It is astonishing how hard these men work, to put themselves in opposition with the growing improvements of their times.

On Tuesday the Lords' alterations in the Church of Ireland Bill were rejected by 260 to 231. Lord John Russell somewhat embarrassed his cause, by hanging his opposition to the alterations, upon a doubt whether they were not an infringement of

the privileges of the Commons, in addition to their intrinsic demerits. And Sir Robert Peel, on the other side, failed, as it appeared to me, in making the most of the advantage given him. He brought his reply to no climax; or to none but what passed without discovery.

I certainly never imagined, that the phrases of a Bill being tossed over the table by the Speaker, and kicked out of the House by the Members on both sides, were anything but figurative. But if I did not misunderstand Lord John Russell's speech, he alluded to these circumstances as having literally happened, in a contest between the two Houses on a question of privilege, not longer ago than the middle of the last century. I regret that the lateness of the Morning Papers after an extended debate, prevents me from having recourse to their reports for confirmation.

London, 6 *August*, 1836.

On Wednesday the President of the Board of Trade laid before the House the Resolutions of the Committee on Railways; a copy of which is forwarded to you herewith. Something seems to have been done towards securing the public, from the danger arising from allowing railways to be carried across vulgar roads "on the level;" that is to say, without the proprietors of the railway building either an arch or a tunnel, to take such roads clear. It would perhaps have been better if the practice had been prohibited altogether; but to prohibit it without special permission from the Committee on the Bill, is undeniably a considerable security. From this security, however, I believe your railway is exempt, as having passed before the insertion of the rule. The general fact, as I could collect it from inquiry upon the Hull and Selby committee, is that the cost of carrying a road overhead by an arch, is on the average less than the cost of maintaining the inspectors and machinery required by crossing on the level. For example, if carrying the road over the railway by an arch costs from five to six hundred pounds (which an engineer said would be the average expense), this is equivalent to from 20*l.* to 24*l.* a-year. But 24*l.* a-year is something less than sixteen-pence a-day; and what kind of an inspector are the railway proprietors to get for sixteen-pence a-day, to say nothing of the expense of keeping up the gates and other machinery required for crossing on the level? The newspapers have reported two or three "appalling accidents" already, from railways crossing carriage or foot ways. Our friends at Hull and Selby therefore would do well

to consider of the propriety of carrying all their cross-roads overhead, though not forced to it by Act of Parliament. I was told they had *five* roads that were to cross on the level, and I think fifteen that were not. If they do not, I can only hope that neither you nor I shall be the man on whom the tower in Siloam falls; and if any of our neighbours have a whole coach-full of children coming home for the holidays, crushed like a nest of young caterpillars by the gardener's wheel-barrow,—or an old man and his wife returning from market on the same horse, are sent to the Infirmary leaving all their eight legs scattered upon the road,—we must stand acquitted for having demonstrated, that it would have been cheaper as well as better to have done the other way.

On the same day the Jewish Civil Disabilities bill was read a second time by 39 to 22. It seems hardly politic to have brought on the Second Reading in so thin a House; for numerous Members were absent, on the understanding that there was to be no House at all. Another opportunity will probably be given the Dissenters for showing they know (if they *do* know), that the way for a man to secure himself, is to secure some other man that lies further outside.

On Thursday my colleague and myself were in a very small minority, on the Gold and Silver Plate bill for Scotland. It may be proper that there should be a mark to distinguish plate of a certain degree of fineness; but where is the necessity for preventing people from buying plate without that mark if they like it? One of the earliest things I recollect, was boys at the "Grammar School" looking at one another's buckles to see if they had the silver mark; and if a buckle had been found without the mark, the owner would have gone without the glory of wearing silver buckles, but that would have been all.

On Friday Mr. Barlow Hoy brought on his motion for an Address to the King on the subject of the American invasion of Texas; and was coldly listened to by a thin House. Have any of your readers seen an elephant ridden by "the Indian that ruled the beast," and admired the knock upon the skull with an engine like a short boat-hook, which was applied to convey the slightest intimation to the sensorium of the unwieldy patient? Just such a resounding blow does the British public seem to require, to be made to understand that the degenerate descendants of our forefathers in America, are invading Mexico for the purpose of establishing slavery. The laws of the Mexican republic, as of others of the new States formed out of the late Spanish colonies, prohibit slavery. Numbers of Americans

from the slave-breeding states, have introduced themselves into the nearest province of Mexico, which is Texas, and occupied lands there; to which the Mexican government appears to have made no forcible objection, as long as they obeyed the laws. But as soon as they are settled in the country, these Americans announce, that Americans cannot live unless allowed to bring slavery along with them, and therefore they will stand up for it as one of the "rights of man." And as the powers that protect slavery would have it, they have beaten a detachment of the Mexican army sent against them, and captured the President of the Mexican republic who unfortunately was with it. Meanwhile the American government looks on, and if the slave-drivers from the Southern States, though hitherto unacknowledged, can retain Texas, there is no doubt that the government is standing by, to admit Texas into the constellation of Slave States with the least possible delay.

The answer of the ministry was poor. It turned off the question to the slave-trade by sea; the matter at issue being, whether America was to invade Mexico for the purpose of establishing a slave-trade by land. It held out hopes that America would not, and could not, think of anything so wicked as laying hands upon Texas; to which the fitting reply would be, that they who would believe in the good intentions of America herein, would believe in General Cordova in Spain. It promised great things to be done by and by, towards repressing the slave-trade in all quarters of the globe, particularly the Portuguese; and in the mean time the Americans are to lay hold of Texas for the purpose of establishing the cart-whip, and we are to try our hands at remonstrance afterwards. It blinked the fact that the insurrection is no Mexican insurrection, but the act of foreigners; that in the army styled insurgent there is only one Mexican, and that the despatches of this army are all written in choice American. What an outcry would be raised if a similar operation were carried on with a contrary intent; if the Haytians for example were thrusting an armed *propagande* into some neighbouring slave-country! How soon would it be discovered, that public law was infringed, and that by a tacit consent of all nations, all had a right to interfere for the repression of such practices! But on the present occasion, all seem to be asleep; and we sit waiting for the consummation of the mischief, that we may know better what we have to cure.

Mr. Maclean brought on his motion or motions, for inquiring into the co-operation afforded to the Queen of Spain. The Spanish government has carried its disinclination to put down

the Carlists for fear of encouraging the Liberals, a little too far; and to the extent that the English ministry may be implicated in the same policy, it is involved in the same danger. "He that will not when he may," is a proverb peculiarly applicable in war; the great goddess Bellona, as Mr. Windham once said, is of all goddesses the least to be flirted with. At the beginning of the year there was every prospect that the Carlists might be put down by ordinary military exertions on the part of the Spanish commander-in-chief. But wherever human reason pointed out that he should fight, there by some inspiration he invariably withdrew; and it was generally so contrived, as that his English allies should be left to rich chances of being overpowered by the enemy. When the English force gained an advantage by itself, this was the signal for the Spanish commander to quit his army, with orders to wait till he came back. Things of this kind sometimes work their own cure. The Constitution of 1812, which is the real Constitution of Spanish growth and was only to be put down by a hundred thousand French bayonets in 1823, is what both the Spanish and English governments will some morning find they have been nursing. After the miserable failure of the attempts to maintain anything else, it is to all appearance the only refuge left, and what our English government should be only too glad to see.

London, 10 *August*, 1836.

On Monday on bringing up the Report of the Pensions Duties bill, a discussion took place on the subject of giving an additional 1300*l.* a-year to the descendant of the Duke of Marlborough by relieving him from taxes. A member of the government, Mr. F. Baring, contended that the Acts contemporary with the conferring of the pension made no provision of this nature. The ministry left the case to the House, but voted for the measure; and the increase of the public payments was consequently voted by 37 to 35.

Events of this kind generally take place upon Clauses brought up at a late stage of a Bill, particularly on bringing up the Report. There is evidently wanting an arrangement, for subjecting all after introductions, to a process of consideration and delay substantially equivalent to what takes place with the original contents of a Bill. In what used to be the University phrase, they ought not to be "huddled."

On Tuesday the principal alterations of the Lords in the Municipal Corporations Act Amendment bill, on the suggestion

of Lord John Russell, were disagreed to without a division. On the same day Lord John Russell moved the going into Committee on the Benefices Plurality bill. As I said before, this is one of the bills that is to do a little, and a very little, in the way of reforming the Church; but because it is a little, I felt bound to vote for that little, and so went in the majority of 66 to 28, in favour of ministers.

On moving the Third Reading of the Civil Offices Declaration bill, the member for Leeds made what appeared to me to be an effort to eject the Jews from the benefit of the bill; which as it stood, without naming them, was so worded as to include them. The Tories at all events took advantage of it, to get rid of the Third Reading for that night. If any of the Dissenters dream of being exclusive, means may be found to exclude *them* at a pinch.

It was circulated in the House of Commons last night, and I heard it from the mouth of a member of the government to whom I was jocularly referred as one curious in such matters, that the Lisbon steamer has brought news of the Constitution of 1812 being proclaimed at Cadiz. The ministers do not seem to have been in a hurry to disperse the news outside; for their organ this morning says nothing about it. I hope the country will like it better than they. There has been nothing of equal importance since the events of July 1830 in France; and I should be glad to see the public everywhere taking it up in the same sort of way. The Constitution of 1812 is the constitution of Spanish invention, which the Spaniards have as much right to as we have to ours; and in 1823 its strength and adaptation to the country were proved, by the fact that a hundred thousand French bayonets under the Duc d'Angoulême, now happily (as the ring say) "no where," were required to put it down. Louis Philippe will probably feel desirous to intervene; but will be held in check by the fear that the French army should march upon Paris instead of Madrid as it is now known it was within an ace of doing before. The Whig ministers will probably be determined by the course popular feeling in England takes; and if this could prevent the Tories from attacking the French revolution of 1830, it ought to have little difficulty in deciding the support of the Spanish one now. The only defect alleged against the Spanish Constitution, for which we were glad to fight when the question was of ejecting Napoleon from Spain, is that it is wanting on the item of a House of Lords. Are the people of England so much in love with their own House of Lords, as to stand upon this point? Ought they not rather to recollect what they got by the fillip given to the

spirit of Reform by the Three Days in France, and be on the look-out whether the declaration of the popular Constitution in Spain is not coming at the nick of time to help us over the difficulties that have accumulated upon us since? I am not a man that pops in and out every day like the man in a weather-house; and therefore I put myself forward on the present conjuncture to say, that a bold declaration of opinion on the part of the people of England like what they made on occasion of the Three Days, might gain for us and Europe, as much as was gained for us then.

London, 13 *August*, 1836.

On Wednesday the House went into a Committee of Supply. It voted 6,496*l.* in addition to the enormous sums previously expended to perfect waste on a palace which nobody will ever inhabit; and it refused 400*l.* for a gallery for the admission of ladies, after it had been determined on by two majorities. With the exception of Lords Howick and Palmerston, all the members of the government either absented themselves or voted against. I claim for them the dislike of all the women in England; and should be glad to see the time arrive, when the weight of such dislike may be manifested at an election.

On Thursday we had the entertainment of one, nay two, Free Conferences with the Lords; things interesting, like the flowering Aloes from time to time advertised in the newspapers, principally as having appeared only once in a hundred years. The last Free Conference is understood to have been in 1740; and so free it was, that either the Lords or Commons drew their swords upon the other, whereupon an order ensued, that at any future conference the Sir Charles Grandisons of the day should leave their toasting-irons in another room. The first of our two conferences was considered a dull affair; as nothing took place but an interchange of reading lessons. But the second was enlivened by positive speeches, delivered *sotto voce* with great judgment and discretion by the various champions on both sides in turn, till the list was nearly exhausted. If "lords are lordliest in their wine," it is well they come to a conference before they have well drunk; for as it is, their ideas of good manners are, that they are to plant themselves on a seat with their hats on, while the "rude and rascal commons," as the Church of England kindly expresses it in her Homilies*, are to stand before them bare-headed till they sink

* Homily on Rebellion; Part 4, § 3. Oxford edition of 1822.

to the ground with fatigue. For my own part, happening to have had more exercise than ordinary in the course of the day, I sat down on the floor from pure weariness, as did several other Members; and close beside me sat a Master in Chancery in his gown, who to diminish the burlesque had taken off his wig, and held it in his hand. I have been present at many conferences with semi-barbarous chieftains; but never saw their visitors greeted with a reception so hoggish. The Tory newspapers are scandalized because some of the Commons were so uncivil as to put on their hats; but they forget to state, that there was before them a line of men, no way visibly not of the same flesh and blood with themselves, carefully ensconced in hats of the dimensions of a lord-mayor's footman's, and seated with an easy dignity like that of King Arthur in "Tom Thumb," which they certainly would not have assumed if they had found themselves in their own housekeeper's-room. But this is the aristocratical part of our constitution; and the King can raise any man to the dignity of doing unhandsomely before his fellows. On a former occasion, as I informed you, the Lords lapsed into decorum. But a council has been held upon the matter, and they have determined to re-lapse since.

On Friday on going into Committee on the Jewish Disabilities bill, the Speaker's leaving the chair was opposed; and some of the orators declared their certainty, that every reflecting individual in the country was on their side. On a division, the strength of this party was found to be 3 against 42. It is not very comprehensible, how the representatives of such a mass of intelligent opinion, came to present so exact an analogy in point of number, to the celebrated "three tailors of Tooley-Street." But man grasps readily at comfort here below; and if I did not entirely and involuntarily mistake, one of the determined band consoled himself with a resemblance of some kind he discovered to the Trinity. This would have been profane if it had come from our side. But the orthodox have a liberty.

London, 17 *August*, 1836.

On Saturday the House of Commons met and sat for two hours. Mr. Warburton gave notice of his intention to repeat the opposition to the Duke of Marlborough's clause in the Pensions Duties Bill, which had been carried on a former occasion by 37 to 35.

On Monday the tables were turned on the Duke of Marl-

borough's pension; for on the motion of Mr. Warburton on the Third Reading, the clause for increasing the pension by the amount of the taxes was thrown out by 36 against 34; which is final, as far at least as respects the present Bill.

On the same evening, the Jewish Disabilities Bill was passed by a majority of 44 to 13. The same speakers as before, tried their strength on this occasion. I cannot approve of the system of not answering; though something may perhaps be said for it, in the concluding stages of a Bill on which it is difficult to say anything new. The one thing which Members of Parliament cannot trust each other for, is to be brief. It is like the letting out of water: and they are checked by the apprehension, of the "weak, washy, everlasting stream" that might ensue. The best way of obviating the difficulty, would perhaps be that brief answer should be made by some official personage. The Chancellor of the Exchequer for example, who appears to have credit with the Tories for the present Bill, should have answered in a dozen words, that his object was to christianize and not unchristianize the legislature, and that persecuting Christianity was not the Christianity of the House of Commons. Without something of this kind, the silent system will at some time be turned to mischief in the hands of an able adversary.

On Tuesday Mr. Grove Price brought forward his motion on the state of Spain; founded on a request for papers. Discussions of this kind always serve the popular cause, and therefore it is to be hoped they will be persevered in. The Hon. mover put forward a very remarkable defence for the Durango decree, in publishing which, he said, (I love unexceptionable authorities, and therefore, as I have lately had occasion to do before, I quote from the report of the *Morning Herald*), "Don Carlos had simply acted upon a law which existed in the Basque provinces, and which had always been carried into effect during the war of independence with France." In other words, the Basques always murdered their French prisoners, and under the same rule Don Carlos murders the English. Now by the right that every man has to turn the admissions of political opponents to the advantage of his own side, I ask what the just inference from all this is, but that the civilized portions of mankind are bound to run in upon Don Carlos and his Basques together,—to *courir sus*, as the French express it,—and abate the nuisance of both prince and people if they can. Dr. Bowring, who knows more about the state of Spain than all the rest of the House of Commons put together, made an admirable reply, which if he takes a hint from an old fellow-worker, is already on the wings of paper and print to join his last at

Cadiz. One point he put forward, which can never be too much spread abroad,—and that is, that the popular Constitution of Spain, with its kind of universal suffrage, its brief parliaments, and its no second chamber, instead of being "innovation," "abstract theory," and so forth, is neither more nor less than the early Constitution of the country, to which Spaniards have the same right to be attached, that we have to Magna Charta, or anything else pertaining to our ancestors we may chuse to set our hearts upon. In fact their original parliaments were annual, and the present biennial ones are only a submission to modern prejudices. Meanwhile the Constitution of 1812 seems to be advancing in all directions. The French army, if we may trust our oft-tried friend the *Herald*, has taken the alarm. Before the declaration of the Constitution, there is every reason to believe that the French military were eagerly volunteering for the French legion in the Spanish service; into which their government, with a military and political tact above the reach of ours, was encouraging them to enter. But the last news from Paris appears to be, that of the regiments invited, *not a man would stir*. They view the attempted increase of the French legion to 25,000 men, as a mere snare to entrap them into acting against the Spanish Constitution. This bodes well; the hope of the world is, according to the noblest fable yet produced by man, in finding "the extinguishers themselves on fire."

London, 20 *August*, 1836.

On Wednesday the House considered the Lords' Amendments to the Common Fields Inclosure Bill. It so happens, that the Lords have inserted the very principle, which Mr. Potter and myself attempted to stand up for, though with as much chance as he that, to speak poetically, "whistles 'gainst thunder." They have assimilated the majority that is to determine in cases of Inclosure, to what the law has already established in the case of creditors;—namely, three-fourths in *number and* value. I hope we shall get over it. And in the mean time we should probably have no objection to such coincidences being multiplied.

The House at rising adjourned to Friday.

On Friday the Prisoners' Counsel Bill came back from the Lords, with the Clause which permits the prisoner in cases of felony to be defended once, *allowed*, but the Clause which permitted that if a second speech was made for the prosecution a second should be made for the defence, *struck out*. Common

sense and justice, in this case, are too much for the Lords to assent to, except by halves. We must gain from our enemies what we can; and when we are stronger we shall gain faster. Lord John Russell, however, gave a most extraordinary reason for accepting the Bill in its present state. He said, if I understood him rightly, that by the Bill as it left the Commons, prisoners for felony would have been put in a better condition than for high treason,—and it had been decided at the Revolution, that prisoners for high treason should be in the best. His Lordship must have been exhausted with making good arguments, when he hit on this.

The same day, the County Polls Bill was returned to us from the Lords, with the oyster completely taken out and the shells left. The only thing of any note the Bill pretended to do, was to limit the poll at county elections to a single day; and this they have taken out. It is the pleasure of our lords the Lords, that we of the Commons do run the gauntlet of all the corruption and violence that can be got up by a two days' poll. A few years ago the Commons were the mere lacqueys of the Lords, sent to do their business in another place, as domestics congregate in a Servants' Hall. And the Lords seem not disposed to quit their hold on whatever of this influence may be left. It may be a question, whether they have not committed themselves to a serious interference with the right of the Commons to understand their own business. At all events it is a good reason among others, for cheering on our friends to carry reform into the Lords.

On Saturday, I heard the King's Speech; and through the accident of being asked to go previously to the House of Lords with the bringer of a Bill, had a full prospect of the ladies. The "blow," as the Horticultural Society might say, exceeded anything before. On this subject, the Lords are certainly in advance. The point of most importance in the King's Speech I noted, was that there had manifestly been no alteration made in the paragraph on Spain, in consequence of the declaratich of the Constitution. Our relations, therefore, with that country, remain *in statu quo*. The last paragraph of the Speech, appears to have been taken from some old one of the Luddite times. We have heard of clergymen preaching a yearly set of sermons round; and it looks as if King's speeches came up again after an interval, in something of the same manner.

Meantime our Constitution of 1812 goes on well. I was told to-day there is to be another Meeting on the subject; so here you have got *the second line*. The third, the "bulwark of

war" as Homer calls them, are still behind; but will be forthcoming when the time comes. One of the ministers said to me last night, "You were a prophet;" and I do not think any of them are either sick or sorry for what has happened. I see our Monday's meeting stirred up your domestic Tories; as it was meant to do. There is nothing like keeping those friends of ours in action; all their movements do us good. How much will they take, for instance, by their efforts to saddle *me* with the operations of men, which they know full well were no part of the sense of the Meeting, but attacks on the sense of the Meeting? Such success to them always. Have they found out yet, who brought the opposition to the Factory Act Amendment Bill within two? Or has anybody told them, that the joke about "the beginning of the end," which they turned over week after week, and said what a shame a man should represent Hull who talked about "the beginning of the end,"—*was not mine but Talleyrand's?*

And now I bid you farewell, till fresh opportunity shall arise for aiming at the common good; in seizing which, I shall not wait for ceremony, but write to you whenever I think I see a point on which our communication may be useful.

[The following letter, written a few days after the election, is introduced as containing the ground-work of some parts of the letters which follow.]

To the Editor of the "Hull Rockingham."

London, 26 June, 1835.

Sir,—I take the opportunity of thanking you, or perhaps more properly your Reporter, for the great accuracy of the reports given in your paper, of the various addresses made by me in different parts of the town, on occasion of the late election. I had no idea that the faculty of reporting a spoken address *verbatim*, could be carried to the extent which has been demonstrated by the reporters of all the Liberal newspapers in my native town.

A few verbal inaccuracies I will point out, as what may be useful to any who may honour the record of my proceedings with a second reading. Towards the beginning of my address from the hustings, "tyrant," "mal-governor," should have been in the plural. In the address from the balcony at the Cross-Keys, the night on which the first day's poll was collected, "aristocratic rich" should have been "aristocratic Whig." In the second line from the bottom of column 4, page 4, there is

a superfluous "not." What was meant to be said, was, that "*because* I believed that the evils which pressed on the poor and middle classes, proceeded from bad and mischievous legislation (meaning the Corn Laws), *therefore* I rejoiced at the exceeding great blunder*." &c.

Only one of the points I was anxious to impress, appears from the crowd of subjects to have been omitted. I think I recollect speaking on it at two different places, one of which I surmise to have been at Mr. Acey's on the Tuesday; and the point was this. I was anxious to show how easily the objections to the principle of Universal Suffrage on the score of numbers, might be removed by what I remember calling "suffrage by sample." In civilized countries, the time of every person's birth is known. If, therefore, it was determined that every person between twenty-one years of age and twenty-two, thirty-one and thirty-two, forty-one and forty-two, and so on, should vote,—it is manifest that a perfect abstract would be thereby made of the opinion of the whole community, and that by extending or contracting the common period (which has here been taken at a year) the number of the actual voters might be brought to bear any proportion to the actual population which might be deemed desirable, and without the smallest additional difficulty from votes being given to women as I suggested. You will perhaps be of opinion, that it might not be without its use to give publicity to this part of my addresses, at a time when it is of so much importance to Reformers to demonstrate that they really propose nothing that is not intrinsically reducible to practice.

On the question of *Reciprocity*, I think I have gotten light, through the examination of what you have had the goodness to print in your paper. If a Hull merchant can import French wine with advantage, which shall be paid for (for example) with English wool, he is told that he ought not to be allowed to do this, unless the French will consent to admit English iron, to be paid for (for example) with French oil; and this because there would not be *reciprocity*. Now the fallacy conveyed in this statement, and which I doubt not deludes the authors of the statement as well as others, is in the idea that unless the French admit the English iron, there is something like a non-payment for the English wool exported*; or that, some way or other, there is some loss or damage upon the bargain concluded between English wool and French wine. Upon which I note,

* Which had been committed in cutting down the people's claim upon the Poor Laws, and leaving the Corn Laws in full operation;—which I had a lively hope the people never would endure.

that the bargain for exchanging English wool against French wine, is concluded simply because it is by itself an advantageous bargain to the parties concerned: and that the fact of its being advantageous is not in the slightest degree affected by the exchange of English iron for French oil taking place to a greater extent, or to a less, or to no extent at all. The fact of the first exchange being advantageous, is not in the smallest degree dependent on the existence of the second; and the fallacy of the demand for what is called reciprocity, is founded on representing that it *is*; on representing, in short, or insinuating, or leaving to be understood, that the payment for the wool is in some way dependent on the reception of the iron. I certainly never saw this in so clear a light till this day; and perhaps you will not object to give publicity to the observation.

To the Secretary of the Hull Reform Association.

London, 15 *Oct.* 1836.

SIR,—An occasion seems to present itself for fulfilling the engagement which concluded my letter to you of the 20th August.

Since I have had the advantage of discussing such subjects with my townsmen, I have lost no opportunity of endeavouring to impress on them the fallacy of the demand for what our adversaries are pleased to call "commercial reciprocity," and the deep interest the members of a trading community have in its exposure.

It is astonishing how long men will live upon a word; and *starve* too. I wonder how many people are starving at this moment, in pure reverence for that big word "reciprocity." Could you expect anybody to go without "reciprocity?" Is it not quite fitting and proper, that you should starve for the sake of "reciprocity?"

The answer to this is, that when representation is made of the necessity of "reciprocity," the simple point in debate is, whether it is true. If the necessity be real, then starve for it with what patience you may. If it be not real, then starve for it as little longer as you can help.

I may go over old ground; and particularly the contents of a letter* which appeared in the *Rockingham* under the date of 26 June, 1835. But without minding this, I shall go on. A new version often makes a subject clearer; it is a fresh step

* The preceding Letter.

upon the ladder, and should be something nearer to the mark.

You at Hull can carry on a certain trade with France. You may not have as much as you would like, because there are dunces in the way that hinder it; but you can have some. There is something, as for instance wine, which the French will allow you to bring away. And there is either something else, as for instance wool, which the French will allow to enter France in return, and so the payment is made in the end by setting off the bills for the wool against the bills for the wine, as I need not tell a Hull man how, and which is tantamount to paying for the wine with the wool;—or else payment is made in money, say sovereigns, which is only making payment with something that has been bought in Peru instead of wool, and which must have been bought in Peru, if not with wool, with something else of English produce, say hardware, which is just the same thing to English trade in the end.

But you would like to do a good deal more. You would like to buy French oil, and pay for it in iron. You would give the Frenchman a capital price for his oil, if he would take it in iron; that is to say, you could afford to give him as much iron, as when sold by the Frenchman in his own country, would give him a splendid profit and you too. But here steps in the folly of the Frenchmen;—nothing peculiar to them, for we have just as great wiseacres at home. The French government, through the influence of some jobbers or other, will not allow your iron to be landed, or not without a duty that cuts up your prospects of a bargain.

Now then come our wise men at home and say to you, "Never consent to bring to Hull the wine you may buy with wool, unless the French will give up their objection to let you buy oil with iron. Let it never be said a Hull man did a thing so ruinous. Do not you see, it would not be 'reciprocity?'"

Is there a man among you, that does not see where the weakness of this trumpery piece of counsel lies? It lies in trying to have it understood, that the bargain between wine and wool is in some way or other imperfect or attended with bad consequences, unless there is also a bargain between oil and iron;—that it is not a good bargain by itself, and that you ought to kick at it unless you can have the other. There is something like an intimation, not in letter but in spirit, that there is not full compensation made by the Frenchman for being indulged with taking off our wool, unless he will also take our iron.

Now ask yourselves, is there or is there not a full and perfect payment made for the wool, when you receive the wine?

Do you accept the wine, for any reason in the world, but because the bargain between wool and wine is a good one and advantageous to all parties? If so, will you allow the trade you have, to be stopped for the sake of the trade you have not? Is it reasonable that anybody should ask you? Perhaps the producers of British iron may have no objection to holding out the threat of stopping your trade in French wine, as a method of trying to frighten France into permitting a trade in their iron. But I surmise these are not the principal movers. The great agents, I suspect, are people who want, not to have something sent abroad, but to prevent something coming here;—who want to keep out some kind of foreign goods, in order to increase the price of something they desire to sell at home, and lay the difference of price once upon traders of some kind from whom they take custom to the same amount, and once over again on the consumers who are you and everybody.

But this, some people will say, is *theory*;—by which they mean in reality the application of sense and reason to a distant object, as in the case of a man who keeps a log to go to Memel. Now, if nobody had ever got to Memel, there might be some doubt. But I can show you the practical men, who have been to Memel and come back again. Read the Member for Kilmarnock's Report on the Commerce and Manufactures of Switzerland. The honest republicans have never been fools enough to stop the introduction of any foreign goods into Switzerland, because the monarchical simpletons their neighbours were silly enough to prohibit Swiss produce. They took what they could get, and entirely refused to stop it for the sake of what they could not. And the consequence is, that the wealth and production of Switzerland have gone on increasing, at a rate to which no parallel can be produced among the neighbouring States. And this too among a people, where the government is extensively democratical; so that there is no pretence for saying it has not been done with the fullest consent of all concerned. No wonder our Tories make a set against the Member for Kilmarnock; they had rather he was drawing 10,000*l.* a-year as coaxer to some absolute government.

Another subject. In the *Morning Herald* of the 20th September, are some statements connected with the marking of newspapers under the Newspapers Postage Act, involving the conduct both of individuals pointed out and of the Liberal members generally, on which the editor has been invited to insert a counter-statement with the name of the author; and as he has declined complying in any shape with the custom of the press in like cases, I have a right to assume that there is a

political object in keeping up the misrepresentation, and that there is consequently a political object in exposing it. It is intimated in the paper mentioned (last column of 2nd page), that the Members who assume the title of Liberals were too busy in attending to some concerns of their own, to mind those of the people on this occasion; and the Member for Kilmarnock is particularly pointed at, as not "having thought it worth while to secure to the public even the small privilege of marking a paragraph in a newspaper sent by post."

If the writer of the article had possessed as good opportunities of knowledge as I had, he would have known that the Member for Kilmarnock made a most pointed representation on the subject to the House, and specified an instance where a London newspaper addressed to him during one of his election contests, was charged fifteen shillings in consequence of a paragraph in it being marked. And to prove that I do not speak without what the French call *connaissance de cause*, I was the man that marked and sent him the newspaper, containing a paragraph favourable to his election, and which he would very probably have been glad to see at the expense of fifteen shillings if he had known of it. Whether this was the handywork of some retainer of the Post Office of opposite political principles, is never likely to be known. But what may happen to one political party may happen to another; and the wise and desirable thing would be to remove the evil altogether.

If I may be allowed to class myself under the *Herald's* category, it will be nothing but the truth to state, that I urged on the Chancellor of the Exchequer with all the clearness of expression I could muster, the nullity of interest, or rather the opposite of interest, which he as a financier had in preventing the marking of paragraphs in a newspaper for the simple purpose of directing to them the attention of the reader; and I specifically confined myself to pleading for being allowed to mark a paragraph *by a line down the side*, as being in the highest degree inapplicable to the conveyance of any ulterior communication. I told him that in my own experience, it had frequently chanced to me to order a dozen copies of a particular newspaper, for the sake of a paragraph in it which I marked and sent to the same number of individuals, chiefly newspaper editors, in the country; and I assured him, in the most distinct manner which some degree of literary practice enabled me to compose, that in no one of these instances *would any letter have been sent*, or did any loss accrue to the revenue, while on the other hand the stamps on the papers were duly paid; for confirmation of all which, I refer you to my letters of

the 23rd and 27th July, transmitted to you at the time. The Chancellor of the Exchequer treated me and my proposition with merriment, and tried to make *hilarité dans la chambre* by holding me up as having fallen into some solecism of expression; though if there were a necessity for the question being cut down to one of school-boy criticism, the difficulty would be found reducible to the Chancellor, as is neither unnatural nor culpable, being wanting in that acute perception of the meaning of the word "*would*," of which the natives of this side of St. George's Channel are considered as having a monopoly. In England, "*would*" implies a contingency, a conditionality,—in fact that it is followed by an *if*, expressed or understood; and I defy any man to point out any *if* by which the words in Italics could be followed, except "if the newspapers had been kept back." He spoke of the *naïveté* with which I had advanced my proposition; and on another occasion when I urged the multitude of communications highly useful to individuals, which would be the consequence of allowing paragraphs to be marked down the side, without any diminution, or rather with an increase to the revenue,—he adopted the same amusing course, of dropping all notice of the reservation, and answered that the reasons offered, were with him the strongest reasons for not complying. I am not so precise as to represent a jocular misrepresentation of this kind as a breach of morality, nor so thin-skinned as to be offended because a minister of state cannot restrain his disposition to be merry. But I feel confident that if I had been so fortunate as to have to do with the leaders of the opposite side of the House, to a serious and friendly proposition I should have received a serious and friendly answer; and it is scarcely necessary that I should suggest in that quarter, that in the event of their chusing at any time to take up the subject, there are many Radicals who would be glad to meet them on any neutral ground that should be fixed upon, for the purpose of trying whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not be brought to a serious and fructifying consideration of the question. If the refusal had come from the Conservative side, we should have been ready enough to tell them, it was because they thought the balance of the press was against them. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer is of that opinion with respect to his own exclusive party, there appears no reason why others should not join to prevent his having his way.

I attempted with equal earnestness to impress upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer the gratuitous trouble and hardship he was inflicting on the newspaper press of all shades of

politics, by making it penal on the publication of a Supplement, not to state the publication of the Supplement at *the end* of the newspaper, as well as at the beginning of the Supplement. I pointed out to him, in the best words my habits of expression could supply, that when a newspaper editor wanted to publish a Supplement, it was frequently in consequence of the arrival of a mass of new matter after his paper had either entirely or in part gone to press; that to announce at the head of the Supplement, that it was a supplement to such a day's newspaper, was essential to the financial object of preventing the Supplement from being sold without the newspaper which is what bears the principal stamp; but that to announce this at the bottom of the newspaper also, was essential to nothing except annoying the newspaper press. But my fortune in this instance was as small as in the other.

I assure you that as to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's saying it would be better to leave the matter to the discretion of the Post Office, with the rest of what is added in the *Herald*, he said, so far as I am capable of giving evidence, nothing of the kind at all. When urged to admit in the most guarded terms the drawing a line down the margin of a paragraph, he utterly refused and rejected the smallest approach to concession. What he *did* say was, that he thought *Members of Parliament* might be allowed to receive newspapers marked: a thing nearly useless to them unless they are also allowed to send newspapers marked into the country, to say nothing of the gratuitous privation to the rest of the community.

Under these circumstances you will agree with me, that the hardest of all hard things is that the Liberal Members, either individually or collectively, should be represented as having deserted their duty on this occasion; and most of all, by newspapers that refuse to insert the contradiction of the representation when conveyed to them. Whether they feel any interest in leading the public into a fools' paradise upon the subject by way of keeping things as they are, is what we may not be imperatively called upon to settle; but it is entirely within our province to determine, that as far as depends on us, the chance of it shall be cut off.

The *Quarterly Review*, I see, contains a mis-statement of a similar nature on another point. In No. CXIII, for September 1836, it intimates that no resistance was made in the House of Commons to the insertion in the Common Fields Inclosure Bill, of "two-thirds in *value*," instead of "two-thirds in *number and value*" as it first stood, and as was finally reinstated by the Lords. Its words are, "We believe that this exaggeration of

—what in a Tory would be called—*aristocratical oppression*, passed the House of Commons without a whisper of objection; but the Lords, with their habitual and constitutional vigilance over such matters, detected and remedied the injustice, by enacting that two-thirds in *number* as well as in *value* should concur to call the Act into operation."—p. 256, Article *The Last Session.*

This imposes on me the duty of referring you to my letter of the 30th July to show, that *two* Radical Members did all in their power to resist the offensive and unpopular introduction, which finally the Lords could not swallow; and that their recording the resistance by dividing the House, was prevented solely by the act of the Whig Speaker, who refused to let them divide, on the ground that the mover, a man advanced in years, was not quick enough in saying "The Ayes have it." It is within the cognizance of every Member of the House, whether it is not the constant practice to put the question a second time, when suggestion is made that anybody has been taken by surprise; and I should be glad if Members of experience would convey to us the knowledge by post or otherwise, of any existing precedent for a Division being refused upon the plea that the Speaker won the race. And now see the consequences of a party submitting to a wrong in the persons of any of its members. The Radicals are prevented by the Speaker from recording a Division on an abuse; and then comes the House of Lords and removes the abuse, while the Tories tell our constituents that not a whisper of objection was made to it in the Commons. Not that I believe the Speaker did it with the malice prepense of the men that Solomon appears to have known, who said "Let us lurk privily for the innocent without cause." I believe that he was sleepy and ill-humoured; but he would no more have done it to the Whigs who are his own party, nor to the Tories whom they are afraid of, than a man will yawn before his mistress or his enemy. But none of this makes the mischief less; so if the Tories send down one version of the history, let us do our best to send down the other. We are ill-treated in all sorts of ways; yet I hope nothing of this kind will make us swerve an inch from the public interest. If any of our friends lose their temper, tell them there is a remedy. *Get power;* and then all that now annoys you, will run after you as if you were its grandfather.

London, 19 *Oct.* 1836.

I RETURN to the Member for Kilmarnock's Report on the Commerce and Manufactures of Switzerland; which ought to be in the hands of every man and boy in Hull, who pretends to

more insight into the nature of trade and the sources of its prosperity, than the urchins that play at marbles in the streets. Take a little of the beginning; and at every word try to extract the bearing which it has on the concernments of your own town and traffic.

'It could not, indeed, but excite the attention of any reflecting person, that the manufactures of Switzerland—almost unobserved, and altogether unprotected, had been gradually, but triumphantly, forcing their way into all the markets of the world however remote, or seemingly inaccessible. That such a remarkable result was not the consequence of geographical position is obvious, for Switzerland neither produces the raw material which she manufactures, nor, when manufactured, has she any port of outlet, except on the conditions which her maritime neighbours impose upon her, No one of her fabrics owes it's prosperity to a protecting or interposing legislation: yet it is not the less true that, without custom-houses to exclude or laws to prohibit the full action of foreign competition on her various industries, her progress has been almost unexampled in manufacturing prosperity. I anticipated, certainly, that Switzerland would exhibit a living and instructive example of the truth and importance of the great principles of political economy when brought into practical operation; but I scarcely expected to find that they had been instrumental in producing such a vast mass of content and happiness as I found existing in the manufacturing cantons, or that they would have raised so large a proportion of the labouring class to independence and comfort.'

'If, in the details which I have to lay before your Lordships, defects and deficiencies should be discovered, I hope it will not be forgotten that in a country whose industry is nowise interfered with by the ruling power, where no custom-houses exist, nor any system of taxation requiring official returns, facts are collected with difficulty; and the questions of consumption, of export and import, necessarily escape from anything like a precise estimate of their progress or their fluctuations. I found, indeed, without a solitary exception, every one of the Swiss governments desirous of communicating whatever information it possessed or I required; yet it constantly happened that accurate arithmetical statistics were inaccessible. But it is impossible to mistake the value of a policy whose results are to be traced in the general content—in the general prosperity. *In most of the manufacturing cantons of Switzerland the power of legislation is not only indirectly, but directly, in the hands of the whole body of the people. Were their commercial economy opposed to the common interest, it could not exist for a day.* It has the sanction of universal experience and of universal approbation. Two millions of men have made, under every disadvantage, the experiment of free trade as a system. Its incontrovertible results must, I am sure, silence the doubts and remove the difficulties of the honest and disinterested inquirer.'—*Report on the Commerce and Manufactures of Switzerland. By John Bowring.* 1836. p. 3.

'Switzerland is far away from all the great outlets of trade. The cotton she manufactures has to be conveyed many hundreds of miles from the Mediterranean, and even a greater distance from the Atlantic Ocean. Her silks she imports from Italy and France, and her wool from Germany. When her produce seeks a market in a foreign land it is exposed to the risks and delays and charges of the same tardy, difficult, and expensive transit. It must find its way over the Jura or the Alpine mountains; be conveyed down the irriguous rivers, or on the inland lakes; *yet, spite of all impediments, the manufactured products of Switzerland are found in all the great markets of the universe; and the reason is simple, but obvious,—Industry has been left to itself.* Wealth has not been diverted by legislative interference from its own natural tendencies. There has been no foolish struggle encouraged by the government between the protected monopoly of the few and the unprotected interests of the many. The consumer has been allowed to go to the cheapest market, the producer to the dearest; and the present position and prospects of Swiss industry, studied in the facts and the details of its increase, will have some influence perhaps with those to whom free-trade theories are repulsive or hateful.'

'It might be expected that the prohibitory system with which surrounding States have fenced their frontiers would alarm the manufacturers of Switzerland, and induce them to seek commercial alliances among neighbouring countries, by adopting a similar legislation, falsely called *protective*. But such has not been the tendency of Swiss opinion, nor the recommendation of Swiss experience. Many of the most enlightened manufacturers assured me that though in 1814 they were much alarmed by the great political changes in progress, and earnestly desirous of making some arrangements with other powers grounded on a basis of mutual favour, they were now convinced that the free-trade and the free-transit policy are the wisest, the most prosperous, and the best. Notwithstanding the natural disadvantages of the geographical position of the Swiss cantons, I am persuaded there does not exist in the world a manufacturing industry more sound, healthy, and elastic, than that of Switzerland. While, on the one hand, it is an object of alarm to those who represent the interests of the *protected* portion of the manufacturers of France,—while the markets of Germany and Italy are becoming less and less accessible to the produce of Swiss industry,—that industry, on the other, is constantly making its way to new regions of demand. The consumption it formerly found in Europe is now far exceeded by that in the transatlantic states; and Switzerland has already, by a courageous perseverance in an intelligent and successful commercial policy, established her manufactures on the broad and immovable basis of *cheap production*. In travelling through the different districts I constantly found merchants and manufacturers who had established connexions with the remotest countries of the globe. They assured me that the anxieties had now ceased which they had felt for some time in consequence of the lines of custom-houses with which France and Germany and Italy, their circumjacent

neighbours, had girdled their frontiers; that they were in fact independent of that narrow and selfish policy which had created the tariffs of so many European nations; that they had been pressed into a wider and more profitable field, which they could successfully explore to the extent of their capitals and their means of production.'

'The Diet of Switzerland, on the strong representations of the Swiss manufacturers, and by way of reprisal upon the prohibiting measures of the French Government, made an attempt in 1820 to introduce a protecting system into the legislation of the country. It really existed only for a few months, and the impediments to free communication were gradually worn out by the mere pressure of the public opinion and the instinct of the public interests. On no topic whatever did I find such a community of feeling as that which recognised the benefits which free trade had conferred upon the country. Even among those seemingly interested in prohibition and protection, there were many who confessed that a great change had taken place in their opinions. A number of manufacturers who had formerly been strenuous advocates for heavy custom-house duties on foreign articles, and had considered themselves to have an exclusive right to the national consumption of their manufactures, especially while surrounding states excluded them, were now convinced by experience that their views had been erroneous, and that their establishments had acquired a strength and a solidity which a protecting penal legislation never could have given them. One of the principal cotton manufacturers says, "In every warehouse, in every shop in the land, English and French goods are exhibited by the side of ours. They have paid no duties; ours have had no protection. Insignificant as were our early attempts, and confined as were our markets, our Government thought right to deny us a helping hand, and to force us to shift for ourselves; and, in spite of the tremendous rivalry of British capital and French taste, we have succeeded. The history of the last century is a history of our progress. Spite of every obstacle, weak as we are,—without a single port or means of outlet except such as are held at the good pleasure of our neighbours,—our articles have found their way, and meet with a ready sale in the four quarters of the globe."—*Id.* p. 4.

Every word of this drops wealth, for those to whom it is given to receive it. See how far, after all our boastings and all our advantages, we are behind a few republican tradesmen and cultivators, who have had the opportunity of making the law *by* themselves and *for* themselves. Calculate the difference between what they have done and we, under our relative difference of natural situation; and thence estimate, if you can, how much has been taken from us on the whole, and how much is taken from us annually at the present.

Take some more of the proceedings of the Swiss.

'In 1830-31 no less than thirteen cantons remodified their constitutions by giving further extension to the popular power. It is true that the change brought into greater action the ignorance and preju-

dices, as well as the knowledge and interests of the people. But the change rather strengthened than weakened the free-trade principle. The labouring classes form a large majority in the manufacturing cantons, where the democratic power is the least controlled. They might, if they pleased, *protect*, as it is called, their labour, exclude foreign competition, settle wages by legal enactments, and subvert all those axioms of political economy which are often held up to opprobrium as hostile to the happiness of the many. But they are living witnesses, living evidences of the truth and value of those fundamental principles of economical science to which they owe their well-being and constantly-increasing prosperity. It has been again and again my lot to hold intercourse with intelligent Swiss workmen, who considered their freedom from commercial trammels as the greatest and best of their privileges. The late insurrection at Lyons forced a number of silk-weavers to settle on the banks of the Lake of Zurich. They gain less wages, it is true, but they enjoy incomparably greater comforts than they left behind them; and I shall not easily forget the observation of one of them; "Sir, the floor on which I tread in Switzerland is cleaner than the table from which I ate my food in France."—*Report &c.* p. 6.

Hear of the doings of a Swiss Committee, and compare them with what would be the probable doings of a Committee of the House of Commons.

'In December 1833 the Swiss confederation appointed a committee to report on the foreign commercial relations of Switzerland. The members of the committee were Messrs. K. von Muralt, I. C. Zellweger, Laue, E. His, Ganguillet, and C. Miescher. Their first report was published within a fortnight after their installation, and it proclaims the principles of a sound and liberal policy. The report naturally boasts of the honourable fact, that the various industry of Switzerland has developed itself without protection or privilege for articles produced at home, as without prohibitions or duties on those imported from abroad; and it strongly recommends, in the fiscal and custom-house struggle which is going on in Europe, that Switzerland should preserve a strict neutrality.'—*Report &c.* p. 8.

'Having thus decidedly objected to become a party to any custom-house league proposed by other nations, they inquire whether a more rigid custom-house system of their own, and the imposition of duties upon foreign produce, might not be a national benefit. They answer, No! for that, though the right of Switzerland to establish a system of her own is undoubted, yet the interests of Switzerland demand for her citizens complete freedom of trade; that to buy and sell without restriction is the best source of individual and national prosperity; that the cost of custom-house restrictions, and their accompanying inconveniences, added to the demoralization which smuggling brings with it, are no small additional motives for objecting to the establishment of such restrictions among a free and intelligent and virtuous people.'

'The committee contend further, that as a means of influence and

reprisal, such a project would fail; that it would indispose the neighbouring powers to treat; would raise the price of Swiss goods, and diminish the demand for them when any change should take place.' —*Id.* p. 9.

'The Committee conclude their Report with the following Resolutions:—

"I. The Swiss confederatiou shall irrevocably adhere to its established system of free trade and manufacture.

II. Under no circumstances and no conditions shall it form a part of the French custom-house system, of the Prussian Commercial League, or the custom-house line of any foreign nation.

III. It shall use every effort for the establishment and extension of the principles of free trade.

IV. It shall, as far as possible, discuss and establish conventions with the neighbouring states for the disposal of agricultural and vineyard produce and cattle, *for obtaining the free ingress of corn*, and for maintaining the daily, reciprocal, economical, neighbourly and border traffic and market transactions.

V. Wherever a free trade is not obtainable, it shall endeavour to remove all prohibitions, to lower duties, and to secure the power of transit on the most favourable terms.

VI. When exceptional favours can be obtained, they shall be used for the advancement of those measures which lead to the accomplishment of the ends proposed; so, however, that exchanges be not thereby limited, nor personal liberty interfered with.

VII. In the interior of Switzerland it shall make every exertion to assist industry and to remove impediments to intercourse, taking care, however, that it do not interfere with the personal concerns of merchants or manufacturers."—*Id.* p. 10.

I think it is within my knowledge, that forty years ago merchants at Hull had a great idea of the benefit of sending their sons to Holland; to learn, I suppose, some new form of double or single entry, or some improved manner of locking up a cash-box. They had more need, now, send them to Switzerland.

An odd contrast is presented between Switzerland the most forward country in the world in commercial policy, and France the most backward. This may possibly be one reason why the king of the *épiciers* is threatening Switzerland.

'The population of Switzerland, though only consisting of two millions, offer, even for the consumption of the country, in consequence of their unrestricted freedom of trade, a considerable market to foreigners. The principal articles imported from France are wine, oil, madder, brandy, alcohol, salt, fruit, sugar, coffee and colonial produce, silk, woollen and cotton manufactures, and articles of fashion of a great variety of sorts. There is no duty, other than a nominal one, upon any one of these objects, while France receives from Switzerland some horned cattle and cheese, both of which pay

enormous duties, and ribands, linens, and threads, all subject to large custom-house imposts. There is also a considerable export of watches and jewellery, which is principally in the hands of contraband traders.'

'Such a state of things naturally produces much discontent in Switzerland, and many representations have been made to the French Government on the necessity of modifying their tariff in a more liberal spirit. There can be no doubt that French agriculture would in the end be greatly benefited by a more extensive introduction of young and lean cattle from Switzerland, and by lowering the duty on horses, which are frequently purchased in Switzerland for the use of the French army. The impediments created by France have already influenced the agricultural productions of Switzerland. Corn and olive culture has invaded the meadow lands, and the oils and grains of France suffer from the loss of the Swiss markets. There is also a tendency to extend the breeding of sheep, a consequence of which will probably be the establishment of rival woollen manufactures, and the loss of those supplies of cattle and horses, which, up to the Restoration, were considered a benefit to France, whose tariff, till then, had imposed a heavy duty on their exportation, while to importation all facilities were given. Of late, the exports of cattle and other Swiss produce being in the direction of Italy and Germany, imports naturally fall into the same route. The salt which Lorraine formerly furnished is now provided by Germany; but the mere transfer of supply from one country is not alone the subject of regret, since the unfriendly and hostile tariff of France has produced among the Swiss population sentiments of repulsion which cannot be witnessed without pain, and which will leave traces behind them even should the causes from which they originated be removed.'

'In representations to the French Government the Swiss authorities have put prominently forward the notorious fact that the protection afforded to French manufactures by highly-raised or prohibitory tariffs has not produced its intended results; that no manufacturing industry has suffered such violent shocks or seen such terrible reverses as the *protected* industry of France. "It may require time," they say, "to enable France to relieve herself from these visibly disastrous effects of her isolated and contracted policy; but as crisis will follow crisis, and the pressure of one prohibition upon another be more and more felt, the progress of inquiry and the necessities of the times, it may be hoped, will persuade the French nation, ere long, that they have far more to gain by an extension of liberal commercial principles than by any protecting tariffs, however dexterously or artfully combined."

"Three lines of custom-houses surround the French territories; their main business is to exclude whatever other countries offer that is better and cheaper than the articles France herself produces. In order that a small number of manufacturers may gain, the whole consuming population are condemned to lose, and to lose in a far heavier proportion; but so many factitious interests are involved, and so little has a sense of the general interest pervaded general

opinion, that the late demands of the Swiss upon France have been less for a complete change of the tariff, than for a lowering of the duties upon some articles peculiarly interesting to Switzerland."—*Report &c.* p. 11.

How happy might nations be, if they had not governments to hinder them! Well may the Tories give out, that the Member for Kilmarnock is "the laughing-stock of Europe." Set that by the side of "the good king" Carlos. They know their business and we know ours. If Tory abuse means anything, the Member for Kilmarnock must be a great man in his generation.

London, 22 Oct. 1836.

THOUGH in these days of steam-boats and accelerated mail-coaches, one man cannot be said to be much more in the way of information than another, you will perhaps expect me to do something in the way of putting together and comparing the conclusions which have been come to in different quarters, upon the point or points to which men's attention at this moment is manifestly attracted.

We have gone successfully and happily through the first stage of a revolution. I do not want you to believe this on my authority; look at the assertions of our opponents, past, present, and to come, and see if they do not declare it to have been a revolution. This first stage consisted in taking the appointment of the Members of the House of Commons from the peers, and giving it to the people. The understanding in the old state of things used to be, that the Lords never went against a majority of more than, eighty I think it was, in the Commons: and our predecessors shook their heads over this, as a proof of the power of the Commons. It was left to us their successors to find out, that the secret of this lay in its being impossible there should be a majority of more than eighty in the Commons, without there being at the same time a majority ready in the Lords. It is easy enough to find data that would fit the case. Suppose the truth was, that there was a certain number (x as an algebraist might call it) of independent Tories in the House of Commons, and a number greater by 80 ($x + 80$) of independent liberals,—by independent, meaning men who did not owe their seats to peers, nor in any other way were influenced by them in their votes;—and that the rest, being a large proportion of the whole House, were the creatures of peers of all the different shades of lordly opinion. This state of things, I submit, would make it physically impossible, that any question should ever be carried by a majority of more than 80 in

the fullest House, without there being previously a majority ready to vote for it in the Lords.

This state of things, happy or unhappy, has been done away by the Reform Bill. The Lords are now the Lords, and not the Lords and Commons too. The oil which the lovers of the sometime "glorious constitution" so doted on, is gone and absorbed; and the two portions of the governmental joint, grate and grind upon each other, without the harmony which arose from the one part being the mere repetition of the other. Things cannot go on so; *we* knew it and *they* knew it, and *we* have beaten. Either the Reform Bill must be undone, and the Lords be both Lords and Commons again; or something must be done to bring the Reformed government into a working state.

There was no abstract necessity for things being brought to this pass; but we have been brought to it by the will and determination of the Lords. Had the Lords possessed the far-sightedness for which aristocracies, unjustly enough perhaps, have taken credit, they might have put the wool-sack of delay between themselves and the shock of change, and taken the chances of what time might do towards recovering their old position. But most happily for us, this policy they have scouted. They have said boldly and lordfully, "Here we stand, the offspring of the by-gone time, an oak here and a mushroom there, and as long as we can each count one, you shall have no good thing either with us or without us."

Under these circumstances, it is out of the question that they can maintain their ground. They have not, as our friends the Methodists are fond of saying, "used the means." The proof of their inability, is in the quiet way in which the belief that something must and will be done, has wrought itself into the public mind. One of the latest-born of Tory organs*, calls the Reform of the Lords "a question it is treason to contend:" and so it would have been forty years ago. The headsman and the dissector's assistant would have been in requisition; there is no doubt of that. But see how quietly we "contend" it now. Is that no symptom, that they have been "weighed in the balances"?

The power of the peers is one which could never have been transferred from a rude and early state of society into a civilized one, unless shielded from public view either by non-exercise, which is equivalent to being no power, or by some invasion of the rights of other portions of the community, never legitimatized by public consent. The Reform Bill was a public protest

* Metropolitan Conservative Journal, No. I, 8 Oct. 1836.

against consent; and the peers had not the genius to have recourse, even temporarily, to their other weapon which was non-exercise. The consequence has been, to show all the obsoleteness of their deformity. They stand out in their antique oddity, a detachment of the tortoise-lizards of the primitive ages, pretending to lord it in these days of steam-cannon and rocket-harpoons.

What reason can they have to expect to stand unaltered, after the basis of their actual power, their influence in the Commons, has been stricken from under them? Can they show any fitness, that the people should take them up again, and restore them to the position from which they have just taken the trouble to shake them down? That they were the people's enemies as they were, was decided at the passing of the Reform Bill; there is nothing reasonable in asking the people to let that battle count for nothing. It is true enough, there is a party that upholds the Lords as the possessors of all wisdom, and the indispensable judges of all policy. But this was the party beaten at the Reform Bill. The Lords had been masters before, and the people had dismissed them from their palmy state. A beaten party must consent to be beaten; at all events till it can find the means of getting uppermost. The old government by the Lords, is what the people have resisted and abolished; and unless the party which was then put down can recover its superiority, the new government by the Lords will not go unaltered.

If it is settled that there will be an alteration, the next questions are what and how. And it is plain the object must be, to have the alteration that will be most safe, most effectual, and most satisfactory to that portion of the peers which is and always has been on the people's side.

The modes proposed for acting on the Lords, and the things proposed to be accomplished on them, are sundry.

One proposal is, that a great public agitation shall be got up as on occasion of the Reform Bill, and that this shall be done *toties quoties*, whenever the Lords may call for the application. This is like asking a man to be trepanned every time his head aches. He may muster resolution for the operation once in a way, to strike at the root of some overwhelming evil; but he cannot be doing it every day, and those who advise it know he will not.

Another proposal is, that the public action shall be got up once for all, and then applied to effect some change that shall be of lasting operation. And this, beyond dispute, looks more in accordance with the rules by which men act elsewhere. An offset of this sect goes farther, and maintains that the action

ought to be conducted through a particular channel,—stopping the Supplies.

To the last part of the proposal, two objections appear to be advanced. One is, that the power of stopping the Supplies, on the strength of which our fathers went on their way so comfortably,—is *fumus et umbra.* That it is as if a man were found going about and saying, "I have a cure for all human evils; nothing can assail me for which I have not a remedy at hand; an heir-loom has descended to me which sets me quite above the world; *I have a knife, and can cut my throat.*" This, we are assured, is the upshot of the boasted old English remedy of stopping the Supplies. We have the power, we are told, of stopping our own breath; we are the creatures of our own supplies, and if we do not supply them we are defunct. The Supplies could not be stopped, it is gravely stated, without half-pay officers and their families being seen running about the country, in a condition that would overwhelm the public sensibilities; it would be pulling down universal ruin, for the insufficient purpose of preventing ourselves from being ruined by the Lords.

I vehemently suspect that our forefathers when they put their trust in this weapon of stopping the Supplies, knew very well that it was a weapon which they durst handle, and their opponents were afraid to dare them to employ. That evils might result from the stoppage of the Supplies, was the very reason why they knew their adversaries could not face the responsibility of prolonging such a state of things by resistance. The Supplies are stopped by their lawful guardians the representatives of the Commons; now let the Lords or whoever else may be on the other side, determine to what precise point they will make themselves responsible for the mischief of resistance, and fail after all. This seems to be the reasonable light in which the Commons would put forward their refusal of Supplies, and in which the community who are their masters would receive it.

Suppose a private gentleman, by way of checking the disorders of his household, and maintaining the direction which as owner he has a right to, were to threaten stopping the supplies. Of what use would it be to threaten him, with the sufferings of the grooms and helpers, or the fainting-fits of the lady's maid. Suppose a professor of humanity were to try to catechise him on the subject; what answer would he get, but that the owner was only exercising his natural right, and all he wanted was due obedience to the power of the purse. Or suppose the coachman should threaten him with letting his horses loose, and turning the stable out of window to revenge

the stoppage of their oats. What would the master do, but give the coachman over to the New Police, and feed his horses through another hand? You would perceive upon the instant, that all these threats were whiff and wind, got up for the mere chance of what they might stand for with a sheepish master.

Another objection which only throws light upon the weakness of the other, has been, that if the Commons were to stop the Supplies, the Lords might do it too. Now one way to hinder this, would be to take care that the first stopping was for some effectual object. Do the opponent's business effectually once, and there will be no chance left him for attacking you in turn. But setting this aside, it no more follows that because the Commons could stop the Supplies in the people's cause, the Lords could stop them against it, than that because a man can set his dog upon an enemy, the enemy can set the dog upon the master in return. It is precisely because there is a connexion of old standing on one side and not the other, that retaliation of the kind supposed is a long way beyond impossible. Try the course; and let the Lords take their chance of executing the rebutter.

Whether the resource which would once have settled the whole difficulty, a creation of peers, could at any time be applied with effect in aid, is what must be settled upon view. Apparently it might serve to decide a balanced question, or help the public round a corner. But the one clear thing is, that it must be applied to do, what should never want doing again.

If the thing is to be done, prudence would point to doing it in any of the ways and all. The popular steam must be got up, and directed into the channel of stopping the Supplies if needful. But above all things, there must be something done that shall operate for evermore. Following the example of Nature, we must lay down rules that shall endure, and not be calling on the omnipotence of the people to interfere, every time a man who had fathers before him shall be disposed to be unreasonable.

But if such is to be the mode of doing, what is it that is to be done? Would it be advisable, as some say, to "destroy the peerage altogether," and make the best of all possible Houses of Commons? This would offend against the rule of making the least alteration that will suffice. Ought we to "circumscribe the power of the peers, and render it impossible for them to exercise their vote more than twice?" This would be nearly as difficult as the other, and would leave more mischief. Would our condition be mended by "the creation of a certain number of peers not hereditary, and mingled with those that are?"

Experience in other countries has proved, that peers of this kind for the most part are successful jobbers, devoid of the best property of the existing peerage, which is that a good man may be born in it by chance. Shall we have "an aristocratic senate chosen by a wealthier class of electors than the lower House"? This would be courting evil, where we have the power to remove. The great business of good government is to keep down and moderate the tendencies of wealth;—to make the possession of it possible, by rendering it tolerable to the people. Wealth is the dangerous servant and frightful enemy, which like fire is to be kept under watch and ward; and it is no part of the business of a free government to be contriving ways for it to display its natural turn for mischief. The assertion that the rich want barriers against the poor, is disproved by all history. In all times and places, the poor have been the victims of the legislation of the rich, except exactly so far as they could muster intelligence and political influence to hinder it. Representative governments are an invention, as far as they have gone, for moderating the power of the rich; and just so far as they cut off the poorer classes from the benefit of representation, so far do they avow that these classes it is intended to maltreat. Lastly, "shall we have a House of Lords chosen from the Lords, by the same electors that chuse the House of Commons?" This is the best thing yet. It has the advantage on the score of practicability, that it holds out a considerable motive to the better-minded of the Lords to accede. A Lord that could get elected by the people, would manifestly be as good as two that could not. But the idea seems to be only yet in the rough; and the time between this and its execution, will probably be enough for collecting the improvements.

The only substantial reason for having a Second Chamber where it can be avoided, is that by being independent of the *momentary* popular will, it may sometimes act as a useful check, by combining the feeling of an aggregate of years, with the feeling of the present. When any great question arises, the first step in a government with any pretensions to popularity, is to (what is called) appeal to the sentiments of the people,—in other words, dismiss the existing First Chamber and chuse a new one. Hence to make a Second Chamber of any use, the two points indicated are, that the members should sit for a period, which without taking away all responsibility, is still considerable; and that they should in no event be liable to be all disbanded together. The perception of this last desirableness, has probably had considerable effect in causing Second Chambers to be framed with seats for life.

It certainly does not appear to be beyond human art, to

frame a plan by which the members of an elective assembly holding their seats for a term of years, should vacate their places with the same absence of effect on the continuity of the assembly, as if the vacancies were left to occur by deaths. And when we reflect on the multitude of muscles put into action daily by every man in putting on his clothes, it does not seem impossible that at some time the public should come to this capacity. All that seems needed is, that on the first collection of the assembly, the seats should be divided by lot into equal classes of one, two, and so on to as many years as make the perfect term; all seats afterwards, whether vacant by death or superannuation, to be elected to, for the full term. Resignations not to be receivable in any case; nor votes by proxy.

Both these requisites of a Second Chamber might be attached to Mr. O'Connell's plan,—for Mr. O'Connell's it is. Let each constituency that now elects two commoners to the Commons, elect one lord to the Lords. And let such as elect one to the Commons, be clubbed two-and-two together to elect a lord; a mode of election which exists now in some instances, without producing any harm. Concede the point of their sitting for seven years, with provisions for the first time as specified; and use it as an additional reason for demanding the shortening of the time of sitting in the Commons. All this would make a parliament, which would be as likely to go on harmoniously for the people's good, as the old one for their evil.

There can be no harm in thinking of the kind of shoe that would fit, whatever the determination of other men that we shall not obtain it. Continue as we are, we cannot; the Lords have put themselves into a state of incompatibility with continuance. Paley said it was evidence of the Divine benevolence, that no direct provision was ever discovered in the human frame for the production of suffering. "Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then, is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it: or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the *object* of it. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization, calculated to produce pain and disease, or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this is to irritate; this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys, this gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout: if by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the worst he can say is, that it is useless: no one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment."

It would be difficult to say as much, for the invention of an irresponsible Chamber, sitting by Divine right in the capital of a free people.

The present dilemma, is between giving up what we have got of our own, and securing it by taking more. If we are to escape the right way, it is hardly necessary to say, it must be by union, moderation, and neither being too hasty nor too slow. Let no man be frightened by the word "democracy." Democracy means the community's governing through its representatives for its own benefit, instead of the benefit of somebody else. All intimations that somebody else knows better what is for your good, are frauds when applied to a nation as far advanced in intelligence and habits of self-management as Great Britain. Give us the evidence, show us the institution, the association, in which the interest of the public was well attended to, except in proportion as the public had virtually the means of attending to it themselves? Is there any instance, any chance, of the affairs of a Company being promoted by the interference of four or five hundred born Directors? Would there be any prudence in such a combination long resisting the introduction of popular selection, after the popular attention had been concentrated on their performances?

I had another subject in some sort akin to this; which must be deferred to another time.

London, 26 *Oct.* 1836.

THE kindred subject intimated in my last, was a review of the current effects of monarchy in Europe; for the purpose of gathering what may improve our own.

No man that looks about him can help seeing, that a vast schism has extended, is extending, and if not stopped by the impact of a comet will continue to extend, through every part of Europe in proportion to its civilization, and the facilities which men have already attained in it for knowing what has been done and uttered by their fellows. The dispute is everywhere this,—whether the community shall be governed for its own interest, or the interest of somebody else. On one side the question loses itself in the submission of the races who have last emerged from gross barbarism, to their civil and religious rulers. And these races, under the guidance of those rulers, form themselves into masses of no small military and political weight, with the avowed object of supporting monarchy, absolute monarchy, wherever it shall be found capable of being supported. Monarchy everywhere has the Baschkirs and Cossacks on its side; and a mutual petting goes on between the two amiable parties, even where circumstances are unfavourable to the full enjoyment of their loves. The other or longer civilized races, all aim with more or less of distinctness

according to their circumstances, either at republicanism, or at a mode of government which as far as regards securing the substantial benefits of self-government to the community, shall only differ from it in name.

Under these circumstances a moderated, or as it is called "constitutional" form of monarchy, has in many parts of the continent of Europe been set up as what Napoleon called a *vaccine*;—an inoculation of something by no means a good in itself, but useful as it may help to keep off some greater evil. Possibly there were two parties, who were tempted to acquiesce in this kind of middle term:—one, as glad of a shelter at any rate, from the gross evils of absolute monarchy; the other, as not unwilling to compromise for something which should have the effect of keeping out what they viewed with far greater apprehension.

For the last twenty years and upwards, an underhand struggle has been carried on between the two principles which divide the continent of Europe, chiefly under the form of local contests between absolute monarchy and this milder form of the disease. And the time has been sufficient, to throw a broad light on the internal defects and dangers of the hereditary, or as it may more properly be called, the matrimonial principle. Scarce one of the inoculated sovereigns, but has been a traitor the instant he had it in his power, and has appealed to all his aunts and cousins within reach, for assistance against his people. The blame is on the idiotic invention, which makes the rulers of mankind a distinct caste, and keeps them so by what the cattle-fanciers call breeding in-and-in. If masses of men did not lose their senses by the mere operation of their multitude, the last thing they would devise would be to set up a number of dumb idols, cut off from their birth from the chances of gaining experience like the rest of mankind, and say to them "Be cousins all, that when we control one of you, we may have the whole family upon our backs."

The way to see what the aggregate effects of this invention have been, is to compare the actual situation of the countries of Europe, with that of the countries to which republicanism was transmitted from Great Britain. Not that there are not enormous blots upon the conduct of the Transatlantic republicans; but they resolve themselves into the defects of the men, not of the institutions. As regards the power of promoting the welfare of those who are admitted to partnership in the machine, the success of the experiment has been complete. What would our Tories give, if they could see two or three rival Governors running up and down the United States at the head of armies, one holding out for the Holy Inquisition here, and another

waiting to be joined by an armament of refugees from Genoa there? See the exultation they display, if the spirit of anarchy evolves itself in a contest with a constable, or the power of misrule attains to a list of wounded by the highly improper employment of a bludgeon. But in seriousness compare this with the situation of various parts of Europe under the boasted monarchical principle; the shootings, the sackings, the mutual slaughters, that take place under cover of determining whether one individual or another, each equally devoid of all the qualities which reason points to as required for the duties of government, shall sit upon four pieces of wood covered with velvet and called a throne. See in another place, a capital threatened with a cannonade, because a girl of seventeen and boy of nineteen put their finger in their eye, and profess themselves not satisfied with a Constitution. These are absurdities which there is no getting over. Systems of policy can stand anything but being ridiculous. And no man can have put away childish things without discovering, that the monarchical principle as exhibited on the continent, is a thing to be thought of only with extreme contempt. It has none of the adjuncts of greatness about it, none of the qualities to which civilized men are led to annex respect. It is all over petty and puerile; and founded on those nursery admirations and antipathies, which a healthy society must necessarily outgrow.

In one country only have things proceeded better. In Great Britain, from its insular situation and other causes, the monarchical principle has been so tamed and tempered, that saving a few judicial murders in the Tory times and an outbreak or two of yeomanry cavalry, there has been no blood shed within the country in consequence of the existence of royalty, for nearly a hundred years. The understanding with the community manifestly is, that monarchy exists on the condition of allowing us all the substantial benefits of the best republic. This compact with the Crown is refined and strengthened daily; and the Reform Bill is the newest and strongest indication of the rate at which the process is going on. There is no struggle in England for republicanism, precisely because there is no occasion for it; there is no substantial object of contest, which is not within reach of the community at present. From this proceeds the mighty calm, which exists in England on the questions that set the rest of Europe in a flame.

But the way to maintain this peace, is by keeping clear of causes of offence. English monarchy is as different from continental monarchy, as the *felis catus* of the naturalists, from the *felis leo*. One a sleek, harmless thing, that if it sometimes

puts out its claws, at all events does little damage; the other, what we willingly look at only through a grate. Whatever, therefore, *lionizes* the English monarchy, is the work of no friend to kingship. We shall probably go on to the end of history, without any serious quarrel with the legacy of our rude forefathers, if good-natured friends of this kind can be kept out of the way. It is true, that numberless mischiefs will to a certain extent always try to gather about the throne. But what we cannot have in one way, we must try to take out in another. If we are doomed to have a weight on one side against us, we must make the greater exertions of our own, to put the vessel on an even keel. We must use the power we have, to pare away and throw overboard as many causes of mischief as we can; and after all, we must exercise the virtue of a quiet and moderate spirit, in comparing what may finally be unpleasant, with what it might have cost us to remove it.

Under such circumstances then, does it accord with common sense, that we should tempt our monarchs to connect themselves from time to time by marriage, with the petty despots of countries in a lower state of civilization and public freedom than our own? Supposing anything like a family invasion to be entirely out of the question to all futurity,—is there anything to be gained by nursing foreign predilections, and providing for foreign influence, in all that concerns the rearing and management of the future king and queen-bees of our state? Shall we be the better for breeding our sovereigns German Tory?—for to that it comes in the end, whatever flashes of temporary interruption may occur.

In July 1834 a beginning was made, by a motion of Colonel Williams in the House of Commons, for leave to bring in a Bill "to repeal the 12th Geo. 3rd, c. 11, called the Royal Marriage Act, for the purpose of restoring to the Members of the Royal Family their just and natural rights, and to afford a prospect that the Government of England will, in time, be under an influence entirely English."

At a period when there is an evident disposition to look into the business of the Lords, would it not be politic and convenient to do a little for the Crown?

I am, SIR, your obedient servant,

T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

END OF FIRST SERIES.

[Second Series.]

Letters of a Representative to his Constituents, during the Session of 1837.—London: Effingham Wilson. 1837.

To the Liberals of all denominations,

in

KINGSTON UPON HULL;

by their affectionate friend and townsman,

T. Perronet Thompson.

PREFACE TO SECOND SERIES.

[Session of 1837.]

The Letters which follow, were written in continuation of the engagement entered into upon the hustings.

To the constituency concerned, they continued to convey a tolerably complete account of the conduct of their representative; being forwarded on the days of date, and published in each of two and sometimes three local newspapers.

With the public they will possibly possess some interest, as a record of parliamentary proceedings during a Session remarkable for the surrender of the Liberal cause into the power of its enemies.

The Extracts from the Debates added in the notes, have, with one or two exceptions, been confined to the object of authenticating the non-complicity of the author.

It is easy to shut the door, after the steed has been stolen. When the people take their cause into their own hands, they may perhaps set some value on the memorials of those, who were for shutting it before, if the leaders would have heard of it.

London, 6 *Sept.* 1837.

LETTERS OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO HIS CONSTITUENTS.

[SECOND SERIES.]

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE HULL REFORM ASSOCIATION.

London, 1 *Feb.* 1837.

SIR,

THE newspapers will have given you the King's Speech as delivered yesterday by Commission; and will have informed you that the ministerial Address in reply, was carried in both Houses without an Amendment being moved.

The object of the Speech was to say little; a point which a little share of talent is competent to accomplish. And its composition corresponded with the matter; presenting a tempting opportunity for the revival of Mr. Cobbett's criticisms on the literary talents of our governors. As a first observation, it contains exactly twenty repetitions of the phrase "his Majesty;" being sometimes at the rate of four times in a sentence. The continual pronunciation of these words by the Speaker in reading his copy to the House of Commons, had a highly ludicrous effect. Napoleon knew better how to play at kingship; he took care to have something else to talk about besides "his Majesty."

After the notices of motion on various interesting subjects which you will also gather from the newspapers, the important thing of the evening was Mr. Roebuck's speech. Whether he drew lots for the office, or took it because nobody else would, I have not the means of informing you. But whichever it was, he has clearly put himself at the head of the popular movement, and it is the business of true "populars" to gather round him. Not that for this purpose it is necessary to go along with him to the letter in everything he has uttered. The want of this literal conformity is always the excuse of feeble people. For example, we need not construe too literally, his intimations that it would make no difference if the Tories were in office. For my own part, I should as soon think of voluntarily admitting the wolf into a sheepfold, on the plea that he would not stay there above a month or two. But expressions of this kind are not to be taken too narrowly. When a father says to his noisy children "We might as well be in Bedlam," it is not to be assumed that he literally sees no difference between the infantine enormity, and the clanking of the chains of full-

grown maniacs. With this allowance, the member for Bath appeared to take the exact position a Liberal leader ought to do. He has certainly laid a course considerably to windward of anything that has been done before; but this was precisely the thing that was wanted. The actual direction of affairs is not with the extremes but with the middle; if, therefore, this middle is to go ahead, the first essential is that the extreme should move. The support given to the member for Bath was not so lively as might have been expected. Like Nehemiah, I pray to be remembered for good, for having cheered the apparition of the classical and honest phrase, the "democratic" section. After having written to you last year, apparently with all acceptation, "Let no man be frightened by the word demo-"cracy; democracy means the community's governing through "its representatives for its own benefit, instead of the benefit "of somebody else*,"—there was perhaps a lurking hope, that by luck we might possibly have been the godfathers.

In all this I have not the least apprehension of wounding our friends who take to themselves the name of Whigs. I am, as the Irish say, "free to confess," that a good country Whig is a good town Radical. But the diversities of what go under that term are almost as great as in Peter Pindar's description of matrimony. Nobody can deny, that there was wanted a shove to the heavy-sterned ones of the fraternity; which Mr. Roebuck's speech is well calculated to apply.

The member for Bath is moreover greatly improved in the mechanical part of oratory; insomuch that he might be supposed to have been passing the vacation under the best masters. Independently of the matter, he will soon be the best worth hearing in the House on the score of manner.

The alterations in the room occupied by the Commons, appear to have made a little improvement on the point of hearing, and not much. The true form for a place of public debate, would probably be that of a theatre, with no projecting galleries, and the Speaker occupying the prompter's old place in the middle of the stage; of which all who were present at the Drury-Lane dinner, have the opportunity of judging. But this would be beyond the genius of the present times. Our ills accumulated in a place built on the model of a coffin; and in a coffin they must end.

I am, SIR, your obedient Servant,
T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

---

* Letter of 22 Oct. 1836. First Series.

London, 4 Feb. 1837.

ON Wednesday the House of Commons decided by a majority of 172 to 11, "that the Sergeant at Arms attending the House do, from time to time, take into his custody any Stranger or Strangers that he shall see, or be informed of to be, in the House or Gallery, while the House, or any Committee of the whole House, is sitting; and that no person, so taken into custody, be discharged out of custody without the special order of the House. And that no Member of this House do presume to bring any Stranger or Strangers into the House or Gallery thereof, while the House is sitting."

But be not alarmed. This is only a piece of the wisdom of parliament. So precious in the eyes of fifteen-sixteenths of the actual representatives, is the bare phantom of doing things in what Sir Roger L'Estrange denominated "huggermugger," and away from the inspection of their constituents, that they grasp at the unpopularity and ridicule which attach to fathering downright falsehoods in matter of fact, and avowing that they prefer living in the arms of the falsehood rather than the truth. Ask the Sergeant at Arms, who is a gentleman of rank and was promoted in the last brevet to be a Colonel in the army, whether he has any orders to take strangers into custody in the gallery, and he will tell you that he has orders *not* to do it, and that his real orders are, to see that strangers are admitted on a member's ticket, thus curiously breaking the heads of both the nominal Orders at one blow. To such odd lengths will men go, to lay the flattering unction to their souls that they are at war with their constituents, and provide an example of what Bentham called the power-stealing mendacity of legislation.

On another subject connected with the rules of the House, I feel greatly disappointed. It has been carried, without a division, That the present mode of publishing Division Lists be extended to Divisions when the House is in Committee, *in all cases where five Members shall require it.* You will see at once, that unless there is some plan behind which we are not aware of, the odds are that the qualification added will in practice amount to a surrender of the point. While the thing is new, or in a few marked cases occurring now and then, five members will make the demand. But in the gross it will be dropped, and the mischief in committee be done in the dark as heretofore. The question was not whether five *members* might wish a division published, but whether five *constituents* might. And the cases of most consequence to be provided for, were precisely those where through late hours, men being taken by surprise, and other causes, there was the greatest probability of five

members not being found to demand. Set it down therefore, that unless there is some plan of which we are not aware, this thing is to do over again.

The House adjourned at twenty minutes before seven.

On Thursday the House met, and adjourned at half-past five. This is slack work; but the House is probably digesting Mr. Roebuck's speech.

On Friday Mr. Horsman moved for a Select Committee to inquire into the fabrication of fictitious votes in Scotland; and supported his motion with great clearness and ability. Mr. Roebuck took up the subject in his own peculiar style; and we may at all events congratulate ourselves on things being called much more distinctly by their names than they used to be. Motion agreed to.

Mr. Brotherton made his motion for preventing late sittings in the House. His object will never be obtained, but by establishing the principle, that no direction under which the House is assembled for one day, shall be construed to authorize its sitting into the next. The numbers on division were 61 to 147.

A plan has been laid for a periodical meeting of Radical members, for the purpose of arranging their proceedings in concert. This undoubtedly will be of use; but I have not the high expectations from it which some have, for the following reason. Most of the Radical members are sent to parliament by constituencies, who have a high, and in some cases an overweening opinion, of what is to be expected from the exertions of their particular representative. Hence these members are much more in the situation of chiefs of clans, than of the leaders of a regular army, bound together by well-digested discipline and habitual co-operation. But there is one kind of tactic always in their power; which is, to help one another. Lord Nelson said to his captains, "If any of you is ever at a loss about the order of battle, he will never be far wrong if he is alongside of an enemy's ship." So a Radical member will never be far wrong, if he is found aiding a brother in an attack upon the common enemy; and this without too nice a regard to the precision of the said brother's movement, or to whether it be exactly what would have been chosen by the assistant if he had had the shaping of it, but with a view to general effects, and losing no opportunity of making an impression on the adversary. In short, to go along with everybody where it is possible, and hang back from nobody but where from some special reason it is unavoidable, appears to be the tactic for *us*. "Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant," is a good rule for individuals, parties to such a compact.

For my own part, I feel ambition enough to gain what promotion I may in that line, to make me engage to be at every man's beck, for all and every purpose to which he may think me capable of co-operating, saving only points of conscience, which of course are always excepted.

London, 8 *Feb.* 1837.

ON Monday the principal debate was on the motion for a Select Committee to inquire into the operation of the Acts permitting Joint Stock Banks. In parliamentary committees of importance, the primary object would appear generally to be, the keeping out the consideration of the only point it is of much consequence to anybody to know, namely whether the whole principle involved is good or bad: and it was so here. In the same manner in the Agricultural Committee, the great object I apprehend to have been, to bar and keep out the inquiry whether agricultural distress might not be produced by the Corn Laws. If a man were found strangling, the first instinct of a parliamentary committee, would be to exclude the question of how far the effect was attributable to the rope.

The Division was for the purpose of endeavouring to extend the inquiry; and we were beaten by 121 to 42. Sir Robert Peel evinced a vastly more intimate acquaintance with the subject than anybody else, and he could evidently blow the whole system into the air at any moment he chose.

On Tuesday the Irish Municipal Corporations were brought forward again. Lord John Russell spoke out. The Irishmen pulled caps on both sides. O'Connell said he loved Yorkshiremen; so that perhaps he has more kindly recollections than he had. The member for Bath made a speech, which if he had never opened his mouth before, would be the beginning of a new æra in the Commons. The People have got into their own House;—as the poor Princess Charlotte said, "*that's flat.*" Country gentlemen always like a hint from the metropolis; therefore keep an eye upon the member for Bath, and recollect I told you.

London, 11 *Feb.* 1837.

THE debate on the Irish Municipal Corporations, which had been adjourned at twelve on Tuesday night, was resumed on Wednesday. Lord Morpeth addressed the House at considerable length, with firmness and ability. Sir James Graham was advanced as the great gun of the Opposition; and as a gun is

a gun, on any side, there is no denying either his range or his capacity. The President of the Board of Control followed, in a speech considerably below his usual standard. The leader of the Opposition called it "the funeral dirge" of the ministry, and compared it to "the notes of the dying swan." Sir Robert himself was "like cannons overcharg'd with double cracks." In place of his usual argumentative manner, he was boisterous and loud; and he indulged to excess in the not very agreeable habit of turning his back to the Speaker and the House, and in that position keeping the little boys on his own benches in a roar of

"counterfeited glee"
"At all his jokes for many a joke had he."

On the present occasion he quoted Tom Thumb and others of the classics with eminent success. The school-boys in the House and out of it, will be the death of us.

Considerable alarm appeared to be taken on our side of the House at certain expressions supposed to have been employed by Lord John Russell towards the end of the debate; and the cock-a-hoop hilarity of the Tories was supposed to have been connected with a knowledge of his meaning. But I have been unable to ascertain with precision, either from anybody's recollection or the reports in the papers, what the expressions were. At the same time it is certain, that very sinister rumours are abroad. When the Irish Corporations Bill is rejected by the Lords, ministers are to ask to dissolve; the King is to refuse; ministers are thereupon to resign; Sir Robert Peel is to come in, and then *he* is to dissolve. If these reports should be realized, you will see that we shall have been carried exactly half-way towards the completion of the threat, "Three dissolutions, and then the dragoons."

The Bill was brought up and read a first time, at two in the morning, without a division.

On Thursday there was no House.

On Friday Mr. Hume moved for leave to bring in his important bill, for placing the finances of counties under a county board to be elected by the rate-payers. Of course the Tories opposed with such arguments as they could muster. One was, that there had been no petitions on the subject. Mr. Wakley thereon replied, that there were no petitions because the mode of presenting them was so unsatisfactory. The truth is, that the rights of petition and liberty of speech, have been practically subverted by the policy which I complained of last session. Instead of asking liberty of speech from the King, who I dare

say has no objection to our enjoying it to the fullest extent, we ought to ask it in another quarter, which if this is not sufficiently explicit, I will engage to point out more distinctly if the fates should reserve for me a seat on the assembling of a new parliament. The right of petition which our fathers struggled for, has at one sweep of a Whig lawyer been made what the military Duke called county meetings, "a farce." A strange mixture of the ludicrous and melancholy it is, to see the petitions of three kingdoms crowded into the miserable pittance of half an hour, and then the House sitting for the next half hour with no business before it, waiting for ministers. Any man who can evade the Serjeant's order to let nobody into the gallery, can judge of the literal truth of this description.

P. S. 12 Feb.—Since my letter to you of yesterday was sent off, I have seen in the *Weekly Chronicle* of 12 February an article headed "Notes taken in the Gallery of the House of Commons," and signed "A Spectator," containing observations on the debate on the Irish Corporations Bill, so strongly corroborative in many instances of mine, that I cannot resist the temptation of recommending them to your notice, and of inviting a comparison from time to time with the remarks which it is very probably intended to continue with regularity in the same journal. We differ upon Sir James Graham; and I would also suggest, for the writer's consideration and working-up on future occasions where the same kind of principle may be involved, that the majority of 172 to 11 in favour of the mock Order for the exclusion of strangers from the gallery, did not arise so much from any culpable neglect of members in acquainting themselves with "the common forms of the House," as from the tricky constitution of those forms as bequeathed to us by an unreformed House of Commons. The great object of the unreformed House of Commons now happily gone by,—the purpose for which it lived and moved and had its being,—was the conservation of existing abuses in Church and State. Amendments are the work of innovators, much oftener than of conservatives; everything therefore which depresses Amendments, or puts them in an unfair position, is in the aggregate in favour of conservatism. It is only necessary to suppose the question of exclusion of strangers to have been put to an ordinary club in the same manner that it was put in the House, to obtain a distinct vision of the trickiness of the form. All the rules bequeathed by the unreformed House, lie under violent suspicion of obliquity from the operation of the same principle. Their constant bearing is, to re-

press the outbreak of free and unshackled opinion under the excitation of the moment, and confine the proceedings of the House to the dull and pompous prepared debates in which the Conservatives conceive that they excel. No man will be more able than this "Spectator" from the gallery, to work out the intimation here conveyed.

I hardly need add, that there is no sort of communication between this writer and myself. I have not the least idea who he may be; and shall avoid inquiring, that I may preserve more distinctly the benefit of his support. The journal in which he writes, is further eminent for the soundness of its advice to the Working Classes; of which an instance will be found in the number of to-day. Of these parts of the journal I am so happy as to know the author; and as he is, I believe, the individual who stands highest in this country for his intimate acquaintance with the wants and interests of the Working Classes, my regret is proportionate, that those classes should not yet have accumulated the power or the intelligence, to bring him into parliament.

London, 15 *Feb.* 1837.

ON Monday Ministers were in a minority of one on the Amendment for refusing a new writ to Stafford. It will do them good. They will find out, that if they mean to hold their places, they must muster more union, more vigour, and more care, than they do at present. If they go on as they do, diminishing their majority by half a dozen votes a-day, they will soon be at the end of their troubles. The numbers were for the Amendment 151, against it 152.

More sparring on the right of petition; which is dwindling away daily under the regime prescribed for it. Think of its having come to this, that the *prayer* of a Petition may be stated in the House, but only by sufferance the *substance*. Rightly did Mr. Wakley say, that the absence of petitions was no proof of the absence of interest in the people; for the people must be of extraordinary composition, who would put themselves to much trouble for such an exhibition.

Lord John Russell moved that the House resolve itself into a Committee on Poor Laws for Ireland; which, after a long debate that brought out the opinions of the leading men on both sides, was agreed to. One part of the ground taken by the mover was so strong, that I do not see how it is ever to be attacked with effect. The Irish, and particularly the classes just above pauperism themselves, support an enormous number

of paupers and mendicants by charity; they do it in the way least calculated for the discrimination of imposture, and having the strongest tendency to the encouragement of improvident and vagrant habits. How then is it possible, that though the expense of keeping the Irish poor under legislative regulations should amount to millions beyound count, the government with the most moderate statesmanship should not be able to extract a fund from the present payers or somebody else in Ireland, which should support the poor and leave a large difference in the pockets of the present rate-payers? It seems to me that this is final; and that we never need hear again of the enormous expense it would be to keep all the poor in Ireland. They *are* kept already, and in the most improvident way. The sum required at the outset for buildings, it might be a sisterly act to give to Ireland; but Ireland ought to think herself well treated. The mode proposed for raising the fund to be collected in Ireland, appeared, if I caught it correctly, to be particularly well devised. It was that half should be levied on the tenant, and half on the landlord. Now though it may occur to political economists, that levying from the tenant is in the abstract only levying from the landlord, there is here this adventitious circumstance, that the tenantry who are conscious of paying periodically towards the public support of the poor, will thereupon withdraw or diminish their private encouragement to mendicancy; which in the contrary case they would not. The debate at one time took to a considerable extent a mathematical turn, for settling the difference between twenty square miles and twenty miles square, and for determining the hypotenuse of a right-angled isoskeles triangle of ten miles side; in which it must be confessed, the Tories had it hollow.

At the earliest time at which I began to attend to such subjects, I could not fail to be conscious of the force of the arguments urged against a legal provision for the poor; particularly its tendency to create the evil it professes to cure. But on combining this with other questions, I began to go over to the belief, that in the actual state of society and government, and so long as the power of contributing to legislation shall not be distributed over the community by something approaching to universal suffrage, it is on the whole a salutary provision, which obliges the legislating classes, (for on them I believe the expense to a great extent will ultimately fall), to support the poor they make. I had once great hopes, that the Corn Laws would at some time be broken down from this quarter. But the landowners have been too many for us; they have to a considerable extent contrived to get rid of the maintenance of

the poor, and leave the Corn Laws behind. Upon which I can only say,—which I think you will find to be quite consonant with my answers to you at the hustings,—that I believe it were a worthy deed, to call out for either the removal of the Corn Laws, or a return to the old Statute of Elizabeth.

On Tuesday Sir William Molesworth moved for leave to bring in a Bill to abolish the Property Qualification for Members of Parliament. Of course I voted with him; though I certainly did not feel very anxious for carrying the motion. On the contrary, if I had anxiety, it was rather that the motion should be rejected by the greatest possible majority. What do we Radicals say, when we address ourselves to a popular assembly, but "Do you not know, that you the poor are made to pay seven times as much tax for your tobacco as the rich; and have you any doubt that this is because the rich make laws for the poor?" Or again, if we are attacking the Corn Laws, do we not say, "Have not these laws been made in an assembly in which every man has taken an oath that he has a pecuniary interest against you?" If then it be true, that the substantial effect of the rule in the way of exclusion, is less than its effect in creating a public impression of its injustice,—why should we strongly object to seeing our adversaries hold fast by the rule which is more injurious to them in one direction, than advantageous in another? You will perhaps say, that I might have said this last night, and it would have been useful. The only result of the attempt would have been, that you would have seen in the papers, "The member for Hull said a few words, which cries of Question made inaudible." If you think a man can say a thing in the House of Commons because he thinks it, you are mistaken. Every day's experience convinces me more and more, that the House of Commons is not the arena where questions of public interest are substantially deliberated on and determined; it is only the laggard registrer of the edicts of the community. I am tired of applying to it; and mean to apply to its masters instead. It is by agitation among the people only, that any public question is finally advanced; though the House will continue to be the necessary secondary instrument. It will always be useful that the decided friends of the people should be in it, that they may be *au courant* of proceedings. But the effectual hammer for any constituency to send to parliament, would be a rising young solicitor, with a face of brass and a forty-horse power of rigmarole, and who would make himself master of his brief. What I therefore very much want to accomplish, is to make a beginning of getting up a sort of political unions,—a

kind of parliamentary "Little-goes,"—for the purpose of discussing parliamentary questions, with a view to the effect that may be produced upon representatives through engaging the attention of their constituents.

Sir William Molesworth's motion was rejected by 133 (ministers included) against 104; so that we Radicals stand where we did. Mr. Warburton gave notice that he would move for leave to bring in a bill to "amend" the laws relating to the Property Qualification of members. So that I have lively hopes, that though the part more immediately connected with the Corn Laws may be cut away from under us, the quarrel between the rich and the poor will be left as pretty a one as ever.

London, 18 *Feb.* 1837.

ON Wednesday the House sat till half past eight; the principal business done, being the progress made in Committee with the Municipal Corporations Bill. The Conservatives might have had a good game before them if they had been aware; in consequence of the absence of so many Radicals at the dinner to Mr. Wakley. It is strange the Radicals cannot find out, how much they are injured on the balance of the account, by the departure from the ancient practice of having no House on Wednesdays. The consequence only is, that as happened last week, there is no house on Thursday instead. But to the Radicals the effect is this, that if they absent themselves for any general purpose on the Wednesday, they are liable to find that business has been carried on in their absence; and when they bustle down to the exclusion of all other business on the Thursday, they are liable to be balked again, by finding there is no House. Their loss is precisely that which is always suffered by men of business, from allowing that to be uncertain which ought to be certain. To their opponents, who as I told you before, can relieve one another upon guard, the consequences are infinitely less important. It is on the Radicals, who are to be on duty all the twenty-four hours and every twenty-four hours, that the system tells. Yet there are those that cannot be persuaded out of the notion, that every nominal gain of time, is a real one.

On Thursday the subject of most interest was Mr. Lushington's motion for relieving the Bishops from their attendance in the House of Lords. Of all the arguments advanced, none was so potent as the reading of the Rev. Sidney Smith's account of the early life and preparation of a Bishop. The Tories betook

themselves to the weapon of refusing to reply; but Mr. Hume and Mr. Buller at last succeeded in drawing out Sir Robert Peel. Lord John Russell's support of the Bishops amounted only to the school-boy's argument, who said that if he learned *A* he should be made to learn *B*, and so on to the end of the alphabet. The unreasonableness of bishops sitting in the House of Lords, was held out as the advanced post of two or three other unreasonablenesses behind, which if the first fell, were all likely to fall in succession. Something was also rested, on the necessity there would be for admitting clergymen into the House of Commons if the bishops did not sit in the other House. And why should they not, to the extent to which they could find constituents to send them? The exclusion of the clergy from the House of Commons, like their celibacy, is only a cunningly-devised invention for cutting them off from having the same interests and feelings as their fellow-citizens, and giving them an interest apart. Blackstone says (I. ii. 175.) that members of parliament must not be "of the clergy, for they sit in convocation;" the reason of their exclusion, therefore, has long been done away. And for any use there is to the interests of the Church, in the bishops being where they are, why do not the Unitarians demand, that Mr. Fox be shorn and sent to the House of Lords, or the Methodists Jabez Bunting? Either they do not do it because it would be of no use to them; or because they are suffering under an oppression, from not having what they have an equal right to.

The Division for the motion was 92 against 197. On the 26th of April 1836, it was 53 against 180. So that on the principle formerly employed (of bringing the Divisions, or their proportions, to a common term, and assuming the two remaining terms as the measure of the goodness of the Divisions), the strength of the Division this time is increased in the ratio of upwards of 11 to 7, or considerably more than half. If public opinion advances at the same rate in geometrical progression, the bishops will be in a minority in the House of Commons in two years; and if in arithmetical, in three.

It would be a curious question in Political Mechanics, to determine by what *law* (in the mathematical sense), such changes of opinion may be expected to progress. There seem to be two conflicting reasons, affecting the velocity. In the earlier stages of a question, the mass of moveable opinion may be considered as large; and this would seem a reason, why the quantity of conversions effected out of it in a given time, should be greater than at later periods. On the other hand, as the innovating party approaches to equality with its opponent, this appears to

constitute a reason why the doubtful, the self-seekers, and the waiters upon Providence, should come over more rapidly than before. So that between the two there may be concluded to be, to a certain extent at least, a tendency to an equable progression of some kind; which shall, for safety, be assumed to be the arithmetical.

On Friday the Irish Municipal Corporations Bill was read a second time without debate; the understanding being, that the trial of strength is to be on Monday, on an Amendment proposed by Lord Francis Egerton.

London, 22 Feb. 1837.

ON Monday Lord Francis Egerton moved his Amendment to the Irish Corporations Bill; which was followed by a debate that was finally adjourned at half past twelve. Everybody seems going over the old ground; and how should there be new? Unless indeed an English member would stand up and say, that the people of England will not fight for Irish oppression or any of its consequences;—that they will not fight to prevent the Repeal of the Union, and they will not fight to prevent the separation of the two countries, if the oppression should amount to giving the Irish a reasonable cause to seek a remedy in either. My belief is, that there is and could be no strong feeling in the English people on either of these points. There would of course be a certain quantity of irritable passions, which under the influence still possessed by the interested classes might be blown up into a flame of bellicose demonstrations of a limited degree of intensity and endurance. But when the feverish fit had run its course, reason would resume its seat, with vastly more rapidity than it did in the parallel case of America. The basis for hostility would be much narrower and less substantial. In the instance of America, Englishmen were puffed out with the idea of some vast insult to their paternal rights, and some undefined injury to their pecuniary prospects. In the case of Ireland, the thinking and the industrious classes have been accustomed mainly to view that country, as a hunting-ground maintained at their cost for the benefit of the aristocracy; as a place where their blood and treasure are to be expended, that a fraction of the expenditure may find its way through certain strainers, into pockets which they have no anxiety to fill. It is impossible that people with such views, should look upon any imaginable change in Ireland, as an evil which they are bound to prevent by an indefinite amount of sacrifice. On the contrary their minds must be

very apt to dwell, on the extent to which the greatest of the supposed alterations, would secure to both countries the advantages of the present state without the evils. Of course the friends of the oppression will rage, and declaim upon the way in which Englishmen, meaning themselves, would expend their last guinea. But they will be mistaken; Englishmen will not. The same mistake was made in the American war. If the still, small voice could be heard now, as then, it would be found saying, "Count the cost. Be sure of your grounds. They "will slip away from under you. A nation to which just cause "of separation is given, almost always separates. The history "of mankind is against you. You will be beaten. Both your "friends and your enemies wish you may." The Whigs are assuredly just now, struggling for the best chance left of preserving Ireland.

The speech of the night, was Mr. Charles Buller's (Liskeard). He is a great master of the *ridentem dicere verum;* which is a tremendous weapon in an assembly composed like the House of Commons.

On Tuesday the war of words was continued, and adjourned again at twelve o'clock, to give full opportunity for repeating every irrelevant story touching the enormities of Lord Mulgrave's administration, or the distresses of the Irish clergymen whose pistols have missed fire. And this is what is called the business of the House; to which the hearing and attending to the petitions of the people are to be sacrificed. The fact is, the ministers, with the genius of Spanish generals, are running their heads where they know there can be no results, as the means of avoiding running where there might. They have no intention of committing themselves irrevocably with the Carlism of the country; and in consequence they are found among the stoutest resisters of any extension of popular success on the sides where it is practicable. They are nursing the chance, in the event of any untoward accident to the popular cause, of placing themselves on the benches of the conqueror and leaving their companions to what may follow; and there in all probability we shall find them in the end. With the exception of their Spanish prototypes, no set of leaders ever displayed such a fixed resolution to do nothing to the real detriment of the public adversary, such a perpetual craning into the enemy's ranks to see that he takes no harm, such a vigour of determination to oppose every man who proposes pulling a brick out of the old defences of the hostile party, or planting a hedge-stake in the road by which they must come back.

London, 25 Feb. 1837.

ON Wednesday the adjourned debate on the Irish Corporations Bill was resumed, and became very interesting in its later stages, as several of the great guns had lain by for the end. The Catholic Attorney-General for Ireland (Mr. Woulfe) made one of the most practically effective points of the evening, when he said, "He had always among his countrymen been a defender of the Union with England; he hoped he should be enabled to continue to defend it." Sir James Graham hereon said, "The King's Attorney-General had declared he would cease to defend the Union." It is needless to point out how wide this was of the mark; everybody must see that there is room for a coach and six, in what the objector persisted in denominating "a nice distinction." And this let me into the fact, which as a retainer of the opposite party I have a right to note for our future advantage, that the member for East Cumberland is a dangerous quoter for his own side. For example, he said a few minutes afterwards, that the member for Bath had spoken of "the harlot church of England, the greatest enormity in Europe." And when Mr. Roebuck rose and stated that he said "the harlot church of Ireland," he replied that "in the eye of the law, the term used should be, the church of England as established in Ireland." This is a kind of want of tact, for which an adversary has a right to be on the look-out. The transfer of a pamphleteering description of Spanish monks to the Catholic Clergy of Ireland, was equally unfortunate. It was exactly what would have been made fifty years ago to the Methodist preachers, and with exactly the same justice. It is astonishing how much the course of persecution in all times and seasons is alike.

Mr. Shiel's reply was, as army men say, "great;" and not the less, for being, from the nature of the case, under absence of premeditation. One circumstance that attended it, will contribute to embalm it in parliamentary memory. When the orator came to the celebrated "alien" Speech, it was discovered that the author of that never-sufficiently-to-be-thanked-Heaven-for effusion, was sitting on the Peers' benches, near the pillar on the side opposite the Speaker's left hand. On which such a shouting of "hear, hear" was raised from the ministerial side of the House, as an old member said he had never witnessed anything to parallel. I heard it called "the Ten Minutes Cheer." The members in the galleries rose, and were seen hanging over the railing eagerly pointing out to one another the individual whose presence excited the commotion; while the strangers in their gallery did the same, to the extent of what their fears of the officers would permit. On the whole

there was a strong resemblance to the scene in the French engraving of the "*Serment du Jeu de Paume.*" It is only given to Lord Lyndhurst, to be so revolutionary in all his ways.

The pith of the Conservative argument on this night as on the preceding, was that the existence of the Irish Church is incompatible with the exercise of civil liberty in Ireland, and therefore civil liberty must be withheld. The same argument maintains black slavery in America; and would maintain the prince of darkness anywhere that he had succeeded in establishing himself by a remove from Pandæmonium.

In the course of the debate a very practical and useful speech upon the actual working of the Irish Corporations, was made by Mr. Walker, member for Wexford town. I heard O'Connell say, that this was the great grandson of the Dr. Walker who defended Derry against James the Second after the governor had taken flight, and who was afterwards killed at the passage of the Boyne, and I have been told is the individual represented as carried by dead in West's picture of that battle. So true it is, that persecution, like misery, makes men acquainted with strange companions. I do believe, a good and competent course of persecution, might have brought Mr. Wilberforce to be a Unitarian deputy.

At three in the morning the house divided. For the destruction of the Irish Corporations, 242; against, 322. Majority against, 80.

On the 4th of February 1836, the Tories on the Address were 243 against 284; majority 41. On the division on the Irish Corporations Bill on the 9th of March 1836, they were the same precise number 243, against 307; majority increased from 41 to 64, or by something more than half. This time, on the same bill, they were the same number less one, or 242, against 322; majority increased since the last time, from 64 to 80, or by one fourth; majority since the division on the Address, increased within a fraction of 2 to 1. I suppose in all this the Tories see evidences of "reaction."

I heard yesterday with great satisfaction, that a man of eminent talents, a distinguished writer and a sound political philosopher, a Whig and (so far as the impossibility of shutting his eyes to the urgencies of the times demands it) "something more," a person to whom it is notorious that the Whigs have had recourse for advice on subjects of high importance*, had delivered as his deliberate opinion, that the Whigs ought to bring in a Bill for the Ballot and Household Suffrage, and on the strength of that, go to the people by a Dissolution. Now

* Professor Senior.—*Added in* 1840.

in this there would be some sense. I mention it in hope that the country Whigs may gather about this idea of a leading mind, and urge attention to it on the part of their weaker brethren that hold the helm.

The House on rising adjourned till Friday.

On Friday the member for Berkshire, Mr. Walter, brought on his motion for a Committee to inquire into the working of the Poor-law Amendment Act. I have so often explained my own opinions on the subject of the Poor-laws and the Poor-law Amendment*, that it would be useless for me to go into

---

* See Letter of 3 Aug. 1836, in the First Series; and of 15 Feb. 1837, in this. Also the following Letter in the *Preston Observer* of 18 Feb. 1837.

POOR LAWS AS CONNECTED WITH CORN LAWS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE PRESTON OBSERVER.

SIR,—It would give me great pleasure to have an opportunity of stating in your journal, with more of distinctness than could perhaps be communicated by a verbal declaration, the views which I had the honour of avowing before the electors of Preston at my visit with my friend Mr. Crawfurd, on the subject of the Poor-laws as connected with the Corn-laws.

When I commenced paying attention to public questions, I did not fail to be impressed with the force of many of the objections urged against a Legal Provision for the poor; particularly its insufficiency for the prevention of poverty, and in fact its tendency to create and keep up the evil it professed to remove. But on connecting this with other subjects which subsequently fell under my notice, and particularly with the subject of the Corn-laws, I began to veer towards an opinion, that in the existing state of society and legislation, the Poor-laws were not a bad check upon the conduct of the legislating classes, in short that it was a good and wholesome provision, so long at least as the power of legislation was not equally divided among all classes of society by something nearly approaching to universal suffrage, that if the legislating classes made paupers by bad laws, they should be obliged to maintain them. And as my persuasion was and is, that a large proportion of the expense of maintaining the poor fell finally on the landowners in the shape of a diminution of rents, I confess myself to have been weak enough to look forward to the Poor-laws, as what would at some time eat up the imagined interest of the landowners in the Corn-laws, and lead to the abandonment of that ruinous infliction on the community.

But on this point the landowners have fairly stolen a march upon my calculations. They have had the ingenuity to get rid of the provision for the poor, and leave the Corn-laws that make the poor behind. Under these circumstances I am ready to go with anybody that will call for "The Old Poor-law or no Corn-law," and if nobody better can be found, to originate anything in Parliament tending to that end. For example, I am quite ready, if desired, to put a notice on the books of the House of Commons, of a motion for returning to the statute of Elizabeth, to be made at some period of the session if not anticipated by ministers forwarding a plan for the gradual removal of the duties on foreign corn; though it should be done with as much of discretion and consultation as can be compassed. And in this I will not admit myself to have any quarrel with the disinterested opponents of the old Poor-laws. All I insist on is, that it was beginning at the wrong end to remove the Poor-laws and leave the Corn-laws behind;—that we have a right to take advantage of the feeling generated by this preposterous alteration;—and that the best thing the opponents of the old Poor-laws can do, is to join heartily in removing the other now. I feel no doubt that the numerous classes throughout the country would very generally accept the Abolition of the Corn-laws in barter for the ancient Poor-

them again, except to say, that I am forcibly struck with the conviction, that if a verdict had been given by a jury, every man of which had been discovered to have taken an oath that he had a pecuniary interest in deciding in one particular way, the decision of that jury would be *ipso facto* null and void, and it would be absurd to think of holding any man legally bound to acknowledge its validity. Now the Corn-laws were laid on by a House of Commons, every man of which had taken an oath that he had a pecuniary interest in deciding one way and not the other. And then the old Poor-law of Elizabeth was removed or altered, by a House of Commons every man of which had taken an oath that in this great struggle between the rich and poor he had a pecuniary interest in deciding in favour of the rich;—a House which to this day resists, and will resist, the admission of any man into the chamber miscalled of Representatives, however elevated by public opinion or put forward by public confidence, who shall be in the situation of having an intimate, personal, and saving knowledge of the feelings and interests of the poor. Upon which I am at a loss to know, why the public, or so many of them as are interested in exploding the injustice, should not come to the same conclusion as upon the verdict of the jury. The seconder of the motion (Mr. Fielden the member for Oldham) declared roundly, that if it ever came to the point, he would defend "his happy valley." And why should not all "happy valleys" defend themselves if they can? To a law enacted fairly and by men with clean hands, passive obedience may be a virtue; but if laws are to bear the stamp of corruption and peculation on their front, what the public will resist, is the measure of what it will escape. I doubt, whether after the circumstances under which the enactment took place become universally known, a jury would convict for resistance to the new Poor-law.

At the same time I know there is a very general disposition in the country to accept of the new Poor-law in exchange for

---

laws, as was loudly and distinctly expressed at Preston; and I am further conscious of a lively hope, that they will never rest content without it.

One of the first questions I was ever asked before a popular assembly, was what I thought of the Poor-law Amendment Act. I replied by saying, I hoped it would turn out that the authors of that change had in popular parlance "let themselves into a good thing," when they took away the support of the poor, and thought to leave the Corn laws afterwards. And upon this understanding I was sent to Parliament.

Under these explanations, I feel myself to be moving openly and without disguise upon my object; and it remains only for us to see what quantity of public attention can be accumulated upon the point.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

the Abolition of the Corn-laws and of the Property Qualification for Members of Parliament. And with less, I hope the country will never be content. A great number of petitions were presented previously to Mr. Walter's making his motion; among which I had one from Barnsley with fourteen hundred signatures, praying for a return to the Forty-Third of Elizabeth.

The debate was finally adjourned till Monday.

London, 1 March, 1837.

ON Monday the debate was resumed, on the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the operation of the Poor-law Amendment Act. After a world of talk, in which nobody touched on the great features of the people's case (at least as the people view them), the ministers professed to make some concession or explanation, by which I believe nothing was either conceded or explained; and the result was, that Mr. Walter's motion was withdrawn. The ministers then named their Committee of twenty-one, "to inquire into the *administration* of the relief of the poor under the Orders and Regulations issued by the Commissioners." I begin to understand the tactics of Committees of the House of Commons. The object is always to cut off inquiry into the good or evil of the principle concerned, which is all the public care about; and to get up an inquiry into some minor point instead. The object of the present Committee is to inquire whether Mr. Higgins the master of the poor-house has properly mixed the oatmeal-porridge which Mr. Wiggins the Commissioner directed him to make. And on this Committee such as it is, there are not above three names that can by any construction be considered as on the people's side. The Committee therefore ought to be called "A Committee for making a favourable report on the Cookery of the Poor-law Commissioners." This is the way things go on, in a government where what is miscalled the popular branch, is in fact a cunningly-devised engine for keeping out by all sorts of strainers and disqualifications, the feeblest infusion of the real feelings and wishes of the people.

On Tuesday there was no business of much importance. A discussion on Railways was principally remarkable for the exclusion of all reference to the interest which the community at large, as distinguished from the projectors, has in their establishment. Suppose you had a railway from Hull to Selby, and it should turn out that from one cause or other the projectors should barely cover their expenses,— does it follow that there-

fore the railway is of no use?—yet this is the House of Commons way of viewing the matter. Would it not be equally wise to say, that if there was a Post-office establishment, of which the receipts barely covered the expenses, such an establishment was of no use? It is plain that there is something behind; that the measure of the utility is not limited to the profits of the jobbers or contractors, but includes all the advantages that may have arisen to the public from having the use of a Post-office. So in the railway, the great question is not how much the jobbers or contractors may have gained or lost by the speculation, but how much the rest of the community may have gained by the transaction of their business with greater facility and despatch. The gain or loss of the contractors may lawfully make one item in the general account; but it is equally certain that the gain of the rest of the community must make another. The exclusion of this last element, is not a bad specimen of the leaning the House of Commons has towards jobbing in all its branches, and the difficulty with which it is induced to recognize the existence of any other interest.

London, 4 *March*, 1837.

THE most remarkable occurrence on Wednesday was the introduction of words by the Attorney-General into the Bill for abolishing arrest and imprisonment for debt, to confer on Members of Parliament the new privilege, of refusing to pay their debts under the law that is to abolish arrest. The privilege of Members from arrest, as is well known, arose out of the fact of some Members having been once stopped on their way to the House of Commons by arrest for fictitious debts, as the means of preventing them from attending a particular Division. But by the new law, arrest is to be done away altogether, except in cases of fraud; and all that remains in the shape of possible personal constraint, is that a Commissioner of Bankruptcy may issue a summons to a debtor who has refused to deliver a schedule of his property by an appointed day, or in whose schedule the creditor has proved to the satisfaction of the Court of Review the existence of material error or omission. Under these circumstances, try if you or anybody else, can accomplish the malicious detention of a Member from the House of Commons. All that the danger can by possibility amount to, is that if a Member chuses fraudulently to resist giving an account of his property, he may be summoned before a legal authority like another man. Here then is the House of Commons,

not standing up for the old privilege of exemption from personal arrest for debt, but claiming the new privilege of being exempt from obeying a summons for crime. In short, the same men who make a property qualification essential to admission into their body, are found providing that they shall not be obliged to pay their debts. This dangerous decision was come to, by the votes of 54 against 51. Mr. Tooke gave notice that he would move for the expulsion of the words on the bringing up of the report. One Member, a marked popular man, is known to have gone into the lobby of the Ayes by mistake; an accident which the want of proper accommodation in the House, and the perplexities consequent thereon, subject everybody to incur. Several other popular Members voted under what appeared to be an odd misapprehension of the argument. They would not resist the introduction of a *new* bad privilege, because they would not attack an *old* bad privilege by a side-wind. Now what is the meaning of attacking an old privilege, when by the new law the privilege and the pretext for it are all to come down together, through the abolition of the danger the privilege was to guard against? And if an old privilege was a bad privilege, what is the meaning of not attacking it by a side-wind or any wind that will bring us within range? What has been gained in any part of the political horizon, except by such a process? I cannot avoid hoping that some of these Members will be led to reconsider the matter before the bringing up of the Report.

After this a Clause was read, for subjecting the profane vulgar who come before Courts of Conscience, to imprisonment for fourteen days. The proposal therefore on the whole stood thus. Members of Parliament are not to pay their debts at all; ordinary men are to pay them, but not to be imprisoned; the baser sort, the *canaille* as they were called in the Property Qualification debate, are to be imprisoned as before. It was proposed to reduce the term of imprisonment to seven days; but even with this amendment it was voted too bad, and the amendment was thrown out at the motion of Mr. Hutt, by 54 against 12. Whether this made an end of the Clause, is what those better acquainted with the wonderful workings of the House of Commons will be competent to decide; but I suspect it is worth looking after. I should not at all wonder, if the unamended Clause for Fourteen Days, was at this moment in full activity.

On Thursday little took place except further contests on Railways. But a new light appears to have broken out on the subject of the words to prevent Members of Parliament from

paying their debts, which the Attorney-General succeeded by a majority of one (for one vote was given the wrong way by mistake) in forcing into the Imprisonment for Debt bill. It seems the Lords will not pass the bill without it; and if you ask why the Lords are not left to make the insertion themselves, it is because the Lords will not do that either, but are determined to throw out the bill altogether, unless the Commons will do the dirty work, and insert the words which are to shelter both. And upon this case, the Whig government is understood to be making an appeal *ad misericordiam*. When they thus court disgrace to avoid putting the House of Lords into a manifest wrong, what probability is there of their having any intention of ever seriously attempting to reduce the power of the Lords? Are they not playing a farce before the public, of which the public are to be the dupes?

An attempt is to be made on Monday to eject the words on the bringing up of the Report; but I suspect the instinct of not paying our debts will prevail.

On Friday was brought forward the ministerial plan for the Abolition of Church Rates. The property of the Church is to be improved, by a legislative alteration in the terms of leases; and in consideration of this, the Church Rates are to be given up, and the repair of churches &c. provided for out of the property of the Church. To this the advocates of the Church objected, that what the Church wanted was not the money, but the power of taking it from Dissenters against their will; for to this amounted the wailings over the *nationality* of the Church, which they declared would be entirely given up by the process of compensation proposed. Nationality, means the nation setting apart a large sum for the maintenance of religion, and allowing one religious sect to take it all. There was, however, a general consent to say nothing of the principle of honesty on any side. The ministers darkly alluded to it, under the character of something which they utterly abhorred, something to which no change of time should ever shock the firmness of their hatred. And the Dissenters were glad to hold their peace, hoping to catch some little drops from the dripping-pan of the ruling tyranny. The debate was finally adjourned to the Friday following.

During the presentation of Petitions previous to the debate, a circumstance occurred which may prove of considerable importance. The Speaker undertook to prevent Mr. Hume from mentioning the *names of the places*, from which the Petitions against Church Rates which he held in his hand were sent. Mr. Hume immediately gave notice that he would prepare a

motion to be brought before the House upon the subject; so that there may be some chance of the question seeing the light. The fact is that the Whig ministry have during this Session and the last, to all substantial purposes destroyed the Right of Petition and of liberty of speech. I hope their friend the Speaker may have gone a step too far for their interest. The manifest reason is, that they found extremely inconvenient the constant fire of popular opinions which the Radicals poured upon them, in the Session which followed the Reform Bill, through the intervention of the Petitions of the people. The Whigs are great masters of prosy speeches, and therefore it was their interest to reduce the proceedings of the House as much as possible to dreary two hours' harangues upon prepared subjects. Whiggery would have been at a nonplus, if it could have been attacked on any given subject by the mere instrumentality of a Petition from the people. Like wise men in their generation therefore, they determined to cut down the Right of Petition. And they did it effectually, by passing an Order through the House (which I remember hearing Members declare was done after midnight and with their utter ignorance), restricting the time for receiving Petitions public and private to *half an hour per diem.* Observe the effect of this. Forty or fifty Members put down their names on a list to present Petitions. Of course the desire of numerous other Members to present, makes a capital argument against any Member who should wish to occupy more than the time of thrusting his Petition into a bag; and so far the Whig strategem succeeds. But it tells also in another way. A large proportion of the Members on the list are prevented from presenting their Petitions on that day. They must therefore a second time come at an early hour to the House, waiting to answer to their names at the process of balloting to decide the order of succession, and very probably after all find themselves again near the bottom of the list, and so on for an indefinite number of times. As an instance, I have myself had the Petition of a private soldier, for I can scarcely tell how long. Sometimes I drew a lot at the bottom of the list, and had to go for another day; sometimes I was at the top of the list, but there was no House; and sometimes there were no Public Petitions to be presented because there was only time for Private. And so here I am; simply on account of the selection which Lord John Russell has made of half an hour as the proper time for the presentation of all the petitions of this great country.

For my own part, I think it is important that the true state of things should be known, if it is only to prevent Members

from falling into the disgrace with their constituents which is the natural consequence of mistakes upon that subject. For example, I dare say there is scarcely a man in Hull who does not believe he has the right to petition parliament; meaning thereby, that he believes his petition will be read in the House of Commons by one of the Members for the town, who will say something in favour of its object; that the other Member will say a little in support, and that something like a pretence at least will be made to receiving it with attention. On the contrary what is the fact? The Speaker stands gesticulating, and trying to put down the Member who is unadvised enough to attempt to say a word in execution of the directions of his constituents. And so the Petition is huddled into a bag, with less ceremony than attends the burial of a deceased kitten: whence it is resuscitated the next day to have the happy fate of counting one in the list of Petitions, or by extraordinary luck indeed, to be printed for the edification of the petitioner and such of his relatives as may chuse to read it. The Working Classes of London, poor unadvised men, have indited a Petition, which they have selected Mr. Roebuck to present, and seventeen other Members to support. I have more confidence in Mr. Roebuck's doing the possible, than in any other man's in the House. But unless a miracle is wrought to serve the Working Classes, Mr. Roebuck will be allowed to put it on the table, and all the other seventeen to hold their peace.

London, 8 March, 1837.

ON Monday Mr. Walter's motion for adding six members to the Committee on the Poor-law Amendment Act, was negatived by 152 to 124. It is therefore finally decided that this Committee, on which three (Mr. Walter said four) of the popular advocates are put, out of twenty-one, is to be held up to the British nation, rich and poor, as a specimen of the justice of parliament, and the confidence to be placed in its decisions. The Member for Leeds "considered that the Committee was fairly constituted" because "*he* was connected with a large manufacturing district, which had expressed a very strong feeling adverse to the new Poor-laws." This, you will see at once, is the old fallacy of "virtual representation." The Member for Leeds and two or three more are on a Committee, with seventeen or eighteen against them; and this is to be a fair Committee. At all events they should give us "virtual representation" turn-and-turn about. Give us a Committee with three admirers of the new Poor-law on it, and eighteen of

its opponents; and let us have the chance of taking a mean between the two Reports. I remember when I supposed gross fraud was banished from public proceedings, as too dangerous to be risked; but if a man can get to the House of Commons, he may live and learn. My counsel to the industrious and poorer classes is, to consider the proceedings of this Committee as those of a packed jury of their enemies, got together for the purpose not concealed, of making a Report unfavourable to their interests. I suppose they know, that anything in the shape of a Report must be determined by the majority of voices, that is to say, by eighteen against three; and with respect to the evidence, which it may not be in the power of the Committee to suppress, there will at all events be the evidence raked together by eighteen men, in opposition to what can be collected by three. I wonder when men will be able to take care of their own affairs.

The great debate of the night, was on the designs of ministers in Canada. They are going to play the American War over again in little; and every man concerned for the interests of public liberty, must wish that it may have the same result. The Canadians have been oppressed for six and-forty years, by a make-believe imitation of our House of Lords;—not by a body possessing large hereditary property in the country, and carrying along with them a considerable portion of habitual respect in consequence of having been time out of mind the objects of reverence to men's ancestors and predecessors, which are circumstances that do really to a certain extent make rational the submission of the people of England to their House of Lords, and he is a feeble politician that does not give to this due weight in his account;—not by a body of this nature, but by a body who have no resemblance to them but in name, a mere collection of official servants of the executive government appointed from time to time at pleasure, and to whom there is no more reason why a Canadian should pay any deference or give up any interest, than why he should take the opinion of the grandees of the Cham of Tartary. The Canadians tired out, declare they will go on no longer unless this mock House of Lords be made *elective*. That is so say, they set up a claim to the very reform which the people of Great Britain themselves are struggling for, though with much less of cause and provocation; and the Whig ministers declare, that they will put down the calf abroad, in order that they may not have to fight the bull at home. It is the battle against the people of England, begun upon the stage of Canada. And how have the Canadians proceeded? They have proceeded as we must do when

the time comes. The Assembly of Lower Canada has for several years stopped the Supplies, and refused to pay up the expenses of the government, till their great grievance, the make-believe House of Lords, is redressed by being made elective in some way by the people. They are living close by the United States, where they know the Senate is elective; and they know by theory and by practice, that the non-elective nature of the Canadian Council is only a machine for robbing the Canadians of their money. They have therefore done, what in parliamentary language is perpetually talked of here, under the title of "buttoning up the purse." And what do the Whig ministers propose to do? They propose to take the purse without the Assembly's consent. It is the old case of America and the Civil Wars over again. And all this from the reforming Whigs.

Now what possible interest can the people of England have in supporting the Whig ministers in this robbery of Canada? If we could but lose Canada, there is not a man in England that lives in houses, that would not be benefited by it; because the principal trade with Canada as now carried on, is only a fraud to give twenty shillings to one man, by taking thirty from the rest of the community. Canada moreover, is the penn, the warren, to which the children of our unhappy countrymen are to be transported, who are forced by the Corn-laws, if they marry, to breed (as was said last night in the House of Commons) for exportation. The New Poor-law, is only a new device, to force the poor to transport themselves to Canada, that the rich may have more to themselves at home. For which of these reasons are we to fight for Canada? There is little doubt of the propositions of ministers being carried in the House of Commons; because they know they are throwing themselves into the arms of the Tories who will join. These Whigs are traitors; they have had their will of us, and now they are sending us to the parish. But there will be an after-reckoning. Fifty Political Unions could not have done so much against the present ministers, as this declared treason of their own. We are stronger to-day, than we were yesterday; in the exact proportion of the increase of our knowledge.

On Tuesday Mr. Grote brought on his motion for the Ballot. His speech was, as usual, a perfect and unassailable Essay on the subject in all its branches. The replies of the ministers were feeble and tottering; winding up with intimations, that they would vote for the Ballot,—*that* they would,—if honourable gentlemen did not mend their ways on the subject of intimidation and corruption. Of the arrival of which opportunity for

ministerial exertion there can be no doubt; inasmuch as the individual temptation to intimidation and corruption, will always vastly outweigh the fear of the share the particular sin may have in provoking the Whig ministers to vote for the Ballot.

The speech of the night, was that of the member for Rochester (Mr. Bernal); who rose to declare himself a convert to the Ballot. Mr. Bernal is a Whig, three parts over to Radical; he is Chairman of Public Committees of the whole House, which is a sort of subsidiary Speaker; much beloved by all parties for his temper and clearness in his office; and I hope will be the Radical Speaker whenever one is wanted. Other men of function also gave in their adhesion on the same night; among whom may be noted our townsman the member for Cambridge. And I do not note one desertion to the enemy. For all this, the division, which was 153 against 265, fell below that of last June (88 against 139) in the proportion of 21 to 23; or by between a twelfth and eleventh part. This may be accounted for, by the effects produced on one side or the other, from the defection among the Working Classes; large bodies of whom are at this moment listening to the Tory trumpets in their rear, instead of their tried leaders in the front, and moving upon every point where discomfiture and loss to the general cause is most likely to await them. But this is what cannot last. They are new men, and must sow their wild oats. In a year or two they will find out, what their old leaders could have told them before, that to rush upon the strong point instead of the weak, merely because they would like best to carry it, is more like an enemy's counsel, than like anything accordant with "the disciplines of the wars" as taught by hardly-earned experience.

London, 11 *March*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the debate was resumed on the affairs of Canada. The Whig ministers by their own speeches, from which what follows is for the most part literal extract, succeeded in establishing the following points.

1. That they entirely agree with Mr. Fox, in thinking that the Legislative Council ought to have been made elective at its establishment in 1791.

2. That they are confirmed in this by the experimental fact, that the evil arising from the want of this principle of popular election, was that while in the one assembly there was a great proportion of the French party, in the other there was an almost exclusively British party, and the consequence was, that violent

opposition always existed between them. If the Council had been elective originally, the effect, after some contests between them, would be, that they would mutually concede, and that the French and British would in the progress of time live together as one people.

3. That it could not be said that such a system was opposed to the British system, in the teeth of the fact that of our colonial possessions more than one-half had elective Legislative Councils.

4. That when Mr. Fox said that unless they made the Council elective it would lead to the consequences which unfortunately now exist, Mr. Pitt replied, that it was only an experiment.

5. That they think it would be a material improvement if the principle of election could now be established in some modified form; and that they have no dislike to the principle of the election of both Assemblies in any of the British colonies.

6. That because the Canadians ask for this elective principle, which the Whigs say ought to have been introduced in 1791;—which they say great evils have arisen for want of;—which they say is not opposed to the British colonial system, but rather the contrary;—which they say Mr. Pitt declared, was only omitted by way of experiment;—and which they say it would be a material improvement to introduce in some form or other at the present moment;—that because the Canadians ask for this, they will go to war with the Canadians to hinder it; and their reason to wit, "because they will not give a triumph to either party."

Some eminent palterer with human rights, once said, he would not do justice because he "would not give a triumph to either party;" and the little Whigs think that by copying this, they are puffing out their froggy sides to the dimensions of the ox. Are we at Hull, such simpletons, as to find a man or a guinea to make this Whig war on Canada, for the sake of preventing somebody from having a triumph in the establishment of the right? Might not we for the same reason subscribe to make war on the *Nisi prius* Court at York? But this is the cant of all governments; and will continue to be so, till the people get that influence over their own affairs which every day is bringing nearer. "You want it; therefore you shall not have it." This is the first word uppermost in the mouth of every man who gets into a coat more guarded than his fellows, and stoops to don the livery of courts. But the people of England are strong enough to bring them to their senses. The

Whigs, if they are allowed to go on, are quietly storing up arguments against the popular power of the purse, for the Tories to make use of against ourselves when the time comes. The theory pressed by the Tories on Wednesday, and which they endeavoured by all means to intertwine with the arguments of their friends the Whigs so that there should be no disentangling them hereafter, was that the popular right of withholding the Supplies, is always to be subordinate to the judgment of the people's enemies that it is properly exercised. This is the pill prepared for us to swallow; and which we are as likely to swallow as not, if we have not sense and spirit to resist the experiment which is now being made on Canada, for the sake of enabling the practitioners to get their hands in for ourselves.

The Whig-Tory Resolution was finally carried by 318 against 56. As many as four divisions took place afterwards, with a view to obtaining some delay, to allow the constituencies to interfere. Observe, that a Whig measure of mischief, is never allowed to wait for return of post. The Tories are "all alive;" their swords begin to be maiden, and they have not had such a chance of fleshing them these twenty years, as they think they see now in Canada,

On Thursday Mr. Buckingham got leave to bring in his Bill for the better regulation of the Mercantile Marine. He was subjected to several attacks, all very wide of the mark. It was assumed for instance, that he was opposed to the general principle of marine insurance, and that he meditated restrictions on the form of vessels; the total inaccuracy of which, after the attention the proceedings of the Shipwrecks Committee attracted at Hull, will be readily admitted there. All this proves, that there are interests at work against him; and where there are interests on one side, I believe it will invariably be found that there are interests on the other.

Mr. Barlow Hoy moved for correspondence on the subject of Texas, and was defeated by 49 against 38. The world seems to be in a conspiracy, Quakers and all, to wrest the province of Texas from Mexico, in punishment for the abolition of negro slavery there. Of the majority of 49, there were nearly twenty Reformers, who ought by all the common rules of speculation, to have been on our side. I wish you or anybody, would publish a bitter examination of the Division list. The Radicals in considerable numbers, like the republicans so-called of America, are unsound upon the question of Slavery. They have got some phrenological crotchets into their heads, about the flatness of the negro skull; which a season or two

at Sierra Leone would enable them to correct. There are flat-heads there, as in other countries; but at the bottom of the whole, is the longing to use the flat-heads for improper purposes.

The member for Finsbury (T. S. Duncombe) moved for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal that portion of the Reform Act which requires the payment of rates and taxes in cities and burghs as the condition of registration; which was carried against ministers by forty-nine to thirty-eight.

On Friday the principal debate was on Lord Mahon's motion for calling the attention of the House to the affairs of Spain. As was remarked by O'Connell, whenever the Carlists are in a crisis or a dilemma, a field-day appears to be got up in the House of Commons to give them heart. The motion ended in nothing, except the opportunity it gave to some of the lively Tories to avouch their enthusiastic feeling for the paragon of virtues, the author of the Durango decree. O for one hour of old Oliver, to talk with the royal miscreant in the gate! But we *will* have it so. Englishmen must be murdered by fifties without resistance, because the perpetrator is from regal loins.

On Saturday the House met at the usual hour; principally for the sake of receiving the report of the Navy Estimates, which have been delayed so long that the government are driven to a day.

London, 15 *March*, 1837.

Two more nights of wearisome debate on Church Rates; in which the only feature worth marking, was the close approach to a general consent to keep principles out of sight. The Attorney-General last night made a slight attempt to transgress the rule; but neither friend nor foe appeared to take cognizance of it, and the learned gentleman himself, I suppose, started at the light of sense and heresy, and hastened to involve himself again in the friendly darkness of orthodoxy. The truth thus hazarded, was that when Church Rates were established, the community was all of one way of thinking in religion, and what was just and proper then, might not be transferable to a different case.

This was the only attempt I heard, towards letting out a little of the forbidden stuff. Sir Robert Peel roundly put the case, that a Dissenter should have bought property at a reduced rate in consequence of the liability to Church Rates, and should proceed to refuse the rates; and then he looked round tri-

umphantly, as knowing that none would answer him. Yet, is there a little member of one of your dissenting congregations at Hull, that does not perfectly know the answer;—that could not tell Sir Robert, if he had the opportunity, that his crack case is exactly as it ought to be, and what he would himself declare to be the right, if the situations were inverted? When our protestant forefathers began to struggle against the dominant church, what would have been justice if the voice of justice could have been heard? Clearly that the dissentients should have been allowed to carry away their portion of the church establishment upon their backs, as a snail carries its house. But this was of course much too good for the dominant church; and the consequence was that the dominant church was overthrown, and another established on its ruins. And what was justice then, is justice now. The Dissenter has a just claim to his share of the general fund appropriated by the nation for the maintenance of religion. The term "national establishment" applied to the establishment of a single sect, is on the face of it a fraud and a falsehood; the establishment is *not* national,—it is the establishment of a particular sect at the expense of the other sects. If the Dissenter chuses to waive his claim to his share of the proceeds, this is anything but a reason why he should be oppressed by a payment instead. As it is, church rates are taken from the holders of all property subjected to them, by the depreciation of all such property; for it is presumable the supporters of church rates do not mean to say that church rates are paid by nobody, because all property subjected to them is sold at a diminished rate. The Dissenters have property as well as other people; the Dissenters therefore pay the church rates like other people, through the depreciation of their property. If then a Dissenter, after buying property at the universally depreciated price in which the property of Dissenters has shared, has the boldness or the good luck to be able to refuse church rates,—what he does is simply to recover, as far as the case reaches, a portion of what ought from the beginning to have been left in his hands as his share of the national contribution for the maintenance of religion, and the amount of which he is actually at this moment disbursing for the support of his own ministers. This, remember, is Sir Robert Peel's crack case; the case with which he looked triumphantly round the House, "while all the boys hollow'd." And in how few words might it have been put down!—but the saying of those few words, is exactly what the House of Commons is an engine to prevent.

The weary business is extended to to-night.

London, 18 *March*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the debate on Church Rates went on for the fourth night; and was concluded at half past two the next morning by a division of 273 for the ministerial proposition, and 250 against. This must be something like a beating given to ministers; but what can be done with men, who present themselves in the attitude of prayer that nobody will conceive them capable of intending to support any general principle of justice; —whose high aim and glorious ambition is to do a little right on false pretences, and smuggle through the legislature a trivial abatement of an enormous nuisance, without incurring the discredit of any hostility to wrong? The probable consequences savour of Dissolution, and all whereby a ministry deservedly defeated once, prepares to try again. At all events, it will be wise to keep our hounds in order.

On Thursday Mr. Clay brought on his motion for an alteration in the Corn Laws. As soon as Mr. Clay had finished speaking, an agricultural member (Mr. Cayley) rose with the seconder, and endeavoured to stop proceedings by counting out the House. The number was found above forty, and the seconder went on. Their first movement having thus failed, the landowners mustered kin and clan, and finally came down to the number of above two hundred. The ordinary routine of a-thousand-times-answered fallacies was put forward, and received as might be expected in an assembly where every man had made oath that he had a pecuniary interest in the question before him. At the instance of friends about me, I made repeated attempts to offer reply, as also to explain my reasons for not voting upon the actual question; but was unable to gain a hearing. Thank God, I have many better places! If I had been a jobber in a railroad or a dabbler in some monopoly, wishing to make a similar explanation, I should have been heard with reverential sympathy, to the extent that human organs could supply. Sir William Molesworth entered upon a demonstration of the mode of operation of the competition generated by the limitation of food, which was perfect in its way, but confined to a portion of the field. Mr. Hume was received with groans and hideous laughs when he attempted to open the case of that part of the community who have not three hundred pounds a-year in land; and when he proceeded to connect the question with the New Poor Law, the sounds that issued from the landed benches had a touch of the New Zealander. If there is a horrible sound on earth, it is the laugh of two or three hundred aristocrats all sworn to a contrary interest, when an honest man presents himself before them to plead the

cause of the industrious and the poor. And now I turn to the people of England,—to that portion of them who do not believe that to swear to a pecuniary interest is the way to constitute a judge,—to the portion who are born to work and to suffer, and not to receive rents and to spend,—a portion with whom I believe I possess some influence, from whom I enjoy some confidence, whom I have at all events endeavoured faithfully to serve, whose cause I have pleaded till the hair that was dark has turned grey, whose cause I could and would plead now, if we had a tribunal where physical force and sworn interest were not opposed to our having a hearing. Their advocate in the person of Mr. Hume, has been received with an indignity scarcely short of anything but blows. Their messengers have been sent back like the messengers of David; and the Lord do so to me and more also, if I go willingly on a message to that camp again, till blessed are the feet of him who comes with proposals of peace. Why will you drive your friends and representatives on the bitter and degrading office, of presenting themselves before howling savages, of rolling in the dust and performing the *Kotou* to their Bantam Majesties, in hopes of obtaining a little morsel of the justice which their coronation oath has taught them it is their interest to refuse? What can you expect from it, but to be trampled upon in the persons of your ambassadors? Take my advice; I have served against the Wahhabees of the Persian Gulph, and know the handling of the kind. Present yourselves no more before the 600 sworn land-owners and poor-rate owners of the House of Commons. Never go near them till they send you a flag of truce. They are your natural and unchangeable enemies, and no mistake; lest there should have been any doubt about it, they have declared their interest on oath. They will grind you to the last, as all men grind what it is their interest to grind. The farthings squeezed from a-thousand-and-eight paupers by the New Poor Law, glitter in the shape of a guinea or a guinea's worth, on the head-dress of the landowner's opera-girl. Your fathers and mothers must die in Poor Bastilles, where you yourselves must follow. If in the mean time ye multiply, it must be for exportation like the Carolina negroes. And how should it be otherwise; is not your government limited to the hands of men who take an oath that all that is your loss is their gain, and who solemnly exclude from participation in making laws for you, every man who is of your own class and feeling, as completely as the negro slave is excluded in America? It is the intent of tyranny avowed and sworn to; you cannot be amazed at what is the natural result of the precautions taken.

And by natural resources it must be met, or else lie down for ever. Change your whole plan of campaign. Begin to look into your own affairs, and to help one another to do it. Hope nothing from parliament; the House of Commons instead of being the machine you dreamed of, is only a cushion to blunt the impulses of popular necessities. Form yourselves everywhere into associations to gain knowledge which is power, and to communicate it through the press. Your owners have made a law against your communicating otherwise; but they cannot stop the press.' The Working Men of London have demonstrated that in general talent they are vastly superior to the average stuff the House of Commons is made of. They are not a force, but the materials for a force; fine limbs and stature, filled with bursting intelligence, like the French people when they first shook themselves to try a fall with the European despots in 1792, and, like them, only wanting the consolidation of a little time and experience to be irresistible. Be active and persevering, like them. Mind not a few mistakes. Show yourselves; be somebody; make yourselves heard of, that you may never be wanted to be felt. Dig a ditch and lie down in it with all your elders and all your children, sooner than trust to the tender mercies of men who are sworn to a pecuniary interest in your sufferings. Do it if you are wise men, and "you'll be glad of it afterwards."

Mr. Hume's speech is of great importance, because it shows that he is come over to the people's side on the question of the Poor Laws as connected with the Corn Laws. Through living in the same part of the town, I have the "privilege" as some of our Hull friends would say, of coming home with him almost every night from the House of Commons; and it is not long since he in some sort rated me for my Poor-law heresies at Preston. The member for Middlesex is always right in the end; but he is not hasty in his conclusions. He is surrounded too, by numbers of *doctrinaires;* which only makes his escape to the popular side of more importance.

Another point on which I am glad to find the member for Middlesex is confirming my preconceived opinions with the weight of his authority, is in believing that the abolition of the Corn Laws is the key to the whole of our enemies' position. Our oppressors are strong, because they contrive to live upon our resources; because, through the Corn Laws, they drain our wealth into the shape of rents, and make us pay for the hoof that tramples on us. There is a story of a party of Turkish troops, who entered a shepherd's house, and ordered him to kill a lamb and roast it; and when they had finished, asked him

how much he meant to pay them for the trouble of eating it. This is the way we are treated by the tyrants of the landed interest; they grow fat upon our lamb, and then ask what remission of taxes we mean to make them for their trouble. The secret of your servitude is here; cut off the mutton, and then you will be able to grapple with your enemies. Extended suffrage, short parliaments, ballot, equal taxes, all turn upon this pivot. Cease to permit your foes to make you keep them out of your toil, and then you will at some time get the other things which you desire. Yet this is what our unfortunate friends the London Working Classes, are at this moment running counter to with all their might. They say they will maintain their enemies, because they will have nothing but universal suffrage; and when they have got universal suffrage, they will set about such little things as ceasing to maintain their enemies. Somebody has been ploughing with our heifer; the adversary has been here. This comes of coquetting with the Tories and the Agricultural Association. A lord or two consented to be civil to the Working Men; and straightway the Working Men are found ready to keep the lords out of their bread. There is a wondrous charm in that word *lord*, and not the least where there is the greatest splutter of professed contempt.

The reason why I could not vote, was because I consider myself pledged to support no measure that does not go to the total abolition of the duties on foreign corn; though willing to agree to almost any conceivable degree of graduality in the process. Any proposal for a fixed duty, I am therefore under the necessity of viewing, not as an instalment, but as making a lodgement, a half-way house, for the enemy to stick at; and such half-way houses are among the greatest dangers in the whole compass of politics. My name appears in the Division List of Thursday by mistake.

The Division for the alteration of the Corn Laws was only 89 against 223. The Whigs either kept aloof, or voted with the enemy.

On Friday Mr. Roebuck moved for a copy of correspondence relating to the capture of the *Vixen*. Some letters between the government and the owners of the Vixen were read; in which the superiority of those of the owners, in everything which constitutes goodness in a letter, was acknowledged by loud cheers. The fact is we have not a government. We are without anything that discharges the office of that organ; as some of the lower classes of animals are without a head or a heart, so we are in a political sense acephalous. The ooject for which a government is instituted, is to have somebody to

carry on the public business; somebody, for instance, to tell us who we are at war with and who not, where our ships may safely go and the public force will protect them, and where not; but we have nobody that can do this. Yet the fault is not so much in the nominal ministers, as in what the country allows to exist elsewhere. Conscious debility is at the bottom of the indecision. We are a divided nation, and as such must fall. Foreigners know that we have a monarchical principle which is an *imperium in imperio;* which insulates itself from the constitutional government of the state, carrying along with it the direction of the national strength, the military force. If the constitutional government has one minister in Russia to do its behests, the unconstitutional has another, to harp on the insecurity of the existing state of things, and point out to the autocrat how the military force of England instead of being at the disposal of the pretended ministers, is a garrison of enemies quartered on the country, and held in leash to be let loose upon us at the proper time. In such a state of things, what chance, is there of protecting *Vixens?*

In the small hours this morning 101,000 men were smuggled through the House, in spite of numerous protests, on the Army Estimates. As I happened to be in the Library writing this to you, I was not in the way to add mine. Anything I have to say on the Army, therefore, must lie over for the Mutiny Act. But it is of very little consequence. It is all a farce; and will be till the people alter it.

"*London*, 21 *March*, 1837.

THE House of Commons met on Saturday, and sat for three quarters of an hour. The most remarkable event was the Speaker's reading a letter from Mr. Vigors, the Liberal member for Carlow, stating that a petition having been presented against his return, it was not his intention to defend his election.

Will the public ever find out, and bethink itself to disapprove, the sale of seats in the House of Commons to the highest bidder? for to this does the present practice amount. In all cases where the numbers run close, it is at the option of the beaten candidate who has money and will spend, to take the election out of the hands of the candidate who cannot or will not do the same. He has only to get up a colourable case; he may insert as many notorious and unsupported falsehoods in his statement as he pleases, without intending to wait to be asked for proof; he can always pick holes in a number of the adverse votes equal to the amount of the majority, though probably the adverse party if

the scrutiny were continued, would destroy six times as many in return; all manner of fraud, perjury, and mal-practice may be proveable against him if it was only gone into; but for all this, he shall have the option of obliging the adverse party to yield without resistance unless able to go to an immediate expense of several thousand pounds, and the miserable arrangements in existence put him out of all practical danger of being made to pay any portion of the expenses through a verdict of "frivolous and vexatious." Surely these things will be mended some day or other.

On Monday the Municipal Corporations (Ireland) Bill went through committee, without being attended with anything remarkable.

London, 24 *March*, 1837.

ON Tuesday Mr. Robinson brought forward his motion on the inexpediency of the laws which prohibit the manufacture of flour for exportation from foreign corn in bond. The debate, on the motion of Lord John Russell, was adjourned for three weeks.

There have been many instances of monstrous absurdities, submitted to by nations, and imposed by their governments; but none perhaps to equal the British Corn Laws, taking into account the state of light and knowledge in which they are endured. Yet here, the progress of intelligence is discernible. I think I perceive symptoms of giving way among the agriculturists; unless these are to a certain degree assumed in reliance on the temporary advantage that has been taken of the ignorance of the working classes, and even then they will be found to have been dangerous concessions in the end. There has been something like an admission, that the Corn Laws would not be maintainable, if there were not monopolies in favour of the manufacturing classes also. The manufacturing classes therefore have the power of putting to rest this argument, by allowing the removal of their own attempted monopolies; from the gradual abolition of which, even though not accompanied by the contemporaneous abolition of the Corn Laws, not loss but gain must arise to the industrious classes in the aggregate, upon the principle that all which is now given to any portion of the industrious classes by a monopoly price, is taken away from some other portion, with a general loss to all upon the quantity of the artificially dear goods of which they may happen to be consumers. And this is in reality the track upon which the Liberals in the government have for many years been moving.

The other side have of course done their utmost to stir up the working classes to opposition, by those arguments which are almost as old as the serpent's "Thou shalt not surely die," and to which the working classes have always been Mother Eve,—the advising them never to consent to the removal of mischief a little at a time, and never to assist in removing a mischief so long as another mischief can be pointed out whose removal they would prefer. It is all an encounter of wits; when men have learned the way, they will succeed, and not before.

Not that the removal of the manufacturers' attempts at monopoly would be followed by the immediate surrender of the landowners; they would still have other shifts. But it would be cutting away one. Their next resource would be to maintain, as in fact they do at present, that they in the exercise of their sworn monopoly of legislation, have been so severe upon themselves, that they have a fair claim to the Corn Laws for compensation. The answer to this will be to give them up their taxes, or at all events lay the taxes in such a way as shall leave no shadow of pretence for a claim in any party. There is no policy in allowing an order of men to tax themselves five pounds, to be a pretence for recovering (as they think) ten pounds, at a final loss of a hundred pounds to the community. This is a true representation of the tax-compensation fallacy.

On the same night the words in the Imprisonment for Debt bill, for creating to members of both Houses of Parliament a new power of refusing to pay their debts after the abolition of arrest, were thrown out by 39 to 27. It remains to be seen whether the ministers will attempt the re-insertion of the words on bringing up the Report or on the Third Reading.

On Wednesday the House was counted out at an early hour.

On Thursday Lord John Russell moved for leave to bring in a bill to abolish the punishment of death in cases of forgery; which he should follow up by moving for leave to bring in several other bills with respect to the criminal law.

Soon after the conclusion of his speech, the House was counted out. It had been previously determined, that the House on rising should adjourn to Monday the 3rd of April.

London, 5 April, 1837.

ON Monday only thirty-six members were found present, and there was consequently no House.

On Tuesday the early part of the sitting was occupied with a discussion on railways; a subject on which the House is always particularly alert. Mr. Ewart brought forward his motion for the division of landed property in cases of intestacy, and cited many individual instances of the lamentable operation of the existing law. The Attorney-General replied in a speech, which I could not help thinking had been what schoolboys call "cabbaged," from some of the forms of oration from time to time published by way of caricature. "Why did not the member for Liverpool apply himself to some practical grievance? Had there been any petitions, from those who in the next fifty years are to suffer through their fathers dying intestate? It was proposed that in cases of intestacy, the property should be divided equally as is done in France; but would it not be a shocking thing if the right of testation was taken from the father as is done in France? Intestacy does not occur in above one case out of a hundred; therefore the provision of law for that case ought to be wrong. To do any good, the whole code of England must be altered; for the distinction between real and personal property, is made in fifty other ways that nobody complains of. If we were legislating for an infant State in one of the South-Sea Islands, it might be well to do justice and right; but legislation must be adapted to the habits, customs, and existing circumstances of a people, and in England younger children have got into the habit of seeing their father's property unjustly divided. Finally, it was necessary to resist a motion tending to the utter subversion of the institutions of the country."

I cannot repress a malicious wish to propose this speech to the consideration of our Society at the "Durham Ox," including the Hebe whom I am afraid I unintentionally drove from her listening-place by being too explanatory upon the *droit de seigneur;* an unhappy circumstance I would not here recal, if it was not to observe that this right was once part of "the existing circumstances of a people," and was doubtless defended by Attorneys-General as parcel of "the institutions of the country."

But the serious inference from this speech of the ministerial officer, is that the present government have no real desire to attack the institutions hostile to the interests of the people; and that where they do move, they are unwilling Calibans, acting under some pressure they are afraid of. The end of which will be, that they will first let down the country into the hands of a Tory House of Commons, and then be roused by the apparition of some other administration, whose prime necessary of

existence will be disclaiming all connexion with the present men.

On division, there appeared for Mr. Ewart's motion 21; against it 54.

London, 8 *April*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the Sale of Beer bill was brought forward for Second Reading; but was finally withdrawn without a division. It is time there should be a combination against these attempts to embitter the cup of the poorer classes, by putting, if not the bishop's, at all events the parson's foot into the draught. We must not be a priest-ridden people if we can help it; and if we did not resist, we should be, even to our small beer.

On the motion for Supply, my notice of a motion on the illegal government of the Army was called, after a delay of nearly nine weeks, and being eighteen times put off by the movements of ministers. Without at all assuming that the grand Machiavelism of the state has been put in requisition, it is enough to name the facts above, to show how bootless any attempt at concert was under such circumstances. In addition to this, the Supply was brought on, contrary to every remonstrance, on an evening appropriated to private bills, and when of course members who had no private bills which interested them, were likely to be away. It was introduced under an engagement that it should not come on if the private business drove it too *late;* and then the private business was huddled through, and it was brought on at six o'clock, which is precisely the hour at which there is a general understanding that disputants of all sorts shall have a flag of truce to dine. Under such circumstances it is nothing miraculous, that of half a dozen members whom I should have expected to second, not one was there. There is no contending against such odds of power in other people's hands; and the whole may help to improve the notions of those who think the House of Commons is a land of Cocagne, where a cock has only to stretch out his neck and crow, and what he wants will fall into his mouth. An hour afterwards, came all the diners-out, to ask when the motion was coming on. But there is no use in losing heart of grace; according to the Maroon girls' proverb, "One day is not all days." To borrow from the more aristocratic but less elegant sources we are accustomed to by the other side of the

House, we must "hit them again in the same place," and cannot fail in the end of "establishing a raw*."

* "On the question that the Speaker do leave the chair, to go into a Committee of Supply,

Colonel *Thompson* said, he had a notice upon the book, which he should have been glad to have brought forward many weeks ago, and of which he should have been happy to have offered some explanation when the notice was given, if he had not been prevented by forms of the House, which he hoped were a portion of the wisdom of our ancestors and not of our own. The consequence of his being prevented from giving any such explanation was, that he had received a number of letters, from which it appeared there was a persuasion that he intended to enter into an examination of the details of the office of the Commander-in-Chief. Now he begged to say, that he had no more intention of doing that, than he had of inquiring into the details of the office of the Archbishop of Canterbury if there was one. His object was simply to bring before the notice of the House, that the government of the army was withdrawn from the practice and application of that constitutional law, which according to the principles settled in times of struggle and danger, gave us a remedy for, and prevention of, the misapplication of the power of the Crown, by placing the administration of all the important departments of the state, in the hands of ministers whose real responsibility consisted in the necessity for all going out of office together, whenever they ceased to be able to maintain a majority in that House. Though not a lawyer, his object could not be mistaken by any fair inquirer. If the mace on the table or its predecessor could tell stories, it would speak of times when there was little doubt of what our forefathers meant by the Customs and Constitution of the Realm, as distinct from Acts of Parliament. But, not to travel out of his immediate line, when the Mutiny Act said that the raising and keeping up an army in the realm without consent of Parliament, was "*against law*," was there a drum-boy that believed that meant, *against an Act of Parliament?* It was written and stamped upon the minds of all men, that there was a law in this country to which even statutes made in that and the other House of Parliament were subservient. To that law, therefore, he appealed, and he would ask whether the government of the army had been kept in the state in which it had been placed by our forefathers? What on this point said history? When the Tories came into office, the first time he believed they had a chance after the Revolution, did they continue the Duke of Marlborough in his office of commander-in-chief an hour longer than they found themselves unable to withdraw him from abroad? When the Whigs again came into power under George I., they restored their commander-in-chief; and, on the next change of ministry, which took place he believed on Sir Robert Walpole's retirement, the commander-in-chief, like other ministers of state, was again changed. He contended that these precedents, occurring as they did in critical times, when it was unsafe to tamper with the just jealousy felt by the people of that formidable machine a standing army, justified him in saying, that by the ancient law and practice of the realm, there ought to be a constitutional administrator of the Army, removeable with the other ministers, as there was of the king's Navy and the king's Courts. By giving up this point, a door would be open to every possible mal-practice and mal-application of the military force, and we might be paying for the maintenance of a numerous and expensive army,—amounting to about a hundred regiments of foot and thirty of cavalry,—without knowing whether they might not at any time be directed against ourselves. Look to the case of Spain; did any one believe that the government would have committed themselves to all the dangers and difficulties arising from sending out a force in so avowedly inferior a state of discipline,—without casting any disparagement on those who were engaged in it,—had they not known that the Army was not really at their disposal? They could move the Marines, because they were under the direction of the Admiralty; and the Artillery and Engineers, because they were under the Master of the Ordnance; but of the superb regiments of infantry and cavalry which made the rest of the British army, the constitutional

On Thursday the same questions were again mooted on bringing up the Report of the Supply. The point at issue, is in substance whether the country is or is not to have the security derivable from all the important departments of the state being in the hands of ministers, who are to be subjected to the

---

and responsible advisers of the Crown knew they could not move a corporal's guard. They could not move a single soldier towards Spain. And the result of this misgovernment of the army was, that our countrymen engaged in the Spanish struggle must suffer all the misfortunes which were daily falling upon them. Again, there were some apprehensions of this country being involved in a struggle with Russia. Was there nobody to tell the northern autocrat, that the British army was not in fact at the disposal of the constitutional ministers of the Crown, and though the King's government might wish to put a stop to his aggressions, that army might even be directed to his assistance? It had been said by some hon. gentlemen in that House, that they hoped never to see the day when the army should be brought under the control of the House of Commons. If this was merely an expression of personal opinion, he had no more wish to interfere with it, than he had for interference with his own. But if it was to be taken as the expression of a political party, then he must say, that the construction put upon it by the political party to which himself belonged was, that those hon. gentlemen hoped the army would always be under the direction of an irresponsible power behind the throne, which power should be themselves. In this country there had not been wanting instances of the dangers that might arise from the government of the army being in the hands of others than the responsible ministers of the Crown. In the unfortunate events which had occurred at Bristol, it was believed that the King's ministers were not held the proper judges of the time and mode of allowing military execution to commence upon the erring men, and that the governors of the army had had recourse to extraordinary measures to effect that end. In the event of similar circumstances occurring in Ireland, was there no fear of the military force being directed by irresponsible persons? Had there not already been—though he knew this was a sore subject for hon. gentlemen opposite—a disposition manifested in certain quarters to tamper with the army? The direction of the army was manifestly the sorest point in the concernments of a free country; and therefore it was the last that ought to be withdrawn from the securities furnished by the practice of the constitution. But if it *was* so withdrawn, what was the consequence, but that the moment the power became illegal, the right to obedience vanished? He was not disposed to modify one jot of his assertion, that the only security any country had against arbitrary power, was in maintaining the principle that obedience was coeval with legality. Let those who exercised power illegally, take the risk; he did not mean to stir from his position, that if the major was true, the minor and conclusion followed. He hoped hon. gentlemen would not imagine he had come down with any expectation of making a *grand coup de lance* on the present occasion, but to make a beginning with a subject which by pains and perseverance would be carried to some fruit. He had not even asked anybody to second his motion; but if anybody did, he would certainly go to a division. If they did not, he knew very well where he should go and say, that no man had stood by him; and he did not believe that in the end he should be the worse for that. If however, as he hoped would be the case, some hon. gentleman came forward to his support, he would, by dividing the House, give himself the pleasure of recording, with the "two or three gathered together" who might be willing to assist him, his sentiments on this question. He now moved, as an amendment to the motion for going into committee, That the government of the Army, as at present conducted, is against law, and no man is held to obedience to the same; and that no Supply be granted till remedy applied.

No hon. Member seconding the amendment, the original motion was carried, and the House went into a Committee of Supply."—*Hansard's Debates*, 5 April, 1837.

responsibility, the only kind which in reality exists, of being obliged to lose their places whenever they fail of keeping a majority in the Commons House of Parliament. I thought I perceived indications, that what I had said the day before, had not been altogether thrown away.

On Friday came on Major Fancourt's motion for a Select Committee to inquire into and report on the question of Military Punishments. There must still be corporal punishment, because the Whig ministers will have it so. They helped to negative the motion for a committee, by 167 to 72.

London, 12 *April*, 1837.

ON Monday came on the motion for the Third Reading of the Irish Municipal Corporations bill. At an early period of the evening the debate appeared to flag, and the House was cleared for a division; but on the rising of Lord Stanley the debate went on. At midnight a division took place on the question of adjournment; which was carried by 286 against 232, a considerable number of members on both sides being understood to have left the House.

On Tuesday the debate was resumed on the Irish Municipal Corporations bill. As might be expected, nothing very new or striking was produced upon a subject where all parties had had so many opportunities to speak their minds. Sir Robert Peel was bold and bitter at the conclusion of the debate; and he adroitly transferred his attack from the subject before the House, to the general policy of ministers. The ministry had nobody prepared to answer; having for the most part shot their bolts. And so their opponents had the advantage of going to a division with the last word. The Third Reading was carried by 302 against 247; being only a majority of one more than on the motion for adjournment on the previous night*.

---

* In the course of the debate (during which an orator had used the term 'somniferous,' and had spoken of the 'young blood of Ireland,')

"Colonel *Thompson* said, that without making any promise not to be 'somniferous,'—and on looking round he saw sad symptoms of the progress the disease of somnolency had made in invading their proceedings,—he must say one part of the question appeared to have been entirely overlooked; and that was, in what light the 'young blood' of *England* might happen to view the case, if Ireland was driven to the extremities which hon. gentlemen opposite appeared to be bent on? That House ought not to make itself too sure of being a rigid criterion of all the feelings and sentiments existing in the country. There were large masses from which it was the boast and glory of that House to separate itself, as from a *profanum vulgus*, and to establish a test of wide distinction between the two. For his own part, it had often happened to him to be astonished at discovering the under-current of opinion on Irish affairs, which came to light

I feel much gratified by finding that my highly respectable Jewish constituent (for I am not aware that there are more voters than one, of that religious persuasion, unless of the same family) has been unanimously elected to the office of guardian of the poor by the inhabitants of Whitefriar ward. Surely

---

when thoughts were declared without disguise. As it had been announced by a preceding speaker, that the House was in a leisure moment,—that there was a sort of lull in its proceedings,—he would make it an excuse for relating one instance of this nature. He knew a man, to whom he was under all the obligations of every kind which one individual could be to another; a man of great natural intelligence, and considerable acquired influence; for many years a Member of that House; not one imbued with wild political theories, but whose antecedents would be best described by saying he had been a Tory banker with strong religious opinions. To this individual he happened to return, after an absence of many years, being then himself of middle age; and in a confidential moment, when the conversation turned on Ireland, partly in consequence of expecting himself to go there in a military capacity, he was surprised at hearing his senior and governor break out with something of oracular solemnity as follows:—"I always thought there would have been only one cure for Ireland; general"—what? Not general fast, nor general humiliation; not general representation, nor general suffrage; it was a much more substantial general than any of these,—"general *Hoche*." Now if a man like this came to such conclusion, was it not still more probable that others who had less ballast on the other side might do the same? If the irritation to Ireland was persevered in, there were two threats that would be heard of from that country; first, repeal of the Union; and if that would not do, separation. He did not believe either of these events would be viewed with all the horror by every portion of the community, which hon. gentlemen opposite might calculate on. It was no secret, that the inclinations of large, and what would be influential, classes in this country, were setting strongly towards republican institutions. For his own part, were he to attempt to define with exactness the political party to which he considered himself as belonging, he should say it was to that party, a very strong one at the period of the Revolution, and than whom there had been no more faithful and unflinching supporters of that great alteration, who might be called the 'republicans under compact;' by which he meant men, who having no more doubt of the inherent superiority of republican institutions than they have of a straight line being the shortest distance between two points, are still willing to concede to the wish of the majority, and engage to discharge all the duties of citizens under a monarchical government,—and he had yet to learn in what portion of those duties they had failed. With these sentiments he could not but be a keen observer on the subject, and therefore he could say from his own observation and knowledge, that a desire for republican institutions was progressing, more rapidly in fact he feared, than was accompanied by knowledge. But with this before them, would gentlemen on the other side believe, that a large party in this country would not be rather gratified than otherwise, by the apparition of an Irish republic, if the Irish were driven to it? Would there not be many who would infer, that they should thereby obtain all the benefits that could be derived from Irish connexion, without the evils? Why then run the chances of exasperating Ireland? Let the case be supposed inverted, and say whether, if English municipal privileges were intercepted on the ground that they would be unfavourable to the power of a small minority of that ancient Church which once was dominant in England, there was any length of violence to which Englishmen would not be disposed to go. He saw in all this strong reasons for the exercise of moderation towards Ireland; and if in any quarter there was a determination to the contrary, he must leave it to the correction of that experience, which would probably be anything but agreeable in its lessons."—*Hansard's Debates*, 11 April, 1837.

there is no Dissenter who has not by this time found out, that he who smites a Jew with incapacity, longs only for the opportunity to transfer the blow to the Dissenter; and that the true policy of the Dissenters in general, is to put their own interest, a day's march out of danger, by securing the extension of toleration to the advanced post of the Jew. The orthodox hate both alike; or if there is any difference, the *odium theologicum* operates in inverse proportion to the magnitude of the questions in dispute.

London, 15 *April*, 1837.

ON Wednesday Mr. Hume's County Rates bill was thrown out by 177 against 84. I suppose nobody expected any different result. As soon as the Reform Bill passed, the first occupation of ministers was in all possible ways to let off the steam; so that if the counties are ever to be reformed upon the principle of the corporations, it must be after events of which the present ministers will be no voluntary promoters, have got up the high-pressure popular power again. The self-elected, self-paid governors of the counties, are just where the governors of corporate towns were before; and if they are ever to be driven from the position they occupy, it must be by a close repetition of the former process.

On Thursday Mr. Roebuck's motion for a committee to inquire into the propriety of totally repealing the stamp duties on newspapers, was negatived by 81 against 42. The quarrel between the rich and poor is therefore still to be maintained on this point. It must be the business of reformers, to play their game according to the cards, and if they cannot make the best use of the repeal, make the best use they can of the refusal.

A motion by Sir Edward Codrington, for a return of the time when certain naval officers were deprived of their half-pay, and the reasons for such deprivations, was negatived by 153 against 46. Suppose now that a criminal court, were found refusing to make a return of the time when a culprit was deprived of life, and the reasons for such deprivation,—what would the inferences on the subject be? And is there any good ground, why what is sauce for the civil goose, should not also be sauce for the naval or military gander? But all this is evidently what must come down; the only wonder is, that a government calling itself liberal, does not take the opportunity to be the agent.

On Friday the ministers carried another of their Resolutions against Canada, by 269 to 46. Lord John Russell talked of

what was "dignified;" did he recollect what a prophet of their own has said, that "all establishments die of dignity*"? In the American War, everything was dignified, except the ending. We are just now at the chrysalis or "dignity" condition; we shall see what kind of a blue-bottle is evolved, when the creature arrives at its full maturity of buzz.

London, 19 *April*, 1837.

ON Monday and Tuesday the debate was on the Affairs of Spain, and it was finally adjourned again till to-night. The situation of ministers is a fine instance of what the French call "a false position," an expression the precise meaning of which for a long time perplexed me exceedingly, and may perhaps have perplexed others. The difficulty, I take it, is solved at once by hitting on the right metaphor. By a "false position" then, the French mean exactly what we do when we talk of false or rotten ground. It means a position where, let a man go East or West, he is equally sure of sinking to the chin. It means such a position as small, evasive, temporising measures bring a political party to, when fat bulls of Basan close them in on every side, and whichever way they turn they have only the choice of the two horns of one dilemma or another.

Now imagine that the Tories had undertaken to conduct an interference in favour of absolutist principles, against some unacknowledged chief of insurrectionists, who should have raised the standard of democracy, for example in the Italian mountains. Would they have allowed themselves to be embarrassed by questions whether they were at war with such a chief or not; and, most of all, would they have made the half-answer which admits all the opponent wants, and is tolerable under no possible complication of human affairs, except when from a woman's lips it breaks upon a lover's ear? If from the decision of the party aided or other causes, they had been prevented from employing the regular land forces of the country, and been reduced to the necessity of sending out an unorganised levy, would they have allowed that levy to have been subjected to all the insult and all the discouragement of every kind which the opposite party, if there had been one ungenerous enough to take that course, could have heaped upon them? Would they have cut them off to the extent of their power, from every excitement and every prospect which in regular armies make the mass of soldiers fight, and which, with

* Edinburgh Review.

the exception of occasional outbreaks of popular or national enthusiasm, are known by experience as good as directs the operations of tailors or any other handicraftsmen, to be the only effective and practical methods of getting up and securing a uniform military action on which dependence can be placed? No, they would have expended some grains of the good soldiership and good policy, of which I wish they had a great deal less than they have. They would have said to their allies, "If you wish for our assistance in the shape you propose, you shall have it, but there must be a decent attention to our interests and credit too. We are not going to send you ten thousand Englishmen, many of them among the best friends of the political cause we may have to defend at home, to be frittered away by the possible jealousies or infirmities of your own government and commanders, in whom we at all events acknowledge no superiority which should carry with it unlimited confidence. Wherever ten thousand Englishmen go, a detachment of the British government goes with them. Do not engage for more than you can accomplish; but the first time there is a maravedi short in the pay, or a reasonable complaint of the rations, we shall advance the difference ourselves, and you must expect to hear us talk of repayment with a sugar-island. The Legion may be in your service, but in the mean time we shall post it in the Army List as his Britannic Majesty's Foreign Legion in the service of such and such a power; and when you have done with it, we will endeavour to engage it in the service of some other of our allies, who may have no objection to the political support and fellowship the presence of such a force may imply. The officers shall have a star before their names, as was done with the German Legion and other good men and true who have served us heretofore; but such of our own officers as chuse it, shall have liberty to go in and out, as in the precedents established. These are our terms; accept them if you like. A very pretty engine for the support of the principles we uphold, we can conceive, with luck, might be a British Legion engaged at the discretion of the government, in supporting any power or state that should chuse to have recourse to it; and its being paid for by the parties who are to have the benefit, will be anything but uncomfortable." All this and more the Tories would have said and done, or have forfeited the claim to being active and able enemies which everybody is willing to allow them.

And suppose an assassin had decreed, that no quarter should be given to the prisoners taken from their Force. Would they have stopped to hear us turn phrases (if we had been disposed

to do it), on the humanity of the said assassin in having dismissed six prisoners on the ground of their being not fighting men but hired musicians, manifestly with a view of making (according to another of the expressions which I have heretofore found puzzling) one of those exceptions which confirm the rule, and shooting all he took in arms? They would have committed themselves to no such "monkey business" as the Indians call it, before mankind. They would have seen the Muse of History, in the shape of a printer's devil, dipping a broad sheet into the abysses of a steam press, and consigning them to "everlasting redemption" in the memory of all that is to come. They would have mustered up some of the energy which the English and French republicans have taught them, and at once have declared that the murder of their countrymen made a new *casus belli* (if it is lawful to make such a transfer from the *casus fœderis*), and that if any foreign powers had objections to their going pell-mell into the contest with the force best calculated to put an end to it, they must settle the question with the man that was the author, and not with them. They would come distinctly out with this declaration, and the country would not be worthy to be a country if it did not support them, to the extent at least of all the consequences of the latest complication of the case. This is what the Tories would do, in whom appears to be cooped up for the present all that remains of the spirit which makes nations safe. They know they would; they won't deny it; they will not refuse the compliment of a thoroughgoing, honest enemy, who has done his best to learn in their ranks whatever might be turned to their discomfort.

As I sat behind O'Connell yesterday (I cannot "*Mister*" him), I took occasion to pour into the portals of his ears some old military stories about Buenos Ayres; and when he rose, he bolted them plain out. This was great luck, in a place where no man has a chance of being heard when he wants it, if he stands anywhere between O'Connell and the regular bores of the House; which last are a class of men who can speak when they like, being always called in preference, on the ground of being necessary evils. Of course I stood to my tackle, and mean to do. As there is no knowing where an old soldier nestles, is there nobody in your neighbourhood, who about nine of the clock in the morning of Sunday the 5th of July 1807, heard Major Trotter of the 83d regiment carry the order down the column in which was the right wing of the 95th or Rifle Regiment, in the following words, "Spare the old men, the women, and the children, but every man able to bear arms,

put him to the bayonet." By —— (I never swore above twice in my life) I thought of Cottingham *. And with this before us, (and what is worse, as I shall be able to prove, not repented of), our unfortunate countrymen in Spain are to have nice conclusions put on them, for not making a war of rose-water against men who have printed themselves assassins, and in the purity of royalist and religious exaltation cultivate the amiable habit of putting their prisoners to death by torture. Thanks to the Tories and their friends for all their mercies.

London, 22 *April*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the debate on Spanish affairs was continued; and concluded at half past three in the morning, by a division of 242 for Sir Henry Hardinge's amendment, and 272 against. The House on rising adjourned to Friday.

With reference to the assertion I made on the subject of Buenos Ayres, and which was so roughly received by the Tory side of the House, I should be glad if you would give publicity to the following extract from the evidence of Lieut. Colonel Bourke, Quartermaster General, on the trial of General Whitelocke (see Trial of General Whitelocke, Tupper's Edition, p. 28). Lieut. Colonel Bourke says, on the 3rd July, two days before the attack actually took place,

"I called at General Gower's quarters" [the second in command], "and he showed me a plan of an attack on the town, "which he appeared to have just finished, and which was com-"pletely detailed in all its parts: it was the same which was "given out the next day in orders, with some very trifling "alterations. I proceeded to inspect the advanced posts at the "centre, and left General Gower going, as I understood, to "head-quarters with the plan. I reached head-quarters after "dusk, and in the course of the evening General Whitelocke "asked my opinion of the plan of attack, which was to take "place the next day at twelve o'clock; I stated my objection "to one clause, which directed, *that no prisoners should be made*, "as I conceived in an action of that sort, in an open town, "*it would be impossible to prevent a great deal of butchery.*" I said I thought the plan would succeed, but it appeared to "me to be completely a new case, as I did not remember to "have heard before of a similar order of attack; the General "said *he would leave out the order for making no prisoners*,

* A village near Hull, known to the correspondent as the residence of the writer's family.

" and would summon the town the next morning before he at-
" tacked it."

Here then the business is out. The order I heard given down the column, is officially proved to have been in the Commander in Chief's plan of attack two days before; and though he said he would leave it out, yet it either never *was* left out, or if it was omitted in writing, was nevertheless executed in matter of fact. I remember hearing the private soldiers discussing the point, as I lay among them on the floor the night before the assault. Some of them said, "We'll kill every man we can catch, for I suppose they would do the same to us." A private rifleman of the company I belonged to, named Boyd, replied "Well, I never did hurt a man that gave up his arms, " and I never will." At day-break Boyd went on with his company, and was shot through the heart. Let us hope he was the next minute a lance-corporal in heaven.

I should have liked to mention some of these points to the House in my own defence. I should have liked to ask Sir Henry Hardinge, whether the battle of Toulouse, in which I dare say he distinguished himself as he did everywhere, was not fought on a Sunday, and on the Sunday of Sundays, Easter Sunday. Sir Henry was very probably more busily employed; but while the battle was going on, and in sight of it, I saw the girls of a French village dressed in white, with the *curé* at their head, making their Easter procession to the church as if nothing had happened. And I strongly suspect that Lord Wellington came to Toulouse, and not Toulouse to him. But for all this, our unfortunate countrymen of the Legion are to be attacked, because they bayonet men who *roast* them, and because they went a mile and a half more than a sabbath-day's journey, towards Hernani on a Sunday. I should have liked, I say, to mention some of these points; but if any gentleman has a secret he wants to keep, the best course I can recommend to him, unless he is one of from half a dozen to a dozen professional speech-makers, is to try to utter it in the House of Commons.

Talking of Sundays, I have just received from my hereditary friends the Methodists in Hull, a request to support Sir Andrew Agnew's motion for a Sunday Bill; and as they were perfectly aware of the opinions I had expressed on that subject both in the House of Commons and out of it, of course they did it "tempting me." I therefore, and because there never can be too much openness between a representative and his constituents, insert a copy of my answer to their communicant.

"SIR,—When Mr. Hutt presents the petitions from the

"Wesleyan congregations in Hull in favour of Sir Andrew "Agnew's motion, I shall have the greatest satisfaction in "giving my testimony to the high respectability of the peti- "tioners, and the claim they have on every imaginable ground, "to a full hearing and consideration of their opinions. At the "same time, as one brought up from a child in the knowledge "of the Scriptures, and in ardent attachment to the principles "of religious liberty our fathers struggled for, I shall be under "the necessity of adding, that I believe the Judaical observ- "ance of a seventh day to be among the burthens which the "Apostle Paul has expressly forbidden Christians to allow any "man to impose upon them (Col. ii. 16), along with meats and "drinks, and new moons, and holydays, and worshipping of "angels, and other ordinances 'after the commandments and "'doctrines of men,' (binding, it may be, all or part of them "upon the Jews, but not binding upon Christians), which "'have a shew of wisdom in will worship, and humility, and "'neglecting of the body,' but to which Christians are specially "directed not 'to be subject,' nay more, to 'touch not, taste "'not, handle not.' It is therefore scarcely necessary for me "to say, that with the greatest readiness to exert myself to the "utmost whenever the occasion shall arise, to preserve to the "Methodist congregations the right of observing a seventh day "in any manner they may chuse, none making them afraid, I "consider all attempts to enforce the like observance on other "persons, as of precisely the same nature as would be an at- "tempt of the Catholics to enforce the observance of the "various ceremonials peculiar to their Church for which they "see more or less of authority in the Scriptures, and to be re- "sisted, if need were, to the blood accordingly."

"With every expression of respect for the Society in which "I was born, and which is intimately connected with my "earliest and deepest recollections, I remain, Sir, your very "obedient servant, &c."

On Friday came on the debate on Mr. Whittle Harvey's "breach of privilege." That is to say, Mr. Whittle Harvey seeing the Poor-law Commissioners attending the meetings of the Poor-law Committee, with every facility in consequence for sending for one witness to support another and acting upon view, thought it would be but fair that *the poor* who are the other party to the trial, should have something like the same advantage; and therefore he wickedly, intolerably, and advisedly, inserted from time to time some notices of the proceedings, in his powerfully conducted paper the *True Sun*, of which he is registered proprietor. Think what an outbreak

arose hereon. The secrets of the prison-house were being communicated to the poor. Lord John Russell brought forward a motion, to the effect that what Sir Roger L'Estrange calls "huggermugger" is the undoubted privilege of the House. Mr. Harvey met it by an Amendment, bearing that the Poor-law Committee should be obliged to report every day; after which process, publication is considered free. You may guess what a pudder was there, on "privilege," and "rights of the House," and "protection of the public interest." Feeling that I had a case in point in which you were concerned, I tried to get up and say, that I had always supposed privilege to mean something I desired to keep, and this was something I desired to get rid of, just as I should a "privilege" of going without my dinner. That I had been, for instance, on the Shipwrecks Committee, where the one thing needful was that the proceedings of the Committee as fast as they could be printed, should be sent from day to day to the seaports, to be copied into all the newspapers there, and enable us to receive information by return of post on all points by which the inquiry could be assisted. What would be the use of sending down a waggon-load at once? Would anybody reprint them; would anybody read them? Suppose somebody had said, "Let us make as much of a job as we can of the Shipwrecks Committee," what course would they have taken but to lay an embargo on the dispersion of the evidence? And this is exactly what is now done, by printed order of the House. It is true I partially broke through the rule; because a rule bearing dishonesty of intention on the face of it, it is the duty of an honest man to break. I sent the printed reports of the Committee from day to day to Hull, and will do so again on like occasion; but I was afraid to prompt the reprinting of extracts, lest I should involve others in difficulties. I am ready, with Mr. Harvey, either to go to Newgate or be expelled the House; but at the same time I express my profound conviction that there is not the slightest danger, and that there is vastly more wit abroad than to attempt either. All this I would have said for you if I could; and as I was not allowed to say it in the House of Commons, I say it here.

The concealment of evidence was defended on the grounds that there is now and then an instance where publicity would be very inconvenient to an individual under examination, or where a state secret may be concerned; grounds that would just as much authorize the holding an Assize with closed doors, and turning all our courts of law into Inquisitions. The Darling committee was alluded to. Why, I do not sleep o'nights, with recollections of the Darling committee; if ever I stay again an

hour in a committee that closes its doors, may I die in the hellish instruments of torture I saw fitted on human bodies in that horrible room!

All this comes to the point which I have over and over endeavoured to impress on you and on the public,—that the House of Commons as it at present exists, is an engine for securing the *minimum* of publicity and information which is compatible with the actual state of popular power, and that it must be reformed and trebly reformed before it becomes anything like the contrary. To give a single instance; there is no liberty of speech, except for a certain number of professional speech-makers who prop one another up in their monopoly. Heaven knows I have troubled nobody at any great length; but from the moment I entered the House of Commons I have been trampled on, because I belonged to no *clique*, and was only your representative. Would to God he had given me ability equal to the inclination, to be the people's instrument for putting down their enemies in turn. Was it decent for instance, that standing as I do in the situation of an officer on the list of the British Legion, I should not have been allowed an opportunity to say a word upon the subject in the debate on Spanish affairs? When the allusion to Buenos Ayres called me up, I thought the time was come; but the moment I mentioned the Legion, the Speaker stopped my mouth by telling me I must not say a word about anything but Buenos Ayres, because the adjournment had been moved. Was it decent again, according to the supposed rules of popular assemblies, that on the question of the Corn Laws, on which if some do not know, others do, that I have bestowed a greater quantity of continuous labour than any other man in the House can show, and have something not unlike a tail in some parts of the country in consequence, I should not be allowed to say one word? But it all comes to the same point. It is the *engine* that is in fault; we must have a re-reformed one, if not a new one, and we will.

The result of the debate on the "breach of privilege" was poor and impotent. Mr. Duncombe moved that the debate be adjourned to that day six months; which if it could have been carried, would manifestly have practically settled the question in favour of the people, for ever and for ever. Instead of that, the Liberals only mustered 18 against 131. Mr. Harvey agreed to bring forward his Amendment on Monday as a substantive motion; and Lord John Russell was allowed to carry his motion without a division.

The Committee on Canada was resumed. Mr. Leader moved

to put off the consideration for six months; in which he was supported on division, by 29 against 182. Mr. Roebuck, on the Canada Land Company Act, moved an Amendment to inquire into the circumstances under which the Act was passed. He was supported on division by 6 against 166; but as the Committee reverted to the old system of concealment, I cannot say more towards giving you the names of the six, than that I remember going across the House to Mr. Hume when he was sitting by himself.

London, 26 *April*, 1837.

ON Monday, the Eighth or principal Resolution against Canada was carried by 116 against 32. The pith of the argument on the Tory-ministerial side, was that the Canadians had so conducted themselves that there was a *necessity* for breaking their constitution. And what is the tyrant's plea thus named necessity? That either the salaries of the "hungry officials,"—hungry enough I dare say they are,—must go unpaid, or the demands of the Canadian people must be conceded. What then, in sober sadness, is the constitutional power of stopping the Supplies, or has it any theory and principle at all? Is it a material thing subsisting, or is it a joke, a trope, a figure, to ornament a minister's discourse with when it suits him, and to be thrown into any vessel of dishonour at his convenience? But if it is not the last, what is the avowed principle of it but this, that whenever a people acting through their representatives see reason to incur the inconveniences and mischiefs attendant on stopping the Supplies, as the means of obtaining some political object which is dear to them, the experience of mankind, impressed by the awful lessons of revolution and civil war, has determined that the evil of not conceding the popular demand is infinitely greater than the mass of evil arising in the shape of disagreeableness to all the officials in the world, and that the part of a sane government is to concede? In short, the willingness of a people to go through the process of stopping the Supplies, is assigned by the theory of free States, as the test that the people ought to have what they ask; and this test the British government has set at naught. Our hold upon them for not doing the same to ourselves when it will serve their turn, is nothing but the hold of fear; it depends simply on our "keeping our hounds in order." If we should ever be found in a state of weakness or division which might make non-resistance to be calculated on, the collar would be slipped on our necks the

moment it was convenient. The present is an experiment *in corpore vili;* and as it is evident there is to be no resistance here, the government will come forth like an eagle that has renewed its youth, to practice its no longer 'prentice claw upon ourselves.

But there is still an argument more. If a colony gets an elective council by demanding it, why may not it get an elective governor also? Well, why should it not? And what would be proved upon the whole, but that a non-elective governor is a great evil and ought to be abated? Look into yesterday's papers for New Brunswick, and what will you see but a non-elective governor for whose recall the Province has applied, telling the House of Assembly that "he has served "his Majesty for nearly half a century in every quarter of the "globe, and trusts those services will receive no diminution in "the estimation of his sovereign, by any representation that "may be made by the House of Assembly of New Brunswick." Now what is this but governing, as far as the effects can go, through a military offset of the despotic power the Crown is afraid to exercise at home? Will anybody submit to this longer than he can help it;—would *you?* You see the grievous impolicy of which all this is a part,—the impolicy of running monarchical against republican institutions, and rousing the latent and ill-concealed heat which in all not barbarous countries exists in favour of the most rational mode of government.

On Tuesday some extraordinary proceedings took place on the Carlow Election ballot. There is a section of an Act of Parliament which passes understanding, (9 Geo. IV. c. 36), directing that in certain cases where there are "two distinct petitions," the sheriff shall have the power of what is called *striking* the committee which is to try the case, (being a power very analogous to that of challenging a jury), in addition to the other parties concerned. Here was a case where there were two distinct petitions; but question arose whether the Act intended two petitions on opposite sides, or two petitions containing distinct complaints on the same side. Nobody attempted any explanation of what was the connexion between the existence of two petitions and the sheriff's right to challenge; which it will occur to you would in all probability have removed the difficulty at once. Serjeant Woulfe moved, that the sheriff had the right; and Mr. Hardy moved an amendment. It was carried by 128 against 118, that the original words should stand; and then came the question that the original motion should pass. This usually passes as a matter

of course. But Lord Stanley in this case began a debate, with the object of showing that though the law was the law, it ought not to be applied; and strange to say, thirteen members went over, (the doors all this time being locked, so that the total was necessarily the same), and it was determined by 131 against 115, that the sheriff should not have his right. Thus then the matter stands. Here is a piece of election law, good or bad in the main as may be; but when the application of this law happens to be in favour of the liberal side in an Irish election, liberal members walk across the House and determine that what they have just voted to be law, shall not be applied. Query, will thirteen Orangemen be found equally complaisant, the first time the law happens to be in favour of an Orange sheriff?

Proceedings on Mr. Whittle Harvey's "breach of privilege," are deferred on account of his absence from ill health.

London, 29 *April*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the Controverted Elections bill was read a second time, without a division. The Freemen's Admission bill was also read a second time, after a division of 75 to 21. Lord John Russell excited considerable attention by a declaration that he would *relax* the provisions of the Reform Bill which limit the exercise of the franchise by the payment of taxes. From this it seemed to be concluded, that there would be no chance hereafter of the noble lord's being found insisting on the Reform Bill as a *final measure*.

Lord John Russell put a block in the wheel of Mr. Hume's bill for regulating the expenses of elections; which it was anticipated would be read a second time without opposition, and probably would have been but for his. This does not come gracefully from an individual who has the power of bringing on and putting off his own bills as he pleases. Mr. Hume was in the house five minutes afterwards; but the more assiduous an unpaid servant of the people is in his attendance, the greater joke it is for a minister to find him away. Does Lord John Russell mean it to be inferred that he opposes the regulation of expenses at elections, or that there was anything in Mr. Hume's bill which was not matter for settling in Committee?

The House on rising adjourned till Friday.

On Friday Lord John Russell moved the second reading of the Poor-laws bill for Ireland. O'Connell made a long and powerful speech; with some parts of which I nevertheless should disagree. For instance, I have little faith in the sup-

posed evils of Absenteeism; and less still in the propriety or practicability of shutting men up in a country because you have made a plague there. The Emperor of Russia I believe attempts something of the kind, probably by the knout; but knout or tax, comes nearly to the same thing in the end. The fact is that the question of Absenteeism forms at this moment the opprobrium of the science of National-Economy; being the question of all others the farthest from having been driven to a satisfactory conclusion. A writer of note some years ago gave evidence before the House of Commons on this subject, which though perhaps on the whole not very far from being right, was far enough to enable the Tory Review to delve under it and blow it at the moon. He said no harm was done, because "the income of an absentee landlord was really as much expended in Ireland as if he were living in it;" and this the Quarterly Review entirely blew up. But it did not follow that because the reason given was insufficient, the general proposition was untrue; any more than it would follow if the demonstrations in the first book of Euclid were made into a hash by transpositions in the printing. What ought to have been said perhaps was, that if an Irish landlord should take into his head to trundle the beef and pork which forms his rent into the sea, this would only create an effectual demand for the production of so much more in Ireland; and that a result of the same kind is to a certain extent at least produced, if he trundles the meat and himself to France instead. In short there is probably a mistake abroad, like what some forty years ago made a mob on Dock-side stop a brig sailing with potatoes for Gibraltar. They said, "If we could only stop potatoes from going to absentees, how we should roll in potatoes here!"—not dreaming that perhaps the result in the long run might be, that just so much fewer potatoes would be grown. But there is no need for us on Dock-side to keep the blame to ourselves; Colbert the French minister had made very nearly the same mistake before, when he prohibited the exportation of corn, expecting to fill all France with bread, and lo the end was, that the corn was not grown.

It may be hoped then, that there is no practical danger of seeing violent measures taken against absentees at present, even on the authority of the Plantagenets. If the question is considered as unsettled in one direction, it may well be in the other. Would it not be good exercise for O'Connell's comprehensive mind to examine,—and he is well known to be far in advance of his countrymen on such points already,—whether the great chance of relief for the Irish nerve and sinew now

running over for want of occupation, would not be in the removal of the bars to English industry which are created by the prohibition of commerce through the Corn Laws? If the demand for muscle were decupled at every commercial and manufacturing station from Glasgow to London, where could it be found ready-made except in Ireland?

London, 3 May, 1837.

ON Monday the House went into Committee on Irish Tithes. The ministry have made an alteration in their plan, which the malevolent will perhaps compare to the difference between the executioner's striking high and low, and by which it is equally uncertain whether any expression of pleasure will be elicited from the patient. They profess to take advantage of an Act of Henry the Eighth (28 Hen. VIII. c. 15, Irish Parliament) by which every priest, deacon, or subdeacon in Ireland was obliged at his ordination to take "a corporal oath," to "keepe, or cause to be kept, a schole for to learne English;" and under the shelter of this they propose to advance upon their object, which is the taking a good round sum from the future holders of ecclesiastical incomes in Ireland, for the purposes of education. Now to this I see but one objection, which is that in the statute aforesaid (nobody but a lawyer, you know, should look at statutes) there follow the awkward words, "taking for the keeping of the same schole, such convenient stipend or salarie, as in the said land is accustomably used to be taken." So that it really does not come upon me with the force of a mathematical demonstration, where and how the authority to take from the Irish church for the purposes of education, is bettered by the said statute. The Irish clergy were manifestly to do something, but they were as manifestly to be paid for it; so that unless the Tories would not have found this out (and it is an awful token, that their great authority for precedents and law has just been inquiring for the very volume of statutes out of which I was copying, and I have put it into his hands), I fear the Whigs had never the chance of taking much by their alteration.

The Irish Poor-laws bill was read a second time without a division. A Dutch alchemist we found living with Signor Caviglia in the side of the Great Pyramid, summed up his success in the words "I spent much money, and broke many *bottles*." Something like this will probably be the end of the plan of Irish Poor-laws.

Mr. Whittle Harvey stated to the House, that the Poor-law

Committee had agreed to the evidence before them being printed from day to day. This is equivalent to permission to publish; and the concession may be considered as going a good way towards practically settling the general question. Every time the obstinacy of prerogative is obliged to bow before the dictates of common sense, a fearful gap is made in the defences of what is left. It will not be long before Mr. Whittle Harvey, or some other member, tries the strength of the remainder. In the mean time it is clear that Mr. Whittle Harvey "has deserved well of his country."

On Wednesday there was a kind of accidental outbreak against the attempt now making to put down the right of speaking on petitions. The Speaker avowed his intention of bringing the House back to the good old practice, by which no person on presenting a petition, was allowed to do more than name the place whence it came, and state its prayer; forgetting, I apprehend, that there was a good older, which would have brought the Commons at large, about the ears of any House calling itself of the Commons, which had set up such a principle. A Frenchman under the ancient Bourbons, described the government as "a despotism modified by song-singing." So we live under a system of declared irrationality, modified by these occasional recalcitrations.

An amusing scene took place, on occasion of a motion by a High Tory member for an Address to the King, praying him to recall to life the ancient Convocation of the Clergy. The Tories deserted their orator, within one or two, and went to dinner; on which the Ultra-Liberals, seeing themselves masters of the House, determined that the best thing they could do, would be to let the Tories have their way, and carry the motion. And they would have done it, if three men in whom they trusted, had not "up helm and borne away" in the very act of going out to divide. The dismay of the ministers was very ludicrous, at seeing the probability of an Address for a Convocation being carried up by "such Members as are also Members of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council." And truly their escape was a narrow one; for the division was 19 to 24.

London, 6 *May*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the House, on the motion of Mr. Robinson, went into Committee on the question of allowing foreign grain to be ground in this country for exportation. The agricultural interest, as they denominate themselves, opposed the permis-

sion as being a step towards the removal of the Corn Laws. Hoping as I do to see the day, when a tax for twenty years shall be laid on home-grown corn unless the land-owners chuse to redeem it by an equivalent tax on rent, I have a curiosity to know what particular form of visage the landlords will assume, when they come to the House of Commons to ask for leave to grind some petty quantity of corn, on the assurance that it shall not interfere with the manufacturers' vested right in supplying the home market with foreign corn, and are refused on the ground that perhaps they will not export quite as good flour as the corn would make. I wonder, I say, with what particular form of visage the landlords will be adorned; for upon this point the country is marching, or will march, and I much doubt whether the landlords will possess the happy obtuseness of feeling which now distinguishes the manufacturers. But at this moment we are peculiarly weak. The Tories, who are wise in their generation, have come down among the working classes, to revive the prejudices which were so old that they are almost as good as new, and to persuade the operatives that it is for their interest to work with the blunt axe instead of the sharp, in order to have the advantage among other things of paying double for their bread. It is the old hostility to machines and threshing-mills, as a sign-board in High-Street used to bear, "new revived." But this is a phænomenon, a phasis, to be gone through like the hooping-cough; we are so much nearer to healthy manhood for having it over. A year or two hence the operatives will have found out, that the "rights of labour" mean something else than the right of keeping the landlords; which in my small judgment is very nearly what they mean at present.

The London shipping interest however, who in the instance before the House appear as the petitioners, have nobody but themselves to thank. They are of all men the steadiest supporters of the maxim, that two losses make one gain. They have ever on their tongues' end the avowal, that having one monopoly themselves, they are ready to support another for their neighbour on terms of reciprocity. In spite of all, their Resolution was rejected by 108 against 43.

O'Connell moved the second reading of his Bill for amending the Law of Libel; which notwithstanding his able argument, was lost by 55 to 47.

On Thursday Sir Samuel Whalley moved for the repeal of the Window Tax, and as is the use and wont in such cases was put down by an immense majority; amounting in the present instance to 206 against 48.

Our townsman the member for Cambridge brought on his motion on the state of the Universities. Nobody knows more about the subject; and after a man has so long made a minority with his solitary "*Non placet*" in evil times, he has a claim to be heard with reverence as a reformer. On an understanding that the government would take the matter into consideration, his motion was finally withdrawn.

On the introduction of Sir Andrew Agnew's Sunday Bill, I did what I could to put life into my promise to my friends at Hull*. I understand I succeeded so far, as to make some members talk of accepting the Chiltern Hundreds. The most extraordinary set of persecuted people ever seen, are these Sunday bill-men. They come with their mouths full of the peril and danger of the part they are going to perform; and then they hoot like all the mobs that ever pelted my father with a sweet egg by mistake †. It is positively only through "bitter mockings," that they allow themselves to be spoken to at all. I suspect their practice is about as near to the Apostles', as their doctrine.

On Friday the question of allowing the marking of paragraphs in newspapers sent by post, was again brought before the House on occasion of the Post-office Bill. The object de-

* "Colonel *Thompson* said, he tried to put down nobody by clamour, and he treated nobody with contempt. But he was in the other situation alluded to by the hon. Member for Tynemouth; he had been urged by constituents, with some of whom he had a long, and he might call it, an hereditary connexion, to take the side of the hon. Baronet the mover of the Bill. But he had been constrained to reply to them, that he had been born among the supporters of religious liberty, and among them he meant to die; and that by the same right by which our fathers protested against the doctrines and practice of an ancient Church, so he would protest, (and if he stood alone in the House he did not stand alone out of doors), that the Judaical observance of the Sabbath was not only not directed in the Scripture to which all parties professed to look for authority, but was absolutely prohibited. Why did not hon. members trouble us about meats and drinks, and keeping the new moons, and holydays; for all these were prohibited in precisely the same passage with sabbath-days? Why did they allow the open sale of such food as pork and sausages? Why did they not propose, that on the assembling of a new parliament, the Sergeant-Surgeon should attend upon the Speaker, and every honourable gentleman be circumcised as he came to the table to be sworn? Why did hon. gentlemen impose one burthen on their neighbours, and evade the other in their proper persons? And why could they not content themselves with the full enjoyment of their own religious opinions, (in which nobody would be more ready to protect than himself), without loading their neighbours with burthens too heavy to be borne? He was the more earnest to make this declaration, because there were many hon. members of great weight in the House, who had displayed a disposition to protect the just rights of the people on this subject from political motives, and who possibly might not have given attention to the fact, that the question of authority was really as he had stated."—*Hansard's Debates*, 4 March, 1837.

† The writer's father used to relate, how he was preaching in the open air in Holderness, and was struck with an egg between the eyes. He always added, that it was as sweet a one as he ever tasted.

manded was for the first time defined with precision (as you will see by reference to the Division List), viz. that after the words "There shall be no words or communication printed on the paper after its publication, or upon the cover thereof, nor any writing or marks upon it, or upon the cover of it, except the name and address of the person to whom sent," the following words be added, "and any line down the margin, made solely and *bonâ fide* for the purpose of directing attention to any particular paragraph." Though every effort was made to impress the uselessness and impolicy of the prohibition, so inveterate is the habit of believing that government is the natural enemy of the people, and all which is to the advantage of the last is to the injury of the other, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused to concede, and the amendment was rejected by 28 to 12. They manage these things better under a republic. Nobody there can be found to maintain that the great organ of national communication and wealth should be made subservient to revenue, or be maimed in its operation lest a few hundred pounds a-year should cease to dribble into the pockets of an aristocracy. Another attempt to get rid of the evil will probably be made on bringing up the Report; and in the mean time it might be useful if the press would pay some attention to the subject.

London, 10 May, 1837,

ON Monday Mr. D'Eyncourt brought on his motion for the Repeal of the Septennial Act. It is clear from Lord John Russell's answer, that the Whigs will never do anything in that way till they are forced. Mr. Roebuck announced his plan for not only shortening the duration of parliaments, but confining the dissolution to periods determined by law, without alteration either at the pleasure of the Crown or on its demise; the only objection to which appears to be, that it is making a greater alteration where a less would do. Mr. D'Eyncourt's motion was finally lost only by 87 against 96; and it has been asserted that if the Liberals could have agreed to go to a division at an earlier period of the night, the motion might have been carried. Speculations of this kind, however, are generally delusive; for if the Liberals are for a division, their opponents for the same reason are not; and if one side can postpone the division by talking, the other can.

Renewed efforts were made to procure some concession from the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the subject of marking newspapers; but in vain. The fact was brought to light in

the course of the debate, that there is no prohibition of anything but "words written," in any Act of Parliament previous to the accession of the present ministry to office; and that consequently with them is the guilt of the restrictions complained of.

London, 13 *May*, 1837.

ON Tuesday Mr. Wallace brought forward his motion on the subject of the Post Office, and was met by an assurance from ministers, that they acknowledged the importance of his plan, and hoped before the end of the Session to submit a measure to the House. There is hope therefore of seeing an end of the barbarism of making the communication by post a source of revenue, instead of expending the public money, if need were, to bring down the rate of postage to the smallest that would confine the matters of transport within reasonable bounds. The lesson read to us by republican governments on this point, is too glaring to be longer overlooked.

Mr. T. S. Duncombe brought forward his motion, on the custom of voting by proxy adopted by the peers. It was opposed by a singular argument on the part of Lord Stanley. He said that no man could seek to abolish voting by proxy in the House of Lords, and refuse to bring in a resolution against *pairing* in the House of Commons. Pairing, it may not be known to all our friends, means two members of opposite political principles, agreeing, for mutual convenience, to be both absent together for a given period. *You*, for instance, say, "I want to go for so many days into the country, but I will not go unless I can find some Tory member who will engage to be absent too;" and *vice versâ*. Now mark the power of analogy, the acumen of comparison, contained in the proposition hazarded. The House of Commons pair, and so may the Lords if they like; *therefore* the Lords ought to have the additional privilege of sending their votes from Baden or from Florence. This is the proposition advanced before the public. Surely if the noble Lord had given no evidence to the contrary on other occasions, this would be a fair argument for disabling the lordly judgment altogether.

On Wednesday the subject of Buenos Ayres was brought up again *. Mr. T. S. Duncombe's motion for the second read-

* "BUENOS AYRES.]—Sir *C. Broke Vere* said that, seeing the honourable and gallant member for Hull in his place, he would take that opportunity of referring to a statement made by the hon. gentlemen on a former night, relative to certain proceedings which that hon. member alleged took place at the attack on

ing of the Reform Acts Amendment bill, after being opposed by Lord John Russell, was negatived by 166 to 73.

Buenos Ayres in 1807, and which he (Sir C. B. Vere) took the liberty of contradicting the accuracy of at the time. Since that time he had written to several officers who were present at the attack on that place, who confirmed the view he had taken of the subject. The first was from a general officer, who said that no such order had been issued as was described by the gallant officer; the next was from an officer who was an aide-de-camp of the commander, and he stated he did not know of any such order being issued. The next was from an officer commanding one of the columns of attack, who stated that no such order had been issued. He had also similar letters from several other officers who were present, who stated that no such orders had been issued; he, therefore, was justified in asserting, that no general order, no brigade order, no regimental order, and indeed no order of any authority, had been issued similar to that described by the honourable and gallant member, namely, that the soldiers should spare the old men and the women and bayonet all others. He had felt it to be particularly his duty to apply to officers belonging to the same regiment that the gallant member belonged to, and all the officers, except one, said that they did not know of any such order; and that one officer to whom he alluded was of the same rank as the honourable member opposite; and that gentleman said that he recollected an officer passing along the column to which he was attached, urging the men to the free use of the bayonet, but he did not recollect whether the particular expression stated by the honourable and gallant member was used or not.

Colonel *Thompson* said, there was a proverbial difficulty in combating the evidence of one man who did see, with the evidence of any number of men who did not. The question brought forward was, whether he had wrongly stated that he heard an order for giving no quarter, carried by a field-officer down the column in which he was, at the attack of Buenos Ayres. He was no party to the policy of bringing this subject a second time before the house and the public. He had introduced it once, as matter of just and perhaps inevitable recrimination. But as a man put now on his defence, he felt assured he should be heard with patience. The first fact with which he was furnished by the honourable baronet opposite was, that an order to the effect described was in the general-in-chief's plan of attack two days before. The honourable baronet would think it no discourtesy if he read again the extract from the evidence on the trial of General Whitelocke. Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke, quartermaster-general, says, on the 3rd of July, two days before the attack actually took place, "I called at General Gower's quarters (the second in command), and he showed me a plan of an attack on the town which he appeared to have just finished, and which was completely detailed in all its parts; it was the same which was given out the next day in orders, with some very trifling alterations." Whether the order to give no quarter was among these trifling alterations, he had not the means to ascertain. "I proceeded to inspect the advance posts at the centre, and left General Gower going, as I understood, to head-quarters with the plan. I reached head-quarters after dusk, and in the course of the evening General Whitelocke asked my opinion of the plan of attack, which was to take place the next day at twelve o'clock. I stated my objection to one clause, which directed that no prisoners should be made, as I conceived in an action of that sort, in an open town, it would be impossible to prevent a great deal of *butchery*." An ugly word in an official proceeding. "I said I thought the plan would succeed, but it appeared to me to be completely a new case, as I did not remember to have heard before of a similar order of attack. The general said he would leave out the order for making no prisoners, and would summon the town the next morning before he attacked it." Whether he did either, must be doubtful. Was it what mankind at large would vote unreasonable, monstrous, or incredible, that what was in the general-in-chief's plan two days before, should be heard by an individual officer on the attack? The honourable baronet had further stated that an

On Thursday the House was engaged in committee on the Irish Poor Laws. Lord John Russell afterwards obtained leave

---

officer in the same regiment with Colonel Thompson, said he thought he remembered an order being passed along by a field-officer to "use the bayonet freely." Now this officer, who happened to be one of the most valued comrades he ever had, he had always understood was in a different column from himself at the time he heard that order given. There were either eleven or thirteen columns; and the time when he heard the order was not when the troops were collected previously to entering the town, but after they were broken up. But he had further evidence, from an accidental and perhaps a hostile source; he would read a description of what took place on the same day, at the same hour, in a different column still. It was from a work which was put upon all mess-tables, and into the hands of the babes and sucklings of the army, in all places where the young idea was taught to "shoot." It was the description, by an eye-witness, of what took place at the attack of another part of Buenos Ayres, the Retiro. After describing a good deal of bayoneting, which might be all fair enough, for when men were sent to fight with bayonets they were not to be expected to use them like a turkey's feather (hear);—but why was not the same said for the British Legion, in whom it had been brought forward as a crime?—the narrator went on to say, that some of the enemy feigned dead; on the arrival of reinforcements "the pretenders to death now tasted it in reality;" a battery was attacked, and "the party there, consisting of about sixty men, made a precipitate retreat; but in place of being able to reach the theatre, they took temporary refuge in a barrack, and were so closely followed up as not to give time to shut the gates. Here there was a regular row in a barrack-room, and not one of the sixty was spared. The only fellows that escaped were five prisoners in the black-hole." But this was not all—there was a *bonne bouche* to come. "When this bustle was over I returned to the barrack, and met coming out, Corporal Mackay, a regular-built Highlander, of my own company (sorry he was to read anything discreditable to a Scottish soldier, but the fault was not his), with a sword well stained in one hand (perhaps some honourable gentlemen might have sons in the army, and wish to know what a well-stained sword was)—with a well-stained sword in one hand, and a pair of boots in the other. I asked him what he had been about? He said the Spaniards were some of them uneasy, and he was quieting them—in fact, he had been putting all the wounded out of pain." Nay, here it was (holding up the book, and turning it on the two sides), in page 504 of *The United Service Journal* for December last;—"and having seen that I had lost my boots in a muddy lane, he had unbooted a dead Spanish officer for the sake of his captain." This was the way the Spaniards were treated. Within four hours afterwards he (Colonel Thompson) was a prisoner in the hands of the Spaniards, and was asked whether the orders he had described were what they had entered the town with, and of course he told the truth. A Spanish officer pulled out his purse, and asked if he wanted money, offering to supply him. If anything could add to the misery of entering a town with such orders, it was the pain of being so treated afterwards (hear!). But he had not done yet. The honourable baronet had not found any person who heard the exact order;—but *he had*. He had a letter from an individual whom he would not name till he had ascertained from him that he was under no fear of suffering from the disclosure, which ran as follows:—"Sir—having read in a newspaper a communication from you to your constituents, wishing to know if there was any old soldier in their neighbourhood who was at Buenos Ayres, although not being in the neighbourhood you write to, I beg to acquaint you that the regiment I served in (regiment's name given, and in a different part of the army from any mentioned before), got orders not to spare any persons except old men, women, and children, and were forced to act accordingly. One or two revolting cases I beg to mention. As the company I belonged to advanced up the street, there appeared at the door of a house, as we passed, a clergyman: he wore white robes. He was killed where he stood, and fell out on his face in the street. The

to bring in a bill, among other things to abolish the stamp duty on the admission of freemen.

On Friday some extraordinary scenes were presented in the House of Commons, in consequence of Sir Francis Burdett's re-election for Westminster. The district committees, and gentlemen volunteers, were invited by advertisement in the newspapers to assemble at Charing Cross, to be ready to receive the successful candidate at the hustings, and afterwards to accompany him to his residence. It would appear that "his residence," included the House of Commons; for the procession took him, with foot-men and chariots and banners, to the door of the House, and I found the lobbies occupied by his infantry bearing his colours, to such an extent that I had difficulty in making my way into the House. If this had been done by the Radicals some years ago, it would have been construed into treason, and we should have had a green bag and a suspension of the Habeas Corpus. And all I want now, is to authenticate the precedent, in hopes it will not be long before the Radicals appeal to it. I wanted to get somebody of older standing than myself, to say as much between joke and earnest in the House; but they were all skimmed milk.

When the new member advanced to the table, the Tories cheered to bring heaven and earth together. The Liberals reserved their fire for the moment when their quondam ally seated himself upon the Tory benches, and then the explosion was more tremendous still.

There is no use in denying the consequences which may result from this tergiversation of one of the most trusted consti-

---

next was a man who thought to secure himself under a woman's petticoats" (loud laughter from the Tory side). Colonel Thompson said he had waited for that laugh. Perhaps when honourable gentlemen opposite had known him longer, they would be less incautious. "The man had two bayonets put through his body in that situation. To describe the agony of the distracted mother, which I believe she was, would take an abler hand than the humble individual's who addresses you (hear!). But the order of the day was, 'You know your orders; do your duty, or——.'" And so, said the gallant member, ends my military report. He would leave the facts before the House, and he submitted that he had shown reason to believe that in four several parts of the army orders tantamount to what he had reported had been given (loud cheers).

Sir *Charles Brooke Vere* did not doubt but that the hon. member saw an officer riding* along the line making the remark that he had stated, but he was satisfied that it was not a general order. He was anxious that the character of the army should be free from any thing approaching to a shadow of a stain, and therefore he had made the observations which he did."—*Hansard's Debates.* 10 May, 1837.

* *Note by the Author.*—It was not stated, that the field-officer who passed the order, was on horseback. It would have been difficult to find a field-officer on horseback under the actual circumstances of the troops.

tuencies in the empire;—saving always the credit of the minority who stoutly resisted. The defection of the Saxons at Leipsic was nothing to it. Instead of "For this we may thank *Adam*," read "*Westminster*." It was the struggle of the upper against the middle classes; and the middle classes, or a too decisive portion of them, have utterly blenched and given way, before the united powers of interest and fudge. Every aristocratically dressed man you meet, has a broad grin upon his countenance; it is as if the captain of the French Guards who volunteered to go out with his company and put down the Revolution, had returned triumphant from his enterprise.

In cases of this kind, the hope is from reaction. Conceal nothing, soften nothing. Tell the people everywhere, that the dogged pertinacious refusal of the Whig ministers to allow the vessel to advance an inch with the flood, has ended in her being carried out to sea with the ebb, and that if the people are to recover their own, all is to do over again. It was plain it would come to this; and if it was escaped now, it would be to come some other time. The Whigs are bent upon seeing that "new heaven and new earth," in which their lot and portion will neither be happy nor definable.

The House at rising adjourned to the 17th, being Whitsuntide.

London, 20 *May*, 1837.

THE House met on Wednesday according to adjournment. On the motion for further consideration of the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr Railway bill, Dr. Bowring the member for Kilmarnock moved the omission of a clause inserted in committee, for preventing the use of the railway on Sundays. The debate evinced considerable advance in knowledge of the subject. It was formally laid down to the House, and not attempted to be opposed by anything but the dictum of "divines," that the Judaical observance of a seventh day is not only no part of Christianity, but is in the teeth of Christianity; from which it follows, that like other burthens which our fathers threw off, it is the imposition of interested men, who see in it the opportunity of increasing their own influence, by setting up an artificial and in fact a false standard of morality, weighing more heavily on their neighbours than on themselves. It is a step gained for religious liberty and sound morals, to see these points stated roundly and fearlessly in the House, as was

done by more than one member on the present occasion; and the effect is not done away, by the adversary having carried his clause for the night, by 51 against 47. The member for Kilmarnock gave notice of his intention to move again on the Third Reading.

On Thursday Mr. Sergeant Talfourd made an eloquent speech on obtaining leave to bring in a bill to amend the law of copyright. After some further business, the House was counted out at half past seven.

On Friday the Clause for closing the Greenock and Ayr Railway on Sundays was thrown out by 115 against 83, after a long debate in which nothing that could be called defence was produced by the supporters of the clause. It is a year, to a day, since I first attempted to set this question on the basis which will finally turn out to be the true one, namely, the total absence of authority in the book to which the bigots profess to appeal; and was cried down by my own side for my pains. I persevered in spite of contumely, and now there is no want of volunteers to take the vessel into port. As intimated before, the nullity of authority for imposing any of the restrictions of the Jewish Sabbath, was laid down in the broadest way, and no denial or counter-statement attempted; though this will not hinder the parties from making the same attempt in the Glasgow and Greenock bill on Tuesday. The member for Bath (Roebuck), in answer to a charge of irreligion, pulled out a pocket bible, and read the House of Commons such a lecture out of it, as has probably not been heard there since the Civil War. Once more I say, the thing has got on the right basis, and we shall beat, as surely as our fathers ever beat out one religious domination to plant another.

On the same night an Instruction to the Committee on the Punishment of Death bill, that they have power to abolish capital punishment in all cases except cases of murder, was within one of being carried; the division on it being 72 to 73. The Division List will show some names, which it is to be regretted should each and severally have incurred the responsibility of preventing the Instruction from being carried. The Mosaic law was again appealed to, in support of hanging by the neck; and one Right Hon. member said, that the variety of crimes for which death was ordered by that law, was proof of the propriety of the punishment of death. The member who followed, quoted the eating of fat, from the book of Leviticus *;

* Lev. vii. 23, 25.

and on the whole, I suspect the bigots received another blow, on this point also. A proposal to except from alleviation the punishment for setting fire to dock-yards, was rejected by 102 to 40*.

London, 23 May, 1837.

On Monday the Report was brought up of the Church Rates bill. The member for St. Andrew's (A. Johnstone) moved an

---

* House of Commons.
Friday, May 19.

The clause in the Glasgow and Ayr Railway bill, prohibiting travelling on it on the Sunday, was again debated.

Mr. *Roebuck* declared that the observance of the Sabbath was no part of the Christian obligation.

Sir R. *Inglis* said the arguments of the honourable member for Bath ought to lead him to move for the repeal of all the enactments respecting sabbath observance, rather than to oppose the present clause.

Colonel *Thompson* would recant everything he had ever said upon the question, if honourable gentlemen opposite would produce a shadow of authority or precedent from the book to which they professed to refer as a rule. He happened to be able to enumerate all the instances in which the subject was at all mentioned; or if he was wrong, he was open to correction. It was commemorated that Paul preached on the first day of the week, and the disciples broke bread. Was there the slightest evidence of a wish to hinder any man from doing the like? It was stated that on the first day of the week the early Christians made a collection for charitable purposes. Was there anything in the omission of the clause, to interfere with the power of doing this? And it was further stated, in an abstruse and mystical book, that an apostle was "in the Spirit on the Lord's day." Was there the slightest tendency to interfere with the right of private judgment on this point either? These were positively the only ways in which the subject was ever mentioned; and upon such grounds did hon. gentlemen opposite claim to shut our railroads (hear). There was no use in saying the clause was only to extend to Ayrshire; if there was any doubt of what was intended yesterday, there was none to-day. Among the papers of the House was the bill which it was proposed to extend to England. The preamble ran, Forasmuch as nothing is more acceptable to God than the true and sincere worship and service of Him according to His holy will, and "that the holy keeping of the Lord's day is a principal part of the true service of God." Suppose a Catholic member had brought in a bill stating "that the practice of auricular confession is a principal part of the true service of God" (cheers)— would not hon. gentlemen have seen that this was a begging of the question? Members on his side of the House, by the same right by which their fathers resisted the one proposition, resisted the other. They stood here to maintain that it was a mere wilful imposition of man's invention, without a shadow of authority from the book professed to be appealed to; which was a great deal more than could be said of auricular confession. There was another reason against the course adopted by the other side. It was setting up a false and fictitious standard of morality (hear)—and entailing on the country all those evils which were the consequences. We were continually told, that all men who came to be hanged, confessed to having begun with sabbath-breaking. He had no doubt that in Mohammedan countries, all men who by their crimes were brought to the punishment of impalement, confessed to having begun with breaking the fast of Ramazán (hear, hear). Burdens were laid on men too heavy to be borne, and thus an artificial crime was

amendment, of a nature to impede, if there was anything to be impeded. But the affair throughout has been conducted in a way from which it is difficult to believe that any thinking man expected or intended success. If the object of the government and the Dissenters (or so many of them as, according to Sir Francis Burdett's figure last night, are contained in the "bellies" of their spokesmen in the House of Commons,) can be defined at all, it was to get some little morsel of relief for the Dissenters, if it could be done by legerdemain, and without

---

created in men's minds (hear, hear)—and their consciences, accustomed once to break through the artificial bound, proceeded rapidly to break through others. Was this the way to legislate for public morality? (cheers). He hoped the House would show its sense of such proceedings, by resisting the attempt to establish an arbitrary and fictitious imposition.

The clause was eventually negatived by 115 against the clause, and 83 for it. The bill was then read a third time, and passed.

The House then proceeded to the consideration of the several bills introduced by the government to diminish capital punishments in cases of forgery, &c., the series of bills heretofore introduced on the motion of Lord John Russell. The Forgery bill went through committee. On the question that the House resolve itself into a committee on the Punishment of Death bill,

Colonel *Thompson* said, that while the hon. member for Waterford city was speaking, he had gone aside to consult a pocket bible, which like the hon. member for Bath, he had brought in his pocket in consideration of the turn to biblical criticism the debates of the evening were likely to take, and moved moreover by the circumstance that the book did not make part of the works for reference contained in the library of the House ("oh, oh," from the opposition) —with a view, if he could have caught the Speaker's eye, to have corroborated that hon. member's opinion of the extreme danger of taking the Mosaic law as the measure of what was necessarily to be punished with death in civilized nations. While looking for certain passages which he had in his recollection, his eye had glanced over other enactments of that code, which would answer his purpose as well. He found it written, that whoever ate "all manner of fat," of ox, or of sheep, or of goat, that soul should be cut off from his people. And whoever ate "all manner of blood," that soul should be cut off from his people. Under these circumstances he would leave it to the House, how far the assignment of capital punishment by the Mosaic code was authority which modern legislators must necessarily follow. There was a question on another subject quite distinct, which he would ask in hope that it would be taken up by others, either now or at some other time. Was there an intention in any quarter, to do away with the punishment of death for political offences? (hear, hear). Many in that House were old enough to have seen God's image sorely mangled, by decapitation and all kinds of barbarous processes, for what were termed political offences. The current of opinion was strongly running against such practices throughout Europe (hear, hear)—and there was a natural anxiety to know whether this country was to be behind the rest† (cheers).

The House divided on the proposed instruction. The numbers—for it, 72; against it, 73; so that it was lost by a majority of one only.—*See Hansard's Debates*, 19 *May* 1837.

---

† This has an interest now, inasmuch as at the time it was uttered, the ministers were meditating the cold-blooded murders in Canada, for which the *lex talionis* is suspended over their individual heads.—*Added in* 1840.

shaking the rottenness of the State by firing any such great guns as appeals to the intrinsic justice of their case. To this not very creditable compact, both parties, as far as I have been able to observe, have adhered with the greatest pertinacity. Both parties will get what they deserve. The Dissenters will get, nothing; for I suppose none of them (as was thrown in their teeth by the Member for Westminster last night) is so weak as to expect, that out of the ministerial majority of 23, which may be a majority of 13 or perhaps of 3 to-night, is to come the extinction of Church Rates. And the government will get the conviction of being one step further on that downward road, which from the day that Lord Grey talked about "his order," they have taken with their eyes open, and from which there is no chance now, of their eyes being taken off, till like Dives they lift them up from a place whence there is no return.

The humbling spectacle was given us last night, of the uncertainty of all human successes, possessions, and attainments, even in those tracks which are considered as affording to man the greatest probability of his latter end being peace. True is it that man walketh in a vain shadow, and disquieteth himself in vain, when the best of us has no certainty, that whatever of claim to the gratitude of his fellows he may have accumulated during the longest life, he may not at the end of it, barter for that cheapest of all returns, the applause of enemies. With Hamlet to Ophelia, "trust none of us." Use us while we serve you, as not abusing us; and when we fail, receive us into mansions where your compassion shall draw a veil over the relics of human weakness, and fulfil the wise injunction of the Persian king, who begged his friends to look at him no more after he had ceased to be what had obtained their veneration and their love.

On Tuesday Dr. Bowring moved the omission from the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway bill, of the clause prohibiting the use of the railway on Sundays. After a long and desultory discussion, in which Sir Robert Peel and other members of the opposition declared their objections to retaining the prohibitory clause, Sir Andrew Agnew consented to withdraw his resistance, and promised to bring in a general bill on the subject of Scotch railways. There was the usual irritability on the subject of "derision," and other improprieties laid to the charge of our side of the House; and I suppose I should not have been wrong if I had assumed that part of it was intended for myself. O it is a hard thing to please either

political or spiritual tyranny, in the manner of resisting them! God grant we never have a nearer acquaintance; the present is enough.

The House subsequently proceeded with the adjourned debate on Church Rates.

London, 27 May, 1837.

'I LEFT the House of Commons about seven on Tuesday night, by the deliberate direction of my very worthy "and approv'd good masters," and with nothing most assuredly like non-concurrence in the soundness of their decision; to assist, as they were pleased to think I might, in showing front for the popular cause in Hull after late reverses elsewhere, though at the expense of losing the chance of delivering Israel, which might have been found, as it turned out, in making the ministerial majority on the Church Rates question 6 instead of 5*. On Wednesday there was no House; on Thursday the House was counted out at an early hour; and on Friday I was back again.

I see the Whig organ† has been merry upon my absence. He is wrong about "the Mayor's right hand;" for if I had been there, I should have been at the Old Hummums. But what would there have been in sitting "on the Mayor's right hand—on the Mayor of Hull's right hand!" that should put the Whig organ to such expense in notes of admiration, to express the turning-up of his exalted nose? The Mayor of Hull happens to be a very good Whig, and to have been in London with an Address. Do the Whigs call this backing their friends?

And now according to the suggestion of the same organ, ask the Dissenters in Hull, or any other place where you have opportunities for the inquiry, what portion of the very low sum at which a knife is wont to be rated in an indictment, they would give for the chance of what they are to get by the present proceedings of the ministry, whether the majority were 5 or 23. They know as well as we do, that the Whig ministers as far as they were able, have let us all down together; and that if the Dissenters are ever to get justice, it must be from other men, or at all events from other handling. But let them go

---

* The Meeting at Hull was in celebration of the majority of the Princess Victoria; and their committee had determined in cold blood, that it was more useful their Member should attend, than stay to increase the hopeless majority of ministers by one. For some of the proceedings of this Meeting, see the pages following the present "Letters."

† Morning Chronicle of 24 May, 1837.

on. As 23 *minus* 5, is to 5, so probably is the time elapsed since the majority of 23. to the time when it will be nothing; and then perhaps the Dissenters will admit, that we at Hull knew our own business and theirs, as well as anybody else could tell us.

On Friday I was in five divisions in Committee on the Irish Poor Law bill; the last of which was in huggermugger. The principal object in debate, was as far as possible to get rid of *ex officio* guardians; in which the Liberals, being opposed by the ministers, were unsuccessful throughout.

London, 31 *May*, 1837.

ON Monday there was no House; pursuant to Friday's adjournment.

On Tuesday the Tories brought forward their discovery, of a plot to send the writ for a new election to Glasgow by express. It turned out, that the writ had arrived at the General Post Office half an hour after the departure of the mails, and had been sent as letter-bags left behind by the mail would be sent, by express; the express, after all, only going seven miles an hour to the mail's ten. Under these circumstances, the further examination at the bar was put an end to, and the ministry goes unconvicted of a conspiracy in the sending of the said writ.

The House then entered on a long debate, in which the object of the Tories was to quash the practice of circulating at a low price the proceedings of the House; on the ground that they had contained an assertion that an indecent book by a certain publisher had been found in Newgate by the examining officers, and the printer of the House of Commons had been prosecuted by the said publisher for a libel. Much did the Tories fret and fume *more suo*, on the necessity of defending private character against the inroads of the House of Commons. And time was, when they would have carried their cause. I always expected to see the day when a convicted thief would bring an action for libel against the printer of the verdict of the jury; and if the Tories had continued in power, the expectation would have been likely enough to be fulfilled. As it is, the House of Commons stood up stoutly for its privilege of publishing; and Resolutions declaratory of the same, (in which it is but fair to say that Sir Robert Peel, and Mr. Wynn the "wiser than the children of men" in what relates to the

rules and privileges of the House, very handsomely joined), were passed by a majority of 126 to 36.

London, 3 June, 1837.

ON Thursday the member for Finsbury (T. S. Duncombe) moved for a select committee to inquire into the allegations of a petition from Colonel Bradley presented on the 17th of February. The circumstances that led to the petition were these. Mr. Duncombe in a debate on military flogging, said he knew a case where punishment had been inflicted by tap of drum, as the means of making it more protracted and excruciating. The Tory side, according to their usual tactic when they see a chance of a man being taken by surprise or led into a scrape, made an immense outcry for names. Mr. Duncombe satisfied their appetite for names; he told them the name of the officer alluded to, and that his authority was Colonel Bradley. The militarists on the Tory side rushed forward *têtes baissées*, to declare the absolute necessity there was that the charge should be proved true or false, without allowing any formal difficulties to interfere with an inquiry. Colonel Bradley hereupon petitions for inquiry before a select committee, and puts into Mr. Duncombe's hands an official letter from a Commanding Officer to him Colonel (then Major) Bradley, from which I have copied the following words:—"in carrying the punishment awarded against the prisoner Reeves into execution, *which I desire may not be hurried, but most impressively inflicted,* I have to beg you will fully explain the subject to the soldiers under your command, assuring them that it is my fixed determination to assemble a General Court Martial upon the next offender of such a nature in the Garrison." Now if any officer or soldier in the army can be found to say this is not good *primâ facie* evidence under the officer's own hand, for the propriety of granting the inquiry which all the parties concerned are understood to join in asking,—(mind, I do not say it is evidence for deciding the main question without further examination, for nobody can say till he tries, what ways there may be of explaining it away),—but if any officer or soldier can be found to say that it is not good evidence why the inquiry which everybody is understood to be asking for should be gone into, that it does not up to the present stage of the matter justify to the extremest stretch of reasonable expectation all that has been advanced by Mr. Duncombe and by Colonel Bradley till finally proved or disproved by examination,—all I can say is, I should be glad to know what he is like,—whether he belongs to the

heavies or to the light,—what corps or department of the army had bred such an anomaly and contradiction to the ordinary rules of human judgment. Five hundred such cases might have occurred, without the petitioner being able in the first stage of the proceedings to put into court the letter of the Commanding Officer directing that the punishment should " not be hurried." Yet you will be wrong if you suppose that for all this the Tories persevered in their urgency for an inquiry. No, they pulled up like a dragoon at a dry well; and their friends the Whig ministers trotted into line with them. These last, I remember, were particularly strong upon the way in which the military question in Colonel Bradley's original case, had been settled against him by a civil jury giving him a hundred pounds damages. With all these points against us, we were in a minority of 34 to 81.

At the same time, in one sense, there is little lost. All that historians have written of or poets feigned,—including Jefferies, John Bunyan, and the State Trials,—after making a certain necessary deduction in point of positive violence for change of times and circumstances, is but a feeble expression of the reality of the imperfections which attend a Select Committee of the House of Commons, as the tribunal for determining a question of this nature. It would be a mere cross-and-jostle match, in which after shutting out the public, every conceivable artifice would be put in action to intimidate, discredit, or keep out witnesses, and perhaps the decision of the Committee garbled after its proceedings were closed, and a false account inserted on the Journals of the House.

On Friday the House proceeded in committee with the Irish Poor Law bill; and afterwards with what is called the Registration and Marriages Act Amendment bill. The effect of this last appears to be, to double-turn the lock, which the original bill might be said only to snap, on the Dissenters. It fiddles about removing some little portion of the kicks bestowed upon them by the orthodox, thereby doubly confirming the remainder. And as the Dissenters are supposed to be most sensitive to kicking in the persons of their women, it is there the orthodox take the opportunity to tickle them by application of the toe.

London, 7 June, 1837.

ON Monday the member for Birmingham (Mr. Attwood) stayed proceedings on the Irish Poor Law bill, by a speech of three hours, the object of which appeared to be to impress on

the House, that divers traders in different parts of the country had come into a situation where it would be very convenient to them to pay half their debts, and to propose that they should be enabled to get off with so doing, by reducing the currency of the country to half its present value. In other words, that bits of paper should be issued to the number that would make the note which now buys a quarter of an ounce of gold in the market buy only half that quantity,—the issuers all along putting into their pockets the amount for which they exchange the bits of paper upon issue, at the same time subtracting it from the substantial value of the circulating medium in the pockets of all the holders in the country by depreciation,—and that with these bits of paper so purposely reduced in value, the debtors shall pay their debts.

Now as I have a notion, that where there are debtors, there are probably creditors also, I can conceive it possible that you at Hull may demur before you join with one accord in this plan "so pretty and small," for relieving us from all commercial evils present and to come, by enabling debtors to pay their debts with half, and taking huge sums out of the pockets of all the holders of the circulating medium besides, for the benefit of certain individuals whose trade it is to be, to be the issuers of the paper. For to this it comes at last, in spite of all that can be said, or left unsaid, upon the subject.

The House of Commons, or what may be presumed to be the more reasonable portion of it, followed the very doubtful policy of not replying; and so the three hours argument for making men pay half their debts, went without other answer, than the proposition of the member for Birmingham being negatived by 84 to 25.

And now let me take the opportunity of once more impressing upon friends at Hull,—as one who for nearly thirty years has endeavoured to work out these questions with as much care and diligence as any whaler out of the port has applied to the problem of keeping a whale-line from fouling in running out,—the substantial cause of these constantly-recurring commercial miseries. I do not mean to say, that in the present case there may not be foreign and particular reasons why the mischief is set in activity at precisely the present moment; but I do mean to say, that there is a constantly-existing artificial cause why commercial miseries must from time to time occur, and that they do occur accordingly, of course taking advantage of any external assisting cause, as tendencies to rheumatism do of an Easterly wind, though there may be no doubt they would ap-

pear at last if the wind should be always West. And I should be particularly glad to attract the attention of your Ladies' Gallery to this subject, because it is precisely one on which honesty and what the scripture calls "a single eye" is more likely to lead to a correct conclusion, than any imaginable acquaintance with the quirks and quibbles by which men in the corrupted currents of this world are accustomed to conceal the truth.

Suppose then that the part of our island north of Tweed, a region highly favoured by nature in point of manufacturing and commercial faculties, but considerably less favoured than some other parts of the island in the faculty of producing food for man, were to be cut off from the power of consuming any food but what was grown within itself. Suppose that some Nebuchadnezzar, instead of commanding the bonnie Scots to bow down before the image which the king had set up, should command them to live upon the "bigg or barley" which was the produce of their own soil, and by no means to think of adding to it by exchanging the manufactured goods of Paisley or Carron for English or any other kind of wheat. Is there a mother of a family in Hull, who however little she may have been in the habit of interfering in the business of the counting-house, has not a glimpse of the fact, that if she and hers were portion of the shut-up Scotch, they would discover that the Scotch manufacturers and their children were every day bidding against one another to give more manufactures for a pound of bread, and consequently the weakest or most unlucky must be perpetually making room by going into the list of bankrupts;—that the same process must extend itself to all people concerned in the transport or sale of these manufactures, in which the counting-house which pays her weekly bills would be specially involved;—and that all this must be going on with a speed proportioned to the number of children which all the families about her might be bent upon providing for? If she had but one darling, she might buoy herself up with the hope that Jacky might take his father's place, and by heaven's grace they might both of them come to the end of their natural lives without making the dreaded appearance in the Gazette. But if she had eight or ten, and saw her neighbours for the most part provided with the like number of olive-branches round their table, it must be a woman of less wit than would serve to calculate the coming of a "full boat day" for marketing, that would not see visions of coming bankruptcies, daughters' husbands in the Gazette, and sons after their third certi-

ficate making their way to try their fortunes in Van Diemen's Land. How should it be otherwise, if the quantity of food that all that live must live by, is to be limited and confined; and what should be the cure, but giving liberty to get more by honest trade where it could be had? I wonder whether there are half a dozen women in Hull, who think their husbands,—the men that look so wise when they come out of their counting-houses, and sometimes I dare say put down ladies' questions with intimations that they are on matters "beyond the scope of the female,"—I wonder whether there are half a dozen who think their husbands are so simple as to sit down quietly under a state of law, which says a Hull ship shall carry out as many English goods as it pleases upon one condition, viz. that it does not bring back the kind of goods which when sold at home would pay. Now this is precisely the actual state of things; and if the men of Hull cannot see into the mill-stone, I want, upon my ancient principles, to refer it to the women. And I shall be content if either man or woman, is persuaded to look for relief to alteration in this state of law, and not to such inventions as allowing debtors to pay their debts by halves.

On Tuesday the House proceeded in committee with the Irish Poor Law bill. Proposals were made for excepting various descriptions of unborn property from the operation of poor-rates, as a method of directing capital to Ireland; but over-ruled.

London, 10 *June*, 1837.

ON Wednesday Mr. Buckingham's Mercantile Shipping bill was thrown out at the Second Reading, by 176 against 28. There was nothing in the bill that might not have been doctored in committee; but it appears the "shipping interest"—a very suspicious term, which like the "agricultural interest" always conveys the idea of the interest which certain classes of the community have at the expense of everybody else,—are of opinion that they are well as they are, and therefore nothing is to be done. It was while you at Hull were picking up the bodies of your dead from the waves and the house-tops*, to an extent which a siege or a sack could scarcely have surpassed, that the wisdom of parliament was rejecting the principle of a decent inspection into the security of them that go down to the sea in ships, and sacrificing life to the convenient indolence or crookedness of owners. There was no doubt before the Ship-

* In consequence of a steam-boat explosion. Some of the bodies were literally blown to the top of a house.—*Added in* 1840.

wrecks Committee, of the existence of a regular system of sending vessels to sea till they sink, founded principally on the want of facilities for giving underwriters notice of the actual condition of particular ships. A stage-coach must not be loaded more than so many inches above the roof; but a timber-ship may "turn the turtle" whenever the captain pleases, and to make the turning more likely, all the freight that can be carried above deck is made the captain's perquisite.

We were on the same night to all appearance terribly beaten upon the Sunday Persecution bill. A bill was brought in, by which it was not only established that you shall rest on Sundays because the Jews rested on Saturdays, whether you will or no,—but which further enacts that during their rest the people shall receive nothing in the shape of either knowledge or of pleasure; and this bill was read a second time, by a majority of 110 against 66. A sect or sects, for their own satisfaction and delight, and the gratification of the passion which men in all ages have felt for forcing their own opinions down the throats of their neighbours, with a zest exactly proportioned to the absence of reasonable plea, not only fancy themselves a decalogue and say to you "Thou shalt not ride in a coach, thou shalt not ride in a cart; thou shalt not ride on a horse, nor an ass, nor any thing else unless you are a rich man and have it of your own;" but they go further and prohibit all increase of earthly knowledge on that day. I believe you may smell at a buttercup; but you must not read about buttercups, or at all events you must not read to other people about them. With a devilish ingenuity copied from the Inquisition, which as you know depresses heresy or Protestantism by studiously associating it with debasing crimes, so if you or I are "present at any meeting of people at which shall take place any public debating upon or discussing any subject or public lecture or speech" (*sic in orig.* as the printers say), we are to be classed with "cock-fighters, dog-fighters, and followers of pastimes of public indecorum, inconvenience or nuisance," and your house or mine "shall be deemed a disorderly house or place, and be dealt with as the law directs in cases of disorderly houses."

Now upon this I will join issue. As St. Paul gave lectures "in his own hired house" without asking the people about him whether they liked it or not, so, by St. Paul, will I. If the "Working Classes" as they call themselves will attend, they shall have a lecture weekly on National-Economy or some other public subject, to the best of my ability; and as I seem to be making some progress in that line of business, it is probable they will not refuse. We shall see whether anybody will

enter my house and treat the inmates "as the law directs in cases of disorderly houses;" or whether it was the mere threat of bullies calculating on trampling on the poor and those who could be oppressed in silence. All persecutors have split on the same kind of rock; they have gone on till they roused against themselves the sympathies of domestic life, and then they have been brought to reason by a general rush of the community. If my friends the Methodists think they shall invade my house for the purpose of enforcing their own religious observances against my consent, without meeting with the same resistance that I would oppose to the like imposition being practised on themselves,—my friends the Methodists were never so mistaken since the day, whenever it was, that they changed from being the persecuted to the persecutors, and forgot the times when a man's saddle-flaps were cut off* for presuming to have a little less or more orthodoxy than his neighbours.

An hon. member, who is high up in the plan for making mine a disorderly house, is in a few days to move on the subject of certain alleged complaints against official men abroad, for employing English subjects in processions or other demonstrations inconsistent with their notions of religious obligation. A governor of Malta for example, proposes to make an English soldier fire a salute in honour of St. Anthony. But says the soldier, "I know nothing of St. Anthony; I was bred in places where we were taught to recognize no saints but what are mentioned in a certain book, and I find nothing there of Saint Anthony." How hard, how horrible, says the hon. member, for the soldier to be called out upon parade, and ordered to "make ready, present, fire," for Saint Anthony! Be it so. But what would the hon. member say, if the Maltese entered the soldier's barrack-room and said, "You shall sit at home all day in honour of Saint Anthony; you shall eat fish or flesh, hot or cold as we like, in honour of St. Anthony; you shall hire no ass or mule, in honour of St. Anthony; and your wife and children shall be sent to the treadmill as disorderlies, if you presume to hold debate on any subject we disapprove, on the day we have set apart in honour of St. Anthony." Now just the cold, calm, half fierce and half contemptuous defiance which a Scottish soldier of the old Puritan breed would rightfully throw back to the projectors of this indecency, and which the maker of the motion would probably think so laudable, must

* This happened to the writer's father, in the times when the Methodists were objects of persecution. He went to a village in Holderness to preach; and when he returned to the inn where he had left his horse, he found the innkeeper had cut off the flaps of his saddle.

we throw back to him and all his following, in turn. But shall that prevent us from supporting this hon. member, in that wherein he is just and right? Assuredly not; and I could almost wish to see these pinks of piety brought once more under the harrow of persecution, that there might be opportunity to find out where the staunchest supporters of religious freedom would be found.

But I have been too serious, and have run after imaginary perils. "Jocky of Norfolk be not too bold!" for "Dickon your master is bought and sold" in a way you may not have dreamed of. There is no serious intention on the part of the Tories to pass this bill. A score of them at most may be zealous for it; but the remainder would be horrified at the smallest probability of such an ending. They are to divide the credit of having voted for the Second Reading, and perhaps to go to a new election with all the honours on their heads; and afterwards they are to vote, one against one clause and another against another, till "from tail to snout the pig is eaten," or at all events reduced to such a miserable "spare-rib," that Sir Andrew himself will not recognize the dry bones of his offspring. This will be the end as regards that side; but it will not be the end as regards ours. We have succeeded, for the first time, in getting the whole question of authority submitted to the House of Commons, in the same manner as our fathers did in instances occurring in their day; and the result has been the establishment, to an extent and completeness to which no parallel can be found in previous history, of the absolute nullity, the literal falsehood and contradiction to all existing matter of fact, inherent in the pretexts attempted to be produced from the authority appealed to. "Ahitopel hanged himself" and "Go thou and do likewise," are only types of the talent for biblical illustration, exhibited by the Scribes and Pharisees of the House of Commons.

But thus it is, that while all around us tells us that in the midst of life we are in death, and every turn forces upon us the feeling of the sad realities of existence, men must worry and teaze each other for the sake of that paltry triumph which consists in forcing on one man the religious opinions of another. Some of us thought the season for this was gone by; but the devil's plums it seems hang over the wall at all hours, and "flourishing professors" will gulp them down. May they be griped, and no Mr. Skill be there to ease them with a pill!

On Thursday there was a long examination of witnesses, touching some reported improprieties among the conductors and supporters of a private bill. This is just the kind of busi-

ness the House of Commons delights to honour. A debate followed, on the privilege of printing by the House of Commons. I am afraid the ministers are going to let us down here also, and that we are to succumb before the publisher of Harriet Wilson, and no more open our mouths to call a spade a spade, although a jury says so.

On Friday Mr. Roebuck moved his Amendment to inquire into the state of the country *; but did not press it to a division. The Irish Tithe bill was read a second time, by 229 against 14.

---

* Colonel Thompson seconded the Amendment. At a subsequent period of the debate, an hon. and learned member having said that "the mover of the amendment indeed used the plural number 'we,' but he did not believe there was one member in the house who agreed entirely with him,"—

"Colonel *Thompson* said, A fat soldier once presented himself to a reviewing general, and said, 'I am the skeleton of the hundred-and-first regiment.' It might have occurred to the hon. and learned gentleman who just sat down, that the seconder of the amendment, however closely he might approach to the position of that skeleton, was at all events likely to make an exception to the assertion that there was nobody who joined in the opinions of the mover. He must state therefore, openly and fairly, that he coincided entirely in the principle of everything that had been said by the member for Bath. Their complaint was (and he would willingly use the dual number if he was speaking Greek or any language that possessed it), that from the earliest period when it was practicable to form any judgment of the practice of the ministry, the ministers had adopted a course calculated to let down themselves and everybody connected with them, and to bring advantage to nobody but their enemies. They had started with a large stock of popular energy in their favour, and in their terror lest the steam should burst, they had let the fire go out. One of their first movements, was at one swoop to alienate from themselves the hearts of all the working classes, by their proceedings towards the Dorchester labourers; and if those classes had not absolutely gone over to the enemy, they had at all events been cooled of any attachment to the ministerial side. Like Spanish generals, the ministry had always had one eye in their own camp, and another in their enemy's; every effort for the success of their own side, had been paralysed by the fear of that side being too successful. The situation to which they had brought themselves, was plain to all men. If any event in the chapter of human accidents should happen to give them a reprieve, the only consequence would be, that as they dwindled, dwindled before, they would dwindle, dwindle again. There was no stock of good luck, which such conduct would not run out. It was clear what must come at last; the hon. gentlemen opposite must return to power, and he hoped they would feel no contempt for those who had foreseen it all along. How long they would stay there, was another question; but their coming in was a phasis, a phænomenon, which the conduct of the ministers had rendered it inevitable to go through. When this took place, we should possibly see the present ministers renewing their strength like the eagle, and declaring their willingness to set about doing in good earnest, what they had much better have done before. Though the member for Bath and himself might be dual in these opinions in that House, there was nothing like duality out of doors; they were both of them supported there by masses of men, who, though moved by nothing like original hostility to the present ministers or their party, agreed with them in believing that the favourable chances had been thrown away, and that nothing was before us but the process he had endeavoured to describe."—*Hansard's Debates*, 9 June, 1837.

London, 14 *June*, 1837.

THE House met at twelve on Saturday, to consider the Lords' Amendments to the English Municipal Corporations bill; and a committee was appointed to draw up the reasons for disagreeing to some of them. Mr. Wakley took the opportunity to ask whether the government meant to establish any inspection of steam-boats in general, as it was known was established in the case of their own. And as might be expected from a government that had just been assisting to prevent the Merchant Shipping bill from going to a committee, they declined any concern with the matter. Lord W. Bentinck moved for a committee to inquire into the practicability of effecting a steam communication with India by the Red Sea; and as, in the conjoint ratio of acquaintance with the country and with the people, I have probably had as great opportunities as any member in the House except Mr. Buckingham, I thought I could not help offering to serve. And you know, that when I profess to attend a committee, I work.

On Monday Lord John Russell moved for a committee to inquire into the possibility of increasing the value of church property. The member for Southwark (Mr. Harvey) moved as an addition, that after a certain defined period, the payment of Church Rates in England and Wales should cease*. This

* "Colonel *Thompson* said he rose to second the amendment, among other reasons, for the same that had been given by the mover,—because in spite of many attempts, he had failed in getting an opportunity of expressing his mind before. He thought there had been a succession of mistakes, and the first mistake was with the Dissenters, in having said that they resisted church rates for conscience sake. He believed he could prove to them that they resisted for a reason much more appropriate to the case. If a Dissenter was stopped on the highway, however much it might be against his conscience to promote the purposes to which the robbers would probably apply his spoil, he would never make the mistake of saying he resisted for conscience sake, he would say he resisted injustice. Try, then, the injustice, by taking another instance. Take the circumstances in which our forefathers, who finally obtained the name of Protestants, began to resist the domination of a church which had previously been universal. If at that period the demands of justice could have been heard, what would they have been, but that our Protestant forefathers should have carried away with them the portion that befell them, of every kind of property the state had set apart for the maintenance of religion? If this could have been done, it would have saved the struggle and the loss which afterwards ensued. Exactly the same was the case of the Dissenters now. He had heard honourable members opposite call the church rates a just debt, and stigmatize as dishonest all who ventured to oppose them. He had heard it stated, if he was not mistaken, —and he much wanted to ascertain the fact, that he might put it into his museum,—that the church rates were paid by everybody, and therefore were paid by nobody. Surely the fact that the value of everybody's property was lessened by them, was not intended to be brought as the evidence that nobody was the loser. How long would such pleas have been admitted by our forefathers? And had the Dissenters no property, to be diminished in value by the church rates? *Whole* justice to the Dissenters, was to give them their portion of the property provided by the community for religious purposes, the tithes included,

gave an opportunity to those who wished to enter their protest against the feebleness of the ministry; and the occasion was seized by 60 (including Tellers on both sides) against 491. Mr. Goulburn then proposed as an amendment, to leave out the words "That a Select Committee be appointed;" which was negatived by 319 against 236; majority 83. Another amendment was then proposed by the same member, at the end of the Question to add the following words, "With the view of applying such amount to the gradual diminution of the evils which flow from the deficiency in the means of religious instruction and pastoral superintendence by ministers of the Established Church;" which was negatived by 291 against 265; majority only 26. The explanation of all this is, that the last amendment was aimed at cutting down the ministerial majority by those who would go over upon the question of the mode of applying the surplus; and it appears that twenty-eight or twenty-nine went over accordingly.

The House met on Tuesday, but was counted out at half-past seven.' A horrible thing is done in the land. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says that many farmers are in the habit of putting their cloaks under their sitting parts, and so evading the law on the subject of taxed carts; the law being, that the remission of taxation upon what by an odd perversion is called a taxed cart because it is less taxed than some other vehicles, is to be dependent upon a certain quantity of blows to be received by the unhappy sitters, after the manner of what your water-borne men and the school-boys of the Grammar School if they adhere to ancient usages call "cobbing," without the merciful interposition of either springs or cushions. Upon the point of cushions, the law it seems is particular; the insertion of a cloak therefore by a fat farmer, either under himself or his "*mississ*," is an act of point-blank smuggling, and as such to be protested against by all authorities sacred and profane. Is it not contemptible, that the legislation of a civilized country should run into miseries like these, and all for the sake of

---

for maintaining their religious worship; *half* justice, was to give them nothing and leave them to find themselves; whole and complete *injustice*, was to take money from them, and leave them to find themselves besides. The Dissenters knew all this as well as anybody else; and it was this injustice they came, or ought to come, to complain of, and not the violation of their consciences, which was in fact non-existent when their money was taken away by force. Another party who were under a great mistake were the government, if they thought they were ever to prosper by thus bringing forward the wrong reason instead of the right; and he hoped it would not be long before both parties would present themselves with a claim more likely to get beyond majorities of five, or six either, as had been the fate of the last."—*Hansard's Debates*, 12 June, 1837.

keeping out a system of taxation which should fairly and simply tax the rich in proportion to their wealth?

I observe that on Monday another notice appears upon the books (see Votes transmitted to you this day) for the 19th, proposing to return to the ancient practice of the House in taking divisions; in other words, for stopping the publication of the Division Lists which you are in the habit of receiving daily. It was remarkable, that on the division which took place the same night on Mr. Harvey's amendment, the greatest reluctance was shown by the majority to clear the House, many Tory members being observed ensconcing themselves in different parts of the house the farthest from the door; and it only wanted five minutes of an hour, when the clearing was accomplished. Of this I am good evidence, as having been one of the Tellers, whose business it is to assist in getting the House cleared. I feel the slightest mental leaning in the world, to believe that this Monday's delay was in some way connected with the Monday's notice.

London, 17 *June*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the second reading of Mr. Robinson's bill for allowing bonded corn to be ground for exportation, was carried by 53 against 42. The most remarkable circumstance attending the debate, was the open way in which the Agricultural and Shipping interests declared their readiness to unite for maintaining their joint impositions on the rest of the community.

The second reading of the Bribery at Elections bill was carried by 70 against 0; a phænomenon I explained on a former occasion, by saying that there was nobody on one side except the mover and seconder, who act as Tellers. There must be very little in the bill, where there is such an absence of opposition. I doubt whether a bill on such a subject, could be started with a worse character. Be sure it is intended to prohibit only what it is not found practicable to carry on with success; and that nothing by which you or I can be preserved from mischief, will be touched by it.

On Thursday Mr. Grantley Berkeley's motion for a Ladies' Gallery was negatived by 116 against 92; the government voting against the motion. Such are the leaders by whom, in this age of extending civilization, we are dragged through the dirt in the rear of foreign nations. The speeches of the mover and seconder were responded to in a strain of low obscenity, which in a Mechanics' Institute or meeting of the Working

Classes would have caused the instant ejection of the offenders; and which in fact prevented the friends of the measure from inducing any debate. If the Working Classes accomplish their ambition of finding their way into parliament, they will find what a descent they will have made in the social scale; and have time enough to compare the pain of bringing home to their families the lively odour of indecency, with the former purity of their humbler associations. As in America described by Miss Martineau, so in England, the lower classes are the sound, and the higher the corrupted; and in both countries, though with much less revolting circumstances in America, the tendency displays itself in ruffianism towards women. What a blessing in both countries, would be a translation of the seat of power; and how unfortunate is any country, whose institutions bring such dregs up to the top!

On the same evening Dr. Bowring renewed his motion for Resolutions to provide for the greater accuracy of the public accounts. Seven millions, if I recollect right, was the amount he stated to be annually left in jeopardy through the absence of the precautions which other nations, and notably France, take in the corresponding circumstances. The Tories fidgetted; and the Secretary for the Home Department trusted the object of the mover had been sufficiently gained, as to bring on a discussion upon it would then impede the progress of public business. The noble Home Secretary is in the situation of the man who could not see the wood for trees. Care of the public accounts is too minute for the consideration of a government, which is doing nothing, will do nothing, and if it ever intended to do anything, has wonderfully deceived its own expectations.

Sir Andrew Agnew was induced temporarily to withdraw a bill for prohibiting the use of railways on Sunday in Scotland. The object, about which under the circumstances of there being another bill for similar purposes before the House for England there can be no mistake, is to gain a step for religious tyranny in Scotland, for the purpose of immediately turning it to account in favour of religious tyranny here. All who have been in the way of being acquainted with Scotchmen, know that in their private moments they admit themselves to be under the dominion of a clergy at home, who whatever merits they may have on certain points, are bigoted and absurd on others, to the extent of inculcating that damnation attends upon whistling on a Sunday, and the man is in a graceless state who does not say grace over a glass of whiskey. One advantage which Scotland has a right to expect from the Union, is that the extravagances of priestly power should be moderated by contact with another

country. At all events Scotland must not be made a stepping-stone to religious tyranny here; and if you are an observer of the signs of the times, you will perhaps agree with me, that ecclesiastical domination, with a wonderful spirit of Catholicity that admits into the same saddle Carlism, Church-of-England-ism, John Knoxism, and any other kind of *ism* that is hostile to the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty in the country where it predominates, is the great stalking-horse under which arbitrary power is at this moment making its advances. Surely the English Dissenters, whatever may be their opinion of Sabbatarian observances for themselves, will not be induced to throw themselves into the plot, by such a sop as the Sunday bill. What chance have they for impunity for their own religious opinions, if they lend themselves to impose upon those of other people? Why, for instance, should they not be all ordered to "shake" and to "jump" by Act of Parliament; for the Shakers and the Jumpers have the advantage over the Sabbatarians in point of scriptural authority, to the extent that makes the difference between a precedent and a prohibition.

On Friday Mr. Harvey presented a petition from Sheffield with 15,000 signatures, against the new Poor-law. Mr. Walter moved for a copy of a particular part of the proceedings of the Poor-law committee, as an amendment upon going into committee of supply; and 30 members against 119 voted with Mr. Walter, among whom I was one.

Contrary to expectation, the King is declared better; which, independently of former obligations, can only be matter of congratulation to the earnest friends of Reform. If the Whig ministry were at this moment to receive the accession of strength they are understood to calculate upon from the new reign, they would only become proportionally more impracticable and hostile to the popular cause, and let the advantage go to waste, like a spendthrift who receives an accession to his fortune before his race of riot has been run. But if it would please heaven to preserve the present sovereign till the ministers had thoroughly beggared themselves in public opinion, there might be a remote chance, that as sometimes happens to a spendthrift, they would use the god-send to recover themselves again, and so some good might be had of it by the country.

London, 21 *June*, 1837.

On Saturday the House met at twelve o'clock, for the purpose of furthering some parts of the Ordnance Estimates to

which no opposition was intended; and adjourned twenty minutes afterwards.

On Monday the House met at the usual hour (four o'clock); but after receiving a few petitions, was counted out. This was attributed to the absence of the government members, consequent on the apprehended demise of the Crown, which in fact took place at two the following morning.

On Tuesday at a quarter before one, "Mr. Speaker, and several other Members, came to the House of Commons, where Mr. Speaker alone, and then the other Members present, took the Oaths, and Subscribed the Oath of Abjuration, according to the Laws made for those purposes." The taking the Oaths continued till four o'clock; and was resumed to-day (Wednesday) at ten, to continue till four as before.

The Queen was proclaimed to-day (Wednesday). It is remarkable, that in the Votes of the House of Commons of yesterday's date, of which a copy is sent to you by this day's post, she is directed to "be proclaimed Queen, by the Style and Title of Alexandrina Victoria;" and I am informed by members who took the oaths yesterday, that this was the title used in the oaths which were administered to them. I speak this on information; for though present yesterday before four o'clock, (which I took for the beginning of the proceedings instead of the end, no notice of earlier meeting having been given), I had not had time to take the oaths myself. But we who forswore James the Eighth &c. upon the second day, found a pen run through the word Alexandrina in the printed copies of the oaths which were put into our hands, and have undeniably taken the oaths to Victoria and nothing else. What I am told is, that the title of Alexandrina Victoria was taken out of the Regency bill; and that the Privy Council has met since, and determined that to save trouble in signing, it should be cut down to Victoria. I put down these facts, in case your Town Clerk should be found wringing his hands in doubt under which name a vagrant is to be sent to the treadmill; and even then, I can only leave him to form his own judgment on the circumstances.

London, 21 *June*, 1837.

At four a House was formed for business. A little before the hour for commencing what is called public business (as distinguished from private bills &c.) General Evans entered, and was received with loud and prolonged cheers from the ministerial side. Soon afterwards Sir Robert Peel came in,

leaning on a crutch, and appearing to be under considerable personal suffering.

At five o'clock the following Message from the Queen was read to the House by the Speaker.

"The Queen entertains the fullest confidence that the House of Commons will participate in the deep affliction which Her Majesty feels at the death of the late King, whose constant desire to promote the interests, to maintain the liberties, and to improve the laws and institutions of the country, will ensure for his name and memory the dutiful and affectionate respect of all Her Majesty's subjects."

"The present state of the public business and the period of the session when considered in connection with the law which imposes on Her Majesty the duty of summoning a New Parliament within a limited time, renders it inexpedient in the judgment of Her Majesty that any new measure should be recommended for your adoption, with the exception of such as may be requisite for carrying on the public service from the close of the present Session to the meeting of the New Parliament."

A speech followed from Lord John Russell, and another from Sir Robert Peel; neither of whom will obtain immortality by his talents in the quality of Public Orator. Addresses were voted to the Queen and the Queen Dowager; and the concluding part of Her Majesty's Message to be further brought before the House to-morrow. The House adjourned at a little after six.

London, 24 June, 1837.

ON Friday Lord John Russell brought the concluding part of the Queen's Message before the House; but it was preluded by the introduction of the knotty question, whether certain members of Her Majesty's Opposition took off their hats at the right moment on the reading of the Message the preceding day. The facts as they fell under my notice were briefly these. When the Speaker stood up and it was understood that he was about to read a Message from the Queen, members began to take off their hats, and some of them to cry "Hats off" by way of quickening the rest. The covered heads were soon reduced to those of two Opposition members; or I think there might be a third, who made a dubious and imperfect effort to adhere. The recusants showed by their looks and manner, that they understood the call made upon them, and did not mean to accede. The Speaker called out "Members will be uncovered,"

and it was not till he had done so more than once, that uniformity was produced in the assembly. It is lucky the member for South Durham* did not happen at that moment to be preserving himself from ear-ache by the natural use of his castor, or the question would have been complicated beyond all possibility of solution by human skill.

And after all it turns out, that there was nothing more at the bottom, than a persuasion that the first of the sounds "Victoria Regina" was the proper nay-word for gentlemen to know when to take off their hats. We were like recruits who take their musquets from the ground at the first sound of "Shoulder," instead of waiting for the word "*Ums*" which is the legitimate indication. And so falls to the ground the first suspected plot against the juvenile Majesty of England.

But another part of the history of the evening does not resolve itself quite so kindly. Lord Stanley intimated the necessity of a bill to provide against the consequences of the possible death of the Queen, and particularly against such as might arise from the King of Hanover not being on the spot to take the succession in case of such event; in other words, I suppose, to constitute a sort of regency, to hold the helm of the state for the period which might elapse during the process of laying aside the cares of paternal government in one country, and assuming them in the other. This is important, first because a considerable portion of the people of England, alive to the absurdity of sending a prince to try his 'prentice hand at despotic government abroad as the means of preparing him for well governing at home, had buoyed themselves up with the hope, amounting by habit to belief, that the forms of our monarchical constitution did not lie under such a manifest inferiority to more rational forms of government, as not to have made provision for excluding this gross folly from the pages of our history; and secondly, because on the part of Lord Stanley and the more moderate Tories of whom he may be considered the representative, it amounts to a volunteer identification of themselves with the expectations and consequences of such a succession to the throne. The main result may be collected in a few words. If there is not virtue, or power, whichever of the two may be the attribute concerned, to declare in what would have been the tone of our ancestors, "that no King of a foreign country, has or can have, any power, vote, or right of succession within the realm of England," then the end is to be this. The anti-popular party in England who put forward the King of

* The only member in the House belonging to the Society of Friends.

Hanover in his chrysalis state of Duke of Cumberland as their sign and banner on all occasions,—who involved his name, however much against his own consent, in tampering with the British army with the manifest view to employing it against the liberties of the country in the event of his succeeding to the reigning King,—are now to postpone their wishes to the time when he may return to them, flushed as their imagination will paint him with the practical exercise of despotic power, surrounded it may be with the attachment of a foreign army of whose military qualities the Tories are at this moment chanting the praise, and backed by all the further connexions which future camps of Kalisch may give an opportunity to organize. In short there is to be a foreign power established, under the sceptre of the chief and idol of the anti-popular party here, with the express purpose of enabling them all to confer together with the vantage which attends on an established government, in furtherance of the projected transfer of the whiskered despotism at no distant period to our shores. Would our ancestors, who saw peril in wafers and in wafered lips, and knew where to look for substantial power to preserve themselves from either, have looked supinely on in such a case as this, and fancied the virtue was gone from them? Who knows what *Vons* and *dorfs* may be looking for the broad lands of Whiggish noblemen? We are at the day of the Sixth Edward again, and similar events might bring about rare confiscations. A death, a dreaded successor, an unsuccessful attempt at opposition, and England and still more Ireland might be thrown into a state, of which all our history associates with sanguinary memory might be but faint and feeble image.

But the chance we are to have of protecting ourselves, must depend on the danger being known. Instead, therefore, of enigmatical intimations in the Lords and Commons, worded for concealing the ideas of the speakers, and from which half the honest people that read them will draw conclusions directly opposite to what will finally be found to have been the meaning, let it be fairly avowed, if it is so, that the monarchical institutions of which we could not bear the removal of a jot or a tittle, are exposing us to be swamped by an importation of continental despotism, and that our prospects lie in the uses we may make of the time which is between. And above all, let this be wrought into the knowledge of the people before the coming elections; that they may have the option of doing what they can to bend the twig the other way.

London, 28 *June*, 1837.

THE House met on Saturday at twelve, and sat for the space of half an hour. These irregular sittings are of ill tendency in a variety of ways; though the Liberals in the House seem in the main to be unconscious of it. Great numbers of Members have made engagements on the expectation of there being no House; and a number more are kept away by the change of hour, which interferes with such innocent habits as reading and answering their letters before they go out for the day. Under these circumstances, ministers have to "make a House;" that is to say, to send down all their subordinates and hangers-on, to make up forty. And the object always is, to advance some proceeding a stage, for the convenience of the ministry. It needs no conjuror to tell that this, if not used for mischief, may be.

On Monday, on the vote for 4,600£ for allowances to poor Protestant Dissenting ministers, French refugees, &c., an objection to receive was started on behalf of the Dissenters; while such liberal churchmen as the Member for the University of Oxford were urgent in pressing it on their acceptance. Religious scruples were stated on the part of the Dissenters; but the true reason evidently was, that they do not like to take a sprat to lose a whale, though there is no getting them to say so. A slice of 4,600£ a-year is pressed on them, because it is felt to weaken their protest against paying from fifty to a hundred thousand pounds a-year for church-rates. To such flat trickery is the world delivered over; and men cannot find out, that the way to oppose it, is to speak up the plain truth for themselves.

On Tuesday the House went into committee on the Beet-root Sugar Duties bill. Nothing ever puzzled me like settling how to vote on this occasion. The whole affair is such a complicated mischief, that a man would have little rest who could not go to sleep till he had assured himself he had done the thing that was better than another. I voted against the four-and-twenty shillings duty on beet-root sugar; and for the reasons following.

1. That while we have no more confidence in governments than we have, it is always a good thing to pull down the revenue; in other words to diminish the sums at the disposal of government.

2. That the people of England would get cheaper sugar; and cheap sugar is a good.

3. That a Chancellor of the Exchequer is always to be sus-

pected, when he props up one financial measure, on another financial measure.

4. That if the West-Indian interest were to come down altogether, it would not be a loss but a gain.

5. That when the landowners of England take part against their apparent interest, there must be a deep ditch somewhere, whether we see it or not, They are infallibly propping somebody, who is to pay them with interest another time.

6. That *cæteris paribus*, it is a good thing to vote with Mr. Hume.

7. That as Mr. Hume and others remarked, there was no propriety in pressing the bill in such a hurry now.

For this collection of reasons, I hope those who may think differently, will have me excused.

London, 1 *July*, 1837.

ON Wednesday the Bonded Corn bill was thrown out by a majority of 82 against 57. I do not know that there is any great harm in the result; for the object was to do a very minute quantity of good, and I doubt whether the loss of it is not overbalanced by the evidence given to the country of the incorrigible nature of the landed oppression, under which we suffer. The President of the Board of Trade will do nothing with a side wind; and it is equally plain he will do nothing with a more direct. The truth is that we must wait till hunger brings our people to their colours, and some time or other we shall have a fair stand-up fight to know whether we are to continue to be the born-thralls of the owners of the soil or not. Our Saxon ancestors wore it written on a ring about their necks; we wear it in an Act of Parliament. But we are a long way from the time yet; there must be thousands more of bankruptcies, and myriads of the wives and children of the working classes must die of hunger or over-work in factories, that a greater quantity of the produce of their industry may be given to the landlords for a bushel of corn. We are in the state of raising statues, to any Tory man who will offer to limit our working hours if we on our parts will assist him to keep up the oppression that creates the inducement to over-work; and half our people might be persuaded to turn against the individual, who should tell them it was an invention of the enemy. But this will mend; misery and the progress of information will alter it. I look to the last, however, most. The working classes, at least in these southern parts, have proved them-

selves unequal to the question. It will be when the capitalists and employers find out where they are hurt, that the real resistance will begin.

By accident I was obliged to return home just as I arrived at the House of Commons; and before I could get back, this Bonded Corn bill had been brought on and put to death. There is no prospect that I could have done much to help it, if I had been there.

On Thursday the Bills of Exchange bill went through committee, after an attempt by a member on the Liberal side which caused much amusement, to resist it on the ground that "the country had flourished" under the Usury laws.

The Jewish Marriages bill also went through committee. The bill is to authorize English Jews to obey the direction of the Mosaic law by which they are to marry their brothers' widows. Now if we who are not Jews follow this direction, we are to be persecuted, and many harmless people have been persecuted, some of them I believe literally to the death, for this or the analogous act of marrying a deceased wife's sister. Surely if a lawgiver wanted to diminish the weight of human evils, he could go no more direct way to do it, than by authorizing in the numerous cases which must practically occur of young children being deprived of the protection of a mother, the repairing of the breach to the greatest practicable extent by a marriage with the deceased wife's sister, who is probably the only woman in the world who is prepared to receive the orphans with anything like affection, not to say without repugnance. An honest man in the House of Commons has told me with tears in his eyes, that he married his wife's sister because his wife on her death-bed made it her dying request to him; and he had been led an uneasy life ever afterwards, till death removed the cause by carrying away the second wife also, and even then he was only too glad to vote for a bill which prevented the disturbance of past marriages on condition of making them illegal for the future. Such then is our miserable condition. We are persecuted if we obey the law of Moses in the matter of marriage, and we are persecuted if we do not obey it in the matter of the sabbath. Said I not rightly in the House of Commons on this occasion, that the Mosaic law is to be used against us as an instrument of persecution, to be shipped and unshipped as may suit the users?

On Friday the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward the budget; for which I refer you to the newspapers. Two things the present ministers are evidently determined on;—that there shall be no relaxation of expenses, they will get up a war

with the Canadas first, if they see no other way;—and that nothing shall be done towards lightening the taxation by making the country more able to bear it, through removing the restrictions by which the country is shut up from foreign trade*.

And now I must introduce a subject relating to myself. After the loss of four thousand pounds taken from me in revenge for having obtained the suffrages of my fellow-townsmen, I cannot incur the expense of another election. Whether the efforts I have had the satisfaction of making in the endeavour to serve them, will have the effect of raising me to the power of serving them elsewhere, is what time must demonstrate. If this should be the effect, I hope they will always calculate on possessing three liberal representatives in parliament instead of two†.

---

* In the course of the debate,

"Colonel *Thompson* said, When so many members have their causes for the distress of the country, I too may be permitted to have my nostrum. Allow the men who are declared to be starving, to purchase food where they can get it. Might it not move a grave man to smile, to see the government of a great commercial country balancing and making inquest after a little gain in one place and a little loss in another, and all the while the traders of that community were forbidden to bring from abroad the only kind of goods that would pay, because they were the only kind that were wanted here? It was like betting on the Derby stakes, every horse to have one leg tied up. Would it not be well, among other schemes, to think of altering this? The hon. Member for Lanarkshire, for instance, when he brings forward, as he promised to-night, the distresses of the hand-loom weavers, will he join *me*, or allow me to join *him*, in calling for relief by letting them purchase cheap bread where they can? This is where the public will one day find the mischief lies, and here they will look for the remedy in preference to all the other ways suggested."—*Hansard's Debates*, 30 June, 1837.

† *Advertisement from Hull Papers.*

TO THE WORTHY AND INDEPENDENT BURGESSES AND ELECTORS OF KINGSTON-UPON-HULL.

GENTLEMEN,—It is right I should lose no time in announcing to you the determination, that I shall not offer myself as a candidate at the ensuing election, for the representation of my native town.

After I had undertaken the legitimate expenses of the last election, which were quite as large as my known property warranted me in incurring, the Tories of our town laid me under the necessity of either paying four thousand pounds to defend the seat, or submitting without resistance to charges of personal misconduct, of which they never dreamed of producing any proof, but which the miserable construction of our election law permitted them to advance in perfect safety up to the moment when it should be convenient to them to withdraw. It was a *guet-apens*; and their metropolitan organ which endeavours to perpetuate the memory of their success by a pun upon my name, was undoubtedly standing by to work their further purpose if I had retired without defence.

Under these circumstances, I submitted as to any other privation to which honest men are liable; and I found my compensation in the fact, that I was doing much towards establishing the triumph of liberal principles in the place whose prosperity was most interesting to me.

I cannot, however, consistently with my duty to others, engage in any further

London, 5 *July*, 1837.

On Saturday the House met at twelve, and the Reform of Parliament (Ireland) bill, the Parliamentary Electors bill, and the Final Register of Electors bill, were each advanced a stage. Adjourned at half past two.

On Monday the House resolved itself into a committee of supply. 200,000£ was granted towards defraying the current expenses of Her Majesty's Civil List. 88,000£ for the new Houses of Parliament. 142,160£. 14*s.* 6*d.* purporting to be in aid of the administration of justice in Lower Canada; the truth being, that it is for the payment of the salaries which the Canadians withhold, and intended to be re-imbursed by taking the money of the Canadians against their consent. I wish the people of England had one touch of the same sort of process; just that they might know what it is that is going on.

On Tuesday a motion was carried for an Address to appoint a Commission to inquire into the distress of the hand-loom weavers. It appears not impossible that this may end in some elucidation of the operation of the Corn-laws; though as that is evidently the sore point, no effort will be left untried to prevent examination in that direction.

London, 8 *July*, 1837.

On Wednesday, after hurrying a number of bills through an additional stage, the House was counted out at an early hour.

On Thursday there was a rather protracted debate on the Slave Treaties bill*. On Mr. Hume's rising to bring forward

---

expense. You have placed me once upon a ground, from which it was not very difficult to move on. Whatever may have been my absolute success in serving you, I feel persuaded that I have established a sufficient character for efforts in your cause, to give me a fair chance of being raised in some other quarter, to a position where I may have the same power of endeavouring to serve you as before, without incurring the difficulties which are personal to myself.

With this hope, I remain, Gentlemen,
Yours very truly and sincerely,
T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

13, Hanover terrace, Regent's Park, 1 July, 1837.

* "Mr. *Goring* wished to know whether any steam-vessels had been sent by the government to the coast of Africa, for the suppression of the slave-trade. He was satisfied that all efforts on the part of the government would be vain, unless aided by other powers, and he hoped that any ship taken in the trade would not only be broken up, but that the persons employed in them would be hanged at the yard-arm.

Colonel *Thompson* said he happened to be a living governor of Sierra Leone, rather a rare species he believed on earth, and therefore he could not well avoid confirming the opinion of the honourable member who last sat down, that steam-boats at the mouths of the rivers would be the effectual instrument for

his motion respecting Upper Canada, the House was counted out.

On Saturday the House met at twelve o'clock, and sat two hours. Mr. Hume declined bringing forward his motion on Canada, in so small a House. All these things will tell, some time or other, both in Canada and here. You see that the House of Commons is in a galloping consumption.

London, 12 *July*, 1837.

On Monday the House went through a variety of business, of the kind that forms the occupation of such scattered members as hold out to the end of a session with an election before them; and was adjourned at an early hour.

On Tuesday a similar process took place; the only tangible object of the meeting being the Second Reading without any observations, of the Lords Justices bill; of which perhaps more hereafter.

As I have endeavoured to give you an account of proceedings when there was anything to tell, so you will acknowledge that when there was nothing, I reduced my reports as nearly as possible to the limits of the matter. Which I hope will be accepted as evidence of general fidelity.

London, 15 *July*, 1837.

The Lords Justices bill, which had been brought down from the Lords on Monday and read a first time, and a second time on Tuesday, went into Committee* on Wednesday, and was read

putting down the slave-trade on the coast of Africa. He had likewise no objection to the other instrument which had been recommended by the same honourable member, the yard-arm, whenever arrangements could be made for administering it by due course of law (hear, hear!); for he was convinced that on treating the slave-trade as piracy by European nations, depended the chance of ultimate suppression. It was seventeen years since he had had the honour of negotiating, under the orders of Sir William Keir Grant in the Persian Gulph, the first treaty or public act in which the slave-trade was written down by its proper name of piracy. This act took place in January 1820, and had been public law in the countries concerned ever since. An act to the same effect was issued by America in the same year; but he had had the honour of comparing dates with Mr. Rush the American minister, and Mr. Rush told him the American act took place in May; so that the British was actually the prior, though from the difference in the modes of communication, the American act was known in England first. It might be acceptable to many that heard him, to be made acquainted with these facts. But the use he wanted to make of them now, was to give additional stimulus to the government to go on, and above all things not to expose themselves to the charge of stopping the small flies in their net, and letting the great ones through.—*Hansard's Debates*, 6 July, 1837.

* "On the motion for going into committee on this bill;
Colonel *Thompson* said, before the Speaker left the chair he must make some

a third time and passed on Thursday. To-day the Hamburg papers bring the Proclamation of "Ernest Augustus, by the grace of God, King of Hanover, Royal Prince of Great Britain and Ireland, Duke of Cumberland, Duke of Brunswick and Luneburg, &c." dated the 5th July, declaring the constitution of Hanover to be "neither in form nor substance binding upon Us;" and intimating "our royal will" to consider, "whether the constitution should be brought back to what it was before the promulgation of the present constitution, *after which* we shall convoke the General Assembly of the States, and impart to them our royal resolution." (See *Times* and other London papers of July 15, 1837.) With such indecent haste do all parties proceed in the plan for a Tory restoration when the time shall come.

A few comments on this Lords Justices bill. Clause 1 appoints the Archbishop of Canterbury at that time being, the Lord Chancellor, the Lord High Treasurer, the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord High Admiral, (there is none; is there to be one appointed, and is it to be the brother of the King of Hanover, the late Viceroy?) and the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, to be in fact a Regency, to act in the name of such Successor and in "his or her" stead, until "he or she" shall arrive *or otherwise determine their authority*,—that is to say, without arriving, shall issue "his or her" royal resolution, that the authority given by this Act shall be determined, or in other words the Act be no Act. Query, where do the ministers mean to find the power, for a "he or

---

observations, which he should have made yesterday when the bill was read a second time, if he had not been in another place by the directions of those he was bound to attend to. The tendency of the present bill, and of the mode in which it was proceeded with, seemed to be to hurry through Parliament the decision of the important question, whether under the actual circumstances of the country, the acceptance of a foreign throne ought not in expediency and justice to form a bar to the succession to the throne of this country. He was perfectly aware, and so were the people behind him, that this was a question the combined legislature of this country was competent to examine. And he knew too, that the great masses of the people of this country had grown up in the belief, that the constitution did not labour under the defect of necessitating or admitting such an evident anomaly. It was known to all, that no foreign prince or potentate could have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm; and it was far from being wrought into the general admission of the people, that he could have temporal either. Whether the people were right either on this question or the general one of expediency, it was not for him to undertake to give an opinion; but he was sure the public feeling would not be consulted, nor concord promoted, by the manner in which this weighty question had been slurred over by being pushed forward in such a manner, and at such a period of the session.

The bill then went through the committee. The report was received, and the bill ordered to be read a third time to-morrow.—*Hansard's Debates*, 12 July, 1837.

she" sovereign in Hanover, to *determine* (such is their phrase) an authority given by Act of Parliament here? Is it intended to be pleaded, that the Act which inserted the word "determine," thereby gave to "him or her" in Hanover the power of "determining"?

By Clause 2, "he or she" is empowered, "at any time during Her Majesty's life [it may be done to-morrow if "he or she" thinks fit] by Three Instruments under his or her hand and seal, revocable or to be altered at his or her will and pleasure, to nominate and appoint such and so many persons, [they may be the two regiments of Life-Guards], being natural-born subjects of this realm of Great Britain and Ireland, as he or she shall think fit, to be added to the Officers before named to be Lords Justices as aforesaid, who shall be empowered by authority of this Act to act with them as Lords Justices of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, as fully and in the same manner as if they [the officers and private gentlemen of the two regiments of Life-Guards, or as the case may be] had been herein particularly named: which said Lord Justices, or the major part of them which shall assemble [there are no men who fall in more readily than the Life-Guards at the sound of the "Assembly"], so as such major part be not fewer than five [there is little fear of it], shall and may use, exercise and execute all the powers and authorities before mentioned as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if all of them had been assembled together and consenting."

By Clause 3, the Three Instruments are to be kept close sealed up, one by the "resident or accredited Minister of such next Successor," [meaning the Hanoverian minister in London], another by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and another by the Lord Chancellor; and not be opened till after the demise of Her Majesty, when they are to be brought before the Privy Council unopened, and forthwith opened and read, and afterwards enrolled in the High Court of Chancery. So that we are not to know of the appointment of the Life-Guards to be Lords Justices, if such should be, until the moment of action arrives.

By Clause 4, if any of the said Three Instruments are missing or not produced, then any one or more shall be as effectual as all. This looks as if intended to meet the possibility of the Lord Chancellor (the Archbishop of Canterbury is hardly to be suspected) taking horse and riding over into the opposite camp.

The remaining five Clauses, or several of them, might be susceptible of observations. But as the Act is not very long,

I recommend to all who have the opportunity, to print it in full for the public benefit.

And now, was there ever such a naked trap set, for bringing on a struggle with that monarchical principle, which as Lord Brougham is popularly bruited to have said, is so sorely tried in these our days? I have not heard that the republicans are at the bottom of it; though there might be nothing irrational in the suspicion. As we thought we had outlived plagues and pestilences, till the Cholera pounced upon us, so we may be nearer the times of the second James than men have thought of. There are some of you will die in harness as your fathers did, if some order be not taken in this matter.

And could you have believed, that this bill so manifestly intended to put us tied and bound into the hands of a foreign prince whom the Tories consider as the Protestant Don Carlos, should have passed through the House of Commons without so much as the margins of the Clauses being read in committee, and without a show of opposition or examination from any quarter, except a few words by which I aspired to the chance of inserting into "the page of history" some such paragraph as follows?—"Several other things occurred to increase "the irritation of the popular mind. One Thompson, who in "the preceding reign had said something in parliament un- "friendly to the succession, was found sewn up in a bag and "thrown into the Thames." However, this is better than going to bed with the consciousness of having followed a multitude to make fools of themselves.

Since writing the above, I have given notice in the House for Monday, to ask ministers whether they view the Proclamation in the Hamburg papers as authentic. If they produce no reason for doubting the authenticity, the case ought to be made over to the constituencies. It will be in the power of any member of the new Parliament to move to bring in a bill, to declare that it is not expedient that any Foreign Prince or Potentate, should have any Jurisdiction, Power, Superiority, Pre-eminence, Authority, or Succession, temporal or spiritual, within this Realm or any of the Queen's Dominions; and to vest the Succession, in the event of the demise of Her Majesty, in Prince George of Cambridge and his heirs. And the constituencies have it in their power to require their representatives to pledge themselves to its support. If they do not, when they find the Life-Guards acting as Lords Justices they will have full leisure to repent.

London, 19 *July*, 1837.

THE sittings of Saturday and Monday, with the prorogation and subsequent dissolution of parliament which took place on the latter day, presented nothing to remark on, which has not been already before you in the public prints*. I return therefore to the subject of my last.

This is the first time the question of national independence has been brought before the British people, in the shape of determining whether it is or is not a part of their boasted Constitution, that the chief of the state, without any political necessity arising out of the peculiar situation of the succession to the throne, is to be passed through a course of continental despotism, as the means of fitting him to be the constitutional sovereign of a free country. If a collection of cool-headed, practical republicans, such as might be found for instance in New England or in Switzerland, were invited to give an opinion on such an arrangement as the means of providing for the happiness of a community, it is plain they would declare it to be the antipodes of common sense; and it remains to be seen whether there is anything peculiar to the circumstances of Britons, which enforces their submitting to an infliction of such unparalleled absurdity.

And in this, the great and only obstacle we shall discover, is in the popular prejudice or belief, that the absurdity is part and parcel of our monarchical system, and cannot be cured or altered without moving the whole foundations of the monarchy. Whereas the fact is, that it is just as much within the scope and province of the legislature, as the appointment of Commissioners by Act of Parliament where the Commissioners are mentioned by their names. And the proof of this is, that a single member of parliament can bring before the notice of the

---

* "Colonel *Thompson*, seeing a member of her Majesty's government in the House, would ask the question of which he had given notice yesterday, namely, whether her Majesty's ministers view as authentic the proclamation purporting to be issued by the king of Hanover, on the 5th day of this present month of July, in which he declared he did not consider the constitution agreed to by his predecessors, George IV. and William IV., as binding on him either in form or in substance, and intimated his intention of reverting to the old constitution without consulting the States-General.

Mr. *Poulett Thomson* could give no answer to the question. It was rather a question for the states of Hanover to consider.

Colonel *Thompson*—Then, Sir, at an early period of the next Session of Parliament, I will move for leave to bring in a Bill to declare that in the existing circumstances of the Crown, no foreign prince or potentate ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, authority, or succession within this realm, or any of the Queen's dominions; and to vest the succession, in the event of the demise of her Majesty, in Prince George of Cambridge and his heirs.—*Hansard's Debates*, 17 July, 1837.

legislature, as I did the day before yesterday, the desirableness of interference in the way of change.

I should weary you were I to attempt to detail all the authorities upon this subject contained in various Acts of Parliament. It will be sufficient to quote a few. By statute 13 Eliz. c. 1. it is asserted in the most explicit words, that "If any person shall "hold, affirm, or maintain, that the common laws of this realm, "not altered by parliament, ought not to direct the right of the "crown of England; or that the Queen's majesty, with and by "the authority of parliament, is not able to make laws and "statutes of sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the "crown of this realm, and *the descent, limitation, inheritance, "and government thereof;*—such person so holding, affirming, "or maintaining, shall, during the life of the Queen, be guilty "of high treason; and after her decease shall be guilty of a "misdemesnor, and forfeit his goods and chattels." The right of altering and limiting the succession was also exercised and asserted in the reigns of Henry IV., Henry VII., Henry VIII., and Queen Mary. The purport of the famous Bill of Exclusion which raised such a ferment in the latter end of the reign of Charles II., was to have set aside the king's brother and presumptive heir, the Duke of York, from the succession, on the score of his being a papist. It passed the House of Commons, but was rejected by the Lords. The Commons acknowledged the hereditary right then subsisting; and the Lords did not dispute the power, but merely the propriety, of an exclusion. History demonstrated, as it may do again, what a mass of avoidable mischief was incurred by the determination.

See also what Blackstone says, who may be considered as our popular edition of the law for common use. "The grand "fundamental maxim upon which the *jus coronæ*, or right of "succession to the throne of these kingdoms, depends, I take "to be this: that the crown is, by common law and constitutional custom, hereditary; and this in a manner peculiar to "itself: but that the right of inheritance may from time to "time be changed or limited by act of parliament; under which "limitations the crown still continues hereditary." Again, "It "is unquestionably in the breast of the supreme legislative "authority of this kingdom, the King and both houses of parliament, to defeat this hereditary right; and, by particular "entails, limitations, and provisions, to exclude the immediate "heir, and vest the inheritance in any one else."

The law of England therefore plainly is, that the crown is hereditary, subject to the interposition of the legislature for the

time being, to prevent notorious absurdities and dangers. The constitution as it exists, defects enough though it may have, is not altogether such a thing for republicans to laugh at, as it would be without this merciful provision. The community is not merely free, it is specially provided with the organization, to do the thing if it likes; and if it does not do it, it is only because it does not like.

The reasons why the community should in the present instance use its power, are first, the manifest evils and dangers that are to be avoided by it, which would seem to be of itself sufficient for all ordinary appetites for reasons: and secondly, for the more squeamish, that there is no precedent in our history, for such a thing as the transplantation of a monarch from a foreign throne, under circumstances of no compulsion arising out of the absence of any other to succeed. Our ancestors it is true transplanted William III. and the two first Georges; but they did it under what they viewed as the hard necessity, of either doing it or allowing the throne to revert to a line proscribed, for want of a successor. When there is no successor in sight without having recourse to the King of Hanover or his line, then the question will be put on the same footing as in the case of the Georges; but till this is the case, it is on a perfectly distinct one. To say that our ancestors made an Act of Settlement and included no provision for a claimant being found upon a foreign throne, might be an argument for monks, but not for men of this world. The bringing in the Georges at all, was manifestly a very sore subject, and one on which our ancestors, though convinced of the necessity, were inclined to dilate as little as was possible. The most unreasonable thing on earth would have been to have expected them to be curious in entering on hypothetic cases; except the unreasonableness of fancying that we are bound by the omission. The acknowledged power of correction, which they in their age applied in the major case, they left us in ours to apply in the minor. Sensible men themselves, they calculated on a posterity who should have common sense for their inheritance.

These points therefore, try to work into the minds of the public before the elections. If the constituencies would make them the subject of pledges from their candidates, they would take a step towards the safety of their country. And surely Providence is with us, in the course which it has permitted the bold bad man who has left us, to select. His first step has been to declare the constitution which was established and agreed to, to a certain extent by his predecessor once removed, George IV., and to a still greater extent by his immediate pre-

decessor William IV., to be "neither in form nor substance binding on him;" and the organ of his party here, says that the Constitution was one suggested by the King and not by the people, and that his predecessor "had no more right to bind his successor than his ancestor had to bind *him*." This forms a good comment on the concessions of kings in general; there is nothing ever had with them but an armed truce. William IV., whenever the Tories chuse, will have been a king most zealous for all just reforms,—*so* zealous, that all which was of his suggestion being held resumable by his successor, all which was not may be held resumable by reason of its inherent badness. "Surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird." Luckily for us, our enemy has tried his *little-go*, before he had the opportunity to try his great one. The people's defence must be in themselves; for if the Whig ministers had twelve legions of angels sent to their assistance, they would take it all out in increased resistance to the wishes of the people, till they brought themselves again to that majority of twenty-three, which is the temperament at which they find it most convenient to exist, secure from the frosts of loss of place on one hand, and the heat of popular progress on the other. When asked on Monday whether they viewed the proclamation of the King of Hanover as authentic, the answer of the government was that it was a question to be put to the States of Hanover. A pretty jest it would be to write to the States of Hanover, and ask them whether Mr. Poulett Thomson thinks the proclamation is authentic! But the answer made an excellent introduction to the Notice that followed. These are the kind of watchmen we have upon the tower. Once more, let the constituencies remember, that God helps them that help themselves; and that in the present case if we do not help ourselves, it is plain that either through design or dullness everybody else will be playing into the hands of the enemy.

If through your means these truths can be impressed on the Electors of the country at this important moment, we shall both of us have lived to purpose if we never did before.

London, 22 July, 1837.

I COLLECT from the continental papers, that the proceedings of the King of Hanover, and all and every mark of attention paid to them in England in any quarter, are attracting great notice abroad, and that it is expected of Englishmen to do something to maintain the rank they have hitherto held among the free people of Europe. I can only therefore impress upon

you and our friends in general, the importance of speaking out upon this important subject at the present elections. And though I know that with you the immediate contest will be over before this can reach the eyes of the public in the usual course, I feel confident that through your assistance this communication will not be altogether without effect. Do not let our ancient town fall into the hands of men, who will make it a landing-place for the King of Hanover.

I will here cease my regular correspondence for the present; but shall hope soon to find an occasion of renewing our conjoint labours in the public service.

London, 29 *July*, 1837.

I TAKE the first leisure moment I have, to write to you on the subject of what has past at your election. We have not enlisted under the expectation that we were to be always the spoilt children of victory; or if we ever dreamed of such a thing, we have had time enough to get the better of such fond imaginings. "*Beating, beaten; beaten, beating*," as Bonaparte said in his first Italian campaign, must be the fare of all who mean to be victorious in the end.

What I want to point out to you now, is the comparative facility with which you may oust your enemies; and as a man who has been "laid down and robbed at the door of the House of Commons" by the same party, I speak with an unction upon the subject.

You have with you the very great advantage, of being able to kill two birds with one stone, and so to a great extent halving the expense. The hateful compost of vice and pollution called the constitution, decrees that the seats in our representation shall be won and lost by money. It is part of a general plot to rob the poor for the benefit of the rich, and must come down when we are able. But in the mean time so it is; we are not answerable for it, nor is it of our making. In the "envy of surrounding nations," nothing to be done without money. There is, however, a clean end of the stick and a dirty one; and we must take hold of the clean end, and see if our adversaries have not got the other.

Knowing the ground as we do from what happened when your Tories robbed me two years ago, we have the power of doing much in the way of shortening the process required. The probability is, that there are thirty or forty bad votes on your side, from removals or otherwise, but free from all that is discreditable; and the same number on the other, with the

addition of about three or four times as many more, *discreditable in the highest degree.* You have therefore only to bring objections to the *nine* most easily disproved votes of the antagonists, (say removals), and Mr. Hutt and the lowest-numbered of his opponents are brought to the process of disproving two and two votes alternately, till one or other party is run out. Here then begin (in the phrase more forcible than elegant of my managing solicitor in 1835) "to let out the stink against them." They fled from it as the devil might from holy water, in 1835. Bring up the most *unsaintly* cases you can find, and we shall see whether they will stand it longer now. And all this time, the work is doing for Mr. Wood. The voters for the two liberal candidates are probably so nearly alike, that when Mr. Hutt has got to the end of his bad votes, those that can possibly be found with Mr. Wood will be comparatively few. The question therefore is nearly reduced, to whether after the process necessary to bring in Mr. Hutt has been concluded, seventy-six more bad votes can be found on the Tory side. Whether this can be done or not, must be matter of calculation; but at all events it is very tempting to go into the calculation, when so much that would be necessary in the single case of Mr. Wood, will have been done previously for Mr. Hutt.

One reason why the liberal community of Hull should find some money upon this occasion, is because they found none for me. Spur up your men of money on this point; and tell them, all they will do now, shall be wiped off from any old score that may be out against them. It is a filthy thing to be talking about money in this way; but it is because we live in a pig-sty of our fathers' making.

I made a *point* on Maidstone, since I wrote to you last. Though not attended with direct success, it has demonstrated that in a place which certainly had no good name, there are 529 unbought men who will vote for the liberal side at all hazards. It has further proved, that the Tories may be flurried there at any time, and made to expend their strength, at the cost of a few cards and handbills. Maidstone therefore is henceforth among the boroughs in purgatory. Beverley I see is in the same state; though Maidstone is the most advanced of the two. Keep up the brotherhood everywhere, and we shall some day come to a government that a man may talk about to foreigners without blushing. The Maidstone election was just like a Hull one; zeal and hard work in plenty. The only difference I could discern, was that the upper classes of tradesmen who in Hull

call themselves Radicals, in Maidstone style themselves only Whigs. But they are the same men at heart. I vowed to the Virgin to send you a hundred pounds towards the Hull scrutiny if I carried Maidstone; but it was not to be.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

END OF THE LETTERS OF A REPRESENTATIVE.

COLLECTIONS &c.

CELEBRATION OF THE BIRTHDAY OF THE PRINCESS VICTORIA AT HULL.

(From the *Hull Saturday Journal* of 27 May 1837.)

Dinner of Reformers in the Victoria Rooms, Queen Street.

On Wednesday (24 May 1837), at five o'clock, about 400 sat down to dinner in the Victoria Rooms. The Hon. Charles Langdale consented to preside.

The *Chairman* proposed,

"The King."
"The Queen."
"The health of the Princess Victoria."
"The Members for the Borough."

Colonel *Thompson* spoke as follows:—Townsmen, and you [looking to the ladies' gallery] whose presence on this particular occasion it would be sin to pass in silence, assembled to commemorate the arrival of your young countrywoman at the age at which by law she may assume the exercise of the proudest prerogative of any human being—that of the Sovereign of a free people (cheers), I will not detain you longer from the great business of this meeting, than to express the joy with which I find myself once more among you in my native place (cheers). Before I left London, a member of the House of Commons, a man most eminent for talent, one with whom I have prided myself to have agreed as frequently as with any individual in that House and to have differed as seldom, declared that he must decline attending a meeting of this nature, because "he would not flatter rising royalty." Agreeing with him still in principle, I come not here "to flatter rising royalty" (loud cheering). My position may be in some sort singular. When I stood before you a candidate, it was objected to me that I had maintained what are called republican principles (loud cheers). Did I shrink from the truth? (shouts of "No"). Did I not avow it? ("Yes, yes"). Did you not elect me upon that avowal? (general and long-continued cheers). And did I not in that House which has been called "the last resort and citadel of human liberty," take opportunity to declare, that if I were to define the particular sect of politicians to which I did in principle belong, I should say I was one of that class—very numerous I believe at the period of the Revolution—who, believing in the superior excellence of republican institutions, as clearly as they believe that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, are still willing to submit their own opinions to those of the majority, and to perform every duty within the limit of their abilities, under a monarchical government; and I dared all men to say, wherein we or ours had been deficient in the keeping of that compact (cheers). In that character I come hither. I come here truly to declare, if the truth can reach, and

I trust it can, the ear of that royal lady whose natal day we are here to celebrate,—the terms on which the lovers (many I believe in this country) of republican principles and institutions, submit themselves loyally and heartily to her sovereignty (cheers). The terms are these,—that she shall govern within the limits of the law (cheers); that she shall remember, that to be a sovereign is a vulgar thing, but to be the sovereign of a free people, and that people England, is the one thing on earth to which God has made no fellow and no second; that *we* shall have all the substantial benefits of the best of republics, and *she* the loyalty and service of consenting freemen (loud cheers). Let her keep her portion of the compact, as here none doubts she will, and then if time of need should come, see how we will keep ours (loud cheering). What man is here who would not join in the conduct of that bold Hungarian Diet, who, when their queen was imperilled, drew their swords with one impulse from their scabbards, exclaiming with Ireland's gallantry (cheers), and something of Ireland's fervid spirit which makes the heart o'erleap the tongue's correctness, "*Moriamur pro rege nostro Mariâ Teresâ*" (loud cheers). Should evil times come, would woman's weakness be felt in sovereign power, or should we not see the days return of that Elizabeth, who dashed the foreign invaders from our coasts, and left the name of woman glorious on the throne, as elsewhere it is beautiful (great cheering). I hear that you are with me; there may be addresses elsewhere more flattering, some more courtly, better adapted perhaps to the ears of those to whom truth has ceased to be desirable; but there will be none more honest, none that in reason should be more acceptable, than this which will proceed from our ancient town, which once drove back an encroaching king (enthusiastic cheering for some time)—which once I say drove back an encroaching king—in our boyhood we kept holiday upon that day, perhaps our children do so still—and by that act helped to lay the foundations of the liberty of Europe and the world (loud cheers). I must speak to you next of the position of public affairs as I left them where I came from (cheers). I would that I could speak more hopefully, more encouragingly; I know the advantages of union—I stand here by union (applause); it is no part of mine to make men disagree. Shall I confess my hopes are low? I will blame no man's intention. I will suppose that all has been done for the best; yet I see one great failure, of which it is but honest, that, so thinking, I should warn you (hear, hear). You are acquainted at least, with those who know the Polar seas. Heard you the history of those men who marched upon the ice ten miles to the northward, and then found they had made two miles south by observation? (cheers, and laughter); while they went north, the ice was moving south, faster than they walked (loud cheers, and laughter). Now that, I am much afraid, has been the case with the ministers who have guided our estate; they have not contemplated how rapidly the evil influences of all kinds which were acting against them, were carrying them to leeward,—how large a discount and deduction they ought to have made from the result of any efforts they were then exhibiting. Would they now look back, and see how many opportunities they had of keeping up

the popular spirit,—of advancing it by just concessions, and thereby preventing the low estate to which I fear they are now reduced,—I cannot think there exists in human minds such thoughtlessness or insensibility, as would not seize the opportunities were it possible they should be offered them again. The time I fear is much gone by. You know to what omissions I allude. Had we had the ballot for instance (loud applause), I do think we should have had more chance to have held our own than we have at present. Had we had some increase to the suffrage (loud cries of "Hear, hear,"), I think the same. What then must we do? Only, I think, this;—each man try to fortify and strengthen that particular citadel and seat of public liberty, in which he may find himself by fortune situated (hear, hear). Evil times may come. Had you heard as I did, a man who once was yours and ours,—a man of whom I will say no more than that he is not now (applause),—had you heard him as I did, throw in the teeth of ministers the absurdity of thinking that they with their majority of 23, which this day may be 13 or 3, should carry any measure against the Lords, in favour of religious freedom (applause)! Is that no indication that our condition is far from good? It never has been my vocation to disguise danger; never, I hope, to expose it unnecessarily; I would dishearten nobody, but I would show you the position in which you stand, and would impress upon every man's mind and imagination the necessity, if he ever acted vigorously, to do so again; if he never acted strenuously before, that he should, in the scriptural phrase, gird up the loins of his mind, and address himself to it, now (cheers). I think it very probable that some difference of opinion existed,—it seldom has done, but perhaps there was some now,—between me and my elder fellow-representative upon this point. Perhaps he did not think so ill of the condition of the ministry as I did. He did urge me not to go away. I feared the benefit of my stay would be easily calculable and very determinately small (cheers); but where I was going, if I could rouse honest men to a sense of their peril, that would be doing a good whose benefits might be unlimited (loud cheers). I came here to tell you this, and I have told you plainly. You will measure it in your minds, and I hope to see the effect of it in your actions hereafter (cheers). If there was anything in my conduct in parliament which I could explain to you, how willingly should I now attempt it. I have done my utmost for you, so far as constant attention could go (loud cheering for some time), which is in all men's power. I have endeavoured to serve you further, to the extent of any ability which God has given me (loud cheers). If any of you have thought that I fell short, perhaps you are not aware of all the difficulties which oppose the progress of a member in that house, particularly a new member; it takes much to beat up against all the opposition that presents itself,—I fear I might sometimes say too, the divisions, of men who do not always help one another to drive the nail to where it might be sent with most effect against the opponent (cheers). On one point I know that I have grieved many, from whom it gave me most heartfelt sorrow to differ for many reasons; yet I was driven between two perils—I could but chuse the least (hear, hear), and

chose that which seemed to me the most consonant with justice, and most likely to tend to those great objects we have all at heart;—I allude to the subject, which, though I am afraid many do not, yet I think part and portion of the great struggle for religious freedom—the Sunday question (cheers). Could I have been heard, I would have argued with all the powers I could command, "Let well alone; don't raise a question which will create great heart-burnings in the breasts of many,—one in which you will to a certainty find yourselves lose ground. Allow your neighbours to have an opinion on religious practice, as well as yourselves (loud cheers); no man wants or wishes to attack you, in the exercise of your own discretion for yourselves." I mention it with perfect deference to every man's right to have an opinion of his own; but if I had not mentioned it, it might be said it was because I durst not (much cheering). Well then, on this question I have done my best. Is there a man here or elsewhere, who thinks that were he oppressed or injured to the smallest definable degree in his religious freedom, there is a power of mind or body in me, that would not be entirely at the service of his defence? (enthusiastic and universal cheering for some time). Such of you then as think that I was wrong—for in this numerous assembly there doubtless must be such—take my excuse; such of you as go along with me, bear it to your neighbours; tell them that I offer no outrage to religious peculiarities, and least of all to theirs; that I pray them to forgive me that on one important point I had not come to the same opinion with them, and trust this difference may be the first and only one (cheers). Let us turn now to another question connected with religious freedom—Church-rates. Oh it would have grieved you as it grieved me, if you had heard how, in that place, this important question was argued with a general consent, as I might say, never to whisper the principle of justice. Surely the Dissenters have done wrong, though I am bold to say it, in not putting into the mouths of their avowed advocates stronger language; they should not have made a compact with the government, to see how much on a point of justice could be got out of the community without appealing openly to the principle that was at stake. All parties will get what they deserve. I might take up the mock of the member for Westminster, who asked why a majority of 23 should do it now, when it would not have done it "in the olden time"? Could you have heard how men did cheer, what recollections were excited by that mention of "the olden time" (laughter)! But if in the olden time with a majority of 23 it was absurd to look for success, what is it now? From this hour begin, you who are interested in the progress of that great question; give up all hopes of present success; look out for that which shall be after it; calculate your measures. Take my word for it, all the time now taken by the forelock will be saved for the ultimate effect. We must aim at the reinforcement of popular opinion in this country. I fear that there lies much blame upon those who, lest the boiler should burst, have let the steam go out (loud cheers and laughter); it *has* done everywhere, except in the hearts of you and such as you; it is for you to rekindle it; it is from you they must recover the flame; nay, you must drive them

to the business sooner or later, or there will be a cessation of every force from which you and yours might look for benefit (cheers). One word more, countrymen. I have taken the liberty to give you an example, of what I recommend to all of you. Bring your young Hannibals, and teach them betimes to swear upon the altars of their country (long-continued cheers), not hatred to any man, God forbid! that was the ancient rite, but we live under a happier dispensation;—make them swear love to the community and to mankind,—and, above all, a firm attachment to the interests of the weak, believing that therein we shall always secure the interests of the strong. In that way let us endeavour to train our children after us, as we also are in some sort the followers of those you may remember, and perhaps have not altogether ceased to regret (loud cheers). It remains for me now to give you "the health of our Chairman" (cheering for some time). Having said so much on religious liberty, I cannot avoid begging you to allow me to connect him with that great question. Look at his motto, *post tenebras lucem*, "after darkness light." I should be sorry to disagree with any here, but I do think that after ages of darkness there sprang up a great light, on that day which saw the abolition of the religious animosities under which our fathers groaned (loud cheers), and certified it by the outward visible sign, of the members of his religious profession walking in the full enjoyment of those liberties which their forefathers were the first to secure to our nation (great cheering).—*Hull Saturday Journal of* 27 *May* 1837.

o

CANADA.—MEETING AT THE CROWN AND ANCHOR TAVERN.

A MEETING was held on Thursday, 11 January 1838, at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, Strand, for the purpose of petitioning Parliament on the present unhappy war in Canada. The interest with which passing occurrences in that colony are viewed by the inhabitants of this metropolis was evinced by the crowded state of the room, long before the time appointed for taking the chair. In the music gallery there were several ladies. Mr. Roebuck first mounted the platform, followed by Mr. Grote, M.P., Mr. Hume, M.P., Mr. Leader, M.P., Mr. Crawford, M.P., and Colonel Thompson. They were greeted with the most tumultuous cheering.

Mr. *Prout* moved that Joseph Hume, Esq., take the chair. The question being seconded and put, was carried by an overwhelming majority.

The chairman introduced the business in a speech of considerable length, in which he explained the nature of the Canadian grievances.

Mr. *Leader* proposed the first resolution.

Colonel *Thompson* came forward to second the resolution, not because he was altogether contented with it, but because he had been asked to do so. He was glad to find that the honourable gentleman who had preceded him had given the real version of the resolution as it originally stood, and not the altered version (cheers). When resolutions had passed through a committee, (and on this occasion he hap-

pened to be chairman of the committee), it frequently occurred that men of a nervous disposition found opportunities to slip out words they thought were forcible, and put in their place those they thought better calculated to let the thing down gently. He rejoiced to hear the honourable member for Westminster declare there was a disastrous "*civil war*" now raging in Canada. Was there not? And should they try to dwindle that away by calling it a disastrous "*disturbance?*" (Cheers.) Why, when three cats quarrelled in a chimney, that was a disastrous disturbance (laughter). The meeting, therefore, would not be surprised at his stating, that if his will only had been consulted, the resolution would have been a much stronger one. If the ministers of the Crown had endeavoured to take the supplies in this country by means of military force, what would Englishmen have called it? (Voices in the meeting, "Treason!") He thanked them for that word. Treason in England was treason in Canada, and he stood there to avow, that had he succeeded in carrying the resolution he had proposed, it would have been, "That the attempt of the ministers of the Crown to seize on the supplies in Canada against the consent of the Representative Assembly, is an act of treason (vehement cheering)—which the British people, if they are wise, will punish when they are able." (Continued cheering). The chairman had warned them against hard words; but words were not hard when true. For proof he referred them to the history of their country. Did they ask what page, or where? They would hear of it about Whitehall. A "glorious act of substantial justice" was once enacted in that neighbourhood, which had been said to give a "crick in the neck" to every absolute monarch once a year. There was our evidence. If the recollection was a disagreeable one, where was the policy of forcing it upon our memory? But listen to the reasons why you are to agree to it. Suppose the government were to send soldiers to seize your goods, would you be satisfied with being told that it was patriotism in you to pray for the success of those troops, because, forsooth, they were Englishmen? (Loud cheers.) We maintain a body of troops for the defence of the country, but should we like them to put their hands into our pockets? We should be told that ministers had a majority in both houses; but have we made up our minds to surrender all the rights that had been handed down to us by our ancestors, by admitting that we held them merely at the will of what might be a corrupt House of Commons for the time being? It was a sad thing to see military execution let loose anywhere. But in Canada it had been done with circumstances of unnecessary aggravation. What necessity was there to burn a hundred men in a barn? (Loud cries of "Shame.") How would the people of this country like such an atrocity perpetrated upon themselves? This was what they paid troops for,—to burn them by hundreds in a barn, in case they resisted the seizing of the supplies. Have the people of England taken a view of their position? If they looked to the west, they would see a Parliament-house "surrendered for the use of the troops,"—those were the very words. If they looked to Hanover, they would see an absolute monarch undertaking to reform a constitution. Yes, that was the last word he

had heard of the King of Hanover. His absolute Majesty was turned Reformer, and was backed by a certain class of Reformers in this country. Dull and stupid people of England! what will become of you if you do not take alarm in time? What ground is there for believing that the ministers who had done these things in Canada, would not do the same here whenever there was a temptation? Is there any ground for confidence in the rest of their proceedings? No man could tell what design would be avowed next, by a ministry who had bottled up their intentions to oppose the progress of reform, till they had slipped the slave's collar on and snapped the lock for seven years, and got themselves elected by constituencies which would never have returned them if the least hint had got abroad of what their intentions were. He put it to the judgment of the meeting, whether parallel conduct in private life, would not be followed by immediate expulsion from society. In conclusion, he would call upon the meeting to forgive what was weak in the resolutions, and strengthen what was strong, and give their aid to collect a force of public opinion sufficient to compel the ministers to retrace their steps. (Cheers.)—*Daily Paper.*

CANADA.—MEETING IN MARYLEBONE.

On Tuesday (20th February 1837), a public meeting of the inhabitants of Marylebone was held at the Mechanics' Institution, Circus-Street, New Road, "to take into consideration the present alarming condition of Canada."

According to the announcement in the handbills, the chair was to be taken at seven o'clock precisely, and at that hour the large room of the Institution was crowded to excess. Considerable impatience was manifested by the meeting at the committee of management or the chairman not making their appearance till within a few minutes of eight o'clock, when J. A. Roebuck, Esq., appeared on the platform, and was unanimously moved to the chair.

Mr. Love, the secretary, read letters from Sir S. Whalley, M.P., Joseph Hume, Esq., and Col. Thompson, excusing themselves for not attending the meeting. Mr. Hall, one of the members for the borough, had spoken to the committee, regretting also that business would detain him out of town till the 15th instant.

* * * * *

Colonel *Thompson* presented himself, and addressed the meeting. He had intended to stay at home, not from a disinclination to serve, but a belief that it might be economy for future service. He came now, because the great Tory organ, the *Times*, had that day thought it worth while to threaten him for what he had said at a larger meeting. He came to make a politic use of this, by repeating and confirming everything he had said before (cheers). He had said that with his will, the resolution proposed to the Westminster meeting should have been, "That the attempt of the Ministers of the Crown to seize on the supplies in Canada against the consent of the Representative Assembly, is an act of treason, which the British people, if they are wise, will punish when they are able" (loud

cheers). And for proof he had referred to the fact, that a greater than they (loud cheers), had been brought to condign punishment for the very attempt that ministers were now engaged in. This was his answer to those threats; but this was not all. He too, stood there for the Queen; and threw the name of traitor upon all, who professing to support her title to the throne, denied that the punishments inflicted on the ejected family, were just, legal, honourable, and glorious (loud and continued cheering). For his part, he would stand on no nice fence, as to what precise quantum of grievance might justify resistance. Sufficed it for him, that the ministers in their insanity and wickedness had chosen to run upon that particular breach of constitutional law, which had been stamped by a civil war and change of dynasty, as justifying resistance, and breaking up the compact between the people and the government. The whole was only a rehearsal; one old and acknowledged right of the people was to be broken down to-day, and another to-morrow; and all the while a possible successor to the throne was looking forward to the chance of repeating the tragedy upon ourselves. But we were told that taking the supplies by force was not to be resisted; submit, and trust to the benevolence of the victorious tyranny. Was this the way our ancestors had acted; or was it the way men acted in private life? If they heard the cry of rape, did they say to the injured, Let him have his will, and wait to see what he will do for you afterwards? (cheers). Once more he exhorted the meeting to consider, that an old and admitted right of the British people, which their fathers had bought with their blood, was now at stake (loud and continued cheering).

Several other speakers followed, and the meeting did not separate till half-past ten.—*Daily Paper.*

THE BALLOT.—GREAT MEETING IN MARYLEBONE.

A VERY numerous public meeting of the inhabitants of the borough of Marylebone, convened by the vestry, was held on Monday last, (21 January 1838), at the Workhouse, New Road, for the purpose of expressing their opinion on the subject of the ballot, and of petitioning parliament in favour of that measure. On the platform were Mr. Hume, M.P., Colonel Evans, M.P., Colonel Thompson, Gilbert Ainslie Young, Esq., Mr. Hall, M.P., Sir S. Whalley, M.P., and other reformers, inhabitants of the borough.

On the motion of Mr. *Hume*, seconded by Mr. *Hovenden*, Dr. Harrison was unanimously called to the chair.

Mr. *Hovenden* moved the first resolution:—"That the meeting was of opinion, from the great and important benefits which have resulted from the practical use of the ballot in the parochial elections of this extensive parish, that it is the only mode by which the independent exercise of the elective franchise can be effectually secured to the voter, and therefore ought to be extended to parliamentary elections of the United Kingdom."

The resolution was seconded by Mr. *Hume*.

Colonel Evans, Mr. Hall, and Sir Samuel Whalley then addressed the meeting; after which the resolution was put and carried.

Mr. *Young* then moved a resolution—"That to carry out the true spirit and efficiency of the Reform Bill by an adequate representation of the people in the Commons' house of parliament, the meeting was of opinion that every householder in the United Kingdom should possess the elective franchise without reference to payment of rates or taxes."

This resolution was seconded by Mr. *Soden*, and carried.

Colonel *Thompson* rose to move the third resolution. He appeared, not this time as a wandering orator, as somebody had called him,—though he never wandered except where he was an invited guest,—but as the tenant of No. 13 in Hanover Terrace. He saw the awful ensigns of parochial authority waving above his head, and was comforted to think he was under the protection of their shade (laughter and cheers). He was to propose a resolution for shortened parliaments, a subject he thought had not received from reformers the attention due; the time was favourable for examination, and he happened himself to have just now a little experimental knowledge on the point. The question had been raised, whether ministers were right or wrong in making their declaration against further Reform. As it was a parish meeting, he would take a parish illustration. It no doubt sometimes happened there, that a couple resolved to enter into the holy state of matrimony, but the awkward question occurred, whether they had not better have done it six months before (cheers and laughter). He had an experimental feeling on the subject, because he might have had a chance of being sent to parliament from more than one borough, if he would have opposed a Whig. But he knew the Whigs would say to him, "How could you lead us to believe you were going along with us in pursuit of a common object (cheers), and without telling us a word of your intention before the time of the elections, (loud cheers), you were all the time bottling up a determination to oppose us? How could you, Colonel Thompson, think this to be consistent with the feelings of an honest man, or the habits of a gentleman?" (loud and continued cheering). He was in hot water with one or two Radical constituencies, on this very point; and he hoped that in this they would see his excuse. But might not we as well ask ministers, why they did not let out some little glimpse before the elections, of what they knew they meant to do directly after? Call over the constituencies they now sit for in parliament,—some the great seats of manufacturing industry,—and in how many of these would they have been returned if the slightest inkling had gone forth, that "they always viewed the preponderance of the landed interest as tending to the stability of the institutions of the country?" (cries of "None.") Here then was a lesson on the fraud of seven years parliaments. But however well it might be to discuss the comparative value of these various reforms, he would say in a popular phrase which use had made forcible, "I wish you may get them" (laughter). The ministers are too busy. Doing what? Hunting a Speaker of a House of Commons with detachments of light infantry (hear, hear, hear). He hoped the people of England might not be like those of Constantinople, who were settling the mysteries of theology, when the Turk was at their gates. The people had now the

enemy at their gates. The question at present, was not what they would like to get, but what they were like to keep. Rights they had received from their fathers had at one swoop been swept away, in the persons of their fellow-citizens in the colonies; and there was nothing but the will of the doers, to prevent their own turn coming next. There was a song in the North, of "Johnny Cope are ye waken'd yet?" (cheers). There was another Johnny, to whom the words might be applied. The English people might be much nearer a reign of terror than they dreamed of. As an instance, whose blood was at that moment bawled for in the House of Commons? His*. (hear.) And had he gone through all the agitations since 1830, to be threatened for the first time now? The explanation was, that there was great difference between what people would do when they were to be responsible for their acts themselves, and what they would attempt through the intervention of a cat's-paw. He warned the country against all the dangers that might arise from a cat's-paw ministry (hear). Not one of the horrible acts which had disgraced the administration of the Whigs, would have been committed if the Tories had been to answer for the deeds themselves (hear). He concluded by moving the third resolution:—"That, for the purpose of having a more efficient and salutary control over the representation of the country, this meeting is of opinion that no Parliament should be elected for a longer period than three years."

Mr. *Nelmes* seconded the resolution.

After Mr. *Brain* and Dr. *Webb* had addressed the meeting in favour of the resolution, it was carried unanimously.

It was also resolved that petitions founded on the resolutions should be presented to both houses of parliament;—that to the Lords by Lord Brougham, and that to the Commons by the members for the borough.

Thanks were then voted to Dr. Harrison for his conduct in the chair.

The *Chairman* briefly acknowledged the compliment paid him by his fellow-parishioners, and the meeting separated at five o'clock, having first given three tremendous rounds of cheering for their "suffering brethren in Canada."—*Hull Advertiser of* 26 *Jan.* 1838.

(*From the Hull Saturday Journal of* 10 *Feb.* 1838.)

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE HULL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION.

SIR,—I saw our friend Mr. —— yesterday, and we went over the subjects on which he was desired to communicate with me.

I need not say, that I am at all times at the service of the Working Men's Association in any manner in which they think me capable of being assistant to the general cause. But at the same time it is impossible for me to conceal my conviction, that the period is gone by in which any practical good was to be expected from the discussion of the Ballot, Extension of the Suffrage, or shortening the duration of Parliaments. All these were the discussions of another æra, of

* A zealous member in the House of Commons, had quoted some incorrect reports of the words used at the Crown and Anchor on the Canada meeting of 11 Jan. (see page 308 preceding), and intimated that the monarchy was in danger unless they were visited in vengeance.

another state of politics and of society. Since then, a dark cloud has come over us, such as nothing is competent to bring upon a political party, except the treachery of some of its component parts. From the date of that great act of fraud, the question has been, not of what we would like to get, but of what we are likely to keep; to be found confounding the two questions together, would be like a man's debating whether he preferred red pine-apples or white, when he was the next moment to be delivered over to the tender mercies of the New Poor Law.

The state of the case is this. Englishmen in large numbers had declared their resolution to obtain the improvement of their political institutions, and particularly to effect an alteration in the composition of the House of Lords. They had let out too, that for bringing this to pass, they trusted to the constitutional power bequeathed to them by their ancestors, of holding a check over the supplies; a power it is not very easy to induce men to agree to exercise, and which for that very reason there is no danger of men's agreeing to exercise, except when the public mind has been fully and fairly made up on the necessity. Here then was a danger which touched Whig lords as well as Tory. The craft of the Ephesians was in peril. The Whig lords who happened to be at the helm, therefore said, "Let us try if we cannot turn the bayonet against this pretension to stopping the supplies, in time. Let us try the question where we shall have many interests to help us; and then we shall establish the precedent against the people of England in general." And they *have* established it, almost without resistance on the part of the English people. I stand here for witness, that so far as has fallen within my own observation, three out of four of professing liberals have either gone over flatly to the enemy's side, or shrunk from making any opposition, on any and on every pretence that imbecillity could invent. The Whig ministers said, "Let us seize on the supplies in Canada. Either the Canadians will resist or they will not. If there is no resistance, then we can say to the English people, You see that the right of withholding the supplies was given up by general consent. If there is resistance, we can put it down, and so establish the precedent, that the same course shall be followed at home, whenever an attempt shall be made to withhold the supplies as the means of enforcing improvement in the form of government." And the Whig ministers had the most perfect success. Three out of four, as I said before, either joined them or let the thing pass without opposition, on the most contemptible pretences. Some said it was right that the power over the supplies should be destroyed in Canada, because the Canadians were of French descent; some, because Canada was a colony; some, because the honour of the army was at stake, and we were bound to wish for the success of the army, which we pay to cut our throats; some said it must be done, to preserve a place to send the people to, who are prevented from keeping themselves at home by the Corn Laws; some, that it was necessary in order to continue paying double price for bad timber, and keep you out of trading to the Baltic. There was nothing so mean, so miserable, which professed liberals of high standing and degree, did not take for an excuse. The Irish Ulysses took the time to make his separate peace, and bargained with ministers for the bonus, of Ireland being eaten last.

Other men were "patting the ministers on the back," when they ought to have been holding them in check by the threat of turning them out upon the first symptom of misconduct; which is the only way in which a minority can make itself felt and heard. So here we are. I can with a good conscience call on you to witness, whether in my place and out of it, I have not done everything within my personal reach and influence, to expose, protest against, and alter this imbecile and suicidal plan of campaign which has been forced on us by leaders, whom time and sorrow will demonstrate, to have never been "worth their salt." A year ago, you were a free people; you had constitutional bulwarks in your front, written in the blood of one tyrant, against whom your fathers shut their gates, and in the exile of another. This year, all is swept away, and you stand only in a fearful waiting for the time, when it shall please the combined Whig and Tory lords to let loose the army upon you with all the atrocities that have been taught to it in Canada. Last year you were fenced about with strong decisions of constitutional law, not perhaps written down in codes any more than those decisions of the common law which say men shall not commit murder, but equally substantial to all appearance in their foundations in the public mind. This year Lord John Russell tells you in express words, that to use your constitutional right of stopping the supplies is to "dissolve the constitution;" an expression for which I hope to see him stand in the place of Strafford and of Laud, whatever may be the modifications which the milder spirit of the age of which he is no part, may enforce on the consequences. Lord Wellington too stands by to echo, that this is the result of encouraging the idea of popular rights, which are no rights in Canada, "nor anywhere else;" an expression graceful and to be expected from the noble lord, just as a fire of musquetry from one side is honest, while from another it would be treachery. Observe meanwhile, that we never stood up for any general and undefined right of resistance because resistance might be profitable. We said, "Never resist the law; resist that which is not law." We said, there are certain laws laid down and agreed on between the government and the people, and if the government breaks these, the duty of resistance is on the same footing as the duty of resistance to house-breaking. We said and say still, that the Whig ministers chose to put themselves into direct acts of contravention of these laws; and we wait to see, whether the Providence which watched over the liberties of our forefathers, will not at some time put into our hands the power of bringing them to justice.

In this position then you stand. If as working men or citizens of the community, you feel any grievances which you ever hoped to see redressed, lay by the expectation as you would oil and hang up a pair of skates when the frost is over, till the people of England have retraced the retrograde march which in their carelessness and their stupidity they have allowed themselves to make. They are not yet thrust into the situation of those unfortunate nations who have nothing to hope but from the same kind of force which keeps off the wild beasts of the forest. They have modes of acting bequeathed to them by their fathers and not yet taken away, which set them at a distance still from the necessity for such remedy. It is quite true, that all freedom is in the end but an

armed heresy, and that what is called moral influence resolves itself finally into the belief that physical influence could be found to back it. But for this reason moral influence must not be given up. Use it then, that you may not come to the rougher necessity, of seeing the "Liberal Club" roasted in High Church, and the "Working Men's Association" eaten by pigs on Garrison Side. There was a time, when the people of England could see beyond their noses, and scent the approach of military execution, even though the ocean rolled between them and the actual bodies of the slain. I tell you again, the people of England must speak out. There must be no more paltering, about who or what is to succeed if the present butchers are driven from the hatchet. Not one of the horrors that have taken place, would have been accomplished if the Whig ministers had been driven from their places the moment they began to show the cloven foot against the interests of the people. If five-and-twenty Radicals had turned them out upon the Penny Stamp, the widows in Canada would have been no widows, nor the children fatherless. How many more are to be made, in Canada or in High-Street, depends on how long the same process shall be deferred. All evil and dangerous things are gathering about us. The University of Oxford by its representative in parliament calls out for "blood enough;" and the priest within its walls insults the throne, by sermons on the "sinfulness" of the Revolution to which the present family owes its rights. If you call yourselves Radicals, be aware that the gallows is demanded for you by name. I tell you the men of blood are close upon you, and you know not how short a time it may be, before all that ever happened to your forefathers, may be but a fraction of your miseries. I declare to you my full conviction, that if at this moment any of the accidents to which humanity is liable were to remove the present occupant of the throne, it would be by the mere will and pleasure of the successor, if he did not march without the chance of effectual resistance, to the abrogation of everything that has been gained by the people of England in constitutional freedom, since the day that Hampden resisted ship-money. Fools and villains have laid down the rule, and you or the people of England have quietly submitted to it, that *all* resistance is criminal,—that whatever is or calls itself supreme, is to commit the act of violation first, you standing by to hold the garments, and you are to have your remedy afterwards. The "passive obedience" and "non-resistance" which our fathers scattered to the four winds, are embodied and upon us again and we are crouching each man in his nest and his harbour, and speculating upon what we should like to get, when the ministry shall run about like the roasted pigs that cried "Come eat us."

I will not ask whether you think me honest. What claim I have to your attention as one that knows a hawk from a herring-sue, it is for yourselves to settle. I assume nothing but the same faculty of judging of consequences from appearances, that makes one of your sailors take in a topgallant-sail, when he sees the squall chasing him astern. But I do most earnestly impress on you, and through you on all who may see any soundness in anything that I have said, the necessity of giving over for the present all debates upon what you would like if there was any chance

that you should get it, and apply your political influence if you have any, towards removing the greater danger that at present hangs over us; and when we have got something like reasonable security for what we thought no man was so bold as to attempt to take away, we will turn again to the discussions which we for the present will wrap up. The first step towards safety, must be to get the present ministers out of office; and the next to bring them to such an account as may deter others. Which that by God's grace and the assistance of the British people it may be accomplished, is the prayer of

Your very sincere and devoted friend and servant,

T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

London, 3 *Feb.* 1838.

THE RADICAL POLICY.

SOME Members of the House of Commons will probably get Peerages at the Coronation; and their present constituents must select new representatives. In reference to such contingency, a correspondent has sent us the following suggestions, which formed part of a letter to a friend. The writer works out one of Colonel Thompson's theories.

"What do you think of the general policy of trying to stir up the Radicals to oppose the Whigs at the forthcoming Coronation elections, as part of a plan for securing to themselves something like a share in the representation? The position of the Radicals is such, that at this moment it may almost be doubted whether they have a single unshackled representative in the House of Commons. If you can point to *one*, I feel quite sure you cannot point to *two*. And whenever there is a new general election, their case is more likely to be worse than better. The point is one of cool theory, and ought to be looked at coolly. I *affirm* (as Euclid might say) that the Radicals throughout the country are in that position, that they cannot expect to have even what the Whigs call virtual representation,—which means having a mouthpiece or two to give utterance to their opinions at all, setting out of the question all approximation to the numerical power of enforcing them; that they cannot expect to have even this, unless they will have recourse to the only defensive measure which God and nature have put within their reach, which is that of demanding from the Whigs, if not a *fair* share, at all events *some* share in the representation, under the threat, and execution too if driven to it, of setting up candidates of their own, with the admitted consequence of bringing in a Tory. I know many will object to this. Those who object are Whigs, and those who do not are Radicals; let there be no ill-humour that as Radicals we fight the battle of the Radicals."

"The Radicals are a minority everywhere, with exceptions, which if you can find out, I cannot. There may be, for instance, twenty thousand Radicals in possession of votes. Mr. O'Connell says the English Radicals in particular are 'contemptible in numbers;' and let it be so, till they are taught to make use of what they have. These twenty thousand voters ought, in fairness, to return from a twentieth to a thirtieth of

the House of Commons,—say between twenty and thirty Members. But, through the single fact of their being dispersed throughout the country, instead of being congregated in masses proportioned to their numbers, they may and do find themselves in the predicament of being scarcely able to send a man to Parliament to be their mouthpiece. If I am told that this is the bargain of all minorities, I deny it—at least so far as concerns their right to help themselves if they can. It is true, that in the existing state of the representation, there is a tendency for every minority to be unrepresented till it can turn itself into a majority; and it is not easy to say how anybody would go about to remove it if he had full powers. But this is not a reason why minorities are not to correct the tendency, if they can find the way. At present the Radicals (by which, you will perceive, is all along intended a distinction from the Whig-Radicals) have no alternative, but either to make up their minds to be virtually excluded from representation for a time to which no limit can be foreseen, or else assume the defensive attitude described. It is plain that the most favourable (perhaps the only very favourable) circumstances for making such a plan effective, would be at a general election, and in the places where the Liberals, by combination, are able to return two Members. But it does not follow that the plan ought not to be put in action under other and less favourable chances. There is no danger, on the whole, of the Radicals getting more than their share; and it is time enough to cry out when there is."

"The Coronation elections present something like an approximation to a general election, by the room they give for acting in various places on a common principle. And the fair composition to be offered by the Radicals to the Whigs is, that on questions where the Whigs and Radicals are notoriously at variance, the representative should abstain from voting; thus placing the ministers one higher on the division than they would have been if the Radicals in the constituency had had things all their own way, and one lower than if the Whigs. If the Radicals anywhere can do better for themselves than this, let them do it; as the Whigs undoubtedly will without scruple on their side. But where they cannot, had they not better do the half they can, than go without representation altogether, for want of a concerted system?"

Desperate diseases call for desperate remedies. At present there is not a shadow of representation of independent Radicalism in the House of Commons. Further, not only do we look in vain for the enunciation and support of any particular class of opinions or measures which may have been termed "Radical," but there is no attempt to perform even the ordinary duties of an Opposition. There were speeches and motions in the days of Tory ascendancy, which would terrify the milk-and-water gentlemen who now profess Liberalism. Under these circumstances, seeing that the Radicals can scarcely be worse off than they are at present, the course of action recommended by the above letter-writer may be worth trying. The first step is to find out fit candidates—men of talent, honesty, and nerve.—*Spectator*, 5 *May*, 1838.

MEETING IN NEW PALACE YARD, WESTMINSTER.

(*Morning Chronicle of* 18 *Sept.* 1838.)

THE meeting of the working classes of the metropolis, which for some time past has been publicly announced to be about to take place, for the purpose of taking into consideration "the People's Charter," which had been prepared by the London Working Classes Association, and the National Petition for universal suffrage, annual parliaments, vote by ballot, and other essential reforms, was held in New Palace Yard, Westminster, on Monday. (17 Sept. 1838).

. . . . . .

At one o'clock the High Bailiff, Francis Smedley, Esq., took the chair, amidst loud cheers. Amongst others who came on the hustings we observed Mr. Leader, M.P.; and R. Brown, Esq., M.P. for Mayo; Col. Thompson; F. O'Connor, Esq.; Dr. Wade; Rev. Mr. Fox; Mr. Welford; M. Cavaignac from Paris; Mr. Swain; Mr. Trott; Mr. Rintoul, &c., &c.

. . . . . .

Mr. *Ebenezer Elliott*, the "Corn law Rhymer," then came forward, and was loudly cheered. (*See Speech in Morning Chronicle of* 18 *Sept.* 1838.)

Colonel *Thompson* said, as he rose to speak to a particular point, he should be brief. The friends and leaders of the people had agreed upon certain subjects to be brought before the meeting, and he trusted the meeting would hear his advice and follow it, which was not to bring any others forward now. There would be time enough for other subjects; and subjects enough when the time came. There would be the Corn Laws; they would ask for a total freedom of the press; he hoped they would shortly hear a demand for a system of secular education, by which he meant a system in which neither Peter, Martin, nor Jack, should interfere to stop the progress of the worldly knowledge which was required by all. How absurd would it appear, if at the door of an eating-house men were asked what catechism they adhered to, before they were allowed to satisfy their earthly wants. Besides these, there would be questions asked as to the right of petition, and the power of the purse, both of which had been virtually taken away by the present Parliament. But they must stick to their present points now; no man must cry "halt" in a charge. Universal suffrage was one of the objects for which they were now met. A new objection had been put forth against that in the press,—that if the working classes had the suffrage they would be the majority, and because they would be the majority they would be all-powerful; and because they were all-powerful they would do all mischief. But he would ask whether somebody had not been all-powerful before, and whether if the people were all-powerful in their stead, it was ever likely they should do half as much mischief as the others had. Was there any probability, for instance, that when they got the power, they would decree that no man in possession of £300 a-year should have a seat in the House of Commons, and no man having £600 a-year should sit for a county? Was there

any probability of a decree that every rich man should pay seven times as much upon his harmless luxuries,—his tobacco, for instance,—as the poor? But there was another answer more direct than that; and this he would put forth in reply to the objection stated in a quarter where he was most grieved to see it. The people did not ask to have to themselves a majority and an exclusive power, as the rich had hitherto done, and, if he must speak classically, "misused it most damnably." They did not seek for that; they only sought to have a fair share of influence in the councils of the country, strained upwards through all the influences of wealth and station in the richer classes. There was another point, on which he was come to sing a new song,—which in Latin is to "recant." He was one of those who had been for accepting Triennial Parliaments; but now he would not hear of Triennial Parliaments, unless accompanied with a provision for one-third vacating their seats annually. That was the highest he would go, and why? Because they had had a lesson on the operation of long parliaments, too good to be forgotten. Before the election of the present parliament the Whigs professed to unite with the Radicals; but the parliament having been elected, they said, "Now we have got you fast for seven years, we will tell you a secret which we concealed before,—we always were for the establishment of the agricultural preponderance, and were opposed to further reform." Surely in vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird. What interest have we in what may be done by the men that may be chosen seven years hence? The bell that is tolling there, will have tolled for half of us. What community of feeling would men chosen seven years ago, have with us now? We want men that shall represent present wants, and not the mouldy crusts of seven years gone, nor the expected ones of seven years to come. Go on, then, on the points you have, letting no man turn you to the right or to the left; and heaven speed your cause.

RADICAL DEMONSTRATION AT HULL.

(*Sun of* 15 *Oct.* 1838.)

Last Friday afternoon, (13 Oct. 1838), at a public meeting called by the Committee of the Working Men's Association, to adopt the National Petition and People's Charter, and also to elect a delegate to the National Convention in London.

Colonel *Thompson* came forward, and was received with great cheering. He said, Townsmen, you well knew from the connexion which has been between us, that I could not hesitate to present myself at the call of any portion of you; still more when I was aware that I should see here a meeting of the honest and industrious classes,—not, it may be, very learned,—not, it may be, possessed of what the world calls power and grandeur, but possessing those qualities which enable our countrymen to boast, that whenever they take a question seriously in hand, it always ends in their success (loud cheers). Look back upon your history, see what there is that has not been carried by resolution and perseverance. I came not here to flatter you; I came

not to buoy you up with false hopes; but to tell you that if you enter seriously and steadily upon the demand of that which justice would give you, you cannot ultimately fail (cheers). You will be disappointed if you think to gain much hastily, perhaps by any single advance you could describe or calculate upon; but everything has a beginning,—every march is begun step by step; yours is the first step here, the second will follow; you will stand by one another,—you will gain the assistance of the better part of the other classes (cheers); and see if the time does not come when we look back upon this day with gratitude to Him who gives us resolution to persevere unto the end (cheers). And what are you here for? You are here to ask the right of having, not everybody's share, but *your share* in making the laws you are to obey (cheers). It is said you would legislate for all? It is a foul calumny. You demand only to have the fair effect of your influence, after it has been strained upwards through that of all the other gradations in society; you ask that your poor man's vote shall go as far as a poor man's vote may finally be worth. Because you are the numerical majority, does it follow that you must carry all before you? Do you carry anything like all now? Is there any fear that you will be too powerful? Do not you see daily and hourly your influence directed by your masters; by those with whom you are connected in your trade and business? They have influence over you; has anybody said they ought not? You only demand, then, that you shall have an honest share in that composition, which makes the difference between free men and slaves (loud cheers). It is hardly necessary for me to point out the ways in which you suffer from the want of all legislative power. You have laws which, for the benefit of one overbearing class, restrict the industry of you all; which stop your ships, lay an embargo on your port, limit the number of your seamen, and confine the prosperity of all within an arbitrary rule. Well then, you have determined on a certain course. And when that has been tried, what is your intention next? Perhaps I may be charged with anticipating; but you certainly will not be long before you find that question force itself upon you. I will tell you what you must do. You must do as your fathers did;—you must turn politicians at large;—you must not say we will have this thing and that thing,—but you must fight the battle wherever it is to be fought. Who is there here that ever worked with a baffling wind into Gibraltar Bay? You went before the wind when it was favourable, and when it was not, you did the best you could to hold your own; if you could not gain on one tack you tried another, and so went on till by God's blessing you got into port (cheers). Just so must you do here,—gain all you can, and above all things make a stout resistance to any diminution of the privileges you have already. What hope you may have from the present Government, it is not in my power to point out. I never wish to set class against class; there will be always in a country like this, a variety of shades of political opinions; we must encourage no bitter feeling against men who go less lengths in polities than ourselves. I speak of those classes—not the ministers,—who go by the name of Whigs.—(Mr. O'Connor here arrived, and was greeted with hearty cheering.) I was

saying that we must not unnecessarily seek a quarrel with any class of political opinions;—the time will come I hope when we all shall move together again for the common good. What are we all, but Whigs *risen upon*?—risen a good deal you will say; but with them was the beginning. But I can hold out no hope to you from the men they have made their ministers;—on the contrary, honesty obliges me to declare, the sooner you succeed in removing them the better (loud cheers). Never give in to that feeblest of all fallacies—the engaging to support bad men because there are some worse (cheers). The business of a small political party was to have acted between the two great parties, threatening each alternately, and so making activity make up for weakness. Never give in to that folly, or treachery, which abandoned Canada, and ultimately Ireland, for the sake of some six months safety to the latter, and then turns her over to her enemies, after having thrown away the defence which was in her reach before (cheers). I have stood here by the side of great men—you know it is not within my desire to speak amiss of them—but I think the time is not far off, when they will bitterly repent the course they have followed with respect to their own country, and equally so with respect to ours. When danger comes to Ireland, where can she look for support but to the English Radicals, described as so without talents, without leaders, without anything that makes a political party respectable? It is not the Radicals, who have deserted Ireland or anybody. But fear the Whig-Radicals, distrust the Whig-Radicals,—the party who, instead of showing front against the invaders of liberty, have bent and bowed when they were in a position where a bold defence might have served the cause. Listen to my own experience of them; for I have a sort of obligation to speak to you on what has befallen myself since I saw you last (cheers). Much have I been decried for certain events which took place in a London constituency—Marylebone. Hear my account, and if you have reason to distrust me, do so; but if not, believe me on my word (cheers). It so happened, that before the conclusion of the last parliament, I had been invited to stand for two several boroughs against a Whig. I replied, as you I think would have done in my place,—"The Whigs and we are acting together, they promise further reform, and we believe them; is it proper that at such a moment I should make myself a party to break up that alliance, and bring on myself the disrepute and disgrace of having been a treacherous ally?" In one of those places I should have been to a certainty returned; in the other, not. What was the consequence? When a general election came, the Whig-Radicals said to themselves, "This man must be a fool; he is honest, and we must make a set at him." In Marylebone, where I am a resident, I had many months before been known as a candidate; but no such measure was meted to me, as I had given others. I was opposed, and how? They called a meeting by advertisement, professedly to decide which candidate should stand, and inviting me by name. I went there, accompanied by friends. And then came forward the great leader of the Whig-Radicals,—I grieve to say it, because I loved the man; he came forward and gave his word to me in that manner which I would have believed from the mouth of

every dragoon in my troop, that the meeting was not a public meeting to decide upon the candidate; that the declaration to that effect was the mistake of a district committee; and that it was a private meeting of the other candidate's friends. We went away; and he then took the chair and declared it to be a meeting to decide between the candidates—"He hoped that all would be heard, he wished the whole parish was there." (Loud cries of "Shame.") And so, after sending us away upon his word passed to us, he declared the majority to be against us: and upon that declaration so obtained, the people of Marylebone were induced to vote against me. That is a specimen of Whig-Radicalism, given us through their organ, their chief. I have said it in print, and I say it again out of print, "I'll not march through Coventry with such a party" (loud cheers and laughter). My advice is then, suspect the Whig-Radicals (cheers); they will let you down when they are able. Such among them as are honest, for there are honest men everywhere, will join you upon occasion; but your business is to try to set up the Radical interest by itself. It may be small at first, you may have only two or three men in the House of Commons,—there will be more at some time (cheers.) But I was telling you not to hope anything from the present ministry. What have they done,—what was their first declaration after myself and others had refused to oppose them at the elections? They came down by their leader in the House of Commons, and declared that they intended to have no further reform? Was not that a political fraud; were we not all deceived—taken in? It may be easy to take in honest men once, but not twice. Their leader himself got elected for Stroud. I know something of the men of Stroud; they were the men who begged that all commercial monopolies might be removed, on condition that the great monopoly of the Corn-Laws was removed along with them. I do not think the leader of the House of Commons told the men of Stroud, he always thought the supremacy of the landed interest necessary for the stability of our institutions. I think he kept it to himself; and yet directly afterwards, he made that enunciation in the House of Commons. My advice then is, petition for a new Parliament, and on this very ground, that the old Parliament was elected under false pretences. That would carry your cause forward by a long tide's work. At present they think they have you fast for six years; you see a specimen of the beautiful working of the Septennial Act. The ministers come forward after concealing their intentions, and when they have you secure for a time equal to the chance of the lives of many of us, then they laugh at you and set you at defiance. But there is another reason which you should urge. Your resolution says, "that this meeting is of opinion that the great mass of the people cannot but view the House of Commons, as at present constituted, as an unjust usurpation of the national will." This may be called strong language; but let us see who can be got to support us in it; and here have we not got the House of Commons themselves? The present House was elected under that most unjust regulation, which said that no man should sit who could not prove that he had a pecuniary interest in the depression of your commerce. That regulation they have this Session removed,

but they have not asked for a new Parliament. They have admitted that they were elected under an unjust regulation;—is it then unjust that you should ask leave to elect again? But I will give you more reasons why you should never trust the Government at present at the helm. Two great rights, either of which our fathers would have defended at the cost of a civil war—they have taken away from us, I am sorry to say almost without resistance by the people. The people were sleeping, I suppose, or fattening, or anything but up and doing. In the first place, they have taken away the right of petitioning. Petition me no petitions, to be put into a basket; you could do that at home (cheers). They have passed a rule that there shall be no speaking upon petitions. They know the danger; it was upon petitions that energetic men were in the habit of making outbreaks favourable to the popular cause, and perilous to the do-nothing system of the Government. They have taken from you at one swoop that right. You know the other right our fathers contended for as a last resource—the stopping the supplies. That too is gone. They tried a simple trick, but it answered only too well. They made the experiment in Canada, and because some men's names there ended in "*eau*" or "*ac*," they thought it would not be minded here. They turned out the troops upon the people as the French King did in the Three Days, but unhappily not with the same result; and we have men here, professing to stand as watchmen on your tower, who say their truly British spirit forced them—to take side with the grenadiers (hear, hear). If the troops were turned out upon you to-morrow, would not these men take the same side again? It is perhaps a thing to thank Heaven for, that we have bought experience cheaply. On my way here I was revived and strengthened by the speech of Mr. Wood at Sheffield,—a noble and a gallant speech, but on one particular point I take the liberty professionally to correct him. He says the unfortunate people of Canada "unsheathed the sword." It has been my trade to watch such things,—to know who unsheathes the sword; it was the Government unsheathed the sword here (cheers). Their first operation was to put down the press by the action of a mob, the magistrates and troops standing by to support. They then seized upon the leaders of the people—"the tall poppies," as they called them. Who can say who may be tall poppies next? If your leaders were seized by military force, and dragged through the streets with ropes round their necks, would you not resist if you were able? (cheers.) Before we can make peace or truce with the party who has done this, we must have certain individuals given up for justice. Should a struggle ever arise between the people and their enemies, I trust the people would use their victory as generously as the French in the day of their success,—they wheeled their conquered enemies out of France in a coach and six (cheers). I trust we should not be behind them in generosity to political enemies; but the blood of unarmed prisoners has been shed, and for this there must be an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (cheers) in the shape of personal reprisals on those who have committed themselves by atrocities on the unarmed (cheers). What will foreigners

think of us? We declared Spain disgraced when prisoners were massacred in cold blood;—and they have in Canada imitated the actions of Don Carlos. There was a gallant foreigner, his name no ill one—Moreau,—his rank a colonel's,—this man they brought out and murdered in cold blood; none of the population, negroes and all, would do the deed, and so the sheriff—God remember him—murdered him himself (hear, hear). What was his crime? He was captured, as many Englishmen have been, assisting an injured people to resist the illegal outbreak of their military despots, and for this they murdered him (shouts of "shame.") Other brave but unfortunate men were captured —one a member of the Assembly, the other a substantial yeoman,—and when their wives presented themselves to *beg their bodies from dissection*, they were refused. Could you not join with me, in calling for one long curse upon the men who have thus dishonoured us? (Loud cheers.) Let the Lords take care of the things of the Lords, our business shall be with the Commons. Their leader in the House of Commons has a wife,—a fair one, I have heard, and good. If she should at some time beg for her husband's body, what could she say against the justice that refused her? O why will men thus forget the world's mutability, and because they were born in pampered aristocracy, make light of the tears of those beneath them! (cheers.) These men have put blood between us; we will trust anybody else but them (cheers). We will take nothing at their hands; there can be no peace till somebody else is sent out to treat with us (cheers). You have determined then, in the first instance, to get the suffrage for all (cheers). But neglect not other subsidiary objects,—such, for instance, as shortened Parliaments. I was one of those who professed themselves willing to agree to Triennial Parliaments; but since the notable fraud which has been put upon us, I never will be consenting to any such composition, unless accompanied with a provision that one-third shall go out annually. Another important point is the equalization of the representation. Why should a petty borough, with some 250 freemen, send two representatives to parliament, and an extensive and important town send none at all, or only the same number? On all these points, go on. There has been much nonsense talked about the difference between moral and physical force. Moral force means nothing but the acknowledgment of the physical force which would back it if need were (cheers). Let us then have no hair-splitting about the impossibility of acting by moral force and physical force at the same time. Physical force, happily, is not necessary here. I know not anything that could make necessary the employment of physical force, except such an outbreak as that made upon our countrymen and friends in Canada (cheers). God forbid that I should be among the men to admit, that in such a case, physical force should not be brought forward to resist. But do not talk of it as the means of increasing your political power. In fact it is not fair. It should not be for honest men to be charged with violence. Let us reserve in awful privacy, as something not to be mentioned needlessly, that circumstances might be conceived which should justify the physical

force our fathers had recourse to. It is not necessary now; there are other means of obtaining your honest end. In these courses then, proceed, and heaven prosper your cause.

(*From the Morning Chronicle of October* 17, 1838.)

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MORNING CHRONICLE.

SIR—Your printer has made an odd mistake in the report of what I said at the public meeting at Hull. He has printed the name of "Mr. Ward" for "Mr. Wood." Mr. Ward was the politician who, when the troops in Canada were turned out upon the people, "set aside the question of abstract justice," and took part with the grenadiers. It certainly was not Mr. Ward whose speech I took the liberty to commend. It was Mr. Willoughby Wood, of whom I will say no more than to recommend his speech to your notice from the *Sheffield Iris* of last week.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Oct. 16, 1838. T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

(*From the Morning Chronicle of October* 18, 1838.)

THE CANADA QUESTION.

DEAR COLONEL THOMPSON—I am deeply indebted to you for the letter which appears in *The Chronicle* of to-day with your signature.

Having differed, *toto cœlo*, with you upon the Canada question, I should be grieved if any one were to imagine that our opinions now concurred, unless the coincidence were produced by your conversion to what I conceive to be the rational view of the case, a miracle of which, judging by your recent speech at Hull, there is little prospect. I was therefore quite at a loss to understand your commendation of me, and am happy to find that the substitution of "Wood" for "Ward" clears up the mystery.

Allow me to add that of my opinions, such as they were and are, I am not the least ashamed. Recent events have only confirmed me in my belief, that it is impossible to govern a country in which the sword has once been drawn, by the ordinary principles of constitutional law; and that, in the difficult and complicated circumstances with which we had to deal, with a large Anglo-Canadian population on the one side, whose fate is involved in the struggle, and the French Canadians (who seem to monopolise all your sympathies) on the other, a temporary dictatorship was our only remedy.

I stood by the Canadians as long as they confined themselves to a constitutional opposition to bad government, although carried to a point which was hardly compatible with the existence of any government at all in that colony. But when they appealed to the sword the case was altered; and I repeat that I have enough of English feeling (English prejudice, if you please) about me to rejoice at their failure. You say that, in taking this course, "I set aside the question of abstract justice."

I maintain that I do no such thing, for I never admitted the abstract justice of *all* the demands of the "Nation Canadienne," although upon many points I concurred with them; and I never will admit the right of any man to force his notions of abstract justice upon me by putting a pistol to my head when I disagree with him. Had the French Canadians followed the advice which you have just given to the people of Hull—had they taken *time* into the account—and trusted not to physical force, but to the gradual operation of public feeling, which all who have a good cause may safely confide in, I might have had the pleasure of still concurring with you in opinion upon this question, as I do upon some others. As it is, we differ—honestly, no doubt, but very widely—and I care not who knows it.

Believe me, yours very faithfully,

2, Cleveland-court, Oct. 17. H. G. WARD.

(*From the Morning Chronicle of October* 22, 1838.)

H. G. WARD, ESQ., M.P. FOR SHEFFIELD.

DEAR SIR—In saying that you "set aside the question of abstract justice," it was my intention to quote the words of your address to your constituents, though there was not opportunity at the moment for referring to the report. On reference to *The Sheffield Iris* of Sept. 11, the words are found thus stated: "I had enough of English feeling about me at once to set aside the mere question of abstract justice." It is not often a quotation from memory is so exact.

The meaning collected from these words was certainly that they implied an admission, that you thought abstract justice was with the Canadians, but moved by that feeling which induces men to desire military success for their own party in opposition to justice, rejoiced in the victory of the troops sent against them. Nobody ever talks of setting aside the mere question of abstract justice, who has not made up his mind that justice is at war with him. At all events, a belief to this effect was the basis of my conclusion.

The evidence within reach of the public may be considered as reducible to the contents of the Canadian newspapers; with always a wide reservation that this shall be considered as hostile evidence to the Canadians, because the first operation of the Government was to put down the press of the opposing side by force, "the magistrates and troops standing by to support." My curiosity is to know how the people of England would act under similar circumstances. The dangerous part of your principle is, that the government has only to break the law and attack the liberties of the people, and then the resistance of the people furnishes your "impossibility of governing by the ordinary principles of constitutional law." It is difficult not to see in this the total destruction of every security for popular rights, so long as there exists a military force capable of being employed to take them away. It is akin to Lord John Russell's declaration, that stopping the supplies would be a dissolution of the constitution. The meaning of

which principle, combined with what has been denominated yours, is that Lord John Russell is at liberty to turn the army upon the people and the House of Commons, the instant the people and the House of Commons use their constitutional right of stopping the supplies. Put it to all the little boys, what meaning there is in a constitutional right, which the minister is at liberty to put down with the standing army whenever it is exercised. But the word which is to cover all, is "necessity," meaning the necessity of either committing the intended treason, or being "crossed in despotism." A thief is under just the same necessity, of either committing his felonious act or letting it alone. A similar course has been taken on the subject of juries. "We desire to punish men for acts which a jury will think laudable; and so we are under the *necessity* of abolishing the institution of juries." In the cases of the Bermuda prisoners this was done. In Chartrand's case the intimidation of juries was trusted to, and as soon as the real point on which the defence rested was brought forward, to wit that Chartrand was killed while acting as a clandestine enemy within the lines of an armed force, it was stopped as *indecent;* whereupon the jury, like men who knew what the institution of the jury was intended for, seeing that the defence was refused a hearing, gave the benefit of it to the prisoner and acquitted him.

There is strong proof that the French Canadians do not "monopolise all my sympathies;" for it is clear enough that a very large portion of the Anglo-Canadian population have an equal claim on any feelings of that nature. There appears no evidence that there was ever the slightest design on the part of the Canadians of French origin to oppress anybody. There is a body of English in that country who you know are considered by political economists of my class, as a detachment quartered there to live by the plunder of the British public through the intervention of a commercial monopoly; and it is of course double grief to such as us, to see military tyranny introduced, not only for the preservation of no interest of the British people, but for the support of a system of sheer loss, damage, and discredit. But nobody has established the existence of any plan to treat even this portion with unjustifiable rigour; and the fact that a very numerous party of British origin, are in their hearts with the French Canadians, is to me strong evidence that the outcry of danger to the Anglo-Canadians was never anything but the *ruse* of an enemy, and to be resisted accordingly.

My advice to the people of Hull, put together as it should be done upon another opportunity, amounted to this, "Do not think of employing physical force, as the means of obtaining further political privileges. But think it high time to be considering what condition you are in for defending the privileges your fathers left you, against such an attack as has been tried in Canada. It will be tried here too, unless you quash the danger by removing the ministers who made the attempt, and bringing them to a personal account for what they have done already." The time will assuredly come for an appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober,—from the British people stupified, to the people with their wits about them.

My great regret is that the Septennial Act should interpose so long an interval before the people of Sheffield can pass a judgment in the present controversy. In the mean time permit me to say, that my obligation for this opportunity of going over my case again, greatly outweighs any that can be due to me for correcting a simple error of the press, which must have been perplexing to you, and to the readers of the public prints in general.

Believe me, yours very sincerely,

Ramsgate, October 19, 1839. T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

(*From the Spectator of October* 20, 1838.)

THE remarks in Colonel Thompson's speech on the executions in Canada, provoked the *Globe* to attempt a defence of those disgraceful proceedings. The Whig journalist gave what he wished to pass for a correct account of the offences of the persons put to death. Colonel Moreau, whom he chose to call Mr. Morrow, pretended to be a loyalist, committed sundry robberies, and set fire to a barn wherein some lancers were sleeping; Lount and Matthews were murderers, incendiaries, and robbers; Lount murdered Colonel Moodie, robbed the mail, and set fire to Dr. Horne's house; and Matthews killed an unoffending man named Smith, set fire to a lodge and some houses, and attempted to steal the mail-bags. Such were the charges of the *Globe;* and in conclusion, that decent journal made some remarks on Colonel Thompson's parentage, intimating that the Colonel's father had inculcated precepts which the son had unhappily forgotten.

A correspondent, reading these observations in the *Globe*, and thinking they called for more notice than they were likely to receive, has sent us the following reply to them.—

"The communications from Canada, given in the Ministerial prints, are all we have to go upon in this matter. As these are all hostile representations, any inference drawn from them cannot be too favourable to the Canadian insurgents. Colonel Moreau is stated in the Canadian communications to be of French parents, but born in America. Of Mr. Morrow mention is now made for the first time; and he may therefore be set down for an invention of the *Globe*. The Canadian Orange papers are decisive as to the real character of Moreau and his expedition; for they charge Mackenzie with being guilty of his blood, by inducing him to enter Canada under such hopeless circumstances. It appears that he entered Upper Canada with a small armed party, and levied contributions for its support. If he gave out that he belonged to the opposite party, it is nothing but what every commander of a partisan detachment has done over and over. He also attacked a party of lancers by surprise in their quarters, and 'wounded one man in the head;' as Tarleton attacked an American cavalry regiment in the Revolutionary war, but with very different consequences from wounding one man in the head. From the *Globe*'s own account, it is quite clear that the putting the man to death was a dastardly act of vengeance on a prisoner."

"But the *Globe* has taken care to omit the damning circumstance stated in Colonel Thompson's speech which is, that no man, black or white, could be found to act as executioner, and the Sheriff was obliged to do the act himself. Here is the verdict of a whole country on the nature of the transaction."

"It was supposed that everybody had given up the story of the murder of Colonel Moodie; because it is notorious that the facts were, that he attempted to force a passage through a body of Canadians who had occupied a road, and fell by the fire directed on him in consequence. It is well known who Lount was; he was the Colonel Lount mentioned in Mackenzie's account of the causes of the failure. Stopping an enemy's despatches is one of the simplest consequences of war; and the man deserves keel-hauling who attempts to confound this with private robbery. He assisted in setting fire to the house of Dr. Horne. Why not hang General Colborne for setting fire to the house of Dr. Neilson? which was probably the act of brutality for which the other was in retaliation. Peter Matthews, too, it appears, fired upon somebody and hit him; and therefore he was put to death. All these are clearly acts of dastardly cruelty, of a piece with the meanness which libelled civilized armies in general, by affirming that it was according to the laws of war, that a church from which troops were fired upon, should be destroyed."

"It is strange the *Globe* said nothing of the murder of Lieutenant Weir; but nobody believes in the murder of Lieutenant Weir, and the government in Canada is at this moment sneaking out of the charge. Everybody knows that Lieutenant Weir chose to attempt to escape from his guard after he had been made prisoner, and was killed in the contest which ensued. The death of Chartrand the government dares not inquire into. Chartrand was a spy as much as ever Major André was. He was detected, and died the death which spies in time of war are subject to. But the Judges who tried the prisoners accused of *murdering* him, stopped the witnesses about to state this fact; and the Jury, giving the prisoners the benefit of the refusal to hear the defence, righteously acquitted them."

(*From the Spectator of* 27 *Oct.* 1838.)

PROFESSOR DE MORGAN'S ESSAY ON PROBABILITY.

THIS Essay is an object of interest to the writer of the present article, as involving the substance of a contest held nearly forty years ago, under circumstances of immense disparity of age and powers, with the most eminent mathematician of that day in Cambridge; which ended in the senior refusing to concede, and the junior to believe. The rebellious catechumen declared to be unintelligible, the reasoning propounded in the beginning of Wood's chapter on Chances; and avowed his heretical belief, that the whole was reducible to the mere question of the number of ways in which an assigned future event could happen or

fail. And now he has the satisfaction of seeing a ripe philosopher advance to support his juvenile heterodoxy.

When we speculate on what is popularly termed the "chance" of a particular event's happening or not happening,—as, for instance, to take one of the simplest cases in nature, the "chance" of throwing an ace with a single die,—the only point about the case capable of reduction to an accurate standard, is the fact that if the throws be continued to a very great or what is called an unlimited extent, the number of aces thrown will approach to one-sixth of the whole. If on trial it should approach to anything else, as to a fifth or to a seventh, this would be evidence before any jury in the world that the dice were *loaded*, or that there did not exist that equable tendency to throw any of the six possible numbers, which was professed. What we want to reduce to calculation then—and in truth, all we *can* reduce to calculation if we try—is the ratio between the hits and the misses which will occur, or at all events will be very nearly approximated to, if the number of throws be increased to an unlimited extent. If the question is anything else, its solution must depend on elements not reducible to numerical representation, or at most must have only a dim and distant reference to the attainable principle which has been described. If a condemned criminal, for example, be promised his life if he throw an ace,—whether he shall be saved or not appears utterly incapable of being reduced to numerical calculation. Either he will be saved entirely or be lost entirely; there is no medium. What we know is, that if there were, for instance, three hundred such criminals brought out to throw for their lives in succession, fifty of them, more or less, would escape, and the rest be condemned. And thence we gather a further conviction, that the single criminal who shall be supposed to be really concerned, is in a very dangerous way,—that it is much more likely he will be lost than saved; and so strongly does this inference exist, that where an individual has been saved in spite of an extraordinary accumulation of unfavourable circumstances, as for instance in the reported cases (if any are true) where a man's life has been saved by throwing an ace half a dozen times over in succession, mankind have invariably proceeded to the conclusion that it was a miraculous declaration of innocence, on the principle of the ordeal of our forefathers. And if we ask ourselves what is meant by the "extraordinary accumulation of unfavourable circumstances," under which that an individual should escape is considered as miraculous; it means this,—that he has escaped under circumstances such that, had forty thousand men been exposed to the same risk, one only out of them all could have been reasonably expected to escape, and to a certainty it would not have happened to more than two or three.

The conclusion from the whole therefore is, that when a reasonable man asks what is the chance of an assigned future event happening or failing, he means to ask what is the proportion between the successes and the failures which would take place in an unlimited number of trials under the same predisposing causes; and if he means to ask anything else, he is not a reasonable man. For example, suppose that before the world was circumnavigated, a man had insisted on asking what was the

chance of its performance. He might have argued, that to circumnavigate the world, might be likened to six India voyages in succession; and therefore if he could discover what number of ships had made six India voyages in succession, and what had failed, he would have arrived at a first approximation to the desired result. But he must add the consideration, that after an India voyage a ship repairs losses in a known port; and here there must be three or four such voyages on the back of one another, without any such assistance. But this also might perhaps to a certain extent be reduced to calculation. Remained then, the danger of the unknown; as for instance, whether there might be a meridian of whirlpool passing through the antipodes, expressly intended to swallow up profane adventurers; or a serpent of the ocean, specially commissioned to guard his native deeps. On the chances of all this, nobody could say anything till it had been tried; the circumnavigator therefore must have had the *æs circa pectus* to set all this last class of perils at defiance.

But if there are classes of future events where we predict the effects from consideration of the causes, there are others where we gather the causes from what we see of the effects. Such, for instance, are the speculations on the duration of life, or the proportion of the sexes; speculations reducible to what may be denominated perfect accuracy in the gross, though not pretending to the smallest power in an individual case. If the actuary of an insurance-office is asked what is the chance of the young man in health and vigour who comes of age to-day, living till to-morrow, all he can answer is, that if a million of individuals under the same circumstances will offer him a very small fraction of a farthing, to return a hundred pounds to their relations in the event of death, he will with perfect confidence accept the bargain. Yet in no individual case can it be certain that there are not the seeds of death which must operate before to-morrow's noon. It is uncertain in the individual, but it is quite certain that it is not so in many individuals; and thus the actuary is safe.

A part of the subject which Mr. De Morgan has not overlooked, is its religious or moral bearing. The dread of knowledge is far from being extinct. There are many to this day besides Mohammedans, who have an indistinct fear of poring into the awful subjects of life and death, very analogous to what our forefathers entertained on the pursuit of what they held forbidden sciences. The great answer in both cases seems to be, that whatever it is given to man to discover, man may know; no proof having ever been shown of the existence of any bar separating the knowable from the lawful. Whether a given man aged twenty shall live fifty years, it is not permitted to us to predict. That of a million men aged twenty some will live fifty years, is a truth as entirely within our attainment, and therefore as innocently to be written down and acted on, as that after winter comes spring, or after seed-time harvest.

The moral effects, also, of an acquaintance with the mathematical principles of chances, appear on the whole to be favourable. It goes to counteract the propensity to recklessness, which is at the bottom of half the vice and much of the misery of mankind. It very often, too, inserts

positive lessons of caution, most useful in actual life. The distinguished individual before alluded to, used to say, "I love to show these things "to our young men. See now, for instance, how the chances against an "event which is dependent on a succession of good fortune, accumulate. "An admiral is to sail to a given port" [it was in the *admiralling* days]— "where it is two to one he meets an expected reinforcement; then to "the West Indies, where it is two to one he meets an enemy's fleet; and "then it is two to one he beats it. What is the ultimate chance of this "event? Eight out of twenty-seven, or not far from two and a half to "one *against* it."

The tendency of these remarks, is to direct many besides actuaries, to the inspection of Mr. De Morgan's Essay on Probabilities.

(*Morning Chronicle*, 11 *Dec.* 1838.)

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE HULL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION.

SIR,—The circumstances of the times are such as make me receive with satisfaction an intimation that I should not be thought obtrusive in offering my remarks. Time was, when we corresponded regularly and habitually; and if the practice was useful then, there can be no objection to its occasional adoption now.

The return of Lord Durham has produced a conjuncture, in which it is necessary for every set of men in the habit of acting together, to consider what course they shall pursue. And it is imperative to do it speedily, because vigorous efforts are making to give to public opinion a course which it shall be difficult to resist.

Let us go briefly over the antecedents of the case. A demand for political Reform had become irresistible in the British Islands. The Whigs offered themselves as guides, and were accepted. After allowing their plan of Reform to be sorely maimed, they passed the remnant, such as it was. Their followers consented to admit the plea of weakness, and rallied with a view to making them stronger another time. The Whig leaders got a seven years' parliament, under the understanding that Reform was to advance; and then they turned round upon their followers, and declared that in the concessions which had been taken for weakness, their object had been to strengthen the enemy against further Reform. Not content with deceiving, they found an opportunity to attack. The strong-hold of the friends of Reform, and by consequence the dread of its opponents, lay in the power of the purse, or in that right of withholding the supplies till redress of grievances, which had been established by the event of two Civil Wars, or it might be said, of three. In a distant colony, this power was in the fact of being appealed to, as the means of removing gross and notorious misgovernment, equally hostile to the interests of the colony and of the mother country. The Whig ministers saw the opportunity of striking at two objects at once; of preserving the misgovernment of Canada, and trampling on England's boasted right of supply, in the persons of the Canadians. They therefore initiated a movement upon the people of Canada, closely resembling

that of Charles X. upon the people of France. Like him, they commenced by turning out the troops in the streets to destroy printing-presses; and when, unlike the case of France, the resistance was unsuccessful, their agents proceeded to all the brutalities which are in store for those who fail in resisting the invasion of arbitrary power. No horrible circumstance was omitted, which could disgrace the British name, and make you blush in the presence of a foreigner. The cold-blooded murder of prisoners under the forms of judicial proceedings, where the judges should have stepped into the dock, and the accused have held the sword of law for treason; the sacking of villages, the burning of churches with their inmates, the gloating over the dead bodies of brave and honest citizens exposed to swine as the punishment for having attempted to defend themselves and us against the outbreak of illegal power;—all these things, defended and adopted by the ministers in their places in parliament, and by a libel on the military profession declared to be the common events of war, gave dreadful intimation of what the fate of a people is, who are not prepared to put down with a high hand the treason of their governors. You know the outcry your aristocracy raise if a hedge of theirs is broken in the progress of any agitation among the people; here is a specimen of what is intended for *you*, if you resist the invasion of the aristocracy and fail. Military men handle each other very gently, as is their interest; but it is inculcated on the soldier, by ministers like ours, that when employed to put down *your* rights, he is to lay aside all feelings of a man, and never think of mercy, but when the citizen is lucky enough to offer it himself.

At such a moment, Lord Durham was invited to proceed to Canada. How,—why,—for what? Had it been possible for such a mission to have been offered to you or me,—or had it happened, which *was* possible, that we had been invited to take a part,—should we not have replied by asking, whether we went there to punish or to conceal? Suppose that when Greenacre had dissected his victim (he only dissected *one*), you had been told that great irritation existed among the connexions of the murdered,—that it was necessary something should be done promptly to restore the public quiet,—and that you were the individual the government had fixed upon as qualified to execute the service;—would not your first question have been, "Is the object to bring the murderer to justice? If so, I am your man; but if the intention is, that I shall hush up the affair favourably for the guilty, that I shall distract public attention by parading the irregularities I may discover to have been consequent on the irritation of the injured, if anything like this be your design, I have a character among my countrymen at home, which I do not mean to lose by going on your wicked errand."

Now this is precisely what Lord Durham, I submit to you, has done. He *has* gone upon their wicked errand. He has made himself art and part in what you and I consider as a wilful breach of the constitution (if we had one), and has thereby established himself an accomplice after the fact. It is of no use to say he did not exercise any volunteer cruelties of his own. He went there to hold the garments of those who were stoning the saints; and he *did* hold them. Thinking so, then, let us have

no fellowship with such an unfruitful work of darkness. Let us come out from among those who will consent to join themselves to such a league, for the sake of some advantage, private or political, they are expecting to derive. It is quite true, that we cannot refuse good from whatever source. But let us be perfectly sure that it *is* good; let us be certain that there is no hook beneath, and at all events be in no hurry to swallow the proffered boon. The same leader deeply disappointed expectation, before his passage to Canada; how do we know but he is put forward to disappoint it again, as a kind of Whig save-all, a "preventer" delusion, a fraud provisional, intended to hold when the other gives way, and so worm us out of the right, for which our fathers shut their gates on kings?

Do you not see, that if the Tories give us anything, we should have the good of it, and no renunciation of any right implied in return? But if we accept of any sop from a Durham administration, we surrender the Right of Supply, and to lead us to this surrender is of the very essence of the offer. It is like a country girl accepting presents from the squire of the parish; the thing is dangerous from him, which would be harmless from her grandmother. I therefore, for one, should much prefer taking anything from the hand which gave us Catholic Emancipation, to accepting the same thing from Lord Durham with such a drawback as has been mentioned.

Let us now revert to an older subject, yet not unconnected with the last. Do not, by unnecessarily talking about fighting, risk giving an opportunity to your enemies to proceed against you at advantage. If they should open on you in defiance of the law as they did in Canada (which I think they dare not), you must defend yourselves as you best can; and the mere fact of your having been so attacked, will be a tower of strength to you. But you are in no condition to invite an attack in wantonness. Recollect that you would be engaged with an enemy, the most merciless the world could produce. Act as men do with the tiger; never chafe him, without being morally certain of what you intend to do with him next. Besides, the Irish brigade has deserted you; it may be the fault of leaders or not, but so the thing is. The moment the time for exertion approached, the Irish leaders made terms for themselves. They virtually went to the Whig government and said, "And what will ye give us, and we leave the Canadians and the English Radicals? Good quarters for Ireland, and we are your men." And then they ludicrously turned round on us and said, "If you only knew how important to us these same snug quarters are, you could not be friends to Ireland if you did not thank us for leaving you." The same leaders, though their lives have been one long threat,—though they in the same breath appeal to the ten thousands of military age in Tipperary, and thrust the thousands of fighting men in Limerick into the Queen's face under the guise of a Petition,—and all this in the plenitude of their choice as absolute directors of themselves,—yet declare they abandon *you* because individuals in your ranks have uttered rash words on the subject of physical force. Your Irish friends are merry; and when they have had their game, they will come back with a broad smile on their countenances,

and expect you to be all friends as before. And so, I suppose, it must be; only, the next time, do not think of assisting the Irish, till you see them too far engaged to draw back. Intimate to friends on that side of the water, that they are expected to take the first line. Short accounts make long reckonings in the end. There is no use in serving the enemy because you have been ill-treated; nor in letting it be supposed you are so stupid as not to understand it, either. But you must not fight if you can help it; you must turn politicians for good. You must read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest; and you will arrive at a time, when you will get what you want without fighting.

These are the remarks which, as to my old constituents, it occurs to me to offer to you; and if I served you faithfully before, you will give me credit for intending the same at present.

Believe me that nothing gives me so much pleasure as maintaining our communication; and that I shall at all times grasp at opportunities of continuing it.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

London, 1 *December*, 1838.

(*Morning Chronicle*, 17 *Dec.* 1838.)

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE HULL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION.

SIR,—Since my letter to you of the 1st, two subjects have been brought before the public, which were not within my knowledge at the time of writing, and which place me under the necessity of addressing you again, in the execution of the trust you have reposed in me.

The struggle is renewed in Canada. The man must have been an idiot or totally unacquainted with the world's history, who did not know it would be so. The patriots have been defeated again, and numerous prisoners have been made, both from the Canadians, and from foreigners (Americans) who had tendered their assistance on the same principles which we boast to have engaged Englishmen in every struggle for constitutional rights which has taken place in Europe, and which were tacitly recognised by the British government in the case of the armaments fitted out under its eye against the *de facto* government of Portugal, and more openly in a later instance, to the extent of not less than fifteen thousand men, against one of the contending parties in the civil war in Spain. With both these affairs, I had as much concern as an individual not actually holding office was likely to possess. In the Portuguese, we had our recruiting-houses open in the heart of London, and our agents enlisting men, all as well known to the government as the way to the Treasury. We embarked them in the Thames, by arrangement with the government; by the simple token, that it could not have been done without. In the case of the force enlisted for Spain, the circumstances are too fresh, and the evidences in our streets to this day too palpable, to require detail. Americans acting on the avowed British principle of international law, have been made prisoners of war. Your

aristocracy is on the point of covering you with infamy, such as has been the lot of no nation since the Christian æra; an infamy which will cling to your children, and make them and you a bye-word for barbarians to mock at. Go no more to Russia; you will be pelted by the Cossacks in the streets, for the misery of being obliged to add Englishman to your titles. Your aristocracy propose to murder their prisoners; and the Whig-Radical press supports them in their design. Remember how Europe, absolutists and all,—for there are good men in the absolutists' ranks, as I know if you do not,—Remember how men of all castes and political creeds shuddered, when Boyd the Englishman was murdered as a prisoner of war by a brutal faction holding the powers of government in Spain. Remember again, what a horror ran through all civilized nations, when in the same country, the prisoners of war made from your own fellow-citizens, were brought out and murdered by order of Don Carlos. In my place in the House of Commons, I gave the felon his proper name, and intimated by words and gesture my trust that he would die a felon's death upon a tree. I hereby apologise to him, if in anything I said, I rashly seemed to cut off his chance of being relieved from singularity of guilt. You, Sir, perhaps have lived, where strict morals and domestic purity held unbroken sway. It may or may not be known to you, as it is to men who have passed their lives "in all sinful callings" like myself, that among the sons and daughters of dissipation there exists a notion, that the consequences of one particular species of immorality, are to be got rid of by speedy communication to another victim. *Don Carlos has wiped himself clean, upon the English aristocracy.* Lord John Russell or his organ, taunted me with being no aristocrat. If he knew how I bow in thankfulness to the disposer of all events, that no such misfortune clings to me or mine, he would feel the full force of the favour done to me, by employing the engine of the press in authentication of the fact.

But murder is not enough. The men in office who supported the expeditions to Oporto and to St. Sebastian must raise the cry of "pirates" by way of concealing the deepness of their baseness. As honest men, judge this most wicked plea, uttered by murderers who shall one day stand face to face with their victims, though in this world they escape. You know that the Northern States of America are the last countries in the world, where it would be possible to collect a force for criminal objects by pecuniary temptations. You know that the individuals your aristocracy is drawing up for slaughter in cold blood after the manner of Don Carlos, are young, brave, honest, warm-hearted men, with brothers to avenge and fathers to guide their arms, like the son of mine you saw wearing the colours of the Spanish Liberals, and whose fate, had he fallen into the hands of a felon, would have been in some sort redeemed by the reflection that man, woman, and child, were employed in cursing the assassin that destroyed him. A new name is invented for the sufferers,—"Sympathisers." Do not we all sympathise? Did not our mothers take us on their knees, and while they read to us the records of the tyrannies our fathers quelled, instil into us with the first elements of thought, that in proportion to our "sympathy" with the oppressed, was our title to virtue, manhood, praise? And because a few English jobbers find it

convenient to break up the foundations of political society by attacking the Right of Supply in Canada, we are to give up all the associations of our youth, the devotions of our riper age, and crouch before them to the extent of a servile silence, while they rob the ark of the constitution of its jewel.

The Tory *Standard* and the Whig-Radical *Examiner* join in one howl for the imitation of Don Carlos. The ministerial organ modestly insinuates, that "Sir John Colborne is an honourable and brave soldier," and perhaps would refuse to execute such an order to its fullest extent. If an honourable and brave soldier will refuse to murder *all* his prisoners, why is he to entail on himself the infamy of *one?* Let me point out to you a fact. These men are to be put to death after a mock court-martial; I do not know whether Don Carlos went through any such process, but whether he did or not is indifferent. *There is no law in existence for putting a prisoner of war to death by any such proceeding, any more than if Lord John Russell should send a number of his epauletted footmen to put you or me to death on proof of our identity.* There is a Mutiny Act annually passed for punishing mutiny and desertion in the enlisted soldier, and there are Articles of War specifying the punishment for various offences against military discipline—*but there is none for the murder of prisoners.* If there is, produce it. If there is not, then every man concerned is liable at any time to be proceeded against for murder in any civil court in Great Britain or America; to say nothing of the stings of conscience, and the suffering of bearing about a Cain-like reminiscence for the rest of life. If an Act of Indemnity should suggest itself, the answer is, that indemnities passed by criminals for their own crimes are repealed *ipso facto* when honest men come into power. The world has been gulled too long by the vulgar error that the soldier murders his prisoners under the sanction of a law; and there cannot be a better time to bring the question to an issue. Alas for the days of antique honour, when a military leader would answer to an order to employ his troops in murder, "Sire, there are here brave soldiers, gallant gentlemen, *but not one executioner.*"

And what is to be the direct result? That every family in the United States or Canada, to whom a victim has belonged, will treasure up some memorial of his end, to claim from his relations or representatives reprisals against the bloody nation whom all men will congregate to hate; and can any country stand against the propagation of such feelings? By what do we hold our ground in Europe, but by the belief that we are a humane and moral people, fit to go alone without being watched by an armed committee of police? Depend on it, nothing can resist the hatred of the human race. Already the feelings of civilised nations are roused against us. In France there are strong signs of a desire to interpose with a remonstrance, as our own Cromwell did with France and Savoy under circumstances less urgent, and covered himself with renown; and though the King may not be zealous for the service, a word from the National Guard might on any day lead him to comply. The absolutist powers will take it up next; for though supporters of aristocracy and monarchy, it is their interest to keep both within some bounds of public opinion, and

they will not be sorry for an opportunity of exposing the hypocrisy of a government which has been continually in their way. The conquerors of Warsaw will perhaps send a deputation, to pray the English aristocracy to preserve the lineaments of men. Who can tell what shame, what deep enduring dishonour, may be in store for a fallen country? And in the home department what are the hopes? If the ministers had declared their wish to fan the sparks of revolution, in what way could they have established so strong a connection between the means and the end? All informed men know, that the great moving force in the French Revolution and its progress through Europe, was the hatred of aristocracy and monarchy which had been generated by the view of Poland and America. Nothing would do for the Whig ministers but to haul up the same scene again, as if to insure from pit, boxes, and gallery, the same destruction of the house.

And for what has all this wreck of honour and of safety been incurred? Simply because men lulled in the embraces of their families, and wrapped in the silken robes of luxury at home,—men who never knew the want of a meal, or encountered suffering but as attendant on the too great extension of a shooting-party,—could not be content to let well alone, but must employ an armed force against the constitution they had sworn to support. See what it is to coquet with crime, or try to fix limits to a course of guilt. They thought to filch a point of constitutional right without resistance; and now they must go on to an extremity of evil, or come and surrender to public punishment. As the vulgar felon begins with larceny, and by what he calls necessity, ends in murder, so the authors of this mass of misery and crime must go on, till they earn from posterity that unenviable prefix to their names, which as yet attaches to but two characters, male and female, in our British history. Let all men take warning, and avoid the beginning of crime, which is as the letting out of water. Be content to keep within the law, as knowing that in the end the strong compact of society will be found too strong for all that break it.

Could not history persuade them, that the old quarrel which had been settled by the results of two revolutions in our own country, could not be raised again with a prospect of reversing their decision? Where were the chances, that this was the moment, when the arbitrary power our fathers shattered, could be revived on their posterity? Yet hear the latest organ of the Whig ministers. "The resistance may or may not be justifiable; but were it to be understood that every reckless incendiary could rise up against the government under which he lives with impunity, sad indeed would be the condition of the inhabitants subject to such a government. No country can know tranquillity, in which it is not well understood that whoever resists authority does so with a halter round his neck, to be tightened in case of failure." Parody this and say, "Were it to be understood that every minister can turn the army against the constitution with impunity, sad indeed would be the condition of the inhabitants. No country can know tranquillity, in which it is not well understood that the minister who attacks the people's legal rights, does so with a halter round his neck,"—and by no means omit the last clause,

—"to be tightened in case of failure." Need I protest against the brutish and servile doctrine, that civilised societies lie at the mercy of men on either side, who chuse to incur the risk of guilt? The case is like that of vulgar crime; the assailant, the violator of the peace, is the object for punishment. There must, to borrow from a Tory enemy, be "fearful blanks as well as tempting prizes," for the rulers as for the ruled. A year has passed, since I pointed out to you the grand criminal, the minister who said in the House of Commons, "Refuse the supplies, and *you dissolve the constitution*." Get a starling, and teach it to cry "Punishment, Punishment;" or cease to claim the title of a free people, if the dictum of a minister is to cut you off from the privileges of your ancestors. I asked the same minister, in a debate * on capital punishments before these affairs in Canada, whether there was any intention of mitigating the ferocity of the law on what the witming party calls political offences; and as was expected, I got no answer. At all events, there is no claim established, for any relaxation in the particular case.

Call you it freedom, decent security for life and property, to live under administrators who have only to break the law, it may be for their own pecuniary interest, and then proceed with unconcern to tell us they have surpassed the days of Claverhouse, and set a county in a flame? You hang a single incendiary; by what compact, what understanding among the human race, is the greater crime to go unpunished? Think too what the men call loyalty, who take a youthful princess, innocent as most girls are at her age, and hold her out as the "Great Mother" of Indian cut-throats. A girl is but a girl; but it happens that this girl is an organ of constitutional power, and she shall not be abused. Go to her with your petitions, fall at her feet, tell her we represent the proud republicans who drove a rival family from the throne, and by their accession to the general compact, placed and maintained her dynasty in the vacant seat; and say we lay our foreheads in the dust, begging, imploring her to remove the "brutal and bloody" men who are covering throne, coronets, and people, in one common shame.

And give into no weakness afterwards. Said I right, when I warned you to beware of a "preventer" delusion, set up as a seaman secures his masts with double stays, that one may hold when the other is shot away? And what says the returned "despot,"—I believe I quote himself? He comes back pledged to the furtherance of what he names "the interests of your fellow-subjects, the inhabitants of British North America." But he explains his meaning by saying, that what he supports "involves the very existence of British supremacy all over the world, and the *efficient maintenance* or *weak abandonment* of that policy which is expressed in the words 'ships, colonies, and commerce.'" I take that to say, he comes pledged to support the system of monopoly, which confers on us (as the Whig-Radical *Examiner* cannot help phrasing it) "the blessings of bad timber at a high price, and the multiplication of bugs." He comes pledged to diminish our ships and our commerce, and to try to

* 19th May, 1837.

persuade us the half is better than the whole; and this is to be carried off with a clap-trap toast, borrowed from Napoleon with whom it meant *something*, and used by our monopolists in their facetious hours, to express the negative quantities of which they are relieving us. He comes pledged to lead us into an interminable war; and if I do not greatly mistake the meaning, the passages marked in italics are tantamount to crying havock against the unfortunate men who have been deprived of their constitutional rights in Canada. But there is a secret, —there is a something the whole press in America, with Tory, Whig, and Whig-Radical assistance at home, has been unable to propound,—a grand *arcanum* which neither the Canadians nor their enemies have been competent to reveal, and which it was ordained for the "despot" and his chosen band to be the first to penetrate. For this you are asked to suspend your judgment for two months; meanwhile the prisoners are to be shot to-morrow. Truly, if you were disposed to ask for counsel, I should be inclined to evade the hopeless task of serving you.

I have done. Perhaps you think I have redeemed the confidence you placed in me. You see now why those joints of the Irish tail were in such a hurry to bring Lord Teignmouth in for Marylebone. To their "patting on the back" are to be traced all the mischiefs that have arisen. I have endeavoured to show I deserved the compliment they paid me.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

London, 12 *Dec.*, 1838.

STATE OF MAGIC IN EGYPT.—BY AN EYE-WITNESS.

(*From Tait's Edinburgh Magazine for April* 1832.)

Our friends the Tories are fond of anything that borders on the impossible. They manifestly regret the time when every bush had its hobgoblin after sunset, or at all events was as likely to contain one as to harbour a jack hare. The smallest fragment of the Black Art is a treasure to them; and a real witch would be far dearer to them than a dryad. What their reason is for thus delighting in the things that are not;—what the bearing is they see in it on the things that are,—for they are a substantial people, and do not deal even with non-entities for nothing;—all this is for those to determine, who know the difference between a useful half-faith and impracticable unbelief, and have calculated the ease with which a man who fears the foul fiend at all corners, may be led into the quiet payment of tax for church or state, and the performance of the other duties of a submissive citizen.

Not that they do this with all the sober sadness of some old women. On the contrary, they contrive to play at hawk-and-buzzard, between jest and earnest. And then, as they sometimes do on more serious occasions,—as, for instance, when they published the staff of the Tory army of occupation that is to be, and affected to be surprised to find another staff prepared to answer them,—they can say it was all in jest, and

wonder that anybody should think of taking seriously such playful pleasantry.

My business at present, is with your townsman Blackwood's story of the Magician of Cairo, at the end of his Magazine for August 1831, Part the Second. I happened to be at Cairo,—Grand Cairo, as it should be in a story,—in the autumn, not of 1830, but of 1822; being in the act of returning, with my wife and boy of seven years old*, from sojourning some eight years in India, in, as Cervantes would have said, "the honourable office of a captain of dragoons," varied by divers negotiations and correspondences with Wahhabees and strange misbelievers in the Erythrean sea, in the quality of Arabic interpreter upon the staff, and other toils and accidents too numerous to mention. Halting, then, at Cairo, under the hospitable roof of the Consul-General of Abyssinian fame, it was my fortune to see something so like what was seen eight years afterwards, bating minute differences, that I cannot help recounting it, for the sake of comparison; noting, however, that as I do not pretend to contradict what anybody *did* see, by what I *did not* see, so I expect that what I *did not* see shall be treated with equal reverence in return.

At the Consul-General's table, (being, as before in part intimated, in August 1822,) the conversation turned on the belief in magic; and the Consul's Italian Staff propounded the following story, which seemed to have perfect possession of their best belief. They said that a magician of great name was then in Cairo,—I think a Mogrebine; and that he had been sent for to the Consul's house, and put to the following proof. A silver spoon had been lost, and he was invited to point out the thief. On arriving, he sent for an Arab boy at hazard out of the street, and after various ceremonies, poured ink into the boy's hand, into which the boy was to look. It was stated, that he asked the boy what he saw, and the boy answered, "*I see a little man.*" Tell him to bring a flag.—"*Now he has brought a flag.*"—Tell him to bring another.—"*Now he has brought another.*"—Tell him to bring a third.—"*Now he has brought it.*"—Tell him to bring a fourth.—"*He has brought it.*"—Tell him to bring the captain of them all.—"*I see a great Sheikh on horseback.*"—Tell him to bring the man that stole the spoon.—"*Now he has brought him.*"—What is he like?—"*He is a Frangi* [European], *poor-looking and mesquin.*" After which, followed other points of personal description not remembered; but which drew from the Staff the observation, that a European of exactly those qualities had been about the house. We expressed our desire to be introduced to the magician, and the Consul gravely intimated, it might hurt the prejudices of his wife as being a Catholic; to the great mirth of the beautiful Consuless when she was told of it, who, though a Catholic and an Italian, declared she was the only person in the family, that set all the magicians in Egypt at defiance.

Having some time afterwards established ourselves in a house of our own, on the edge of the garden of the Austrian Consulate, (as I remember by the token that a Turkish officer who had been taking his evening walk of meditation, very gravely opened the window from the garden,

* Since the Author of "Twelve Months in the British Legion."

put in first one leg of his huge trowsers and then the other, and strode into the room followed by his pipe-bearer, as being the shortest cut into the street; though I must do him the justice to say he laughed and was very conversable, when I brought him up with a salâm and a cup of coffee, by way of demonstrating there was somebody in the house besides the Arab owner), we sent for the magician. I remember a well-dressed personable man, of what, after the fashion of the nomenclature in the Chamber of Deputies, might be called the young middle-age. He agreed to show us a specimen of his art, though I do not recollect that the nature of it was defined. He fixed upon our little boy of seven years old to be his instrument; and I remember he talked some nonsense about requiring an innocent agent, and how a woman might do as well, if she could plead the innocent presence of the unborn. He despatched a servant into the bazâr, to procure frankincense and other things which he directed; and on their being produced, we all retired into a room, and closed the doors and windows. An earthen pot was placed in the middle of the floor, containing fire; and the magician sat down by it. He placed the little boy before him, and poured ink into the hollow of the boy's hand, and bid him look into it steadily. I think the mother rather quailed, at seeing her child in such propinquity with "the Enemy;" but recovered herself on being exhorted to defy the devil and all his works. And the thing was not entirely without danger from another quarter; for it was understood the Pasha had directed a special edict against all dealing with familiar spirits; and the Pasha's edicts were not altogether to be trifled with, as we knew from the mishap of a poor Indian servant, who was caught in the bazâr in the fact of taking thirteen of the Pasha's tin piastres in change for a dollar, when the political economy of Grand Cairo had decreed that twelve were to be equal in public estimation, and was immediately incarcerated in the place of skulls, or at least of heads, from which it is supposed he would have come out shorn of his beard and the chin it grew from, if the Consular cocked hat and Abyssinian charger had not proceeded at a gallop to the Court at Shubra, to claim him as a subject of the British crown; and much did poor Baloo vow, that no earthly temptation should take him again, to quit the gentle rule of the Old Lady in Leadenhall-Street, who though she pinches a Peishwa and mercilessly screws a renter when it suits her, it must be allowed has a reverent care for the heads of all her lieges, and gives them a fair chance of going to their graves with the members nature had bestowed upon them.

Hisce positis, as the logicians say, the magician began his process. The boy was innocent of fear; being in fact a person rather perplexed and imperfect in those parts of theology that should have caused him to feel alarm. His native nurse first taught him to kiss his hand to the moon walking in brightness; which, being especially reprobated in the book of Job, we persuaded him to renounce. We next found him making salâms as he passed the fat old gentleman with an elephant's head, and other foul idolatries bedaubed with rose-pink and butter, that show themselves on various milestone-like appurtenances to an Indian road. After his visit to the Persian Gulph he leaned more towards monotheism; and

I once found him seated between two guns on the quarter-deck of an Arab frigate, in the midst of a fry of devotees of little more than his own age, busily engaged in chanting canticles in praise of Mohammed the "amber-*ee*." His early leaning towards the ugly gods of Hindostan, had made it a delicate matter to introduce him to our Evil Principle; and the fact was, that when he afterwards saw the Freischutz in England, we had no means of making him comprehend the nature of the crimson fiend, but by telling him he was a relation of his old elephant-headed friend Gunputty. On the whole I imagine there never was a better subject to cope with a sorcerer; and when he asked the cause of the immediate preparations, we told him the man was going to show some feats of legerdemain such as he used to see in India. The magician began by throwing grains of incense upon the fire, bowing with a see-saw motion and repeating "*Heyya hadji Capitân, Heyya hadji Capitân;* which being interpreted, if it was intended to have any meaning, would appear to imply "*Hurra, pilgrim Captain!*" being, as I understood it at the time, an invocation by his style and title, of the spirit he wished to see. When nothing came, he increased his zeal after the manner of a priest of Baal, and seemed determined that if the "Captain" was sleeping or on a journey, he should not be missed for want of calling. One slight *variorum* reading I observed. Instead of saying to the boy "What do you see?" as had been reported,—he said "*Do you see a little man?*" which, if he had been accessible to fear or phantasy, was manifestly telling him what he was to look for. The boy however, resolutely declared he saw nothing; and the sorcerer continued his calls upon his spirit. When in this manner curiosity had been roused to something like expectation, the boy suddenly exclaimed, "I see something!" *Tremor occupat artus;*—when he quashed it all by adding, "I see my nose." By the dim light of the fire, he had succeeded in getting a glimpse of his own countenance reflected in the ink. The magician doubled his exertions by way of carrying the thing off; but there was much less gravity in his audience afterwards; and at last he was forced to declare, that the spirit would not come, and the reason he believed was because we were Christians. He said, however, if an Arab boy was substituted, the spirit would come. A servant therefore was sent to bring a boy by the offer of a piastre, and one was soon produced. Whether there was any confederacy or not, I had no precise means to ascertain; but I was inclined to think not. The Arab boy was trusted with the ink in the place of the European, and on the magician's asking him the leading question "Do you see a little man?" he took but one look and answered "Yes." The orders then followed, "Tell him to bring a flag," &c.; to all of which, whether operated on by some dread of refusing, or by the natural inclination of one rogue to help another, he duly answered that the thing was done. I do not remember any further *dénoûment* that there was; and so ended the magic of the magician of Grand Cairo.

Being disappointed in this experiment, we began to seek for the opportunity of making others, and offered a reward for any person who would show us a specimen of imp or spirit. One man was produced,

who was stated to be of considerable fame. He said he would show me a spirit; but I must go out with him three nights running to a cross road at midnight, and perform divers ceremonies and lustrations which he proceeded to describe. I believe he had got an inkling, that I intended to leave Cairo the next day. I told him, however, that I would cheerfully go through any ceremonies he might propose. He next said, it would be necessary that I should repeat the name of the spirit I called for, eleven thousand times; and this I assured him I would painfully perform. He then said, he was afraid at my age the operation would be dangerous. I wonder whether the rogue meant that I was too young, or too old, or too middle-aged; for I was exactly thirty-eight. Seeing that I only pressed him the more, he took his fee and walked off, intimating that there was no use in doing these things with Frangis.

I saw another instance in Cairo, of the way in which a story accumulates by telling, and the degree in which even sensible Europeans by long residence are induced to give into the belief they find around them. The conversation turned one day on the power of charming serpents, supposed to be inherent in certain descendants of the *Psylli*. One of the Consular Staff immediately declared, that a most remarkable instance had happened in the Consul-General's own court-yard the day before. That one of those gifted men had come into the yard, and declared he knew by his art there were serpents in the stable; and that he had immediately gone and summoned forth two snakes of the most poisonous kind, which he had seized in his hands and brought in the presence of the relater to the Consular threshold. Now it happened to me, to see the whole of this scene. I was wandering about the Consul's court, gazing at the curiosities scattered round, enough to have set up any European museum with an Egyptian branch, and particularly at a lame mummy's crutch, found with him in his coffin, on which it is possible the original owner hopped away from the plague of frogs. An old rural Arab of respectable appearance was standing at the Consul's door, holding in his hand the hooked stick which an Arab keeps to recover the halter of his camel if he happens to lose it while mounted, and presenting altogether a parallel to a substantial yeoman with his riding-whip, come to town to do a little justice-business with the mayor. A stable-keeper came and said, that two snakes had made their appearance in the stable; on which the Arab, being no more in the habit of fearing such vermin than a European farmer of fearing rats, proceeded towards the stable, and I followed him. Sure enough, there were two snakes in dalliance in the horse's stall; and my construction was, that it was the poor animals' Saint Valentine. The Arab, however, ruthlessly smote them with his gib stick, in a way that showed an exact comprehension of what would settle a snake; and brought them hanging by the tails and still writhing with the remains of life, and laid them at the threshold of the house. I looked at the snakes, and felt a strong persuasion they were of a harmless kind; but whether they were or not, was of small moment as the Arab treated them.

I remember in India once driving one of the snake-jugglers to discovery. He told the servants there were snakes in the stable; and offered

to produce one. He accordingly went, with piping and other ceremonies, and soon demonstrated a goodly *cobra de capello* struggling by the tail. He secured this in his repository of snakes, and said he thought there was another; on which he went through the same operations again. Though he had been too quick for me on both occasions, I offered him a rupee to produce a third, which he agreed to; and this time I saw the snake's head, struggling rather oddly in his nether garments. He ran into the horse's stall, rushed forward with a shriek to distract attention, and then I saw him jerk out a snake of some four feet long, and drag it backwards by the tip of the tail as if desperately afraid of it. Knowing his snakes must be an exhaustible quantity, I proffered a second rupee for another, taking care to keep between him and his snake-basket; which he declined. But on turning round and giving him a chance to communicate with his receptacle, he quickly presented himself with the assurance that now he thought he knew where a serpent might be lodged. The Indian servants all devoutly believed in his skill; but it is impossible not to be ashamed of Europeans, who adorn their books with marks of similar gullibility.

One more story, and I have done. I do intensely regret, that at Cairo I did not purchase a manifest book of magic, in Arabic, adorned with terrible figures of dæmons down the margins, which would have been enough to burn any succession of possessors in the good old times. It was offered to me for forty piastres (about 13*s.* 4*d.*); but *blasé* as I was with curiosities, and distracted between the desire to have the book and to avoid increasing baggage, I haggled about the price, and the seller never presented himself again. On examining it, it was manifestly a book on *chemistry*, or possibly enough alchemy; the various agents being typified in the margin by dæmons with prodigious horns and tails, in which I thought I recognised the origin of the odd remnants still presented on the coloured bottles in a druggist's window. One most tremendous fiend, who might be recognized as frequently repeated, was always underlined *zeybak*, "quicksilver;" and another of diverse form but equal terror, was lettered *hámiz*, "an acid." I would willingly give ten times the sum, if the book was recoverable now. There can be no doubt that here was one of the books of secret arts, our forefathers used to suffer for.

Finally, Sir, may heaven deliver us, *which I doubt*, from all sorcerers, magicians, soothsayers, dealers with familiar spirits, and others of the class which the old law calls "incorrigible rogues and vagabonds," by the passing of the Reform Bill. So prays, &c. &c.

(*From the Lancet for* 5 *Sept.* 1838.)

ANIMAL MAGNETISM. EXPERIMENTS OF BARON DUPOTET.

To the Editor of the Lancet.

SIR,—On the 17th of this month I was invited by a friend to accompany him to see the experiments of Baron DUPOTET DE SENNEVOYE, at *University College Hospital.* I had witnessed the performance of the

snake-charmers in India, and of the necromancer of Grand Cairo so often described. I had seen something of what were called the remains of the Psylli in Egypt; and had reduced all these, to my own conviction at least, within the limits of natural causes, and laid an account of them before the public in a magazine conducted by a friend*. As a professed unbeliever in whatever is not proved, I felt not disinclined to add "Animal Magnetism" to my subjects of scrutiny; and this disposition was increased by the circumstance of my daughter having told me that some years ago she was introduced to the Baron at Paris, and proved an impracticable subject, and of my having been lately applied to from the country to consult an eminent physician in town on a case of epilepsy, from whose conversation I had gathered much interesting information on the power of the imagination over epileptic affections, which I could not help surmising I should see confirmed and extended. Add to all this, that I am some relation to Dr. Alderson of Hull, who I believe was the first man that exploded the existence of apparitions, by demonstrating that the seeing of apparitions is symptomatic of a certain state of disease; and you will perceive that I was in many ways pledged to not allowing myself to be misled through want of the sceptical virtues. I will therefore offer you the best account in my power of what I witnessed, and the inferences I was disposed to draw; trusting to have credit for having done it in a spirit of fairness throughout, and without the smallest intention of giving pain to any individual.

On our arriving at the hospital, the medical officers, with their pupils, were going their rounds in the men's ward. Though invited to accompany them, I preferred remaining near the head of the stairs, where I had a more general view. In a short time the Baron arrived, a plain, intelligent, unassuming-looking man, with a resemblance, it struck me, to Mr. Vigors the member for Carlow. I was shown at a distance, in the women's ward, a girl, apparently walking with difficulty, who was stated to be one of the patients on whom the experiments of the Baron had been made; and shortly afterwards another arrived, who, from the attention she attracted, I soon found was the patient *par excellence*, the *prima donna* of the "magnetic" stage. When the medical men had finished in the men's ward, they came into the women's, making, with the visitors, something more than twenty; besides which there were eight or nine women patients in the ward, apparently convalescents or with slight complaints, and two or three women attendants.

The first-mentioned girl was invited to seat herself in an arm-chair in the middle of the ward. She was apparently about twenty years of age, with dark hair, heavy look as if suffering under the effect of some soporific drug, an in-patient of the hospital on account of epileptic fits, and I suspect had partially lost the use of the left side from causes connected with that complaint. The Baron proceeded to draw his hands downwards before her face, sometimes alternately and sometimes both together, in the manner which I believe is pretty generally known as making part of the "magnetic" process. After about a quarter of an hour, the

* The Article preceding.

patient was asked how she felt, (the Baron, by the way, not attempting English except under circumstances of urgency,) and on her replying that she thought she felt "a little sleepy," the experiment was declared unsuccessful; though it was intimated that more effect had been produced on a previous occasion. I began to think I was the infidel before whom nothing was fated to be seen.

The other young lady then sat down, with no reluctance, but on the contrary that appearance of self-complacency which attends on conscious eminence in any line. She looked about seventeen years of age, with fair complexion and a profusion of flaxen ringlets, features Grecian and in fact eminently handsome, figure short and slightly inclining to Lord Byron's dislike, ankles rather stouter than the Venus's, hands large and red, that looked like vouchers for honest labour; to all appearance in the bloom of youth and health, and manifestly of the temperament the French would call *sensible et coquette*, but an out-patient of the hospital for epileptic fits, and with (as afterwards appeared) a seton in the back of her neck, in part process of cure. If I were to hazard a conjecture, I would say she was neither servant-girl nor sempstress, but the daughter of an artisan or small tradesman, who scrubbed her father's stairs, washed his linen, and did the rest of the hard work of the house, but still lived in the state of freedom and enjoyment which attends on a condition so comparatively fortunate. From the downcast direction of her eyes as she sat, they could not be calculated on for indicating sleep; but her fingers played with her shawl, in the manner of a person who did not quite know what to do with her hands, which showed her to be awake. The Baron proceeded with the waving motion of his hands. I cannot say positively whether he ever touched her face, but he might possibly sometimes touch it slightly, or the surrounding curls; and he certainly touched the *gigot* sleeves, in a way which she could not fail to be conscious of. Once also,—*honi soit qui mal y pense*,—in a later stage of the performance, he touched her knee, through the clothes, with the point of the fingers of the flattened hand held horizontally, as if he was intending to keep up an electrical communication. The patient appeared disposed to doze, and lean back in her chair; in doing which, she several times complained of hurting the seton in her neck, which temporarily roused her. In about five minutes she began to rub the left eye with the back of her hand, and then the other, rubbing with both hands at once with considerable violence. At the intimation of the Baron, somebody told her to open her eyes, and she replied pettishly, "I can't,—I can't." Some of the medical attendants opened the eyelids by force, and they closed again. The Baron then intimated that he would restore her to vision; and this part of the proceedings I watched with much curiosity. It appeared to me, that he applied the thumbs and forefingers of both hands at once to the interior angles of the eyes, and then drew them from the nose outwards, pressing against the edges of the bones of the orbits; and this he did rapidly, twice. The patient immediately rose from her chair and opened her eyes, looking about her with a winking and embarrassed manner, as if waked out of sleep. I describe what I saw; and the only comment I can make upon it is, that up to this period there

could not be said to be any distinct evidence, beyond the assertion of the patient, for the reality of the effects purported to be produced.

She sat down without the smallest appearance of reluctance, for the continuation of the experiment. Her fingers at first played with her shawl as before; but in three or four minutes the motion of the fingers ceased, and first one hand and then the other fell down as in sleep. She soon began to lean to her left against the Baron, who, I must say, supported her in a very handsome and artist-like manner, by taking hold of her elbow with one hand, continuing to wave the other before her face. In about a minute more she raised herself, with a kind of convulsive effort to inspire the greatest possible quantity of air,—which the Baron received with a *là, là*, as a man who knew perfectly what was coming,—and then she made a prolonged expiration, with something between a sigh and a sob, and fell across the arm of the chair on the other side as if dead. To preserve the *bienséances* she was laid out upon the floor, and her head and shoulders propped on a machine provided in hospitals for that purpose. The muscles appeared entirely relaxed, the limbs remaining in any position into which they were put; and in fact, with the exception that her colour continued slightly flushed, she presented the appearance of a recent corpse. The doctors proceeded to pinch her hands, each harder than his predecessor, and forced snuff up her nostrils at an unmerciful rate, as each surmised his rappee was stronger than his neighbour's; but all without producing any token of sensibility. A young artist present could not help exclaiming, "What would I give if she would remain in that position for twelve hours, that I might sketch her!" and truly a painter with a Cymon, might have racked his imagination a long time for so good an Iphigenia. The next process was that of shaking and shouting her name in her ear. This at first produced movements of impatience, such as I think I have witnessed in the cases of epilepsy which fall more or less under every body's notice; and once she made that motion which is so frightful to the friends of epileptic patients, and resembles an effort to shake off an invisible enemy,—the

> ——— "si pectore possit
> Excussisse Deum,"———

of the Roman poet. At last our youthful Pythoness began to speak:—

> "Tunc sic orsa loqui vates."———

The first words she uttered were, "O why should blushes dye my cheek?" and the next were a poetical aphorism of no doubt equal impressiveness, of which I only collected that the burthen was "a sigh."

> ——— "Et talia fata,
> Conticuit."———

But after being again "well shaken," she spoke again and said, "I won't be turned out, as I was before, for the servants to laugh at;" which was explained by somebody saying, that on a former occasion when she had been subjected to the same experiments, she fancied that the servants (I suppose of the hospital) laughed at her. On continuation

of the shaking process, she began to relate, by starts, some occurrences in her neighbourhood which had impressed her imagination as ridiculous;—I surmise,

"Obscuris vera involvens."——

She said, "There was a man went mad, and he jumped out of bed without his clothes and ran into the street." Another shake produced, "I thought how droll it would have been, if he had run into a meeting of old quakers." Next came, "He said that Mr. Hall [the apothecary, I suppose, that ought to have kept him in bed] wanted to get at his wife." And finally, "He called Mr. Hall an old gallipot-scraper." All this was said in the low, quiet tone of people that talk in their sleep; intermixed with laughing. Some of the women present remarked, "That's exactly all what she talks in her fits." The Baron now began to try what he probably considered as his *tours de force;* but these appeared to me to be failures. He retired to the extremity of the ward, and I understood the effect was to be that the patient was to come to herself; but nothing of this kind was produced. He then signified that he would take another individual by the hand, and while he held his hand, the patient was to make to that individual rational answers. It was tried, and, sure enough, the patient replied; but not to the point, and always upon one subject. The individual whose hand was taken by the Baron, was a pupil who it appeared had charge of the department of young ladies with setons in their necks, and his voice invariably caused her ideas to recur to the dressing of her neck, and she replied to him, half coquettishly and half pettishly, "Get away. Do you know how much you hurt my neck? If you hurt me so, you shall never come near me again." I thought the young man seemed rather disconcerted by the duty he was put upon. After something more than an hour had elapsed from the time when the patient "sighed away her soul," the Baron intimated that he would restore her to consciousness. What he did this time, appeared to consist in bringing his two hands within a foot of her face, and waving them two or three times across the face, from the nose outwards, in directions at right angles to that by which the first symptoms had appeared to be induced, saying at the same time, with as much of English pronunciation as he could muster, "Get up." The patient immediately rose, and looked about her with the same winking and embarrassed air as before,—took the arm of the young pupil, as Terence would say *quàm familiariter*, and disappeared in the matron's room; after which I saw her no more, till, chancing to be detained by rain at the vestibule, I saw her going out, apparently nothing the worse; and as I was asked if I would see the experiment renewed the next day but one, I suppose she was perfectly ready for the repetition.

And now I come to the impression made on me in the way of explanation. I entirely give up the idea of collusion on the part of the patient; she was much too pretty and light-hearted to be the instrument of a cold-blooded and painful fraud. To say no more of the pinching and the snuff, it would have required a long drilling to teach a girl the

symptoms to be counterfeited; and what would be the chance of a foreigner's finding the requisites united, in an out-patient in the University College Hospital?

The explanation, I apprehend, lies in a much shorter compass. It is simply, that the waving motion of the hands (which it is observable is as perceptible to the patient when the eyes are shut as when open, especially if the face be turned towards the light, as anybody may convince themselves by experiment with their own hands) produces an action on the brain, (akin perhaps to the dizziness produced by the sight of running water), sufficient in *some* epileptic patients (in the actual case, one out of two) to bring on a real repetition of the epileptic fit. I never felt any doubt that the patient was in one of her epileptic fits; and the remark of the women is confirmation of the identity. What troubled me, was the idea of what would become of us all if the patient never recovered, and we were brought before the coroner that sat on Mr. Cocking*. How the recovery was brought about, I admit to be the mysterious point; but if we will only keep our wits about us, and not be run away with by admiration of the marvellous, we must be on the point of finding out the whole. The fact already ascertained, I maintain to be, that certain motions before the eyes, produce a cerebral affection, capable of inducing epilepsy in certain states of predisposition. There is nothing in this more wonderful than in many other facts established by experiment. For example, a few weeks ago I experienced for the first time, what I remember hearing the servants talk of when I was a boy, that certain patterns upon walls and furniture produce giddiness. I was in a room at the Albion, and found the walls turning round. My first thoughts were of apoplexy; but the recollection of the servants' assertion came to my relief. The paper on the walls was a crimson ground, with something like serpentine columns in white, reaching from the floor to the cieling. Now if so slight a circumstance can produce a cerebral affection in a person of strong nerves and free from disease, there seems nothing unreasonable in believing that a wavy motion before the eyes of a weakly patient, may produce a *sui generis* effect upon the brain, which in epileptic habits shall have a tendency to produce recurrence of the fit. It appears to be merely a question of experiment. An honest scepticism does not consist in refusing to believe that a cause *A* may produce an effect *B*, if experiment proves them to be connected; but in refusing to believe anything without competent proof.

Another point of circumstantial evidence in support of the absence of collusion, I think I see in the following. Though not medical, I have enough of general information to know, that one of the first symptoms by which cerebral affections in general demonstrate themselves, and particularly in women, in consequence probably of the greater contrast with their previous habits, is a diminution of the ordinary restraint on language. It takes place in insanity, in drunkenness, in the delirium of

* An unfortunate experimentalist who about that time cut himself loose from a balloon in a parachute of his own invention, and was killed. The jury displayed an anxiety to express their horror at the loss of life by philosopllical experiments.

opium, and in epileptic fits, which are only another form of cerebral affection. Everybody knows that when ladies faint, there is a hustling away of gentlemen; which is not so much on account of the necessity of cutting laces, as for fear of what might be said by the patient during the temporary suspension of restraint. The purest-minded woman upon earth, might talk of her innocent preferences, her state of health, or many other subjects on which witnesses would not be desirable. Now I submit that in the case described, there is just so much of this kind of evidence as goes to establish the cause assigned. It is out of the range of probability, that a foreigner should have been able to instil with effect into the mind of a hospital patient, that precisely such and such a departure from her ordinary restraint in language and conversation, would best keep up the character she was to assume. I therefore conclude it to be more likely that there was a real affection of the brain.

One inference would appear to be, that the cerebral irritation which induces the epileptic action, at least of the artificial kind, is attended with no pain. It may even be attended with soothing and agreeable sensations; as in the case of a little girl of my own, of four and a half years, who always requests to be "tickled" to sleep, the "tickling" consisting in somebody drawing their hands lightly over her face, which invariably sends her in a few minutes to sleep. Various questions of importance may also suggest themselves. If there is a process that removes the artificial fit, will it lead to a way of removing the natural one? And what is to be the effect of the artificial fits upon the patient? Epilepsy is understood to be confirmed by habit; is then the repetition three times a week of the artificial fit, to go towards confirming the habit, or may it have a tendency to act as a *vaccine*, and prevent or modify the natural disease? It has been asserted in some of the newspapers, that the patient described has had no recurrence of her natural fits since the artificial practice. If this be so, there appears something like an exhaustion of the epileptic tendency.

I have not witnessed any repetition of the experiments, but I have heard the accounts of a person in whom I have confidence; and as nothing but sheer imbecility can prevent the immediate ascertaining whether the main facts are correct or not, I shall take the liberty of alluding to them under that reservation. He says he saw the process tried on a girl of fourteen (whom I surmise I recollect), an in-patient in the hospital, suffering under what the doctors called "ecstatic delirium," left behind by a fever. She was exceedingly violent and abusive, assailing the Baron with the common-places she had heard employed against foreigners, which fortunately he did not understand; but after the "sigh" which would appear to be a general symptom, she came out a quiet, timid, orderly little girl, answering with great propriety to everything which was said to her. If this be so, the artificial cerebral irritation whatever it is, would appear to have a tendency to quiet delirium. An effect of the same kind, I think has been asserted to have been produced on maniacal patients, by turning them in what our forefathers called a whirligig. The patient whom I saw before, is also described as having approached much nearer to rationality during the access, or to have had

the fit in what may be called a diluted state. As one instance, I understand that when pestered with questions in her ear, she attempted to rise and make a manual defence; which reminds me, that when I saw her, she, either by accident or design, gave a sound cuff to one unhappy questioner. Does the artificial stimulus, then, wear out, or alter its effect by repetition? And does this wearing-out modify the results, and so produce different phænomena in the patient? All these seem among possible things, and all seem to be determinable by attention and care.

What appears to be the subject for regret, is, that instead of pursuing the connexion between causes and effects with scientific caution, it should have been chosen to attempt to envelope the whole with the name of a new and mysterious science, and invest it as far as possible with something of the supernatural. I cannot help avowing, that unless it was considered as a necessary compliment, the medical men present seemed to lean to the side of the question which they ought not; in short, there was a little of a *gobe-mouche* spirit abroad. For instance, some of the questions they asked were in the highest degree unwise; not only as implying the expectation of supernatural or extra-natural responses, but as having a direct tendency to act as what counsel call "leading questions." Take for example, "How many more times must you be magnetized before you are able to see with your eyes shut?"—which my informant seems to think was afterwards extended to asking her how long it would be before she could tell what o'clock it was by a watch held to the pit of her stomach, to which, after much teazing, she appears to have held out something like a promise of hope. At the same time it is but fair to say, that these questions may have been put at the direction of the Baron, and have been considered as an essential part of the trial of his process. And in one view, good may result in the end. The alchemists might obscure science on the whole, by the wild and mystical view they chose to take of the operations of nature. But their most irregular flights had still a certain chance of discovering useful materials for the cooler heads of future generations to work upon.

My hope therefore is, that some medical person will take up the question with the advantages of professional knowledge, and will steer a just course between credulity on the one hand, and a sickly dread of discovering new truths upon the other, though concealed under any imaginable mass of the fantastic and the unsound. My old relation would have found it all out in a week; if a maniacal patient had not kicked him to death. Truth can never be too soon secured, nor error too quickly got rid of. Fifty years ago, it is probable that some useful physiological facts which will now be elicited, would have beeen seized on by scientific men if the whole subject had not been contrived to be involved in the mystical and the ridiculous. And what is there we might not come to now, if the reins were given to the supernatural and the unproved? Think only what a combination in politics might be made out of "Animal Magnetism" and St. Simonianism; or various other amalgams which will suggest themselves to the reader.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

London, 28 *August*, 1837. T.

(*Hull Saturday Journal*, 11 *May*, 1839.)

MEETING OF REFORMERS.

LAST evening (10 May, 1839,) a meeting of the friends of Colonel Thompson was held in the Victoria Rooms, Queen-street, to hear an address from the candidate. The spacious room and gallery were crowded to excess—we should suppose there could not be less than a thousand persons present; and, with the exception of a slight sprinkling of Tories, all seemed most enthusiastic in their support of the Colonel. On his entrance, Colonel Thompson was received with cheers. Some delay took place as to the appointment of a chairman; at length Mr. John Peck was proposed and unanimously carried, and opened the business with a few appropriate remarks. He alluded to a meeting held that afternoon, at the Kingston Hotel, and the determination come to, to send a requisition to Mr. Hutt and to support Colonel Thompson. This announcement was received with much cheering.

Colonel *Thompson* then came forward, and was received with great cheering, which continued some time. He spoke as follows:—Gentlemen,—In consequence of a gone-by promise, I have lost no time in presenting myself before you upon the present conjuncture of affairs. What has been often foretold to you has come upon us—rather in a hurry perhaps when it did come—but everything unpleasant comes in a hurry. You have had warnings over and over, that the course was not pursued that would prevent our coming to the present pass. It is hard to blame; yet how can a man defend his own opinions without in some way blaming those who differ from him? It is harder still to throw blame upon veteran liberals, with whom it has been your pride to see your representative stand side by side. Yet, as I have never made any secret of my opinions, I must repeat my conviction that the sad fallacy, the awful mistake which caused the Irish and English leaders to acquiesce in the debility of the Whig aristocracy, is what has ended in letting us all down together. They were told over and over, "The fate of the country, for this time at least, is in your hands; you are responsible for keeping the feeble Whig aristocracy in the right way by threatening to desert them the moment they try to leave it." This they refused to do; and now that the evil is come, I do believe we Radicals are the only men who can call ourselves free from blame. But if you were the men who were right, ought you not to take a step of political importance thereupon? (cheers). There may be numerically stronger bodies than we, but we hang well together, and make up in activity what we may want in numbers. What I say here, may not be said solely to the Radicals of Hull, but may reach the ears of those in other quarters, and produce effect. I would point out to them all and everywhere, that in the constituencies situated like that of this town, they are in a position to come forward and demand a half of the Liberal representation. And little enough after all, and what will go but little way towards giving them that share which upon a fair numerical division of the whole country would fall to their lot. We do not say we will have half the whole representation, but that we will have half of that small portion of it which

it is in our own power to get (cheers). I would offend nobody, but I must speak with freedom here to those who are my own particular friends. I advise them then to stand forward now, not only because it is for their advantage as a party, but is the best thing for the common advantage besides. It is for the common good that you should say "We *will* have *some* representation; we will have somebody in parliament who shall speak our sentiments; we will not be tongue-tied there, when we have the means to hinder it" (cheers). But if you do that, it is fair you should also do the other thing. You must say to that other section of Liberals which is less advanced in Liberal opinions than yourselves, "The power we claim, we freely give. Fix on your representative. We object not to your having a voice; only give us one too. Upon that condition, we are yours and you are ours" (loud cheers). And what is the alternative to this plan? That by refusing to co-operate, we have the power to bring on a result so mournful, that I will not further allude to it;—and so have they. Let us then, as the most active party, put forward this proposal without delay, as we do now, intending to keep it in good faith, and nothing doubting that the same good faith will be shown towards us (cheers). In all this, there is no compromise of principle. That word "compromise" is an invention of the enemy. Who seeks for a compromise? Do *I* compromise? (cheers). Is there anything I ever said, or did, or thought, that I come here to apologise for, or soften down to please any man or set of men? It is not that I came for. I came to ask, whether taking me with all you like and all you dislike, you will go on with me to assist in bringing in two Liberals as your representatives in parliament (loud cheers). I know how hard it is, for a man who boasts to have studied and defended the interests of the numerous classes, to avoid sometimes running against the aristocratic feelings of the richer classes of society. I am afraid you may as soon ask the leopard to change his spots, as that there should be perfect union upon such points; but we will not demand it; we will not say one word upon that subject—we call for no discussion upon political opinions now. Is it or is it not for the general advantage, and for that of each party separately, that we should go on together; and if it is, in God's name let us do so (cheers). We are to a certain extent beforehand in the contest; in advance of the other Liberal constituencies in the country; and who knows but we may do something—and it is not the first time Hull has been distinguished—which may make our countrymen look up to us as the town that has taken the first step in the good way, and shown an example for others to pursue (cheers). We would stop to lament over what is past, if lamentation could do anything; tears of blood might be wept over what has happened within the limits of this country's rule in the last few years and months. I have never concealed my bitter feelings upon these points. You have yet to see, what may come of the example. You may think it a small thing to see a Speaker of a House of Assembly hunted across the country by detachments of Light Infantry, when it is not at your door; but how soon may it happen to yourselves (cheers). Example is catching. Already you read of the ten outlets of a town in Wales being occupied by detachments of troops,

in order that authority may pick and chuse among those that are within. Let me assure you, that whenever you find the ten or the hundred outlets of your own town occupied by troops for the like purpose, you will find it a bitterer thing than you ever thought to taste of. I say this, not for the sake of irritation, but to prove that I come here not to conceal feelings, but to advise you to that course which will, and must, and shall, give us the voice we want. Had I been your representative, can you not see many things, which though one voice might be finally beaten down, would not have gone on unresisted as they did? There *were* two men in parliament—once called the dual party, for it is true that they were two—who had they been there still, would not have allowed the sad transactions in the colonies to pass without a desperate unyielding resistance. They would have marched over us, I know; but they would at all events have had the trouble of doing it. It was the most grievous earthly misfortune that ever happened to me, that kept me away from the opportunity of being thus trodden down. But time and change happen to all men; and with this I suppose I must be content. There is not time for sorrow; we must go forward. I come then to ask your assistance to the scheme I have proposed. What is your complaint? That your opinions are not represented. Heaven knows how weak their representation is at the very best. Yet so are things situated, that to take advantage of the little you have, and to use it resolutely and well, presents the only method by which you can reasonably hope to escape into a better state of things. There is no occasion for you to despair. Believe me, there is a feeling growing,—growth,—in the hearts of the vast majority in this country, which will not be finally repressed or kept down by any, and for which some vents must be found in wholesome Reforms, and these vents it shall be our business to demand and to obtain (cheers). Prospects are not very bright for those who wish to live in peace by honest industry. Had we had anything like a fair opportunity of protecting ourselves, it would have been long before *we* had volunteered a scuffle. It is not by civil disturbances that your interests are promoted. Oh, you are not the men who delight in war. Quiet labour would have done for *you*, if you might have enjoyed the fruits. If there is a dangerous spirit raised, let those take the blame who raised it, and who would not put it down (cheers). And most of all, for this present crisis, let the saddle rest on the right horse; we will have none of it; we utterly refuse to bear a fragment of the blame. But now the thing is here, we will take the best road our reason can point out. We are for peace, not violence. Those violent men who talked of force, have done much harm to the success of their own cause; and among other reasons, because they never had the force they talked of (cheers). Times have been, and may be again, when physical power may be called for. There is a time to resist, as Solomon says there is a time for all things; but that time was not now. You were weak, your enemies were strong, and there was a better way to go about it. Say not I came here to deny the justice of the poor man's complaints. Though perhaps not poor myself, I have eyes to see, and heart to feel, that the poor man in this country is wretchedly ill-treated (cheers). And why?

It used to be, because he was without the knowledge. That cause is going fast. He has the knowledge, or is going to it rapidly; and heavy responsibility will rest on those who, knowing that fact, shall not make way for the improvement of his state. But it is because we wish for peace and peaceful measures, that we come here to discharge our part of a public duty, by the peaceful and constitutional mode of sending a representative of our opinions to parliament; and so God prosper us in our honest efforts. ("Amen" from several voices, and general cheering).

(*Hull Advertiser*, 17 *May*, 1839.)

WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION.

On Tuesday evening (14 May, 1839), a meeting of the members of this association was held in their room in Salthouse-lane, to hear Colonel Thompson.

Mr. *J. Jackson* was called to the chair, and briefly addressed the assembly, which then nearly filled the spacious room.

Colonel *Thompson* was received with general and long-continued cheering. He said,—Gentlemen, after congratulating you upon the unanimity displayed in this assembly upon such points as may concern your own interests, allow me to lay before you what has struck me upon the opportunity which now exists for doing service to the Liberal cause in general, and more particularly the cause of the numerous and industrious classes. I should belie all my professions if I did not avow, that the industrious classes have great and heavy causes of complaint. In this country a system of misgovernment has been directed to diverting the produce of their labour, into the pockets, to speak plainly, of the non-industrious classes. That makes the great evil existing in this country. It has been left us in some degree by our fathers—they are to blame for the beginning—we shall be to blame if we do not put an end to it (cheers). There have been periods in the history of this and of other countries, when great questions of public liberty have been carried by the exertion of force; but these cases have always arisen when there has first been a direct attempt of the governing powers to carry some point by the exertion of force too. But this is not our case now—we are men who wish to have our privileges and liberties increased, but we are not acting in consequence of any direct invasion of the laws. Hence I conclude that we have better and wiser means to obtain our ends; wiser because positively more easy and more effectual. We have a government which although very far from perfect, yet does rank as a comparatively free government among the governments of the earth. What then is meant by being free, but that the people have powers and privileges which are competent without violence to gain for them all reasonable objects they can possibly desire? (cheers). These objects we want to know first, and then to carry them (cheers). At this moment you appear to have an opportunity to take an important stride in popular power. The most active among us in the pursuit of political privileges, take the name of

Radicals. The voters amongst them may be numerically a minority; that is to say the other great parties—the party of positive injustice, and the half-hearted supporters of improvement—may each be numerically superior. But it does so happen that in extensive portions of the constituency of the country, we have a power which has not yet been exerted, but which ought to be. Do you not see that in a borough like our own, where we have a compact body of 300 or 400 Radicals, the other parties being pretty nearly balanced, we can say "We will have one representative?" (cheers). What would be the effect, if all the constituencies in the country similarly circumstanced should make the same demand, and with success? It would make the difference between having 40 or 50 men to speak on our behalf on national questions, and having half-a-dozen or none. It would be an immense stride gained, of which the effect would be rapidly felt. Let us try then if we cannot make this a city set upon a hill, and an example for other men to copy (cheers); and you who read history know this is not the first time our native town has been a place distinguished. What is there to be opposed to you? You have the means in your hands of combining, if you will use it firmly. Your demand is reasonable—that you should send one representative, and take up heartily with one of theirs for the other. If the two parties quarrel, the result must be the bringing in two Tories, whom I am not wrong in calling the common enemy (cheers). The choice is before you; will you bring in one of each class of Liberals, or two Tories? If a man asks his conscience, what use he is bound to make of the power of voting, the answer must be, that he is bound to use it for the common good. Which then of the two courses above mentioned does he think will be productive of the greatest common good; to have two Tories, or one Whig and one Radical representative? If you all of you feel a decided opinion on this point, follow it up by taking, like wise men, the best steps to obtain your object. And I do not see why important political consequences should not in a short time follow. Suppose an endeavour is made to form a new ministry on the principle of carrying some great popular privileges—it will be for you to support such ministers and keep them to their point. We must act like the mariner, who with a shifting wind runs before it when he is able, and holds his own in the best way he can when it is against him. With few exceptions, it is by a little at a time that public liberties can be gained. When we obtain the inch we must go for the ell; and if we and our associates in the country hold together on the plan I have proposed, I am much mistaken if we do not get both the inch and the ell (cheers). The absence of such a party in the House of Commons as I have described, has been what has brought things to the present pass; and whenever the exertions of the Radicals in the constituencies can raise up such a one and carry it to a certain strength, do you not see that a time must come when a government will be formed in dependence on the support of this party as an element, and so it will hold the power of enforcing the progress of the popular cause? What we want is a party which will go against any minister that utters the word "Finality" (cheers). Gentlemen, for the favourable opinion you have expressed of myself, I can

only say that as far as my abilities extended, I feel conscious of having endeavoured to deserve it (cheers). Every man can give industry, determination, perseverance; and every man, if he pleases, can give honesty (cheers). It was my endeavour so to act, in discharge of the trust you have heretofore conferred upon me, as to leave a reasonable expectation that the public interest would not suffer from your conferring it on me again (great cheers for some time).

(*From the Weekly True Sun of March* 23, 1839.)

RADICAL INDEPENDENCE.

THE advice contained in the following letter well deserves the consideration of all Liberal constituencies who do not intend to be Whig-ridden to the end of the chapter.—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE WEEKLY TRUE SUN.

SIR,—In consequence of the allusion to the Wigan election in your paper of the 16th, and recollecting also that yours was the paper which boldly announced the Marylebone election in March last to have been the declaration of Radical independence, I take the liberty of forwarding to you my reply to a letter received this day from Leicester, stating the intention of nominating me as a candidate there.

Your obedient servant,

T. PERRONET THOMPSON.

London, March 20, 1839.

[The letter, to which the following is a reply, was addressed to Colonel Thompson by Mr. John Markham, as chairman of a Radical Association in Leicester, informing him that it was the intention of the advocates of universal suffrage in that town to nominate him as a candidate.]

13, Hanover-terrace, Regent's-park, 20th March, 1839.

SIR,—In compliance with the engagement publicly made after the Marylebone election in March last, I readily forward to you my entire agreement in the intention expressed in your letter of yesterday's date, of nominating me at the election now taking place at Leicester; and I shall be prepared to meet such expenses as may be unavoidably consequent.

I trust this will be made a step towards the organization of a general system, of which the conduct of the Radicals in Marylebone, on the occasion of the attack there made on them by the Whigs, was a marked and successful example. And that system briefly is, to set up and *carry through the poll*, a Radical candidate at every *double* election in the kingdom, where the Whigs will not agree to combine in supporting one Whig and one Radical candidate; and at every *single* election, where the Whigs have not come to a satisfactory composition with the Radicals on the subject of the candidate to be supported. By this plan, and this only, the Radicals, if they can display combination and energy, may obtain a substantial share of influence in the House of Commons as at present constituted.

There is no use in attempting to conceal the small progress which the Radicals at large have made towards the execution of such a system. It is probably within your knowledge, that I wrote to the Radical Association at Wigan, on occasion of the late election there, offering to find the expenses of a poll; and that the Committee declined the offer, on the grounds that the Whig candidate's election was certain, and that there was consequently no probability of seating a Radical Reform candidate. The result was, that the Whig candidate came in by a majority of two. It is clear, therefore, that he came in solely in consequence of the decision of the Radical Association on my proposition, and that if their decision had been different he would not.

If the Radicals ever mean to show themselves as a distinct body in the House of Commons, they must use the same means (bating iniquities) that other parties do. They must be prepared, from the present moment or as near it as may be, with the candidate they mean to support at a future election, come when it may; and they must give every chance, by the avowal of their preparations, for the accomplishment of such a composition as is to lead to carrying their man. They must have the assistance of some active and determined individuals of the class who go under the name of *parliamentary* (or more properly *election*) agents; whose business it is to be in possession of all attainable information touching the occurrence of vacancies, and other points affecting the general object. They must further endeavour to have an organ in the press, for the express purpose of working and conducting the general plan. On both these points any assistance within my reach shall be entirely at their service.

It was my earnest desire to have set on foot some celebration of the anniversary of the Marylebone election, which was on the 2d of March 1838; and there were parties at a distance from the metropolis who gladly would have joined. Perhaps, as the subject attracts increased attention, something of the same kind may yet be desirable.

Any publicity that can be given to this letter and the plan of campaign contained in it, may be useful to the general cause, and cannot be disagreeable to myself. Though our interference at Wigan and at Leicester has not had the same marked effects that were produced in Marylebone, it has saved our credit for keeping hold of the clue the Marylebone election presented to us, and has enabled us to class the whole three elections among the evidence that we have power in our hands if we have resolution to make use of it.

I am, Sir, your very obedient servant,

T. Perronet Thompson.

(*From the Weekly True Sun of April* 28, 1839.)

FROM A CORRESPONDENT.

The plan for promoting the apparition of an independent Radical party in the next House of Commons, is making progress. An extract from the *Ayrshire Examiner*, headed "Tactics of the Radical Party," will

show the extent to which the project is matured in Scotland. The plan is simply this:—In all the constituencies which send two members to Parliament, and where the balance between the Whigs and Tories approaches to equality, to be prepared with one purely Radical candidate, and to make the Whigs the offer of combining to bring in one pure Whig of their choice on condition of receiving the like assistance in return. This is the course which the Radicals, setting drivellers and concealed enemies at defiance, are proceeding to adopt. The question which will be asked here is, what is the alternative which the Radicals rely on? The answer is one of those which are only difficult for want of straightforwardness. The Radicals, like other people, have different shades of opinion among themselves. There are the more advanced set, who believe in their hearts that there is no evil like the present system of governing by Whigs under the permission of the Tories—the "cat's-paw ministry" in short, which was the term under which the banner was raised against it by Colonel Thompson, at the great Marylebone meeting for the Ballot in January 1838, and which was the moving cause of the determination of the Whig-Radicals to bring a Tory into Parliament at the election which followed a month afterwards. This set, of course, believing that a return to the ancient practice of seeing the declared supporters of abuse in office and the Whigs in opposition, would be a great good *per se*, hold out the threat of voting directly for a Tory. After these come another class, who have not yet taken alarm at the process going on for advancing Tory objects through Whig hands. These men have still a lurking susceptibility to the cry of "Keep out the Tory," and make a sort of composition among their conflicting feelings by threatening to refuse voting for a Whig, which they purpose to accomplish by giving a plumper for the Radical, or, which will come pretty nearly to the same thing, not voting at all. These two classes then, will go each their several way, eschewing all *tests* by which the weaker brethren may be separated from the stronger or *vice versâ*. Both will have to set their faces like a flint against the hypocrites and the feebles who run about exclaiming against "dictation," and preaching up the "will of the majority of Liberals." The last is a simple fraud, and to be stuck up as such in any place where fallacies are made scarecrows of. There is a compact that the members shall be the men who have the majority of votes out of the whole constituency; but none that fifty Radicals shall go without their man when they might have him, because a hundred who chuse to call themselves Liberals say they should prefer it. The Radicals are mere *poke-puddings*, if the present plan does not procure them thirty or forty representatives in the next Parliament. Bailie Craig is probably manœuvring upon a branch of this principle in Ayrshire; and if he perseveres, the *Birmingham Journal* will have been wrong in supposing, that the chance of immediate success was all he had to set off against "his share of the polling-places." The Whigs are slow in believing anybody can act against them upon plan; but the next time the Bailie presents himself to them in the gate, see if he is not treated with profound respect. An interesting point for the curious in election theories, is to see how completely the tendency of

constituencies sending two members each, to favour the giving *some* representation in the House of Commons to minorities, has been overlooked by the theorizers; who at the time of the Reform Bill, were almost universally for doing it away. For this discovery and its consequences, thank the Marylebone election. Why does not the "Convention" make itself a committee for gaining power in the coming Parliament? Next week I shall endeavour to give something like a tabular statement of the constituencies which, from the returns of the last election, appear to come under the description intimated.

(*From the Weekly True Sun of May* 26, 1839.)

TO THE EDITOR OF THE WEEKLY TRUE SUN.

SIR,—Pursuant to intimation in an article with the same heading as the present in a former number (W. T. S. for 28 April 1839), classed Lists are herewith forwarded to you of the constituencies in which the Radicals ought to examine their chance of securing at least one satisfactory representative at the ensuing election.

The moving force by which they are to effect this, lies simply in their power of obliging the Whigs either to accede to the terms offered, or see themselves entirely driven from the representation of the constituency. For brevity this may be called the "Partition principle."

The moral force by which the Radicals are to wind themselves up to the requisite point, is by convincing themselves and others, that a Tory ministry checked as it would be by the Whigs, is a smaller evil, or if preferred a greater good, than a Whig ministry acting as the cat's-paw of the Tories, and doing their work as the condition of retaining the salaries of office. If proofs are wanted, they are in the facts that in the course of comparatively a few months, the people has seen destroyed or grievously endamaged, the Right of Supply, of Petition, of Habeas Corpus, and within these few days, of holding Public Meetings, and of possessing arms according to the Bill of Rights; each and every one of which would have cost a twelvemonth's siege to a Tory ministry with the Whigs in opposition.

To the reasonable Radicals therefore in any constituency, the values of the several possible results at the coming election, stand in the following order:—First, Obtaining a share of the representation of their constituency, by combination with the Whigs. Secondly, Seeing the whole of the representation go to the Tories. Thirdly and worst of all, Seeing it divided between the Whigs and Tories, to the exclusion of themselves.

The course for the Radicals may consequently be defined to be, to demand one representative of their own in a constituency which sends two members to parliament, and a "Whig and something more" in a constituency which sends but one. The constituencies which send more than two members, hold out no particular prospect of further gain; with the exception of London, where there is no reason why the Radicals should not demand two. Such constituencies will be distinguished by a figure showing the number of members.

If question is made of "Who are Radicals?" they are all who are disposed to resist and put an end to the compact, by which the progress of reform is stopped as the means of keeping the present ministers in office with the consent of the Tories. There may not be identity of feeling on all points, among those who in England, Scotland, and Ireland agree in coming under this description; but it is enough if they agree in this.

The whole number of places in the Lists is 350; so that if the principle was successful in only one in ten, it would give the Radicals thirty-five fair representatives in the next House of Commons.

For the grounds on which the Lists were formed, acknowledgment must in justice be made to the invaluable Tables in the *Spectator* of 19 August, 1837; an inspection of which will generally be sufficiently explanatory.

LIST I.—Constituencies sending two or more members to parliament, where the Whigs and Radicals together appear to have the predominance; and where consequently, if the Radicals have not one representative of their own choice already, they ought to demand one by the application of the Partition principle.

England and Wales.—Brighton, Cambridge (town), Carlisle, Chester, Cockermouth, Coventry, Cumberland (East), Derbyshire (North), Derby (town), Devonport, Durham (South), Finsbury, Halifax, Knaresborough, Lambeth, Leicester (town), Lichfield, London (4) to demand two, Malton, Manchester, Marylebone, Newport, Northampton (town), Nottingham (town), Oldham, Peterborough, Plymouth, Poole, Portsmouth, Reading, Richmond, Rochester, Sandwich, Sheffield, Southwark, Stroud, Taunton, Tavistock, Tiverton, Totnes, Tower Hamlets, Westminster, Windsor, Wolverhampton, Wycombe, Yarmouth, Yorkshire (West).

Scotland.—Edinburgh, Glasgow.

Ireland.—Belfast, Carlow (county), Clare, Cork (county), Cork (city), Dublin (county), Dublin (city), Galway (county), Galway (town), Kerry, Kildare, Kilkenny (county), King's County, Leitrim, Limerick (county), Limerick (city), Longford, Louth, Mayo, Meath, Roscommon, Tipperary, Waterford (county), Waterford (city), Westmeath, Wexford (county), Wicklow.

LIST II.—Constituencies sending two or more members to parliament, and at present in a fluctuating or contested state; where the Radicals should examine whether the union consequent on the enforcement of the Partition principle would not end in dividing the representation between the Whigs and Radicals.

England and Wales.—Andover, Aylesbury, Barnstaple, Bath, Bedfordshire, Bedford (town), Berkshire (3), Berwick, Beverley, Blackburn, Bodmin, Bolton, Boston, Bradford, Bridgenorth, Bridgewater, Brighton, Bristol, Bucks (county), Buckingham (town), Bury St. Edmund's, Cambridgeshire, Canterbury, Carmarthenshire, Cheshire (North), Cheshire (South), Chichester, Colchester, Cornwall (East), Cornwall (West), Cumberland (West), Cricklade, Denbighshire, Derbyshire (South), Devizes, Devonshire (North), Devonshire (South), Dorset-

shire (3), Dover, Durham (North), Durham (city), Essex (South), Exeter, Glamorganshire, Gloucestershire (East), Gloucestershire (West), Gloucester (city), Grantham, Greenwich, Guildford, Hampshire (North), Hampshire (South), Harwich, Hastings, Herefordshire (3), Hereford (city), Hertfordshire (3), Hertford (town), Honiton, Hull, Huntingdonshire, Ipswich, Kent (East), Kent (West), Lancashire (South), Lancaster (town), Leeds, Leicestershire (North), Leominster, Lewes, Lincolnshire (Lindsey), Lincolnshire (Kesteven), Lincoln (city), Liverpool, Ludlow, Lymington, Lynn, Macclesfield, Maidstone, Maldon, Marlow, Middlesex, Monmouthshire, Newark, Newcastle-under-Line, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Norfolk (East), Norfolk (West), Northamptonshire (North), Northumberland (North), Northumberland (South), Norwich, Nottinghamshire (North), Nottinghamshire (South), Oxfordshire (3), Oxford (city), Penryn, Pontefract, Preston, Retford, Ripon, St. Alban's, Salisbury, Scarborough, Shoreham, Shrewsbury, Somersetshire (East), Somersetshire (West), Southampton, Staffordshire (North), Staffordshire (South), Stafford (town), Stamford, Stockport, Stoke-upon-Trent, Sudbury, Suffolk (East), Suffolk (West), Sunderland, Surrey (East), Surrey (West), Sussex (East), Sussex (West), Tewkesbury, Thetford, Truro, Warwickshire (North), Warwickshire (South), Warwick (town), Wells, Wenlock, Weymouth, Wigan, Wiltshire (North), Wiltshire (South), Winchester, Worcestershire (East), Worcestershire (West), Worcester (city), Yorkshire (North), Yorkshire (East), York (city).

Scotland.—The only places in Scotland which send more than one member, are in the preceding List.

Ireland.—Antrim, Armagh (county), Monaghan, Queen's County.

List III.—Places sending one member to parliament, where the Radicals, if not satisfied with the present representative, ought to examine whether they might not gain a point of advantage by enforcing on the Whigs the necessity of agreeing to support a "Whig and something more."

England and Wales.—Arundel, Ashburton, Ashton, Banbury, Beaumaris, Bewdley, Breconshire, Brecon (town), Bury, Calne, Cardigan (town), Carmarthen (town), Carnarvon (town), Chatham, Cheltenham, Clitheroe, Dartmouth, Denbigh (town), Droitwitch, Dudley, Evesham, Flintshire, Flint (town), Frome, Gateshead, Grimsby, Haverfordwest, Helston, Horsham, Huddersfield, Hythe, Kendal, Kidderminster, Launceston, Liskeard, Lyme, Malmesbury, Merthyr Tydvil, Midhurst, Monmouth, Montgomery (town), Morpeth, Northallerton, Petersfield, Radnorshire, Rochdale, Rye, Salford, Shaftesbury, South Shields, Swansea, Thirsk, Tynemouth, Wakefield, Wallingford, Walsall, Wareham, Warrington, Westbury, Whitby, Wight (Isle of), Woodstock.

Scotland.—Aberdeenshire, Aberdeen (city), Argyllshire, Ayrshire, Ayr Burghs, Banffshire, Berwickshire, Caithness-shire, Clackmannan and Kinross, Dumbartonshire, Dumfries, Dundee, Edinburghshire, Elgin Burghs, Falkirk, Fifeshire, Forfarshire, Greenock, Haddingtonshire, Haddington Burghs, Inverness-shire, Inverness (town), Kilmarnock, Kirkaldy, Kircudbrightshire, Lanarkshire, Leith, Linlithgowshire,

Montrose, Orkney, Paisley, Peebles-shire, Perthshire, Perth (city), Renfrewshire, Ross and Cromarty, Roxburghshire, St. Andrew's, Selkirkshire, Stirlingshire, Stirling Burghs, Sutherlandshire, Wick Burghs, Wigtonshire, Wigton Burghs.

Ireland.—Armagh (city), Athlone, Carlow (town), Carrickfergus, Cashel, Clonmel, Coleraine, Downpatrick, Drogheda, Dundalk, Dungarvan, Ennis, Kilkenny (town), Kinsale, Mallow, Newry, Ross, Sligo (town), Tralee, Wexford (town), Youghall.

(*From the Northern Liberator of* 10 *Jan.* 1840.)

In the summer of 1837, the Working Men's Association, of London, called a public meeting at the Crown and Anchor, Strand, to pass an address to the nation on Universal Suffrage. The meeting was one of the most crowded ever witnessed. A petition to the House of Commons was afterwards grounded on this address. The committee of the Working Men's Association, were still anxious to have their political principles more prominently brought before the public, and particularly before the "liberal" members of Parliament; and with this view called another meeting at the British Coffee House, to discuss the principles of the Petition afresh. Several members of the Commons attended. The discussion lasted, we believe, two nights. The result was the following document, which we have copied from the original with our own hands:—

Resolutions agreed to at a meeting held at the British Coffee House, on Wednesday, the 7th June, 1837.

Proposed by Daniel O'Connell, Esq., M.P.

Seconded by Charles Hindley, Esq., M. P.

1st. That we agree to support any proposition for Universal Suffrage, made on the Petition, emanating from the Working Men's Association, when presented to the House of Commons by Mr. Roebuck.

Proposed by Daniel O'Connell, Esq., M. P.

Seconded by Charles Hindley, Esq., M. P.

2d. That we agree to support and vote for a Bill, or Bills, to be brought into the House of Commons, embodying the principles of Universal Suffrage, equal representation, free election of representatives, without reference to property, the Ballot, and short Parliaments of fixed duration, the limit not to exceed three years.

Proposed by Daniel O'Connell, Esq., M. P.

Seconded by Sharman Crawford, Esq., M. P.

3d. That we agree to support and vote for a Bill, or Bills, to be brought into the House of Commons, for such a reform in the House of Commons, as shall render it responsible to the people.

Proposed by John Temple Leader, Esq., M. P.

Seconded by Mr. Robert Hartwell.

4th. That a Committee of twelve persons be appointed to draw up a Bill, or Bills, in the legal form, embodying the principles agreed to, and that they be submitted to another [meeting] of the liberal members of

Parliament, and the Working Men's Association, and that the following be the persons appointed:—

Daniel O'Connell, Esq., M.P.
John Arthur Roebuck, Esq., M.P.
John Temple Leader, Esq.
Charles Hindley, Esq., M.P.
Thomas Perronet Thompson, Esq., M.P.
William Sharman Crawford, Esq., M.P.
Mr. Henry Hetherington.
Mr. John Cleave.
Mr. James Watson.
Mr. Richard Moore.
Mr. William Lovett.
Mr. Henry Vincent.

The following names, in the hand-writing of the parties are appended to the document:—

(Signed)

Daniel O'Connell, M.P., for the city of Kilkenny.

Charles Hindley, M.P., for Ashton-under-Line, except the 3rd resolution.

William Sharman Crawford, M.P., for Dundalk.

John Fielden, M.P., for Oldham, except the 3rd resolution.

Thomas Wakley, M.P., for Finsbury.

I cordially concur in the 2nd and 4th resolutions.

D. W. Harvey.

T. Perronet Thompson, M.P., Hull.

J A. Roebuck, M.P., Bath.

I am friendly to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th resolutions,

John Bowring, M.P., for the Clyde Boroughs.

The names are all given as they are placed in this document. This was the foundation of the Charter.

LECTURES.

(At a period when the extension of knowledge is pursued under all kinds of forms, it was thought the publication of the following heads or fragments of Lectures, might occasionally furnish the skeleton for a youthful lecturer's address to his class, with such filling up and improvements as his genius should suggest.)

AT THE OPENING OF THE WESTMINSTER MECHANICS' INSTITUTION, GROSVENOR-STEEET, MILBANK-ROW.

(*True Sun*, 10 *Jan.* 1837.)

We are assembled for the purpose, in the antiquated phrase of our forefathers, of "hanselling" a room for the uses of a Mechanics' Institution in Westminster; a fact which in itself is evidence, as agreeable to ourselves as it may be disagreeable to some of our opponents, of the progress which knowledge is making among the most numerous, and by that very circumstance the most important classes of the community. Our attention, therefore, is naturally directed to the reasons which make

it important that the numerous classes should know. And this again throws us back upon inquiring, what has been their state and condition hitherto, through knowing or not knowing; what they have suffered, what they are suffering, and what they are likely to escape.

On referring to history, the earliest monuments that present themselves are monuments of the suffering and degradation of the numerous classes. So soon as any set of individuals were able, by the possession of better heads, stronger arms, or more numerous families, to attain to any degree of preponderance above their fellows, they appear, by the universal practice of all ages and countries, to have struck out for obtaining two monopolies;—one, the monopoly of directing what should be done in this world; and the other, the monopoly of assigning what should entitle men to happiness in the next. The earliest existing monuments of human labour, are probably the Pyramids of Egypt; and of the object and intent of these accumulations, the only thing that can be predicated with certainty is, that they were for no use to those at whose expense they were made. Had the traces been left of enormous exertions to build a bridge, remove a mountain, or clear a river, it might be conceivable that men should have banded together and said, "Let us do these things, because they will be of use to us." But when a country is found studded with edifices of hewn stone, the bases of which have been stated to be of the magnitude of Lincoln's Inn Square (and I have compared the statement upon the spot, and saw no reason to doubt its general accuracy), and of whose other dimensions you may judge by the representations with which every one is familiar; and when these mountains of masonry are found to have been built for the purpose of containing an ox's bone, there can be no hesitation in setting them down as awful instances of the oppression of the numerous classes by secular or priestly tyranny, or a combination of both. So far as can be gathered from the other remains of Egypt, the priestly power appears to have been the supreme, and the secular one merely the instrument. The country must have been governed by a college of priests, who kept a commander-in-chief as Mr. Warren the great blacking-maker keeps a poet. Of the history of the Egyptians, as distinguished from that of the sacerdotal order, all that can be gathered from their monumental remains is, that they occasionally went forth to war with the approbation of their priests, as men do now; that they committed horrid mutilations on their enemies when they were successful, and brought back the mutilated members, as offerings to the representatives of heaven at home. In fact, in Egypt the next life ran away with the present. Men lived only to die with the orthodox ceremonies; saving always the work that might be got out of them by the way. A historian records the quantities of onions and garlic that were consumed by the workers on one pyramid; so that it would appear they had rations of some kind. But who paid for the rations? Is it not manifest that they were paid for by the industrious classes in the end, who were made to pay for that which was not bread, and which they did not want?

The next æra in human history which cannot well be overlooked, is that of the Greek republics; and their history is as useful in one direc-

ion, as that of Egypt in the other. Though not all-perfect, they made such advances in the science of human happiness, as we are all glad to refer to with gratitude, and our enemies with spleen. Half the use which our political opponents make of the advantages of learning which they possess, is to pick holes in the history of the Greek republics, on the strength of the remains of the Tory poets of that time; for Toryism, if I may be excused so direct an allusion to existing politics, is not a thing of modern date, but goes back to the earliest histories, and nothing can be more amusing than to trace the resemblance between the operations of human ingenuity in those times and the present. But it is clear that the Greeks got rid of much evil, and wrought much good for themselves and their successors. The influence of the sacerdotal order, though not entirely removed, was cut down nearly to that of story-tellers and receivers of a certain number of votive cattle, which they offered to the gods and ate themselves. Men lived to live, and not for the sake of being chief performers at their own funeral; and many were the brilliant things produced by the wisdom of the preference. The Venus to a mummy, the Parthenon to a pyramid,—can any man doubt to which his affections shall be given? Their wars and toils too, though often undertaken for objects foreign to the general good, had more of interest to the community at large than in the Egyptian period. The condition of the numerous classes, if we set aside the existence of personal slavery, which perhaps did not in those early ages cut off a people from the right to admission among civilized communities, was comparatively fortunate. If they worked and paid, they at least conceived they had some interest in what they paid for; and that, we all know, goes a long way towards the satisfaction of the payer.

The next remarkable period was under the Roman power. I wish the Mechanics' Institute would re-write the Roman history, with comments. We should then know why the old version was so precious to our enemies, and why they attached so much importance to training up their youth by it to the way that they should go. The Roman history, from first to last, is one unbroken specimen of the oppressions of an overbearing aristocracy, adorned with all the art that could be applied to it through the advantage of the oppressors being their own trumpeters; and as such, there is no wonder in its having been the text-book from which the imitators in all ages have been glad to copy. Take one example, specially involving the treatment of the numerous classes. It can scarcely be unknown to any of you, that to this day it is a commonplace with the anti-popular party, especially the portion whom the *Edinburgh Review* has denominated the squirearchy, to say of anything they disapprove, that it would be as bad "as an Agrarian Law." Now what was the Agrarian Law, to which they make pretence to appeal? For several generations after the commencement of the Roman power, the people were obliged to go out to war at the command of their government, without either pay or prize-money except the promise of the division of the conquered lands. The Roman aristocracy delayed the division, and ended by keeping the lands, with small exception, to themselves. The people every now and then broke out into a demand for their share,

and this, when a score or two of years had salved over the possession, the Roman aristocracy chose to call asking for "other people's property." Livy's History will tell you all about it*; and Livy was a great supporter of the "glorious constitution" of those times. You know now what our opponents learn Latin for. But do not mistake the inference, and say men should not learn Latin; say rather they should learn it, that they may find out the weakness of the adversary.

The grand principle of the Roman government under all forms, was that wealth was to be made by taking it from foreigners by force, or as it is still called, conquest, and that all that was created by industry at home, was to be at the disposal of those engaged in the conquering process. Hence the pursuits of industry were in only secondary request, and were in fact to a great extent considered as discreditable and mean. The people meanwhile were pampered in words by the assurance of their greatness, and now and then a procession to St. Jupiter's, to return thanks for having successfully cut the throats of "a neighbouring nation;" but the real power and disposal of life, goods, and liberty, were in the hands of the aristocracy, who quietly made a regulation, the origin of the "Sturges Bourne's Act" existing at this day, which settled that so many hundred of such a class of Romans were to have a vote among them, and such and such a class were to have a vote a-piece. The Roman people seem never to have found out the fraud; and our own people are only beginning to find it out now.

When the Roman government fell into such discredit that the arbitrary power of an Emperor was submitted to as a refuge, and this again was followed by the irruption of the barbarous nations of the north, a new ally to bad government was discovered in the corruption of Christianity. The union between church and state had existed in considerable strength in the days of paganism; but all was as nothing, compared to the union which was quickly got up between secular tyranny, and the professors of the most unassuming religion which, as its authors left it, had appeared upon the earth. Misgovernment sheltered itself under the throne of God; it did not exactly say "throne," but "divine right" did as well. In this gulph the people of Europe lay, till some revivals of the ancient learning, followed up by disputes on matters of historical and literary criticism with the theological authorities, in which the orthodox, which means the powerful, went considerably to the wall,—opened the way for the increase of the people's power of regulating their own affairs, which has been going on perpetually increasing since.

During all these periods, the numerous classes of the community were oppressed because they were weak, and weak because they were ignorant. Look at the slave-driver to this day; he does not rob his victims of their limbs, but of their knowledge. Look at your own government; it does not enact that you shall be handcuffed as the means of preventing resistance to its bad intentions, but it lays a tax upon your reading. It says plain out, "We have something we are going to do or not to do, which

* For Extracts, see Vol. III. p. 467, Note from Article on the *National Character of the Romans.*

the numerous classes would never endure if they were wise; and therefore we will take care they shall *not* be wise." What inference do you draw, when you or any of your neighbours are astonished with a pitch-plaster across your bodily eyes, except that there is a design to *Burke* you afterwards? Why should you be more slow in drawing the conclusion, when it is only your mental eyes they desire to block up and disable? May not a man be led into any quantity of mischief, by making a fool of him, as well as any other way? Revolve this; see your situation. The government has been asked in all sorts of ways, to take the money, only to let you have the use of the sight which nature has provided for you. It even avows, or portions of it, that it does not want the money; but it cannot bear to see the people instructed, or at all events it can bear to see any but the poor. There lies the dread; "Fear ye the constable?" the poor may say to such a government. Fore-warned is fore-armed; have you not a curiosity to ascertain the object with more precision? Was the fear general, of the wisdom of the poor; or had it, mayhap, some particular object,—one which touched the poor in proportion to their poverty, and made a penny-premium on ignorance effective in the place most wanted? Could it be the New Poor Law? Heaven knows; but there is no need to trouble heaven, to know this, that the provision for the poor is taken away while the taxes on their bread are left, and that at the same identical time the blinders are clapped upon the poor, lest they should attain to the knowledge of the good or evil of the doing.

From all this there is but one conclusion—Get knowledge. The secret is out; you are intended to be wronged, and you will be wronged, unless you bestir yourselves upon the warning your enemies have vouchsafed you. I refuse all apology for saying your enemies; the government that passes laws against the information of the community, is a public enemy proclaimed, and the only question is how to abate the nuisance without falling into a greater. To the acquisition of knowledge, then, bend all your efforts. You need not be afraid of going a little wrong; you will get right some time or other. Some of our friends, I see, are running their heads against the Newtonian Theory. If they knew as much of the sea service as they do of a hob-nail, they would let the Newtonian Theory alone. If they were familiar with the extent to which its truth is confirmed by its practical effects upon the navigator and the astronomer, they would pause before they ran the risk of giving occasion to the adversary to speak reproachfully. But no great harm will come of it; the Newtonian Theory will go down to their children in spite of them,—which is more than the Corn Laws will. Let your relaxation, your pleasure, be to learn; I see by the very words of your Prospectus, that these are your habits already. One word of advice on a practical point. Take advantage of the relaxation of labour which the custom of the country gives to the industrious classes one day in seven. Employ a portion of it in refitting your bodies by exercise and enjoyment, for the confinement of the ensuing week; and employ another portion of it in furnishing your minds with the knowledge of what will make you useful to yourselves, and formidable to your enemies. In short, set up a political

Sunday School. If bigots object, answer them as your fathers did when they told them there was scripture authority for the Pope appointing kings. Tell them simply that it is false in matter of fact; that without going into any question of the authority of the book to which they refer, there not only is no such order in the book, but there is a prohibition in the book. Consult the apostle Paul, if he is any judge; and see if allowing any man to trouble you about keeping sabbath-days is not prohibited along with the keeping of new moons, and meats and drinks, and the other shadows of Jewish ordinances. "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of holiday, or new moon, or sabbath-days," Coloss. ii. 16. Why do not they plague the working classes about keeping the new moon? It is because they see nothing to be got by it; and in the other case they see the temptation of forcing upon us what they think will tend to our subjection and their exaltation. But then, they say, it is ordered in a certain chapter of the book of Exodus; men are ordered to be circumcised elsewhere, but it is not in that chapter. The same chapter prohibits the arts of sculpture and design,—dot and stroke engraving, lithography and all; why are these allowed to go abroad without being troubled by the police? And then they say, the day was changed. Show us the order in the orderly-book; they know very well that there is none. All that appears is, that the early Christians made a collection for charitable purposes on the first day of the week, which they probably did because it was the first; and it is once called "the Lord's day," in allusion to the resurrection. Be persuaded then, that any attempt to interfere with you on this ground, is an imposition by the richer classes on the poorer. We will follow Paul's advice, and "let no man judge us;" and if they chuse to put us to the test, we will resist as our forefathers resisted others of man's inventions. The apprehension of resistance to bad laws, forms the only practical check to the operations of bad lawmakers; and the blame of what may follow, is with those that risk it. In fact they *do not* risk it; they bluster, but they give way before the responsibility.

Finally then, go on as your fathers did, making the most of the light and knowledge you have, to acquire the light and knowledge you have not. And may the Providence that favoured *them* in breaking the bonds of political and religious tyranny, favour you also with success proportioned to your day.

LECTURE I.—ON NATIONAL ECONOMY.

(*True Sun, Dec.* 23, 1836.)

Before the Working Men's Association, 6, Upper North Place, Gray's Inn Road.

Object of the science which has been known by the title of Political Economy.—First, what it is not. It does *not* mean a politic economizing at the expense of the poor. Next then, what it is.

Economy means "keeping a house in order."

Political is that which "relates to the many."

Mrs. Marcet's then, was the best definition of Political Economy. What domestic economy is to a family, that Political Economy is to a nation.

National Economy, after the Germans, is a better term. If it had been always used, the ideas of the public would have been much clearer on the subject than they are.

National Economy has for its object the best means of obtaining and distributing *wealth*. But what is *wealth?*

Wealth is well-being. "In all time of our tribulation, in all time of our *wealth*."

National Economy then, applies to the raising up of the greatest quantity of happiness, through the instrumentality of the products of industry. And what good thing is there that is not affected from this cause?

National Economy therefore is the proper business of every man and every hour. We all practise it, either good or bad; like Molière's man, who without knowing it, had all his life been speaking prose.

It is the science, in fact, of preventing our being defrauded by our betters.

A great change has taken place since the time of the ancients. The ancient plan for obtaining wealth was by conquest; in other words—pillage. All that was possible was to be taken from foreigners, and all that was produced by the industrious at home was to be at the disposal of those engaged in the process. *Patriotism* meant a readiness to follow any leader to the plunder of others. *Luxury* meant a state of comfort which indisposed men to become agents for such a purpose.

Happiness of the change. Modern improvements have been carried further still. As one consequence of the change, there will never be another commercial war.

Effects which are to be expected from the extension of knowledge in this quarter:—

The first inference to be anticipated is, that it is not true that nations are made to be enemies, or even rivals; but on the contrary, workers together.

The second inference which may probably be arrived at is, that it is not true that the different classes into which society is divided—and into which it would be quickly divided again if the present arrangement were destroyed—have any opposition of interests when properly understood.

A century ago, the attention of intelligent men was directed to natural phænomena. The appetite being to a considerable extent sated in that direction, it now is directed to these. Will it not be discovered, that if the moral world is fearfully and wonderfully made, the commercial one is so no less?

Objections to the science:—

That it is *cruel*. It may be, that it has been wrong. *Bad* national economy may easily be cruel.

That it deals in vague generalities. This is like saying, "Do not trust arithmetic. What is true of an ounce, will not be true of a hundredweight."

That it is *theory*. Theory means seeing the consequences of one thing in another thing. Merchants' accounts are *theory*.

That errors have been made. But where have they not? How long was astronomy before men came to anything like a general agreement on it?

Knowledge on this subject, to be useful, must proceed upwards, and not downwards. It will never come to us by Act of Parliament. It is only when the industrious classes are as well acquainted with their interests in large masses as they are in small, that they can expect to see an end of imposition and suffering.

Let us enter, then, on the examination without prejudice, and with a simple desire to learn by inquiry. Every sensible man, to the last hour of his life, is a scholar. He may be promoted to be a monitor in the great school of mutual instruction, but he is a learner not the less.

Above all, let us be anxious to attend to and make the most of the interests of all who are likely to suffer by necessary change; that we may know and point out the methods by which the alterations may be effected with the best results upon the happiness of all.

LECTURE II.—ON FREE TRADE.

(*Constitutional, Dec.* 14, 1836.)

THE general question is, whether it is the interest of a nation, in the aggregate, to buy at the cheapest market; or whether any national gain or advantage can be made by buying at the dearer market, on the ground of employing our own manufacturers. And after this there is the further question, of what is the effect of the two courses on the operative classes? Put the case of the wood-cutter. Suppose you had been in the habit of employing a man to cut up wood for firing, one day in a week, at a shilling a-day, and it was proposed he should in future work with a blunt axe, which should oblige you to employ him two days in a week, and pay him two shillings; and this to serve the trade of wood-cutters.

Your first answer would be, that if the trade of wood-cutters was to gain a shilling, *you* were manifestly to lose one, and you could see no national gain in that. *But is this all?* You would have laid out the extra shillings on something and on somebody. Suppose then you had been in the habit of spending them upon a gardener to tend your garden and grow you cabbages; would not this gardener declare, that giving the extra shilling to the wood-cutter, was taking a shilling in the way of employment from *him?* The gain to the wood-cutter then, and the loss to the gardener, balance one another exactly, and so do the after consequences of their expenditure. If the wood-cutter would expend the shilling upon some trade or other, the gardener would expend it on some trade or other too. It might even happen that they would expend

it on the *same* trade,—that whichever of them got it, would go to the same butcher or the same baker. But whether they go to the same or not, they will either of them expend it; the consequences therefore to trade in the aggregate must be the same.

There remains then precisely this difference; that if you give the shilling to the gardener, you are to have a shilling's worth of cabbages for your money; and if you give it to the wood-cutter you are to have none. Everything is to be equal, except that you are to lose a shilling. You are to lose a shilling, and in the aggregate nobody else be the better for it. A wood-cutter is to gain a shilling by being employed a day in the week more; but a gardener is to lose a shilling, by being employed a day in the week less. There are two people to lose, and one to gain; the gardener and you to lose a shilling each or a shilling's worth, and the wood-cutter to gain one. A shilling is to be gained by the one, at a loss of two shillings to the others. This is the plan for making wealth by blunt axes.

In all this there is nothing wonderful, except that anybody should have failed to see it. If a private individual was advised to work two days with a blunt axe instead of one with a sharp axe, he would reply at once, that it would be one day's clear loss to him, and through him to the nation of which he makes a part. What then is to make the result different, if instead of cutting the wood with his own arm, he does it by an arm he hires?

This fact of there being two losses for one gain, has sometimes been described by the phrase of *the double incidence of the loss*, meaning thereby that the loss fell twice over for once the gain. The phrase may be good or bad; what is important is to see the thing meant. A shilling is lost twice, or by two people; and gained once, or by one person. Two shillings then on the side of loss, and one on the other, make one shilling loss on the balance of the account, just as two shillings paid at shilling whist, and one received, make one shilling lost on the balance of the whole.

Note in all this, that even supposing that you who are to lose the shilling by paying for the blunt axe, are an outcast for whom nobody is bound to have any consideration at all, still it is a total falsehood to state that after excluding you to the uttermost, there is any benefit to trade in the aggregate. It is clearly only a robbing of Peter to pay Paul. If the employment and wages of wood-cutters are to be improved, those of gardeners are to be reduced. Unless it can be proved that the wood-cutter is a better man than the gardener, and that it is right and fitting to take a shilling from a gardener to give it to a wood-cutter, there is nothing gained. If the half of a farthing out of the shilling you lose, was to be given to trade in the aggregate, it might help to comfort you. But as it is, it is clear you are to be robbed for love.

The thing kept out of sight,—the thing men have failed to observe and to put forward,—the thing whose omission is at the bottom of the whole error that has been upon the subject,—is the existence of another trade, represented here by the gardener's, which must be damaged by the proposed interference with the natural course of expenditure, to the

exact amount that the trade meant to be favoured is advantaged, thus leaving the loss to the user or consumer an unbalanced loss, with nothing in the shape of good to trade in the aggregate to set against it. But what is true in one instance is true in any number of instances. If all that is added to one man's employment and wages is to be taken from some other's, by no possibility can any aggregate increase to wages or employment be the result. You may be the lucky man who gains in spite of all; but in the main, each man's losses must be equal to his gains, and his last state be no better than his first. The whole process must amount to "Dropping buckets into empty wells, and growing old in drawing nothing up."

Next, as to the case of some commodity which can be procured cheaper from abroad, but which it is proposed, for the good of trade, to make at a higher price at home, through prohibiting the foreign.

Suppose, for instance, foreign gloves can be had for two shillings, but it is proposed to prohibit them and make the same kind at home for three; and this, on the ground that it is to be good for trade. Examine the consequences, as in the case of the blunt axe. In the first place, somebody's trade, to the amount of two shillings, is to be stopped, which used to provide the British goods which went abroad to pay for the foreign gloves; for unless they were got for nothing, they must have been paid for in something. Secondly, somebody must lose trade to the amount of the third shilling, which would have been spent upon him if it had not been taken to be expended on the maker of dear gloves; being in fact the representative of the gardener, in the case of the blunt axe. These three shillings are to be lost by some trades or other, and to be given to the maker of dear gloves that is to be. So far then, there is a balance exactly. No man can show a farthing of gain to trade in the aggregate. If you were to be the maker of the English gloves, you might say you were a lucky man to get the three shillings; but if you were of any of the other trades from which these three shillings are to be taken, you would be of opinion things were better as they were. Whichever party you belonged to, you could not pretend to say there was anything done for trade in the aggregate. But there is one part of the question which is to notice yet. In one case the wearer of gloves is to have something for his third shilling, and in the other he is to have nothing. By the invention of making men wear dear gloves, he is to be robbed for love, without a fragment of benefit to British trade in the aggregate, to set off against his loss.

But an objection will be made, that the foreign goods will be paid for, not in goods, but in *money*. And where does money come from, and how is it got? Is it not procured, like any other commodity, by paying for it with goods of some kind, in the countries where it is produced? As we certainly do not buy gold and silver with gold and silver, we must buy them with goods. Supposing then the fact to be, that we pay for foreign goods with sovereigns, this is only paying for them with the goods that were given for those sovereigns abroad. If the foreign gloves had been paid for in Turkey coffee, you would never say this ought to be stopped as ruinous to trade; because you would see

that they were virtually paid for by the goods that were sent to Turkey to buy the coffee. And the same with the sovereigns.

If sovereigns are sent abroad, this will raise the value of sovereigns at home, and more goods will consequently be sent to buy them in the countries where they grow; which is exactly what will happen in the case of Turkey coffee. This part of the subject might be further gone into, in a lecture upon Currency.

Bank; any difficulties introduced by, not chargeable on Free Trade. We check and break up the regular exchange of goods for goods; and then because there comes every now and then a famine which sends people to the Bank to demand sovereigns to send abroad for corn, this is made into an argument why we should not have the corn.

If the above is the result when "protection" is given to one trade, would any benefit arise to trade in the aggregate, from giving the same kind of "protection" to all? Would it not manifestly be an attempt of the same kind, as an attempt to make money by allowing every man in his turn to establish a halfpenny toll at Charing Cross;—but with this further result, that at every turn, what is taken out of the pocket of one trade to be given to some other trade, is at the same time lost over again by another party, the consumer? So that, as it affects the wealth of the whole nation, the process may be compared to one which should allow every man in turn to establish a toll at Charing Cross, with a proviso, that of what he received, half should always be thrown into the Thames.

But suppose the question limited entirely to the effect on the working classes. Fancy everybody but yourselves put entirely out of consideration; I will not ask you to take them in the smallest degree into account. What seems then to be established is, that in your character of operatives, there is to be no good done to you in the aggregate at all. There is to be a great deal of plucking one another, ending in being on the whole just where you were. It is to be the case of the monkeys in Exeter Change, where every one ate out of his neighbour's pan. This is to be the result to you, in your character of operatives; and at every turn there is to be a gratuitous loss to you in your character of consumers, besides.

And this leads me to notice the imposition, which partly through ignorance and partly through contempt for the working classes, has been attempted to be put on them upon this point. Are the working classes to be no consumers? In their capacity of workers they are to eat out of one another's pans; and in their capacity of consumers, in proportion to what they consume, they are to share in the common loss. This is the bargain that is offered to them; this is what they are invited to accede to.

If conveniences and comforts of life can be advantageously procured from abroad, why are the working classes to be cut off from all share in the benefit? "Don't drink tea; it's a foreign drug. Working men should live on beer, and raise the price of barley. Why should your wives and daughters wear a silk ribband; don't you see it's an outlandish luxury?" Suspect all orators who preach to you in this style.

What they really advise is, that you, the working people, should give up your share in this world's comforts and conveniences, such as they are, that somebody who does not work may have more.

Fallacy of saying each trade is to be depressed in turn. Would such a plan succeed, if purposely acted on? Would it not be found, that wherever you tried to depress one trade, you encouraged one or more others, so that the whole plan was naught?

But perhaps you will say, you are not much attached to foreign luxuries. You can do without them, if it will please anybody; and are not disposed to get into a quarrel for their sake. Have you reckoned them up? Do you know what foreign luxuries are? What think you of *bread;* is that a luxury; or is the luxury increased by paying for it the double of what you might? Does not this open your eyes to the merit of the argument which urges poor men to abstain from foreign luxuries? You see what this is running into,—*Corn Laws.* Corn is to be raised by the dear process at home, instead of being procured by the cheap one from abroad. Sixty shillings is to be expended to raise a quarter of corn at home, instead of thirty shillings on the makers of the goods that would buy it from abroad, and thirty more on such trader as the consumer chose to expend it on, and get value for his money. As concerns the trade of the country in the aggregate (putting you, the consumer, on one side), there is not to be a farthing gained; but you, the consumer, are to pay double for your quarter of corn, instead of giving half for the corn, and spending the other half on anything you like. It is a repetition of the joke of the blunt axe; and you, the operative, that live by corn, are the man that is to pay the piper. Without a fragment of benefit to trade in the aggregate to balance it, and merely that one overbearing branch of trade who have had the ingenuity to allow no man to come into Parliament without swearing he belongs to them, may put money into their pockets at the expense of the manufacturing branches, you, the operatives and consumers of corn, are to pay double for your bread. You are to pay 1s. for your loaf, where you might have it for 6d., and have the other 6d. to spend for your own advantage. You are to lay out a shilling with one trader, the monopolist in corn, for a loaf; instead of laying out sixpence on some other trader for the same loaf, and sixpence more on some other, for anything you chuse to have. You are to rob two traders of sixpence each, to give both sixpences to one; *your* temptation to the business being, that for one of the sixpences you are to have nothing in return.

Some useful applications of the general principle of free trade may be noted in conclusion.

It enables us to get rid of the objections that are sometimes started to improvements. Take for example the instance of Omnibusses. A working man rides in one for his business or his comfort, for sixpence instead of two shillings; and there are not wanting those who would put this down if they could. Suppose you are assailed with the objection, that if you save eighteenpence, the hackney-coachman loses it, where then is the public gain? Answer, that if you save eighteenpence, you expend it upon somebody instead of the hackney-coachman, which is all

the same to trade; and to *you* there is this great difference, that you get something for your eighteenpence besides. There is a story, whether true or not, that Blackheath has its name from there being coal under it, and that by the wisdom of our ancestors it is ordered to be shut up, to prevent injuring the coal trade to Newcastle. Answer, that if it was opened, all that you saved by it you would expend on something else, which would be the same to trade in the aggregate; and *you* would have something for the money instead of nothing. The Canada merchants lay a tax on Baltic timber, to enable them (they urge) to bring the Canada timber from the greater distance. Tell them that what they take from *you* in the price of timber, *you* would have expended with somebody else to whom it would have been as good as to them; there are therefore two losses for one gain, or yours is a pure unbalanced loss inflicted through you upon the country.

Another important point affected by this principle, is that of Machinery. Why do you always use a machine when it is for your own saving; and how do you defend yourself for so doing? Answer, all that I save by using the machine I assuredly spend on something, which is the same to trade. And to me there is the difference, that for this money I get something instead of nothing.

Note the remarkable practical evidence in favour of free trade, contained in Dr. Bowring's Report on Switzerland. The power in that country is with the people; yet they support the system. The great comparative prosperity and wealth of Switzerland, arise simply from all men's consenting to apply themselves to those species of production for which the country has facilities, instead of those for which it has not.

LECTURE III.—ON POPULATION.

(*True Sun, Dec.* 9, 1836.)

THE greatest advance in the science of National Economy which has been made within what may be called the time of the existing generation, was contained in Malthus's discovery of the theory of population. No man has ever confuted a fragment of what Malthus has said. But it had one great fault. *He only told half.* He explained the half of the consequences which bore hard upon the people,—the half which called on them for sacrifices and self-denial. But he did not enforce the half which went to show on what the necessity for those sacrifices depended, and how it was to be diminished.

The substance of Mr. Malthus's book,—which is all contained in four or five pages, the rest being illustration,—is that men in our own and many other countries, do not multiply so fast as they would if there was nothing to hinder them. And the proof is, that in some other countries which can be mentioned, they multiply much faster. But as there is no reason to suppose the disposition to form domestic establishments is less strong here than in those other places, the inference is that there is something here which hinders.

What it is that makes the difficulty, it is not hard to see. In the most numerous and least wealthy classes, the difficulty is in finding food for

a family; and in the wealthier classes the same effect is produced by the difficulty of supporting a family without descending from their standing in society. For example, any individual tradesman's son or daughter might marry, if they would consent to become day-labourers. But they will not consent to become day-labourers; and therefore they do not marry.

But if people, after all, marry improvidently, what is to come then? And here rises to view a fact of primary importance. In new countries, like some parts of America, where fresh land is to be had for clearing, mouths instead of being an incumbrance are an assistance. If there were twice as many mouths and pairs of hands as there are, there would be no difficulty in their obtaining twice as much food, or more. Adam Smith has stated that in some parts of America, a widow with five or six children, was courted as a kind of fortune. Is that the case here? It may be put to your own knowledge. And does not this point to the fact, that in new countries where land is plenty, and every man can create food that likes, there is a premium upon children; but that in old countries, where the population is already at the amount, or nearly so, of what can live upon the produce, it is directly the reverse? In an old country it is not true, that the more hands the more food. The quantity may be capable of increase by increased exertions to a certain extent; it may be like an India-rubber rope that will stretch a little; but in spite of that, there is a limit. Many people have not seen this, and upon the want of it have been built some of the most current errors connected with this subject.

If, then, in a country where the quantity of food is limited as described, the people, after all, persist in endeavouring to increase their numbers, how will they be kept down? I suppose nobody will deny, that if there is not food for them, be kept down they must. Malthus said, they will be kept down by two agents—1st, *Misery;* and, 2dly, *Vice*, which is always in the long run strongly promoted by misery, and which in its turn is a great increaser of misery itself, and has moreover peculiar ways of its own in which it either prevents human beings from coming into the world, or thrusts them out of it after they are there. This is what Malthus said, and who can contradict it? And yet he has been run down and bespattered with abuse, as if he had promulgated something outraging all truth and reason. He had partly himself to blame. Why did he leave out the other half? Why did he tell us all that would come to us if we were shut up in a cage, and not throw more light upon the question of what it was that made the cage, and how it was to be got rid of or alleviated? Be not run away with by clamour upon this point; but keep your eyes open, to see whether the observations of Malthus, properly backed by that which he omitted, do not turn out to be the road to the working man's deliverance after all.

Malthus then, whether he meant it or not, has let us into the secret that the reason why men cannot multiply as they might be disposed to do, or why, if they attempt it, they must submit to the thousand-and-one miseries which he has painfully described, is that it is difficult to obtain food. In short we are like rats in a cage, who are to multiply on a given quantity of food or something approaching to it. We will not dispute

a word of what he has said touching the misery of such a situation; but we will take the liberty of asking what makes the cage, and why it should continue.

The truth is,—and for this observation we are mainly indebted to Malthus,—that man is so constituted that his first impulse, under circumstances holding out the slightest possibility of support, is to form domestic unions and surround himself with children. It appears to be the stimulus which Providence has ordained, to induce man to complete his mission of filling the habitable earth. And the consequence is, that in a new country, population quickly becomes crowded in the places which offered the greatest advantages to first settlers; and that in an old one, it rapidly and continually advances up to the limits of the existing food.

Suppose the case of an island newly peopled. At first, probably, the occupation of cultivator and manufacturer will be, to a great extent, combined; but as numbers increase, there will be a division of labour, and the man that makes shoes, will buy with them a portion of his neighbour's corn. In the beginning, as is found to be generally the case in new countries, these artisans will be well paid; that is, they will get a copious supply of corn in return for their day's work. But if the numbers on the island increase till they begin to press against the food which the soil can supply, they must bid one against another, and so get less and less. What will in fact be given for corn, will be just so much as will induce the people who are to eat it, to agree about the division of it. This, and this only, will be the measure of the price of corn. The price of corn, therefore, will rise; and as this increase of price has no dependence on the cost of cultivating the land, the price for which the corn will sell will soon be more than the cost of production, and the difference will be *rent*. But to make this rent, the manufacturers give more hours' work for the same quantity of corn.

This increase of toil to the manufacturing classes in the island, will be greatly and substantially alleviated, if after the population has begun to press on the limits of the supply of food, there are other islands from which food can be procured in exchange for manufactured goods. But suppose the landowners have the power to prohibit foreign exchanges for food. The consequences will be the same in kind, as if a town should shut its gates, and resolve to allow no food but such as was grown within the walls. Estimate the consequences; try all objections and proposals by this parallel.

Suppose it were urged to you, that it would make the landowners rich within the walls, and what was good for one class must be good for another.

Suppose it was argued, as an objection to opening the gates, that the growers of corn within the walls would be obliged to take to manufacturing pursuits, and this would ruin you by reducing wages.

Suppose you were offered a protection a-piece in turn, as a bribe for allowing the gates to be kept shut.

Would not each and every of these fallacies be answered by you on the spot?

Note too, how certain it is that the landowners within the walls, and their labourers, must be brought to the grindstone in the end. When you had multiplied till you bid against one another to starvation point, would not the agricultural labourers have done the same? Had the gates been open, and you been allowed to buy food with your manufactures outside, the children of the agriculturists might have found employment abroad by joining in your ranks. But this is made impossible. They can, therefore, in the end be no better off than you. There may have been a single flush of advantage to their trade at the time the gates were shut; but when that is over, they will only find they are five instead of four, and that the five are worse off than the four, and without chance of mending their condition.

To the landowners the evil must in time extend, through the impossibility of finding maintenance for their children except by subdividing their estates. And this none of them can escape, except such as are either to have no children, or to have some way of keeping them at the public expense.

Emigration; cruelty of enforcing. Why are laws to be passed to oblige men to beg to be transported as a relief?

Look then broadly at the question, and see whether the great point on which the happiness of the working classes depends, is not simply in keeping open the opportunity for an indefinite supply of food as the reward of industry. Let no man say, we shall speedily people up to it. By God's grace, so we shall. But then we must look out for more; as we do for another dinner. One dinner will not keep a man long alive; but we are for a succession. The world is before us; and when it is filled up, in the first place there must have an immense time intervened, of which we will not be so foolish as to refuse to take advantage; and in the next place, the world will only be then, where we are invited to be now for love.

Notice the objection upon national security. The same objection would apply to all commerce. Have no commerce, because it may be cut off by war! Reply, the very tendency of commerce is to prevent war; which is killing two birds with one stone. We have been at war with all the world, and yet we could never be prevented from getting *naval stores.*

Hardship of the case. Your goods may be sent abroad, and every thing brought back except what will pay.

Put the supposition that the manufacturers had laid a tax on home-grown corn, or a bounty on foreign.

LECTURE IV.—ON CURRENCY.

(*Constitutional, December* 17, 1836.)

THE subject is complicated in itself; but the difficulty has been vastly increased by the use of vague language, and by rushing to conclusions without condescending to "begin at the beginning."

There seems to be a propensity to wrap up the question in a kind of slang, implying that the users think there is something droll and out of

the common course of things. Thus a French author called money the *poudre de prélinpinpin*; and we hear something like a translation of this every day, in the popular phrase of coming down with "the *dust*." Everybody remembers a dozen other cant terms of the same nature; among which even the recognized term "cash" may be classed; for "cash" can only have been taken in jest from "cashier," which is *caissier*, "the man that keeps the chest." Children too, early acquire a mysterious idea that money is a key that opens all locks; and to this fact, of the effects of money being forced on their notice so much sooner than they can understand the reasons, is probably owing the obscurity which with most people attends the subject through life.

Let us meet these difficulties by determining to say nothing but what we understand. Half the disputes in the world would be cut short, if men would only agree on this rule.

Man appears to be the only animal capable of understanding the advantages derivable from exchange. The elephant at the Zoological Gardens receives a halfpenny in his trunk, and passes it round the corner to a seller of buns, who gives him a bun in return. But there is no reason to think he does this on any other principle than that by which he might be taught to pull a string, if he found that the consequence habitually was that a bun fell down.

In the rudest state in which man can be found, it is possible that exchanges may be principally confined to cases where each party desires to consume what he is to receive. A savage may exchange a bow and arrows for food when he is hungry, and refuse when he is not. But a very little increase in his intercourse with men, will cause him to find out, that to make the thing offered a good bargain, there is no necessity for his wanting to consume it himself; but that it is quite sufficient if it is a thing in such general request for consumption, that the persons can never be far off who would be willing to obtain possession of it by giving him something he *did* want to consume in return. Hence there would speedily be some substances of general desire, which men would get into the habit of passing from one to another, not with any necessary intention of consuming them themselves, but upon the strength of their being at any time exchangeable with somebody who wanted to consume. Thus a peck of salt, a bar of iron, corn, cattle, skins, and various other substances, are or have been employed in different parts of the world for the purpose described. And the things so employed, may be called the *instrument of exchange*; for by means of them, individuals in the end exchange their commodities for what they wish actually to consume or to enjoy.

If we wish to know at what *rate* the substances so employed would pass, the answer seems to be within every person's reach. Suppose any one of us were to wheel about with him a bushel of corn, as a substitute for a crown-piece in his pocket; how much of any kind of commodity he might wish to consume, would he get for it upon demand? Clearly, not so much as would be required to purchase a bushel of corn in the market, but that reduced quantity which would be given for it by a retailer, who bought it to sell again, and speculated upon selling it for

the greater quantity just mentioned, as the market price; with a further deduction for all the expense, delay, risk, and trouble, which might arise to the receiver in carrying it to the retailer. Hence it would not be true, that if a bushel of corn would buy an ell of cloth, an ell of cloth would buy a bushel of corn. On the contrary, it would buy much less than a bushel. To put it in mathematical terms, it would buy less, in the ratio that what could be got in any kind of substances for an ell of cloth by sending it to a retailer, multiplied by what could be got in the same way for a bushel of corn, bore to the market price of an ell of cloth in the same kind of substances, multiplied by the market price (in the same substances) of a bushel of corn. From which must further be deducted the expense of sending to the retailer.

The motive from which men will part with a portion of their commodities at this reduced rate, is because it saves them the trouble and delay of standing in the market and waiting till a purchaser offers the desired kind of goods in return. But as the difference of rate depends greatly on the trouble and risk of conveyance from one man to another, it is clear there is a premium on employing for the instrument of exchange the kind of commodities which are most easily conveyed and least likely to spoil. For example, if a man should carry about with him for pocket-money a waggon-load of straw and a bar of some kind of metal, that were selling for the same in the market, he would find that what he could get for the straw as an instrument of exchange would be less than what he could get for the metal, by all the difference in the portability and risk of spoiling; and therefore, if he was wise, he would employ metal instead of straw ever after, if he could. And the final result, in all countries where intercourse and civilization had arrived at a certain pitch, would be that those metals, a given quantity of which is in the highest request,—in other words, the precious metals,—are of all commodities the most economical and convenient for the instrument of exchange, and as such they would come to be almost exclusively employed for it.

In any given community, the quantity of commodities of all kinds which would be employed as the instrument of exchange, may be considered as the same one day with another, on the same principle that the food consumed may be supposed the same. There may be a difference in a course of years, or even from year to year, or from one season of the year to another. But this will be because the aggregate wealth or business of the community is altered; while they remain the same, the quantity of commodities used as the instrument of exchange will remain the same; because if it were to become less, somebody would have an inducement to apply more commodities of some kind to this purpose, and if it were to become more, somebody would be induced to withdraw part of the commodities in use as the instrument of exchange, and apply them to the purposes of consumption. In fact, the substances in circulation as the instrument of exchange would be subject to a perpetual drain, from individuals applying them to the purpose of consumption; which, again, would create a perpetual demand for new. And as the substances so consumed would be received at a low or gainful rate, and

replaced at a losing one, from all this consuming and replacing, there would in the aggregate be neither loss nor gain.

The first employment of the precious metals as the instrument of exchange, would be by weight. Thus Abraham "weighed to Ephron the silver, four hundred shekels of silver, current with the merchant," (Gen. xxiii. 16.)—the earliest mention of currency, undoubtedly, in history. But when governments had attained to a certain degree of consistence and trustworthiness, it would be discovered that a great deal of trouble and risk in weighing and examining the fineness of the precious metals might be saved, by a government's putting a stamp on pieces of metal, in a way that should cause both the fineness and the weight to be authenticated by the external appearance. And this is the invention of *coins*.

The government that fabricated these coins, might clearly at the outset issue them for as much as the metal contained in them, and something more. Every man who wanted them for the instrument of exchange, would be ready to give as much as for the metal contained in them, and at all events a large portion of what he considered to be the worth of the saving he was to make in escaping the necessity of weighing and assaying.

So far is plain sailing. There is not a word, with the exception of a mathematical expression, which is not open to every person of the most moderate habits of examination and inference. But here begins a part which (as the Americans say, *if true*,) presents an instance of complication like what is found in the explanation of the tides, and various other appearances in nature. It is not to be gone through without attention and patience; and, after all, it is not so hard as it looks.

The very curious phænomenon which I am going to announce to you, is that, if *Pharaoh* for instance was the first issuer of coins, the rate at which they would be received in the market and pass from man to man, would in the first stages *rise and rise*, not merely by the amount of what is saved on each transfer by escaping weighing and assaying, but by something considerably greater, and which is limited only by the actual circumstances of the case and country. And I invite particular attention to this; in the first place, because it is confessedly of paradoxical appearance, like the assertion that there shall be two tides a-day, which at first sight looks exactly as if it was the thing that ought not to be; and secondly, because, if established, it is the key to almost all the fallacies with which society has been troubled on the subject of currency.

Let, then, the proposition be stated in the broadest terms. It is this; that if Pharaoh's coins contained, for instance, an ounce of gold each, and the saving of weighing and assaying on each particular coin when it was transferred was equal to the portion which we should call a penny, or somewhereabout the thousandth part,—the rate at which the coins would pass in the market in the early stages would rise, not merely by a penny each, but by two, ten, or a hundred times that amount, and in fact, till one of two things which shall be hereafter described, should occur to stop it.

And now to the demonstration. It cannot be disputed, that on the first commencement of the issues, every man who wanted the coins for

the instrument of exchange, would be willing to give for each, more goods of any kind he had for sale, than for an ounce of plain gold, or for clearness gold-dust, by at least a considerable portion (say half) of the saving made of weighing and assaying. For if he passed it again for only the same as an ounce of gold-dust, he would still be the gainer to the amount of what we should call a halfpenny. But *would* he pass it for no more than an ounce of gold-dust? On the contrary, it is clear, that the same reason which induced him to bid the value of a halfpenny more for the coin and think himself a gainer after all, would induce the other men with whom he came in contact, to be anxious to get possession of it from him at the same rate. But if he passes the coin at the increased rate that he received it, instead of a halfpenny he saves a penny, or, in fact, gets the whole saving for nothing. But when he finds by experiment that he passes the coins at the same increased rate he gave for them, why should he not, if coins are scarce and it is a question who shall get them, bid at least the amount of a halfpenny more? It is plain, that if he gets possession of them by so doing, he will save a halfpenny, even though he passes them at the previous rate. But when he passes them, he will find that the same reasons which made *him* willing to add the halfpenny, will make other men willing to do the same. He will therefore pass the money again at the full rate at which he received it; and this will make him as willing as ever, to bid a halfpenny more. In this manner the rate will go on rising, till one of two things happens; till either it has risen so high that the existing supply of coins is sufficient to conduct all the exchanges for which they are wanted, and so an end is put to further competition;—or till the anxiety of men to procure coins by adding a halfpenny to the existing market rate, is balanced by the fear that from some cause or other the rate may be upset before the coins are out of their possession. Hence there would be a height to which the rate would rise, and a height to which it would not rise. If Pharaoh's government was a stable and peaceable one, the height might be expected to be greater; and the contrary. It could hardly be so bad, as that the rate should not rise by something; and it is always possible to name altitudes, which under no conceivable government is it likely it should reach.

When the coins issued were sufficient in number to conduct all the exchanges of the community at the elevated rate, whatever it was, to which the general competition for coins had raised them, then if the government proceeded to further increase their number, the market rate of coins would *fall*, and to such a point as would make the increased number of coins no more than sufficient to make the supply complete. And this would be brought about by the simple process of the market prices of commodities rising, as in other instances of increased demand. The height of the rate would prevent any of the coins from being applied to the uses of ordinary gold; for no man would convert a coin into an ounce of ordinary gold, when it was going in the market for perhaps an ounce and a quarter. All the additional coins, therefore, must be brought into the market by somebody, in the shape of an additional demand. And this, as before stated, must cause the prices of commo-

dities to rise, or which is the same thing, the market rate of the coins to fall. And this process must be continued, till the cessation of the cause; that is to say, till the rate is reduced so as to make the increased number pass for no more in the whole than the old.

If the issues of new coins were persisted in, a time would come when a coin would purchase the same quantity of commodities as an ounce of plain gold. And if they were continued still further, by the same necessity for a rise of prices the market rate of the coins would be depressed *below* that of an ounce of plain gold; and consequently, as soon as the difference was enough to make itself felt, there would be a premium upon applying coins to the purposes of plain gold, and the coin would be melted down. But if it was possible by severe laws to prevent this melting down,—which might perhaps be practicable to a certain extent,—then, in proportion to that extent, a coin would buy less in the market than an ounce of plain gold. It will perhaps be objected to this, that the coins must at all events be an ounce of gold, and therefore must always buy as much. And so it would, if it were an ounce of *useable* gold; but by the supposition it is not, because a law is there that hinders it. Its power of purchasing, therefore, must depend on other considerations.

Here then, we get a sight of the first great fallacy abroad on the subject of currency; which is, that the wealth of a community is to be increased by what is called "making money plentiful," meaning thereby nothing but increasing the number of pieces of money. On which it is sufficient if we have ascertained that the effect of such an attempt is to cause the increased number to pass for exactly the same as the old, and in fact perform the same offices.

Note here the fallacy of promising to make money cheap, and labour dear. Money may be said to be cheap, when it will buy very little of useable things in general; as is the case when it is depreciated. But whether labour is thereby rendered better paid, depends entirely on whether wages are increased more than the money is depreciated; which is by no means the probable consequence, but the contrary.

The next advance was to the making of paper money. It was found, by experiment, that if a government issued pieces of paper containing a promise to pay a certain quantity of gold, as for instance an ounce, upon demand, these pieces of paper might, within certain limits, be paid away by the government for the same quantity of commodities as an ounce of gold, and continue to be circulated from one man to another for an ounce of gold or more, without being brought back to the government in demand for gold. And the principles on which the worth of this paper will be regulated, will be the same that have been described in the case of gold. As long as every man has experimental proof that an ounce of gold can be had for each of these notes upon demand, there is no reason why it should not pass from hand to hand, like any other valid promissory note, for at all events the same as an ounce of gold. But if there was some particular convenience in these notes more than in an ounce of gold, and their number was restricted so as to create a competition for obtaining them, they ought, on the principles before stated, to rise not

only by the amount at which that convenience might be estimated, but by this many times over. And accordingly it is found, that under appropriate circumstances, precisely that phænomenon takes place. What is called an *Agio*, is the phænomenon in question; and though Adam Smith suggests what he surmises to have been the cause, I do not know that the mode of operation has ever been explained except on the principles here adduced; and that the principles do explain it, appears to be a strong confirmation of their truth. The best account of Agios is given by Adam Smith, in the *Wealth of Nations*, book 4, chap. 3. The Bank of Amsterdam issued a kind of paper which had certain advantages in being secure from fire, robbery, and other ac idents, and being paid away by a simple transfer in the bank books, without the trouble of counting or risk of transporting; in the same way, probably, as takes place here with respect to transfers in the funds. And the consequence was found to be, that this paper sometimes rose to nine per cent above the amount expressed in it, and sometimes sank as low as par. Upon which the bank sagaciously determined to sell at all times this bank money for currency at a rise of five per cent, and to buy it in whenever it fell below four; by which means they kept the Agio, as it was called, always between five per cent and four. The explanation of which is, that five per cent was what the bank found to be a living profit, or what left a fair remuneration for its trouble after paying all expenses; and therefore it carried its issues to the point that brought down the difference of the market rate to five per cent, and no further. At the same time it is evident that the absolute difference in convenience and safety could by no means amount to five pounds in the hundred. It might not amount to half-a-crown; but this was sufficient to make the rate rise upon the principles stated; and the remarkable thing which is generally overlooked, is that, after all, the difference in convenience and safety was finally paid by nobody, for everybody passed the bank money at the same increased rate that he received it. The phænomenon is altogether a very remarkable one, and appears to be without effectual explanation, except on the principles proposed.

It may be assumed, therefore, that the paper issued by a government would be always capable of rising in the market, or what is called bearing an agio; and that the reason it does not, is because governments issue such quantities as prevent it. But as one effect of the issue of this paper money, whether it bears an agio above gold money or not, must be to increase the quantity of money, gold and paper together, which is in circulation, the effect must be as before, that the prices of commodities will rise, or which is the same thing, the market rate of money will fall. And if the issues of paper be increased to a certain point, the gold coin will come to be worth less in the market than the ounce of plain gold which it is made of, and consequently coins will be melted down, till the number of coins and notes together is reduced to the number which will make the coin pass for as much as the gold which it is made of. And if the issues of paper be continued, a time will come when the coins will be driven out of circulation altogether, and applied to the uses of ordinary metal. All of which will take place with a gain to the govern-

ment equal to the commodities it receives for the paper at its issue, and no loss to anybody else. For a coin, when put into the melting-pot, is not lost to the owner, but only applied by him to one use instead of another.

After the gold coins are all driven out, if the government still goes on issuing paper, what will be the result then? Clearly, that the notes will buy less in the market than the ounces of gold promised to be paid upon demand. The consequence of which will be, that the notes will be brought back in demand for gold. And this will go on till the number of notes in circulation is reduced to what will cause the rate to rise to an equality with the ounce of gold, or to something so near it, that the difference is insufficient to tempt anybody to carry back the notes in demand for gold.

As long, then, as the government keeps its promises of paying in gold upon demand, this is a perfectly effectual check upon the number of paper notes that will be issued. For when the notes are brought back for payment as fast as they are issued, there is manifestly nothing to be gained by issuing more. But there is no end of human discoveries. It was discovered by the Pitt Ministry, that there was no necessity for a government to keep its promises. And upon this discovery ensued some others, which in some degree took the public by surprise. The object of the Pitt Ministry was nothing so simple as merely refusing to pay gold for notes they had already issued; their object was to go on issuing paper after they had declared their intention not to pay. And to the surprise of the greatest part of the community, the system went on with more smoothness than they expected. Instead of Bank of England notes being carried to the trunk-makers, to sell for what they might fetch as waste paper, there did not at first seem to be any marked alteration. To the astonishment of many, the man who had a Bank of England note in his pocket found himself as able to get a dinner as ever. At last, however, it began to be found out that the prices of things were rising; and by slow degrees, and not till after the mischief had been carried to a vast extent, the public began to find experimentally that the worth of a government's paper notes does not depend on their being payable in gold, but simply upon the greater or smaller number thrown into circulation. It follows, therefore, that a government, if it chose, might issue paper money without any promise or pretence of ever paying in gold at all, and keep it to any standard that might be fixed upon,—as, for instance, make each note continue to purchase in the market an ounce of gold;—if it could prevail on itself, or be prevailed on by the power of the community, to issue notes to the extent that would keep them to this value, and no more. Whether to oblige a government to pay in gold upon demand, may or may not be the best practicable method of limiting its issues of paper, must depend in a great degree on the extent of power possessed by the community over its government. All governments will go wrong if they can; or, at all events, all *have* done so. The virtue and the information, therefore, which are to hinder mischief, must be looked for in the community at large.

It will be interesting to enumerate the consequences of such a system

of over-issues of paper. If the taxes are continued at the same nominal amount, at the same time that the government begins to gain what it receives for the superfluous issues at the decreasing rate, it will begin to lose upon the produce of the taxes in consequence of being obliged to receive the notes at the same reduced rate; and a period will soon arrive when the daily loss will balance the daily gain, and a daily balance of loss will commence. If there are fundholders, then this period will be deferred, in consequence of the gains that will be made by defrauding the fundholders, or paying them in a money purposely made worse. But still such a period will arrive at last. So that by such a plan, it is impossible that the government should not finally lose.

But it would be a poor contriver that could not find out a way for making the substantial produce of the taxes remain undiminished. And for this, it is only necessary to lay the taxes *ad valorem*, or in proportion to the price of the article for the time being. If this be done, the gains of the government will go on increasing without end. On a calculation of what was actually taken by the British government through the fraudulent depreciation of Bank notes by issuing and refusing to pay between 1797 and 1814, the amount will appear to be somewhere about forty-six millions. And if a calculation be made of what has been lost and gained by the fundholders, in the same manner as might be done if they formed one individual, turning everything into its present value upon the principles familiar in the calculation of the present value of annuities, it will be found that the fundholders are *minus* somewhere about the substantial present value of eight millions and a half. The fallacy abroad on this subject, consists in counting all that any of the fundholders have ever gained, and omitting all that they have lost.

If private bankers are allowed to issue notes, it is plain that every one of these notes takes the place of one which ought to be issued by the government and what is received for it be put to the public account, and that the worth of the note is taken by the private banker instead. The permission therefore of the issue of private bank notes, is of the same nature as if the government should allow individuals to wheel away the tar and pitch out of the dock-yards, or the beef out of the Victualling-Office. The plain duty of a government is to keep a National Bank, as it keeps a National Victualling-Office, and account to the public for all that goes through it. The business of a private banker is to discount bills and keep cash accounts. But he should do this with his own money, and not with other people's; and he does do it with other people's every time he is allowed to make a note and substitute it for a note issued by the public authority. In fact, an honest government would issue all the paper currency itself, and put the amount received for it to the public account, by applying it to redeem a portion of the public debt, and so relieving everybody from a share of taxes in proportion.

The consequences of a depreciation of paper are to lead men into overtrading, and consequently into bankruptcy, and to depress the substantial amount of wages. When the power of money to purchase is growing less and less daily, it needs no great penetration to see, that the substantial wages of working men will always be behind. When *fifteen*

pence have come to purchase only as much as a shilling did before, the working men will find that where they had a shilling they have only *fourteen* pence. The working classes do not seem generally aware of this. On the contrary, they seem often to have a longing for a depreciation of money, through some vague idea that the increase in the nominal amount of money in circulation is to make wealth.

LECTURE V.—ON THE "GREATEST-HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE."

(*True Sun*, 22 *Dec.* 1836.)

DISCOVERIES are scarcely ever made at once. On the contrary, it is often difficult to decide, to what precise period the title of discovery shall be assigned. If we take a late period, we find too much that can be traced to predecessors; and if we take an early one, we find too little to have been of any service without the additions of posterity. The fact is, that the seeds of knowledge, as of other fruits, are small; and that the title of discoverer is best due to those, who at any period of the world's existence, have made the largest and most important additions to the actual stock. It is one thing to discover a naked principle, and another thing to discover the sweeping application of a principle. The first man who observed that steam would lift up the lid of a tea-kettle, was a discoverer; but this does not take away the title of him who applied the discovery to the steam-engine.

There is no point on which men have more taxed their ingenuity, than in trying to discover the rule which settles what (in the phrase employed) they *ought* to do. What is the meaning of this word *ought*? If we ought to do what we ought, why ought we;—and if you and I differ in opinion upon what we ought to do, how ought we to settle it? It is plain that here is a word used, with a plenteousness of no meaning, or at all events no determined meaning.

Ought, in all languages, has a reference to some forcible reason why we should follow a certain course. In Greek, the corresponding word means to "bind;" which is the same as in the Latin term "obligation." The Saxon *ought* comes from to "owe," and the Latin *debeo* in the same manner means both "ought" and to "owe money." Hence it would appear that in all these languages, *ought* implies obligation of some kind. We are to be bound to do or to omit some certain act, on penalty of some result that is to arise if we do not.

What then is the obligation, the inducement or the penalty, which is to cause mankind to follow certain courses and avoid others? And 1st, in *Morals*, which mean the rule of conduct for individuals in their private capacities, what is to be the guide? There is scarcely any action, which at different times and places, has not been held criminal, venial, and even laudable. In this perplexity, can anybody discover a clue? Try, for instance, with one of the words that looks easiest, *justice*. But one man's justice is not another man's justice; who then is to decide, where doctors disagree?

If a collection of rude and ignorant men were brought together, as might be the case for instance with the survivors of a shipwreck on a

desert island, it is scarcely possible they should not arrive at some glimpse of the fact, that justice was that rule of arrangement with respect to life and property, which is most for the good *of all.* A slave-owner might be disposed to cast the interest of his slave out of his consideration of what made justice; but if the slaves were as powerful as he, they would soon bring him to a rectification of his code. Among a society where strength was pretty equally divided, if not among individuals at all events among families and partnerships, there would soon arise a strong disposition to admit, that that rule was *just*, which when universally applied, *increased the happiness of the whole community.* Examine and see, whether our own idea of justice is not reducible to this. A law may be unjust and yet be applicable to the whole community. The mere fact, therefore, of a law falling on one man as well as on another, does not make it *just.* By *just*, we mean something more; and we can mean nothing else, than that it is of the kind which promotes the happiness or welfare of the community on general application. And in like manner on other questions of morals, of which justice is but a particular branch,—the clue discoverable to the whole, is that *morality* is the rule of conduct, which if generally pursued, would lead to the greatest happiness in the aggregate.

The next observation which lies open to the searcher, is that the rule which gives the greatest aggregate of happiness, always gives the happiness of the *greatest number of individuals.* Try it, in any of the cases on which the agreement of mankind has been the most decided; see whether any infringement of the rule does not take away more from the happiness of the injured, than it can add to the happiness of those who expect to benefit by it. Take, for instance, the grossest case of all, the existence of personal slavery. Is it not clear, that the happiness conferred on one oppressor, is vastly inferior in amount to the sum of the happiness taken away from all the oppressed? Hence the rule we are in search of is the rule which gives "the greatest happiness." To say "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," is a superfluity, and a superfluity that spoils the accuracy of the whole. It is having two things where there ought only to be one; like two splits to a pen, or two images in a looking-glass. One of the latest acts of the great modern discoverer and elucidator of the principle of the "Greatest Happiness," was to correct this redundancy; and if it was done at the instance of the individual who here addresses you, it was a circumstance in his life which you would not expect him to forget. The great practical philosopher, by almost the last act of his hand, noted the expression as not only redundant, but as capable of that worst of misconstructions, the supposition that the numerical majority are to consult their own happiness at any expense to the minority. (See *Bentham's Deontology*, the concluding pages; where the author puts the case of an island that should contain a thousand black men and a thousand white, and notes the terrible blunder it would be, to imagine that the first of these classes who multiplied to be a thousand-and-one, would thereby be justified in making the increase of the happiness of the thousand-and-one the sole measure of their conduct.)

But it has been urged against Bentham's principle, that it holds out no motive. Supposing it did hold out no motive, it would have been something highly important and valuable to have discovered nothing but the rule. But it happens that the motive is so closely connected with the rule, that shutting the eyes will not hinder a man from perceiving it. In many cases nature (which means the actual constitution of things) has intimately connected suffering, present or future, with the infraction of the rule. Or in other words, the rule is the rule, because from the construction of man and the circumstances by which he is surrounded, he will be sure to be at some time or other very unhappy if he breaks it. Example, temperance. But there are other cases, in which men have got so tired of suffering in their own persons by one-another's breaches of the rule, that they have entered into compacts for mutual prevention. These compacts sometimes take the form of *penal laws*; and in other cases they exert themselves in the shape of a quantity of general aversion or dislike, which few individuals are found stout-hearted enough to encounter. With most men the motives thus created are sufficient. With a small number they are not; but nobody has maintained, that for a motive to exist, it must be a motive that has proved effectual upon every man that ever lived.

The proposition, that what is for the general good is in the long run for the interest of the individual, is neither more nor less than the truth promulgated in the proverb that "Honesty is the best policy," and various other collections from popular experience. The great fallacy that has been put forward upon this point is, that the painful consequences are not *certain*. Some thieves go unhanged; therefore there is no motive for avoiding the trade of a thief. But a wise man who should have thoughts of taking up the business of a thief, would reflect, that though it might be all very well if he could be sure of escaping as some have, it was not very well when all the chances of hanging were before him. And the same with any of the other inflictions, whether natural or artificial, which are the *probable* results of breaches of the rule.

The application of the same principle will throw light on the meaning of many other terms, to which a high degree of importance has in all ages been attached. Thus, what is *Liberty*, but the absence of all interference of power except such as increases the general happiness? *Patriotism*, but an attachment to the interests of the country to which we belong, regulated always by the conviction, that if this is exercised to the injury of surrounding countries, nature, or Providence, will find the means of punishment? *Loyalty*, but a rational attachment to the administrator of the law, *so long as his operations are directed towards the general happiness, and no longer?*

After *Morals* come in succession Internal Law, Home Politics, Foreign Politics, and International Law; in which the same principle is the common back-bone that runs through all. One of the works left for the aspiring among our posterity, is to re-write all these subjects on the Greatest-Happiness Principle.

LECTURE VI.—ON THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.

THE earliest condition of man has been the patriarchal.
Then chiefs or judges.
Then petty kings.
Then extensive empires, governed by arbitrary sovereigns.
A hierarchy was very generally called in aid.

It was not till some thousand years after the commencement of what is known of human history, that extensive masses of the community began to claim a share in government. And though their efforts for the attainment of this object were in many points imperfect and unsuccessful, the results were still sufficient to stamp the seal of success upon the general principle.

The first inference to be drawn from experience is, that whoever have any share in governing, will try to turn it to the benefit of themselves. Arbitrary sovereigns, though there might be brief and individual exceptions, in the long run have exercised their power for the personal gratification of the monarch. Aristocracies have exercised it for the advantage of "their order." And democracies, when really not directed by the influence of other classes, which has been very seldom, have not been behind-hand in showing that they too could oppress.

It was not till after the Roman empire had sunk under the arms of what were called the barbarous nations, that the greatest practical improvement ever made in the exercise of political power, was introduced to the notice of mankind. The Roman people voted on some occasions by tribes; and in the mode of doing it, submitted to impositions so grossly calculated for giving the preponderance to aristocratic influence, as might even surprise men who had been in the habit of submitting to Sturges Bourne's Act in their parishes*. But the invention of a regular set of representatives, understood to be chosen by the people with more or less of purity, was due to the barbarians. It appears to have arisen out of the woods of Germany, which manifestly contained what might be called a new *graft* of human kind, of which we are to this hour gathering the fruits.

Representation, then, opens at once the widest field for speculation. It may be of all sorts and qualities, from that which existed in England before the Reform Bill, to the best which experience can collect in other countries, or imagination frame.

And what is the just object of Representation? The obtaining the greatest aggregate of happiness to the community, through wise government. That no man's happiness shall be increased, by means which in the long run induce greater suffering to other men than happiness to himself; or in other words by the breach of those rules, of which men by long experiment have attained to a pretty distinct vision under the name of *justice*.

How then is this object to be pursued? And here a grand fallacy has in all ages been set up, by the apparition of certain classes or orders of

* See more particulars in page 368, preceding.

men, who maintained that *they* monopolized all knowledge on the subject, and to them consequently should be left the management of mankind. Other classes would probably have done the same if they could; but as the rich and powerful had the best chance to maintain themselves in the competition, so the rich and powerful have been usually found to be those who put forward this claim with most loudness and effect.

But experience has proved that these claimants always governed ill. They governed as every man of moderate intellect might have assumed it was their intention to do, for the benefit of their own order. How then is it to be amended?

If certain orders of men claimed that it was their right to go into the market, and direct by their superior wisdom how much of the good things contained there should in the first place go to themselves, and how much of the remainder should afterwards go to individual expectants among the rest of the community; it would not be long before great heart-burnings arose against this mode of distribution, and it was discovered, that however paramount were the wisdom and virtue of these elevated directors of the market, a sounder practical way was to admit all men to the market, to compete there according to their means. Something like this, appears to take place on the question of Representation. Who can advance a feasible argument to show,—still more, who can substantially prove,—that if representation could be reduced to a competition like that in the market, where every man should equally enter in person, and tell afterwards for what he was worth, or in proportion to the means of influence be they great or small which he had been able to provide himself,—this would not be (if adventitious difficulties are not found to intervene) the really desirable and comfortable consummation?

How many jealousies would this remove! When we protest against *influence*, we always mean undue and unjust influence. We mean influence that is unfairly bottled up and fenced about, to the exclusion of the influences of other men which would otherwise come in contact with it, till it becomes a dangerous agent by its uncounteracted accumulations. But give every man an equal chance to exert what influence he has, and then these accumulations of influence become comparatively harmless. They cannot overbear the thousands of little influences to which they are opposed; and the thousand owners of the little influences come by a chance for the protection of themselves.

But, say the objectors, this would not represent *property*. What is the meaning here, of representing property? Precisely the same as if the rich man should declare, that his property was not represented in the market unless the poor man was kept out. The complaint in reality is, that great property is not represented to the exclusion of the small; that the poor man, in fact, is not placed at the mercy of the rich.

Suppose a number of men were invited to form a joint-stock company for some common purpose. It would be a strange invitation which should begin by proposing that the holders of all the smaller shares should have no voice at all. This is to make the difference infinite; and the just difference never can be infinite.

But in the case of the great joint-stock company called a state or political community, there are two points in which it differs from any others.

The First is, that the sacrifices demanded from the holders of the smaller stakes, are absolutely greater than from the holders of the greater.

The Second is, that on the supposition that all the holders had votes alike, there are naturally existing causes, why the influence of the holders of the larger stakes over the small,—in other words of the rich over the poor,—if not larger than it ought to be for the public good, is at all events not less.

The rich have hitherto had the reins of government in their own hands; and they have given evidence, that whoever might be fit for governing, they by themselves were not.

Fallacy of "virtual representation."

Points wanted to be gained. First, extension of the suffrage, in all and every way that is not evidently intended to support a monopoly of some existing class to the prejudice of others. Absence of danger. Practicability of obviating objections from number, &c. Suffrage by sample. Nothing *then* to hinder women having votes.

Secondly, securing of personal liberty by Ballot. Answer the Tory objections to the Ballot.

Thirdly, reducing the temptation to mischief by diminishing the periods of election. Not only frequent elections, but dispersion of elections, by making them at different times. No property qualification. Equality of electoral districts*.

Means of gaining these points. Warn against jealousies among classes. If the wolves came down among the sheep to argue with them, the first thing they would try to do, would be to set the long horns against the short horns, the thick-woolled against the thin. Too much has been done in this way already. The operative classes are taught to separate themselves from their employers, on the ground that the success of their employers would be their own loss. This is just what the Carlists would do in the Christino army if they could. The interests of the different classes may not be identical; but one cannot move in advance, without something being gained for the other too.

Note how far we are from anything like a just system of representation now; how on the contrary, our system, though not so bad as once, is full of point-blank contrivances for subjecting the poor to the domination of the rich. In addition to the more palpable forms, note the comparatively unsuspected one, that no poor man can be returned to the House of Commons, because there is always a power of inflicting on him any quantity of pecuniary loss after the election, at the expense of about an equal loss to his rich opponents. That this would be done away, is one objection the rich have to the ballot.

But observe, that though the extension of the suffrage may be the

* Add to these, the Permanent Sitting of Parliament. Without this, we shall have our annual "war of the recess."—*Added in March* 1841.

object we should fix upon if we had our choice, it does not follow that the way to get it is to say we will have that and nothing else. Suppose the inmates of a prison were to say, "Put us out on the green sward before the windows, and when we are there we will think about the other things you recommend to us." The answer would be, that those other things were precisely the means to assist in getting to the green sward, and as such were recommended. To every enemy's position, there is something that may be called the key; and the key in the present case would seem to be, to cut off the enemy from the means of maintaining himself out of our pockets by the intervention of impositions on our industry. But as it is plain that on this point the working-classes are not agreed, there seems every probability that they must wait till they are.

The great political discovery of modern times appears to be, that if men are to be free in their general government, they must practise it in their local. Arbitrary governments have well known the converse. If improvement is to be gradual, let us see what we can do in this direction. Let us watch, for instance, what progress parishes can make in getting rid of Sturges Bourne's Act; and use it as a gauge and measure of our chance for good government on the great scale.

LECTURE VII.—ON TAXATION AND THE NATIONAL DEBT.

THE effects of taxes laid on foreign articles with the object of creating a monopoly price at home, have been shown in a preceding Lecture (on Free Trade) to resolve themselves into taking the difference of price twice over and from two sets of people, to put it once into the pockets of the favoured class. Or in other words, the difference of price is thrown into the sea; being neither more nor less than what would happen if an individual was foolish enough to hire a man to work for him with a blunt axe, for the sake of paying him for more day's-works.

When a tax is laid on the produce of manufacturing industry, instead of being laid on rent which is not industry, a loss of a similar kind takes place.

For even if the tax was laid equally or *ad valorem* on all manufactures, it is impossible that if for every shilling expended on manufactures, the consumer was obliged to put another shilling into a box for somebody else, there should not be a wonderful diminution in the quantity of business done. In fact it would be the same, as if the price had been suddenly increased by the necessity of giving more for the raw material, or by a failure of the powers of nature. Call then the loss by this diminution of business, the loss *A*.

If a certain sum, as for instance a hundred pounds, is levied upon rent, the landlord loses the use of it and the government takes it. It is possible that each would have expended it with the same tradesman, as for instance on a gun-maker, with only the substitution of musquets for fowling-pieces. In this case it is clear that the difference to trade is nothing; and if instead of expending it on the same tradesman they

would expend it on different ones, the difference to trade in the aggregate must be nothing still.

Suppose now the same hundred pounds to be levied on the consumers of manufactured goods, by means of a tax on manufactures. As before, the consumers lose the use of a hundred pounds and the government takes it. And as before, the difference to trade in the aggregate, of whether the hundred pounds was expended by the government or by the people out of whose pockets it is taken, must be null. So far then the consequences are the same. But there is something yet behind. There is the loss to manufactures and trade, similar to what would have arisen from a failure of the powers of nature, which it was agreed to call the loss *A*.

If we inquire further for the cause, it lies plainly in the fact, that rent is not industry, but an impost upon other men's industry. A tax on rent therefore, touches no industry; because industry is not there to be touched.

If this is true of taxes on industry, it must be equally true of taxes on the industrious. A wise nation therefore would never levy a tax on industry, or the industrious, while it could levy it on rent which is not industry.

The effect upon the working classes, of taxes on the necessaries of life, appears to be, in addition to any of its general consequences as above stated, to leave the working men always behind in their efforts to recover it in their wages. The effect is of the same kind, as in the case of a depreciation of the currency. If a tax be laid once, they perhaps at last recover the greatest portion of it. But if it is laid on repeatedly, they must be more and more behind. And the effect of each operation, is to depress their habits of living, and so secure their loss being permanent.

If this was not so, why do the rich show so much anxiety to keep the taxes off themselves, and throw them on the poor? They know the poor recover a portion in their wages; but they know they do not recover all.

If anybody would pay off the national debt for us, as for instance the Man in the Moon, there is no doubt the community in the aggregate would be the better for it. They would be the better, by exactly the amount of the taxes each man now pays for the interest. But it does not follow that the same result would ensue from our refusing to pay the interest. This, as far as the community in the aggregate is concerned, would be only robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The fact is, that money once raised by funding is irrecoverable. It may be bought up, by paying exactly what it is worth in the market. But that is not recovering it. Or the interest may be taken from one man and left with another. But that is not recovering it either.

And this does not prove that, as some have chosen to say, a national debt is no evil. The evil is when the debt is contracted; and the worst thing about it is, that there is no getting rid of it, and least of all by refusing to pay the interest afterwards.

What would be the use of our paying off the national debt, if we are

to pay for it exactly what it is worth in the market? It would only be encouraging the aristocracy to take the whole from us over again, by plunging us as deeply into debt as before. Suppose it were proposed that every man who pays 5*l.* a-year towards the interest of the debt, should come forward with 100*l.* and be free of the tax. What would the consequence be, but that the 5*l.* a-year would be laid on him again directly? Having got the national debt, let us prize it and keep it, unless we wish to have two.

The true and only remedy, is to get liberty to outgrow the debt. Since the peace of 1815, what the community has lost by the restriction of its commerce to serve the landed aristocracy, would have paid the national debt over and over.

It is true that the taxes which are to pay the fundholders are unjustly proportioned. The rich lay the taxes, and they lay some of them as much as eleven-fold upon the poor. But remedy this by making the rich pay their share through a property-tax; not by robbing the fundholders.

It is not true that the fundholders have got more than they engaged for. The allegation is a fallacy, dependent on reckoning all that any of the fundholders ever got too much, and taking no notice of what they got too little. If an accurate account be taken of all they gained or lost, in the same manner as if they made but one man, it will be found there is now due to them to the value of about eight millions and a half, and like to be. (See Postscript to Article on *Equitable Adjustment*, in vol. II, p. 392.)

END OF LECTURES.

THE

TRUE THEORY

OF

RENT,

IN OPPOSITION TO MR. RICARDO AND OTHERS.

BEING

AN EXPOSITION OF FALLACIES ON RENT, TITHES, &c.

In the form of a Review of Mr. Mill's Elements of Political Economy.

NINTH EDITION.

(First Edition published by Ridgway, 18 Dec. 1826.)

TO WHICH IS ADDED A POSTSCRIPT,

Containing a Translation of Chap. xx. of Vol. iv. of the "Cours Complet d'Économie Politique Pratique" of M. Jean-Baptiste Say, published subsequently to the First Edition.

Price Threepence.

PREFACE.

THE principal object of the following pages, is to demonstrate the fallacy of what is denominated the Ricardo Theory of Rent, and the injustice of the conclusion built upon it, that tithes and taxes on the land fall on the consumer.

What it is endeavoured to establish is, that the cause of rent is nothing but what was long ago pointed out by Adam Smith, namely, the limited quantity of the land in comparison with the competitors for its produce.

The answer made to the earlier Editions has been, that "the difference is only in the expression," and that "there is none in the principle." There is at all events the difference of the whole of the conclusion specified.

Since the appearance of the first edition, the subject has been carried forward under the title of "A Catechism on the Corn Laws;" with a view to trace the nature and consequences of those laws, as derivable from the true, or Adam Smith's, theory of rent, and to form a book of reference for the solution of the fallacies advanced in their support.

The result of this examination has been to show, that what is denominated the Ricardo Theory, is at this moment the great point of weakness of the opponents of the Corn Laws; and that their first policy and duty is to cut it away. No advantage can be given to the enemies of the truth, like defending a fallacy upon one point. The argument *does not depend on the Ricardo Theory;* and the political economists are sacrificing the truth on the Corn Laws, for the sake of a fallacy on tithes.

The enemies of political economy,—those who wish there should be no such thing, for reasons of their own,—of course exult in every weakness of its friends. As if all human knowledge, in matters of any complexity, did not come through a succession of discoveries of error; as children, by dint of falling, learn to walk. Opinions clash in all directions; and that which endures, is true. If mistakes are made, they must be found out and corrected when it pleases heaven. But to argue that truth is not discoverable, because there are mistakes,—is like proposing to banish algebra because somebody has erred in a sign, or merchants' accounts because a clerk in Lombard-Street made an entry on the wrong side of the book.

He who undertakes to point out errors in the arguments of others, is unable to engage that there shall be none in his own. With reasonable men the measure of his success will be, the degree in which, on the whole, he shall be found to have assisted the progress of truth.

T. Perronet Thompson,
Queen's Coll. Camvridge.

*(Apology must be made for the insertion of this and the "Catechism on the Corn Laws" without attention to the order of the dates, on the ground of its not having made part of the original design. Some alterations having also been made in the course of reprinting the "True Theory of Rent," this ought to have been called the Tenth Edition, and not the Ninth.—*June 1841.*)*

TRUE THEORY OF RENT.

THE public can have no just cause of apprehension from political economy; but a great deal from *bad* political economy, which is in fact no political economy at all. What it is of importance therefore to promote, is the direction of the same rigid processes to this science, that have been extended to the earlier and more forward branches of human knowledge. The discoveries already made in it have been so striking, that the coming age is probably destined to witness as great a determination of interest to this quarter, as took place towards natural philosophy in the period which followed the discoveries of Kepler and of Newton. And in reality the subject is only another branch of the philosophy of natural phænomena, and to be pursued by the same rules as any of the others. For no reason can be given why the connexion, for example, between the demand for a given substance and the supply, should not be as legitimate an object of philosophical examination, as the connexion between two bodies at the end of a lever, or between two substances which exercise a chemical action on each other.

If the English universities, which have always been in a great measure the depositories of knowledge in other branches of physical inquiry, have been too little sensible of the degree in which the interests of science are concerned in this class of subjects, it is only the more necessary that they should be excited to a consciousness of the reality. And if it further happens, that their particular interests are concerned as well as those of other parts of the community, the truth is not less the truth because its defenders are to be injured by the error. Should they, therefore, suffer from the effects of fallacies such as men of very moderate rank among their pupils would take off if presented in the schools, they can only blame their own supineness for whatever may be the possible result. If the faulty conclusion had related to tides or to telescopes, they would have opposed it by the dissemination of a counter version of the truth. But because it relates to a tax or a tithe, it is treated as if it had no possible connexion with "a succession of able men in church or state," and was devoid of all relation to "sound learning and religious education."

The same class of writers whose political economy is the most doubtful, have been unsparing in their invectives against academical institutions, and have at least done all in their power to provoke them to a salutary jealousy. Many of the assailants were members of the universities, who having themselves carried little away, had a certain excuse for feeling no gratitude. Others there were of a rarer sort, who declared that after having won learning to be their bride, they had found her all barrenness;—nothing reflecting, how different is the conclusion of the public in such cases, from that which the complainant would suggest.

One of the leading charges against the universities has been, that they do not turn their learning to a substantial use. There is at all events one use to which it might advantageously be turned; which is, the examination of the theories of their assailants.

The object of this article is to bring the opinions of what has denominated itself "the new school of political economy," to the test of something like such an examination as is undergone by every theory which makes part of the system of education in an English university. And for this purpose a work has been selected, which is the acknowledged epitome of the opinions in question, with the latest corrections and additions.

The account given of Capital would have been clearer, if it had begun with the definition. Capital, is wealth employed in the production of other wealth. After this general definition, the elucidation of particular points presents no difficulty.

But it is on arriving at the subject of Rent, that the disputed matter commences. However much the assertion may move of anger or contempt, the Ricardo Theory of Rent is founded on a fallacy. The easiest way of proceeding to show this, will be by giving the substance of the paragraphs which contain the argument; referring to the author quoted, or any other writer on the same side, to remove the suspicion of misrepresentation,—and marking with italics the stages where the fallacy appears.

'Land is of different degrees of fertility. &c.

Lands, of the highest fertility, do not yield the whole of what they are capable of yielding, with the same facility. &c.

Till the whole of the best land is brought under cultivation, and till it has received the application of a certain quantity of capital, all the capital employed upon the land is employed with an equal return. At a certain point, however, no additional capital can be employed upon the same land, without a diminution of return. &c.

When capital producing a lower return is applied to the land, it is applied in one of two ways. It is either applied to new land of the second degree of fertility, then for the first time brought under cultivation; or it is applied to land of the first degree of fertility, which has already received all the capital which can be applied without a diminution of return.

Whether capital shall be applied to land of the second degree of fertility, or in a second dose to the land of the first degree of fertility, will depend, in each instance, upon the nature and qualities of the two soils. &c.

The land of the different degrees of fertility; first, or highest sort; second, or next highest; &c. No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, &c. 1st dose, 2d dose, 3d dose, and so on.

So long as land produces nothing, it is not worth appropriating. &c.

During this time, land speaking correctly, yields no rent. &c.

The time, however, arrives, as population, and the demand for food increase, *when it is necessary* either to have recourse to land of the second quality, or to apply a second dose of capital, less productively, upon land of the first quality.

If a man cultivates land of the second quality, upon which a certain

quantity of capital will produce only eight quarters of corn, while the same quantity of capital upon land of the first quality will produce ten quarters, it will make no difference to him, whether he pay two quarters for leave to cultivate the first sort, or cultivate the second without any payment. He will therefore be content to pay two quarters for leave to cultivate the first sort; *and that payment constitutes rent.*

Let us suppose, again, that instead of cultivating land of the second quality, it is more advisable to apply a second dose of capital to land of the first quality;—&c. The effect upon rent is thus the same in both cases.

It follows that rent increases in proportion as the productive power of the capital, successively bestowed upon the land, decreases. &c.

We may thus obtain a general expression for rent. In applying capital, either to lands of various degrees of fertility, or, in successive doses, to the same land, some portions of the capital so employed are attended with a greater produce, some with a less. That which yields the least, yields all that is necessary for re-imbursing and rewarding the capitalist. The capitalist will receive no more than this remuneration for any portion of capital which he employs, because the competition of others will prevent him. All that is yielded above this remuneration the landlord will be able to appropriate. *Rent, therefore, is the difference between the return made to the more productive portions, and that which is made to the least productive portion, of capital, employed upon the land.*—Mill, pp. 29—33.

In this account, the matters of fact stated in the outset are entirely and absolutely true. The fallacy lies in assuming to be the cause what in reality is only a consequence. Proof spirit sells for a certain price, and more diluted spirits sell for inferior prices till they come to that which is worth no more than water; *therefore* the reason why proof spirit sells for a high price, is that there are weaker spirits which are selling for a lower, and if there had happened to have been no weaker spirits, the proof spirit would not have sold at all. This is a specimen of the kind of fallacy involved. There is precisely the same nullity of proof, that what is quite true with respect to the concomitant circumstances when they happen to exist, is therefore the essential and inseparable cause, without which the principal phænomenon could not have taken place. *When* it happens,—or even if it *always* happens,—that there exist soils of various degrees of productiveness down to that which does no more than replace the expense of cultivation with the necessary profit, and that men are moreover acquainted with the art of forcing increased crops by the application of more capital,—all that is stated with respect to the rent being equal to the difference between the highest and lowest returns, is as necessarily and undeniably true as anything that has been stated with respect to proof spirit. But all this is no manner of evidence, that these circumstances are the *causes* of the principal phænomenon, and that it could not have existed without them,—in one case more than in the other. In both cases this kind of conclusion is a pure fallacy, a simple *non causa pro causâ*. On the truth or falsehood of this, hang the merits of the whole of what is called the Ricardo Theory of Rent, and the consequences derived from it.

It is easy to imagine the existence of a country in which the land should be of a uniform and high quality, and where, from the great facility of procuring crops and the consequent non-improvement of agricultural science, the cultivators should, for ages together, have no idea of the processes by which a European farmer forces an increased crop through the expenditure of an increased quantity of capital upon the land. The whole of the cultivated portion of Egypt, and great part of India, present specimens of such a state of things; yet in both these countries, a heavy rent is paid to the great landlord, which is the government. If it was shown before, that the Theory of Rent is not true by virtue of the reasoning contained in it, this supplies the experimental proof that it is not true by accident either.

The simple cause of rent, in such countries and everywhere else, is in reality nothing but what Adam Smith pointed out long ago. It is the same that gives rise to the rent of the vineyard that produces Tokay. It is *the limited quantity of the land, in comparison with the competitors for its produce;* or, as it is sometimes called, the monopoly*. Let the case be supposed of a small number of settlers taking possession of a large and fertile island; and let the soil be so good, and their habits of agricultural energy so limited, that a slight scratching of the ground and throwing in the seed shall be all the cultivation they at first think of bestowing, as for ages together has been a picture of the agriculture of many tropical countries. If the land was unappropriated, and every man might occupy at will, it is plain that in the commencement no man would pay another any rent, either for leave to cultivate, or for the grass, wood, &c., which might be the spontaneous produce. Or if instead of the land being entirely unappropriated, the right of property in it was vested in a number of owners, but who were without the means of bringing the land into immediate cultivation, it would be equally plain that the competition among these owners would in the commencement reduce the rent which any of them could obtain, to the lowest possible magnitude, which is in fact no magnitude at all. In such an establishment, the degree of each man's wealth, supposing him to possess the brief capital required for setting his industry in motion, would be in proportion to the exertions of himself or of his family. He that by his activity could raise or collect much corn, fruit, sheep, furs, or whatever else were the objects of industry within his reach, would be comparatively rich. Such manufactures as he stood in need of, he must obtain either by the uneconomical process of employing part of his own labour or that of his dependents in their production, or by paying for them with part of his agricultural produce to such artisans as in the progress of the division of labour would make their appearance. But as he would have no alternative but either to pay the artisans their price, or have recourse to the

* When the term monopoly is thus applied to land, it does not necessarily mean a monopoly arising from any immediate act of the owner; for a monopoly, in the sense here meant, will arise to a certain extent under any system that can be imagined. There must always be a monopoly of the best land, and the nearest land, and that which is most favourably situated for the consumption of its produce; and this monopoly must cause such land to yield a rent.

uneconomical and wasteful method of manufacturing the articles himself, the recompense of these artisans would in the commencement be exceedingly liberal, and their lives easy. They would be a comparatively idle and insolent race, working when they pleased, and almost for what they pleased; as artisans are always described to be in newly peopled agricultural countries. But when population and cultivation had increased so as to begin to press against the limits of the soil contained in the whole island, and there was no longer new land to be had for asking, a very different scene would begin to arise. All the population which was not employed in agricultural labour, or supported without labour upon some kind of previous accumulation, must apply itself to manufacturing industry. And as the number of persons so employed increased, a competition would arise among them for the products of agriculture upon which they must live; and this competition would oblige them to give a greater portion of the results of their own labour, in return for a smaller and less luxurious quantity of agricultural produce than they had been accustomed to receive. It is true that the land must finally find food for all that live on it, as the vineyard finds wine for all that finally drink Tokay; but it does not therefore follow, that many of those who live on it, may not, when their numbers have increased, live much less abundantly than they used to do, and give a much greater quantity of the results of their own labour in return for a given quantity of the produce. It is proved by the experience of all countries, that moderately good land is capable of producing food for many times the number of hands required for its cultivation; so that all these numbers may be called into being, to assist in the demand. Hence if the exchange of commodities was conducted by the intervention of a circulating medium, the money price of agricultural produce must rise in comparison with the money prices of other commodities. Whether this comparative rise would take place by an increase in the money price of corn, or by a diminution in the money prices of other commodities, or by both these processes at once, would depend on the manner and degree in which the community had the opportunity of supplying itself with the metals employed in coins, or on other circumstances connected with the principles of Currency. But in whatever manner it took place, its effects would be virtually the same; so that it is sufficient to consider the case where the whole alteration is supposed to take place in the money price of agricultural produce. The land-owners, then, would begin to get rich, through the simple fact of their being the land-owners and there being no more land to own. If it should be found some day that a contiguous island had sprung up of the same nature with the first, their prospect of increased wealth would drop at once; and every thing would go on as it did at the commencement, till the new island had been cultivated and peopled like the other. But if this does not happen, the lucky land-owners will incontinently begin to swell into men of landed wealth. If they keep their land in their own hands, they will rise into what are termed gentlemen-farmers, or men who unite in their own persons the characters of landlord and cultivator. But as soon as what they obtain by the sale of their produce, is sufficiently greater than the amount for which they can hire one of their less

fortunate neighbours, who is heir to his own industry and no land beside, the greater part of them will hire a farming-man or overseer with part of the produce, and sit down in the enjoyment of the *otium cum dignitate* of landed gentlemen with the remainder. And from this step of the farming-man, they will soon proceed to the further one, of finding a farming-man who will advance his own capital, making an adequate deduction out of the produce in return,—or in other words a farmer or tenant. The reason of this further step will be, their desire to get more completely rid of the trouble of superintending the employment of the capital; for a tenant has his own interest at stake in watching it with the utmost exactness, while a farming-man, having no such interest, must still be superintended in a considerable degree. And all the *residuum* left after delivering to the tenant the portion of the proceeds which the competition among individuals of his class obliges him to accept, will be rent*. And what the tenant will be obliged to accept, will be such a part of the price of the produce, as will return him the capital he must lay out, with the lowest rate of profit for which men under the existing habits of the society will consent to lay out farming capital and superintend its employment. But of the existence of this residuum, the primary cause is manifestly the increased price of corn. As it has been accurately expressed by Mr. Ricardo, "Rent will be paid because corn sells high; and not corn sell high because rent is paid†."

If it should be objected, that a rise in the money price of corn must create a rise in the money prices of other commodities,—the answer is, that this is as far from following, as that a rise in the price of corn must create a rise in wages, at a time when the fact avowedly is, that the increase of competition among the labourers is such as to oblige them to accept a diminished recompense. The cases are in reality alike.

In all this there is no occasion for a word about different qualities of land or doses of capital. The simple case is what is to be settled first; and then the accidents are to be taken into the account, till the whole is brought to the case presented in nature. This is the way men proceed to reason in other instances; and must needs be the way in this. To say that the simple case is not the practical one, would be the argument of a man who had never contemplated such a process as analysis. All complex cases are solved by dividing them into simple ones; and almost all the cases of nature are complex.

If it *happens* that in the island supposed there are lands of every va-

---

* When the term *residuum* is employed in the sequel, it invariably means all that is left after satisfying the tenant.

This residuum is often loosely called *rent*, in cases which demand a clearer term. There are in fact two popular meanings of the word rent; one, the total residuum abovementioned; and the other, the share finally left for the landlord after taxes and other demands, if such exist, have been further taken out, which will be called for distinction *rent to the landlord*.

In making this distinction nothing is done towards prejudging the question of whether the residuum will rise with taxation, so as to leave the landlord's share the same as before; which is in fact the principal question at issue.

† Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, by David Ricardo, Esq. p. 62.

riety of downward quality, then as population, competition for food, and prices increase; men will be enabled and induced to take lower and lower qualities of land successively into cultivation, stopping always at the quality where the produce will do no more than repay them the expenses with the lowest profit for which they will consent to lay out capital and superintend its employment. At the same time the value of the produce on all the superior lands will increase; and since all the difference between the actual proceeds and what allows that lowest profit, will be taken for rent at the first moment when the land-owner is able to avail himself of the competition which is in his favour, the rent on all the qualities of land above the lowest, will increase also. The quantum of inferiority with which new lands can be brought into cultivation, will be determined by the rise in the price of produce, which is what makes their cultivation practicable. The increased quantity of produce brought into existence by the cultivation of this new land, will create a certain degree of reaction upon the price of produce, and consequently upon the quantity of new land finally brought into cultivation; but a reaction of this kind can never go the length of reducing the price to its original magnitude. For if it reduced it to this point, the quantity of cultivated land and of produce would be reduced to their original magnitudes also. But a reaction cannot be created by an increase of produce which is nothing. Hence if there is to be any reaction at all, there must be some increase of produce to make it, and some increase of price to cause that increase of produce. The price therefore must finally be raised, in spite of the reaction. And it will not only be raised,—but since the magnitude of the reaction altogether, must depend on the magnitude of the increase of produce compared with the magnitude of the whole produce that existed before,—in all the cases which occur in practice, the effect of the reaction will be comparatively small. But in all this, *it is the rise in the price of produce* (of which a rise in rent is a necessary concomitant) *that enables and causes inferior land to be brought into cultivation; and not the cultivation of inferior land that causes the rise of rent.* It is surprising that the author formerly quoted should have discerned so accurately the fallacy of supposing that corn sells high because rent is paid, instead of that rent is paid because corn sells high, —and should not have observed the kindred fallacy contained in the parts of the quotations which were given in italics above.

In the same manner, if it *happens* that the supposed cultivators possess sufficient habits of observation to discover methods of obtaining a greater crop by means of a greater outlay and greater exertions, every increase of price will enable and encourage them to make improvements in their mode of cultivating any given portion of soil. The operation of an increase in the price of produce in causing a greater outlay to be made upon the land, and the mode in which the proceeds will be divided between the landlord and the tenant, may easily be traced. Let the case be supposed of a land-owner who unites the characters of landlord and cultivator; and let the lowest rate of profit for which he and other cultivators are willing to advance capital and superintend its employ-

ment, be ten per cent. per annum*. And let the amount of what he annually lays out on the land be 1000*l.* and the final value of the produce 1200*l.* Now the reason why this cultivator does not lay out annually on the land a *greater* sum than 1000*l.*, as for instance 1010*l.*, —is because he knows, either by actual experiment or by that tact which enables him to do without it, that the final value of the whole produce would be increased by less than 11*l.*, which is the lowest return for which he is willing to advance the additional 10*l.* And if he was to add a second 10*l.*, he knows, it may be, that it would be returned with no profit at all; and that to add a third would cause him a loss;—so that no man in his senses would do either. The reason why he does not lay out a *smaller* sum than 1000*l.*, as for instance 990*l.*,—is because he knows that the final value of the produce would be diminished by more than 11*l.*, and that consequently he should lose an opportunity of employing 10*l.* with what he considers as a fair profit. And for the same reasons that this cultivator will lay out exactly 1000*l.* upon the land, any other man desirous of laying out agricultural capital for a profit of 10 per cent per annum will agree to do the same. The land-owner therefore may, if he pleases, find a man who will engage to lay out 1000*l.* per annum on the land on condition of receiving 1100*l.* out of the proceeds,—or in other words pay 100*l.* a-year out of the produce as rent. If he was to offer it for a less rent than this, the farmer would only put the difference into his pocket and not increase the outlay on the land. If he was to demand a greater rent, he could not get it; because it would not leave the cultivator the rate of profit which, by the supposition, is the lowest for which cultivators will advance capital and superintend its employment,—or in other words, because the farmer could not live. Hence if the land-owner continues to keep the land in his own hands, he may with propriety consider, 100*l.* per annum as what he makes by being his own farmer, and 100*l.* per annum as what he receives by virtue of his good fortune in being landlord. Or the annual gain, of 200*l.* may be considered as dividing itself into two parts, of which 100*l.* is of the nature of profits of capital, and 100*l.* of the nature of rent. To find now the effects of an increase in the price of produce, let it be supposed that the annual produce of the land is 600 quarters, corn being at 40*s.* per quarter; and that the addition of 10*l.* to the present annual outlay of 1000*l.* instead of effecting an increase of five quarters and a half in the annual produce, which is what would be required in order to bring in 11*l.*, will only effect an increase of five quarters. In this case it is evident that an increase in the price of corn of four shillings per quarter, would cause the five quarters to fetch 11*l.* and make it worth while for the cultivator to add the 10*l.* to

* This lowest rate of profit must always be something; for nobody will incur the risk and trouble of employing capital for nothing. And in countries where a certain rate of interest can be had from safe borrowers, consisting either of private persons or the government, this fact is at once a proof that in those countries, men in general do not employ capital without a profit greater than such interest, and a reason why no individual of ordinary understanding will ever designedly do so. For sooner than do so, individuals would lend their money or buy stock, and receive the returns without risk or trouble.

the outlay; and it would be added accordingly. But at the same time that the annual produce of the estate was thus increased by five quarters, and the part of the final gain which resolves itself into the profits of stock was increased from 100*l.* to 101*l.*,—the price of the other 600 quarters would be increased by 120*l.* which would be rent, and make the whole rent 220*l.* And if the addition of a second 10*l.* to the annual outlay, would produce four more quarters, then to make it worth while to add this second 10*l.* to the outlay, the price of four quarters must rise to 11*l.* or the quarter to 55*s.*; which would increase the portion that resolves itself into profits of stock to 102*l.*, and make the rent rise again by 332*l.* 15*s.* or the whole rent be 552*l.* 15*s.* It is true that while all this was going on, a certain degree of reaction would from time to time take place on the price of corn, in consequence of the increase of produce created by the operations of this and other cultivators. But as was shown before, the reaction cannot go the length of restoring the price of corn to what it was originally; and when it is said that corn rises by four shillings or any other sum, this includes all reaction, and, consequently no correction for reaction is required. And the sums thus stated to be of the nature of rent, are what the land-owner, if he chuses to let his land, would in the long run be able to obtain in the several circumstances described. If the landlord mismanages his own affairs,—if he hampers himself with leases which prevent him from taking a fair advantage from time to time of the competition among farmers,—or if he finds it impracticable in the nature of things, to regulate a contract of the description concerned, with incessant and inviolable accuracy,—these are not the defects of the theory, but of the execution. This distinction is of the greater importance, because many of the difficulties which arise on the subject of rent, proceed from confounding the irregularities in its receipt which spring out of the absence of an incessantly active system of operation on each other on the parts of the landlord and tenant, with the amount which will be received in the long run and upon the whole, and to which all the contracts between landlord and tenant will tend as to a mean.

It may be collected, therefore, that the effect of every successive increase of price will be, in the first place, to make rent rise everywhere by the amount of the increase of price upon the previous produce, as fast as the landlords have the opportunity of adjusting their agreements with their tenants. And in the next place, the effect will be to bring a certain belt of new land into cultivation, *provided there happens to exist* land so circumstanced in point of quality as to be capable of being brought into cultivation with profit by the supposed increase of price; and to cause a certain augumentation of outlay on all the other lands in cultivation, *provided the cultivators are acquainted* with the method of forcing a greater crop by a greater outlay. And the consequence of these two operations, *if they take place*, will be a certain increase of produce, and a certain reaction on the price of produce in the way of keeping it down, which must however fall far short of keeping it down to its original state. In the same manner every successive diminution of price will cause all the contrary results. The most marked consequence will be to make

rent fall everywhere by the amount of the decrease of price upon the final produce; which will take place as fast as the tenants have the opportunity of adjusting their agreements with the landlords. And besides this a certain belt of land will be thrown out of cultivation, and a certain diminution of outlay be made on other lands; *under the provisoes stated in the other case.* And the consequence of these two operations, if they take place, will be a certain diminution of produce, and a certain reaction on the price of produce in the way of keeping it up, which must however fall far short of keeping it up to its original height.

The effects of agricultural improvements may be traced in a similar manner. The improvement may either be one which makes a saving in some part of the expense of bringing the produce to market, as for instance a threshing-machine; or it may be one which requires an increased outlay upon the land but returns an increased quantity of produce, as for instance drill husbandry. And first, of the first kind. Suppose then the same case as before; corn being at 40*s.* In these circumstances, the diminution in the expense of threshing necessary to cause the five additional quarters to be produced by the cultivator, would be such as would make the price received for these five quarters afford a profit of 10 per cent. As an approximation, therefore, it may be stated, that the threshing-machine, after every fair allowance for its cost, must reduce the expense of bringing five quarters to market, from 10*l.* to ten-elevenths of 10*l.*, or 9*l.* 1*s.* 10*d.*,—or effect a saving in threshing corn, of 3*s.* 7½*d.* per quarter. But a correction must be applied for the reaction effected from time to time on the price of corn by the appearance of the additional quantity created by the operations of this and other cultivators in consequence of the invention of threshing-machines. For example, the fact might turn out to be, that instead of a saving of 3*s.* 7½*d.* per quarter producing the effect described, a saving of 3*s.* 11½*d.** might be finally required to do it, in consequence of corn contemporaneously falling from 40*s.* to 39*s.* 8*d.* through the reaction on the price. If this diminution of expense should be effected by threshing-machines, such an outlay would be made on the land as would cause the additional five quarters to be produced. But at the same time that these five quarters were being produced by an annual outlay of 9*l.* 0*s.* 3¾*d.*, the annual outlay necessary to bring the other 600 quarters to market would be reduced from 1000*l.* to 881*l.* 17*s.* 6*d.*;

* If there was no reaction on the price of corn, the saving of 3*s.* 7½*d.* per quarter would cause on the estate in question an increase of produce of a hundred-and-twentieth part. If this estate may be taken as a sample of the average quality of estates throughout the country, a hundred-and-twentieth may be assumed as the average increase of produce effected by threshing-machines; but if not, then some other fraction must be assumed. Suppose then, that the average increase is a hundred-and-twentieth. This increase being comparatively small, will have an effect on the price of corn at all events not very remote from diminishing it in the contrary proportion, or reducing it from 40*s.* to 39*s.* 8*d.* But if the price would fall by 4*d.* a saving of 3*s.* 7½*d.* will be too little; and the saving to produce the effect described, must be more nearly one-eleventh of 39*s.* 8*d.* and fourpence more, or 3*s.* 11½*d.* If instead of 4*d.* the price would fall by 2*d.*, or by 8*d.*, it would only make an alteration of nearly coincident amount in the magnitude of the saving required.

making the whole final outlay 890*l.* 17*s.* 9¾*d.*, and the final receipts, at 39*s.* 8*d.* per quarter, 1199*l.* 18*s.* 4*d.* But the portion of these receipts which is necessary to replace 890*l.* 17*s.* 9¾*d.* with a profit of 10 per cent, is 979*l.* 19*s.* 7*d.* A tenant may therefore be found who will agree to lay out 890*l.* 17*s.* 9¾*d.* on condition of retaining 979*l.* 19*s.* 7*d.* out of the proceeds, and pay the residuum as rent. Hence if the land-owner chuses to let his estate, 219*l.* 18*s.* 9*d.* is what, under the new dynasty of threshing-machines, he may obtain for rent.

If the improvement was of the second kind, and if it demanded, for example, on the estate supposed, an additional outlay of 100*l.* per annum, —the first thing which may be remarked is, that it would not take place at all unless the addition made by it to the value of the produce would be at least 110*l.* per annum. If the addition was exactly this, then the rent would remain unaltered, and the amount of the farmer's yearly profits would be increased by 10*l.* But if it was more, as for instance 125*l.* per annum, then 15*l.* would be added to the annual rent as soon as the landlord had the opportunity of appealing to the competition in his favour, and the amount of the farmer's yearly profits would be increased by the other 10*l.* as before. In other words, the whole of the gain would be added to the rent, except the portion required to pay the necessary profits of the tenant on the additional outlay. If the use of the improved method induces any further changes in the addition that can be made to the outlay so as to be returned with a living profit on the sum added, they must be accounted for separately.—As the direct effect of this species of improvement is to create an increase in the produce, its tendency is to create a comparatively great reaction on the price of corn in the way of reducing it. No correction however is required on this account; because when the addition to the value of the produce is supposed to be 110*l.* or any other sum, this includes reactions.

The effect, then, of all agricultural improvements is to increase the quantity of produce and lower its price; but improvements which consist in a saving of expense, do this in a less degree than those which require an augmented outlay. Improvements of the first kind diminish the quantity of capital demanded from the tenant, and consequently the final amount of the profits that will be left him; improvements of the latter kind increase them. In improvements of the first kind, the landlord finally obtains the whole of the gain, and a part of what used to be the profits of the tenant besides. In those of the latter kind, he obtains only that part of the gain which is left after paying the increased amount of profits of the tenant. An improvement of this last kind is always advantageous to the tenant; and, except in the lowest class of cases where nothing is left after paying the necessary profits of the tenant, to the landlord also. An improvement of the other kind is always very advantageous to the landlord; but it is against the tenant, in the same way as a diminution in the quantity of capital that can be employed with a profit is against any other dealer;—in the same way, for example, as the introduction of cabriolets with one horse is against the interest of the dealers who have been accumstomed to convey single passengers in coaches with two. In the instance of cabriolets, it is possible that the difference may

be made up to the dealers, by the increased number of persons who are induced to ride. But this is not the case with the tenants; because their profits on the additional quarters produced, are not equal to the diminution of profits arising out of the diminution of capital employed on the remainder*.

The phænomena here described as attendant on the rent of land in general, will be found to correspond with those which attend on the rent of the vineyard that produces Tokay; and great clearness will result from attention to the magnified case. More particularly light is thrown on the cause of the principal phænomenon, which is the permanence of the excess of the price of the aggregate produce, above the cost of its production. The outlay stops at the point where the last addition to it only creates such an addition to the whole produce, as returns the sum added to the outlay with a living profit on itself; but the nature and constitution of the soil are such, that this does not carry the produce to anything like what will reduce the price of the whole, to what returns the whole outlay with only a living profit. The last 10*l.* added to the outlay increases the whole proceeds by no more than, it may be, 11*l.*, and another 10*l.* would increase it by less; and therefore the outlay stops. But this does not prevent the fact that the produce of the whole outlay, or the aggregate produce, may be selling for five or six times the aggregate cost of its production, or for any other amount.

Perhaps the subject may be made clearer, by considering what the case would have been, if no addition to the outlay would have increased the produce of the vineyard at all. There is no natural impossibility in such having been the fact; and simple ignorance on the part of the cultivators would amount in practice to the same thing. In such circumstances, there would be no addition to the outlay above that of an ordinary vineyard; and yet the aggregate produce would be selling for five or six times the cost of its production. The outlay, for example, might

---

* This may be a proper place for alluding to the question which exists among political economists, whether *an increased quantity of corn will sell for a greater total sum, or for a less.* Mr. Tooke and Mr. Ricardo appear to be of opinion that it will sell for less; while Mr. Joplin is of the contrary opinion, because farmers are never observed to rejoice in a bad harvest, even though it is universal.

The fact which conciliates both opinions probably is, that a diminished supply (to take the contrary case) might sell for more *for a single year*; but would not sell for more *for a succession of years*. For if continued, it would cause a diminution of population, and consequently a diminution of demand and of price; and the end would be, the selling a reduced quantity *at the old price per quarter*.

Provision therefore appears to be made in the constitution of things, for its being the interest of the growers in the long run, to grow as much as they can. So that even if there was only one great grower, he could gain nothing in the end by diminishing the quantity of corn.

A larger deduction should be made upon this principle, from the alleged shock which would be given to prices by the removal of the Corn Laws. For if the removal was gradual (and nobody has asked for anything else), an increase of demand would grow up with the increase of supply, and the fall of price be finally much diminished. It is quite true, that the land-owners have no more right to a monopoly of corn than a highwayman to the monopoly of a road. But it is also true, that they will make all the outcry they can, and that they ought not to be allowed to make an outcry upon what would never happen to them.

be 1000*l.*; but the produce, instead of selling for 1200*l.* or 1300*l.*, might sell for 6000*l.* Suppose now, that instead of the case being exactly thus, an addition of 10*l.* could be made to the outlay, with the effect of creating an addition to the value of the whole produce, amounting to 11*l.* or whatever else is considered as 10*l.* with the lowest living profit. The 10*l.* would be added accordingly; but the result would still be, that an outlay of 1010*l.* produced a return of 6011*l.* And it is because the nature and constitution of the soil are such that *no more* than 10*l.* can be added to the outlay so as to be returned with a living profit on the sum added, that the whole outlay never overtakes the whole price, or reduces it to the cost of the whole production. If, for example, a second 10*l.* was added, the constitution of the soil is such that the increase effected in the produce would be worth, it may be, 10*l.*; which is no profit at all. And if a third 10*l.* was added, the increase in the produce might be only worth 9*l.*; which is a loss of 1*l.* But no man in his senses, when by laying out 1010*l.* he can obtain 6011*l.*, will lay out 1020*l.* to obtain 6021*l.*; still less 1030*l.* to obtain 6030*l.* The competition for the produce causes high price; but the high price does not increase the outlay to anything like what creates an increase of produce sufficient to reduce the price of the whole to the cost of production; and the reason why it does not, is to be found in that constitution of things, by which the quantity of produce increases more slowly than the quantity of outlay or labour applied.—All these conclusions may be rigidly transferred to corn.

If it is urged that the land which produces Tokay presents the case of a vineyard possessing extraordinary properties in comparison of other vineyards, and that there is nothing analogous to this in the case of corn, and therefore the cases are not alike;—the answer is, that if all the other vineyards were to lose the faculty of producing wine, the price of Tokay would only be increased; and the land that produces Tokay would *then* be in the same circumstances with respect to wine, that the corn land of any country where the quantity is limited in comparison with the demand, is in with respect to corn.

On returning to the passages previously extracted, it will be seen that the first inaccuracy occurs at the words "*when it is necessary;*" the truth being, that land of inferior quality is not taken into cultivation because it is necessary, but because it is profitable. The necessity might exist long enough, if it did not make itself intelligible to the cultivator through his purse. And the inaccuracy is of importance, because it holds of the great aboriginal fallacy of the Theory of Rent. But the inference on which that fallacy is directly built in the passages quoted, is first intimated in the words "*and that payment constitutes rent.*" The payment described *is* rent; but that does not prove that rent is this and nothing else. It no more proves it than because turtle is man's food, it is proved that man's food is turtle, and where there is no turtle there will be no food. A ploughman puts his children on their guard against this sophism, by the homely illustration, that "a mare is a horse, but a horse is not a mare." If he was a logician according to forms, he would tell them that one is the *inclusum*, the other the *includens*, and that these are

not interconvertible terms. This may be all very abstruse and metaphysical; but ploughmen laugh at those who do not practically comprehend it. The fallacy looks out again more confidently in the words, "*It follows that*" &c.; and in the next paragraph it is embodied into "*a general expression*," where rent is stated to be the difference between the greatest and least returns, instead of stating that the difference between the returns, *when circumstances happen to be such that there exists a difference of returns at all*, is equal to the rent. In which the deceptive process consists,—as in the instance of the turtle,—in first stating a proposition which *is* true, and then substituting the inverse of the proposition, which *is not* true. And the mode in which the substitution is effected, is an instance of the figure called encroachment; which consists in introducing a fallacy gently at first, and repeating it over and over in bolder terms, as the mind becomes familiarized with its appearance.

If it is urged that both the present writer and Mr. Ricardo from whom his theory is derived, have distinctly represented the cultivation of the inferior soils as flowing from the appropriation of land and the limitation of its quantity, and that to affirm that rent proceeds from the secondary cause is tantamount to affirming that it proceeds from the first;—the answer is, that it is one thing to affirm that the competition is the simple cause of rent in all cases, and would equally cause it if no difference in the qualities of soils and no knowledge of the art of forcing crops were in existence,—and another thing to affirm, that it causes rent through the intervention of these circumstance, and would not cause rent without them.

To this the reply has been, that the difference is "only in the expression," and that "there is none in the principle*." Which is simply affirming, that it makes no difference whether the horse is held to move the cart, or the cart the horse;—that we see their movements are coincident in one instance, and therefore the question whether the cart could go without the horse, or the horse without the cart, is a *logomachy* and superfluous in respect of all conceivable consequences. This is an unexaggerated statement of the reasoning of the reply.

The substantial proof that there *is* a difference, is that there is another case, in which weighty variations arise from the two assumptions. The whole of the inference *that tithes and taxes on the land fall on the consumer*, is dependent on the belief that the cart may be held to move the horse. It lies therefore with the supporters of the inference, to prove their premises.

Extracts will next be given from the same Theory as delivered by its original propounder Mr. Ricardo; with a commentary.

Rent invariably proceeds from the employment of an additional quantity of labour with a proportionally less return.—*Principles of Political Economy and*

The aboriginal fallacy of the Ricardo Theory of Rent. An additional quantity of labour will be employed because prices have risen, which at the same time raises rents; and not rents rise because more labour has been employed.

The gratuitous and unsupported inversion of

* Westminster Review, No. XIII. *p.* 179, *l.* 24, 25, *note.*

Taxation. By David Ricardo, Esq. p. 58.

this proposition, is the radical defect of the whole Theory, and of the consequences which depend upon it.

It is true, that on the best land, the same produce would still be obtained with the same labour as before, but its value would be enhanced in consequence of the diminished returns obtained by those who employed fresh labour and stock on the less fertile land.—*Ricardo.* p. 61.

The value of one man's produce is not enhanced because the returns obtained by another man in less favourable circumstances are smaller than his own; for the tendency of the latter individual's creating new produce at all, is to reduce the price of produce, not increase it. But the price of all agricultural produce is first enhanced from an extrinsic cause, namely, the increase of competition among the purchasers; and the enhancement makes it worth while to employ more labour for the sake of an increase of produce, in spite of the partial reaction created by the appearance of this new produce in the market.

The reason then, why raw produce rises in comparative value, is because more labour is employed in the production of the last portion obtained, and not because a rent is paid to the landlord. — *Ricardo.* p. 62.

The reason is neither because more labour is employed in the production of the last portion, nor because a rent is paid to the landlord; but because the competition has risen so as to increase the price. And this increase of price is what makes it worth while to apply more labour, for the sake of an increase of produce.

Tokay does not rise in comparative value either because more labour is employed in the production of the last portion obtained, or because a rent is paid to the landlord. It rises in consequence of the magnitude of the demand for it, compared with the quantity that can be supplied; and *then* it becomes profitable to employ a certain quantity of additional labour in the production of a new portion of produce, and the rent is raised at the same time.

The value of corn is regulated by the quantity of labour bestowed on its production on that quality of land, or with that portion of capital, which pays no rent.—*Ricardo.* p. 62.

The value of corn is not regulated by this; but does itself regulate the quality of land and the portion of capital, which can be brought into action with a profit.

The inverted proposition as given opposite, amounts to saying, that the price of corn is regulated by the cost for which it can be produced on the last quality of land, or with the last portion of capital, which can be brought into activity *with a living profit at the going price.* Or in other words, that the price is regulated by the price; which is reasoning in a circle.

'Nothing is more common than to hear of the advantages which the land possesses over every other source of useful produce, on account of the surplus, which it yields in the form of rent. Yet when land is most abundant, when most productive, and most fertile, it yields no rent; and it is only when its powers decay, and less is yielded in return for labour, that a share of the original produce of the more fertile portions is set apart for rent.—*Ricardo.* p. 62.

Among the properties here assigned as the cause of *no rent*, the property of *abundance*, or of unappropriated land not having begun to be scarce, is the only effective one. The rise in the price of agricultural produce, at one and the same time raises rent, and makes it practicable to cultivate land less fertile, or whose powers have decayed. But there is no foundation for the inverted proposition, that it is only when the powers of land decay, that there will be rent.

There would be rent though there was no such thing as decayed or inferior land within the circle to which a given community is indebted for its supply; as soon as the demand for corn began to press against the limits of the produce. The fact of there being either decayed or inferior land at all, is itself but an accident, which might have been or might not have been, like the fact of there being weak and inferior spirits; and has no more to do with the general cause of rent, than the fact of there being weak spirits has to do with the general fact of spirits selling for a price. If any man were to assert, that proof spirit sold for a high price because there were weaker spirits that were selling for a lower, and was thence to deduce some practical inference,—it would be clear that the whole was a fallacy, cultivated for the sake of the inference. The case of rent is of the same kind; and the false inference for the sake of which the fallacy is cultivated, is *that tithes fall on the consumer.*

It is however quite true, that land possesses no advantages over other sources of useful produce, on account of its yielding a rent; for all that is given to one, is taken from another. The overlooking this, appears to have been the error of the *Economistes.*

If air, water, the elasticity of steam, and the pressure of the atmosphere, were of various qualities; if they could be appropriated, and each quality existed only in moderate abundance, they as well as the land would afford a rent, as the successive qualities were brought into use.—*Ricardo.* p. 63.

When air, water, &c., can be appropriated, and the supply is limited in proportion to the demand, they *are* made the subjects of rent; without any reference to the existence of various qualities. A gaoler who should take bribes for the luxury of breathing a freer atmosphere, would receive rent for air. And if a walk on the roof sold for half-a-crown, while putting the head out of window was only sixpence,—he would have been equally able to obtain the half-crown, if his gaol had happened to have no windows at all. It is the high price of fresh air altogether, that makes the window sell for sixpence; and not the window selling for sixpence that makes the roof sell for half-a-crown.

With every worse quality employed, the value of the commodities in the manufacture of which they were used would rise; because equal quantities of labour would be less productive.— *Ricardo*, p. 63.

The value of the commodities does not rise because equal quantities of labour are less productive; but it is because the price of the commodities is raised by the increase of competition or some other extrinsic cause,—so as to make it worth while to employ an increased quantity of labour for the sake of a comparatively smaller increase of produce,—that the quantity of labour is increased. If manufacturers can afford to purchase a less efficient material at the same price as they used to purchase a better, it must be because the demand for the articles finally manufactured has raised their price sufficiently to prevent the manufacturers from losing; and not the price rise because less efficient materials have been employed.

If the surplus produce which land affords in the form of rent be an advantage, it is desirable that, every year, the machinery newly constructed should be less efficient than the old, as that would undoubtedly give a greater exchangeable value to the goods manufactured, not only by that machinery, but by all the machinery in the kingdom; and a rent would be paid to all those who possessed the most productive machinery.—*Ricardo*, p. 64.

This is only an expansion of the fallacious proposition conveyed in the preceding extract.

It is, however, quite true, that the surplus produce which land affords in the form of rent, is no advantage in the aggregate.

The rise of rent is always the effect of the increasing wealth of the country, and of the difficulty of providing food for its augmented population.—*Ricardo*, p. 65.

It is the effect of the last alone. It is true that the necessity for giving an increased quantity of manufactured goods in return for agricultural produce, raises the wealth of that portion of the nation which consists of the owners of rent, by taking it from somebody else. But this cannot be called increasing the wealth of the country.

Rent increases most rapidly, as the disposable land decreases in its productive powers. —*Ricardo*, p. 66.

It would increase still more rapidly, if there was no disposable land with any difference of productive powers at all. The less is the produce of the belt of land which is so circumstanced as to be called into activity by any particular increase of price, the less will be the magnitude of the reaction upon price and rent, which arises from the appearance of its produce in the market;

and it will be least of all, if the belt of land happens to be none. The relation between rent and the productive power of the disposable land, is one of opposition, not of connexion. It is of the same kind as the relation between the water in a reservoir and a leak. The accumulation of water increases most rapidly, as the leak decreases; and would be most if it were none at all. To infer that the existence of the leak is essential to the accumulation, would present a fallacy like that conveyed in this part of Mr. Ricardo's Theory of Rent.

The mistake of believing, that because the water accumulates most rapidly as the leak decreases, *the leak is the cause of the accumulation*,—was probably what led to the fallacy of inversion which is the great error of the Ricardo Theory.

This again may be all very abstruse and metaphysical; but the man who cannot comprehend it, would never get his living as a cooper's journeyman.

Wealth increases most rapidly in those countries where the disposable land is most fertile, where importation is least restricted, and where through agricultural improvements, productions can be multiplied without any increase in the proportional quantity of labour, and where consequently the progress of rent is slow.—*Ricardo*, p. 66.

The effect of agricultural improvements, in all cases, has been shown to be, not to retard the progress of rent, but to promote it.

But *that* corn which is produced with the greatest quantity of labour, is the regulator of the price of corn.—*Ricardo*, p. 67.

The aboriginal fallacy again. The corn which is produced with the greatest quantity of labour does not regulate the price of corn; but the price determines what is the greatest quantity of labour which can be profitably expended on producing corn.

Adam Smith, therefore, cannot be correct in supposing that the original rule, which regulated the exchangeable value of commodities, namely, the comparative quantity of labour by which they were produced, can be at all altered by the appropriation of land and the payment of rent.—*Ricardo*, p. 67.

Adam Smith knew, that the limitation of the land, as soon as the time arrives when the population begins to press against the production, introduces a new element of the exchangeable value of the produce, namely, that of monopoly price. Under a monopoly where the quantity of produce is necessarily limited, the question is no longer how much it cost in producing, but how much the competition among the purchasers will induce them to give. Tokay does not cost more in producing than any other wine; or at all events, not more in proportion to its price. But it sells for a great deal more, because the supply is limited, and the competition great; and the difference becomes rent.

To say the value was regulated by the cost because it was regulated

by the cost of the last portion produced,—would only be a quibble, even if the latter part was true. For the question is, why the *whole* produce of one kind of commodity sells only for the average cost of production, including a living profit; and of another, for five or six times as much.

Adam Smith, therefore, was right.

Raw material enters into the composition of most commodities, but the value of that raw material as well as corn is regulated by the productiveness of the portion of capital last employed on the land, and paying no rent.—*Ricardo*, p. 67.

The incorrectness of this has been shown, in what has been said of corn.

—and therefore rent is not a component part of the price of commodities.—*Ricardo*, p. 67.

If this means, that rent is not the cause of the price of the produce, or of any part of it, it is true; but not for the reason assigned. The reason is because, instead of the rent being the cause of the price, the price is the cause of the rent. The rent of the vineyard, in this sense, is not a component part of the price of Tokay; for the plain reason, that the price men are willing to give for Tokay, is what causes the rent.

At the same time there is no objection to the ordinary sense in which rent is said to be a component part of the price of a commodity; meaning only that the price of some of its component parts is a monopoly price, or one that affords a rent. The two senses are different; and must not be confounded.

—and we have seen, that with every portion of additional capital, which it becomes necessary to employ on the land with a less productive return, rent would rise.—*Ricardo*, p. 68.

The aboriginal fallacy again. The price of produce rises first, and determines what addition of capital can be employed with a profit; and at the same time raises rent.

It follows from the same principles, that any circumstances in society which should make it unnecessary to employ the same amount of capital on the land, and which should therefore make the portion last employed more productive, would lower rent.—*Ricardo*, p. 68.

Any saving in agricultural processes is such a circumstance; and agricultural savings, as has been seen, do not lower rent, but powerfully increase it. The error arises as before, from attributing the production of rent to a wrong cause.

Any great reduction in the capital of a country, which should materially diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of labour, would naturally have this effect. — *Ricardo*, p. 68.

It would lower rent; but it would be because it diminished the power of the competitors to bid, and consequently the price of corn.

The same effects may however be produced when the wealth and population of a country are increased, if that increase is accompanied by such marked improvements in agriculture, as shall have the same effect of diminishing the necessity of cultivating the poorer lands, or of expending the same amount of capital on the cultivation of the more fertile portions.—*Ricardo*, p. 69.

The effects of agricultural improvements upon rent, have been shown to be of a nature directly contrary.

If a million of quarters of corn be necessary for the support of a given population, and it be raised on land of the qualities of No. 1, 2, 3; and if an improvement be afterwards discovered, by which it can be raised on No. 1 and 2, without employing No. 3, it is evident that the immediate effect must be a fall of rent; for No. 2, instead of No 3, will then be cultivated without paying any rent, and the rent of No. 1, instead of being the difference between the produce of No. 3, and No. 1, will be the difference only between No. 2 and 1. With the same population, and no more, there can be no demand for any additional quantity of corn, the capital and labour employed on No. 3, will be devoted to the production of other commodities desirable to the community, and can have no effect in raising rent, unless the raw material from which they are made cannot be obtained without employing capital less advantageously on the land, in which case No. 3 must again be cultivated.—*Ricardo*, p. 69.

If a million of quarters is raised on land of the qualities of No. 1, 2, 3, and an improvement in agriculture subsequently takes place, the effect will be that there will be some increase of produce on 1 and 2 and 3, and some reduction of price in consequence; and the landlord will everywhere take all that remains after paying the necessary profits of stock, for rent. With the same population, and no more, there can be no demand for any additional quantity of corn, *at the same price as before*, but there will at a reduced price. Men economize in the use of corn, as of every thing else, when it is dear, and use it more liberally when it is cheap; and to say they do not, is only the fallacy of saying some men do not. If it was not so, it would be impossible to get through a scarce year, or to consume all the corn that is produced in one of extraordinary plenty. The nature of effectual demand is entirely overlooked.

But improvements in agriculture are of two kinds; those which increase the productive powers of the land, and those which enable us to obtain its produce with less labour. They both lead to a fall in the price of raw produce; they both affect rent, but they do not affect it equally.—*Ricardo*, p. 70.

Their effect on rent is of a nature directly contrary to what is intended to be stated. They both increase it. It is true that they both lead to a small fall in the price of produce; but they increase rent after all.

If, by the introduction of the turnip husbandry, or by the use of a more invigorating manure, I can obtain the same produce with less capital, and without disturbing the difference between the productive powers of the successive portions of capital, I shall lower rent; for a different and more productive portion will be that which will form the standard from which every other will be reckoned.—*Ricardo*, p. 72.

The aboriginal fallacy again. Landlords may be asked whether turnip husbandry and invigorating manures have lowered rent. If they had, landlords would have been seen forming, not a Board of Agriculture, but a Board for the Suppression of Turnips and the Prevention of Manure.

—but since the same cause, the difficulty of production, raises the exchangeable value of raw produce, and raises also the proportion of raw produce paid to the landlord for rent, it is obvious that the landlord is doubly benefited by difficulty of production. First he obtains a greater share, and secondly, the commodity in which he is paid is of greater value.—*Ricardo*, p. 75.

An increase in the difficulty of production, would be the opposite of an increase in the facility of production,—or in other words of an agricultural improvement (see p. 410); for an agricultural improvement is nothing but the discovery of some mode of increasing the facility of production. The effect therefore would be always disadvantageous to the landlord.

It may not be quite certain whether the supposed case is what the author had in view. If he meant to speak of difficulty of production generally, and without raising the question of what would be the effect of its being increased;—then, it acts only as the instrument of limiting the produce, and so raising the price above what would pay the necessary cost and profits of production of the whole.

Having in a former part of this work established, I hope satisfactorily, the principle, that the price of corn is regulated by the cost of its production on that land exclu-

If the principle represented as regulating the price of corn, is incorrect, the conclusion derived from it, on the subject of land-tax, tithes, and taxes on produce, is without foundation.

A tax or tithe will cause a small reaction on the price, in consequence of the existence

sively, or rather with that capital exclusively, which pays no rent, it will follow that whatever may increase the cost of production, will increase the price.—Whatever may reduce it, will lower the price. The necessity of cultivating poorer land, or of obtaining a less return with a given additional capital on land already in cultivation, will inevitably raise the exchangeable value of raw produce. The discovery of machinery, which will enable the cultivator to obtain his corn at a less cost of production, will necessarily lower its exchangeable value. Any tax which may be imposed on the cultivator, whether in the shape of land-tax, tithes, or a tax on the produce when obtained, will increase the cost of production, and will therefore raise the price of raw produce.—*Ricardo*, p. 194.

of land and outlay which will be thrown out of activity by it. But this will not prevent the tax, with the exception of a small effect of the reaction, from being thrown upon the rent.

After these extracts from the Theory as delivered by its original propounder, the examination of the consequences derived from it will be carried on by references to the work of Mr. Mill.

The idea of having discovered a new principle for the determination of Rent, which among other qualities has that of being independent of the rate of profits of capital, leads to what is presented as a discovery of the regulating principle of Profits. Rent, it is urged, has been discovered to be a thing of fixed and determinate magnitude, depending on something in the decreasing qualities of land, and "independent of the general result of the productive powers of labour and capital*;" Wages, "depend on the proportion between population and capital†;"—and these two being settled, "it is evident that the portion which remains is Profits‡." That "wages depend on the proportion between population and capital," is tantamount to saying, that the greater share a man gets, the richer he will be. But it is never stated why the proportion between population and capital is different at one time and place from what it is at another, or what it is that induces such a condition of things as makes the shares different. To state how things vary, is not to state their absolute magnitude; for one may be indefinitely great, and another indefinitely small, and still both vary after the same law§. A labourer in Ireland will live and bring up a family upon potatoes; a labourer in England will see the world unpeopled first. Why does not the labouring population in England increase till wages are reduced to the same condition as in Ireland; or why is not the population in Ireland diminished till it bears the same proportion to capital as in England? This is the question that wanted answering; and the answer would have pointed to another element essential to the

---

* Mill, p. 85. † Id. p. 41. ‡ Id. p. 68.

§ In the language of algebra, x and X may both vary as $\frac{y}{z}$; but to know anything about the absolute magnitude of x, it is necessary to know that $x = A \times \frac{y}{z}$. The manner of living imposed by habits and opinions, is the missing A.

determination of both wages and profits, and whose existence is incompatible with the solution advanced. And this element, as long since pointed out by Adam Smith, is the force of opinion and habit. Englishmen have the physical capability of living on potatoes, as much as other men, but fortunately they have not the habit; and though it might be wrong to say they would starve first in their own proper persons, they will utterly refuse to multiply upon such diet, the effect of which on population is ultimately the same. And the causes of these differences of habit, are to be found in everything that has affected the past, or affects the present condition of society,—in ancient institutions, in modern improvements, in past and present laws, in battles lost and won, in reformations of religion, in the progress of science, in the manners of the higher classes, in the information of the lower, in everything which man can neither suddenly alter nor create, and which connects his present mode of existence, with that of his ancestors and his posterity. Fluctuations will be perpetually taking place in the existing proportion between population and capital; but the element which, in the midst of these, keeps the average rate of wages to one point and not to another, or which determines the point to which wages shall tend as to a mean, is not physical but mental. There may be a lowest physical point somewhere; but happily all civilized, and most uncivilized nations, are considerably above it. The New-Hollander may approach the lowest physical point, when he feeds on worms; but this has no bearing on the question, why one man lives on beef and another on potatoes, for both diets are happily far removed from that of the New-Hollander. The Englishman will not live and bring up a family upon potatoes; because, though he may consent to live on them when he can positively procure nothing else,—habit, custom, the opinion of those around him, have made it in his eyes contemptible, irrational, absurd, for a man to be living on potatoes when he has the opportunity of getting anything better. In his hours of prosperity, therefore, he will to a certainty solace himself with bacon, and most probably venture upon beef; and as this absorbs a greater portion of his income in what he views as necessary to his individual existence, it proportionally reduces his disposition to burthen himself with new mouths. If the Irishman had the prospect of all this bacon and beef, he would view it as convertible into potatoes for a family like a patriarch's. The Englishman thinks it but decency to swallow all, and omits the family.

And as opinions and habits determine the final or average proportion which shall be maintained between the numbers of the labouring population and the funds for their support, or in other words determine the average rate of Wages,—so they also determine the average rate of Profits of Stock, which are only the wages of another description of labourers, consisting partly of the recompense of present labour exerted in the form of superintendence, and partly of the recompense of past labour exerted in the creation of their capital*. Public opinion and

* This last part is the recompense spread over the greatest possible space. If it was proposed to a savage hunter to give a hundred of his deer for a gun, for the sake of the additional deer which his hunting would by means of it obtain for him

custom require, for example, that a shopkeeper shall have a good coat,—shall drink at all times malt liquor and sometimes wine, and give them to his neighbours,—that his wife and daughters, if he has any, shall wear clean linen, and moreover not wash it themselves,—and that when they travel, it shall be by the stage coach and not by the waggon. Though he may do without some or other of these things in a certain degree when necessity presses, he cannot and will not do without them in the main. If therefore he is a man of foresight, he will at all events defer adding to the population of shopkeepers, till he sees a fair prospect of supporting a family in the way which public opinion pronounces to be respectable. But if he engages in it without foresight, he will keep down the population of shopkeepers in another way; for he will break. Bankruptcy is the check to the indefinite multiplication of traders, as the evils arising from diminished food are the check to the indefinite multiplication of the poorer class of labourers. In the same manner, if the higher order of traders would, or could do without a certain rate of expenditure, they might remit something of their rate of profits. If a great brewer, for example, would drive his family to the two-shilling gallery in one of his own drays,—or a banker be content, as in India, to sit on a mud floor in the shop of his forefathers, and retire to swallow rice with the condiment of ghee,—there would be some chance of the thing being brought to pass. But the "crowning city" has determined, that her merchants shall be princes, and her traffickers the honourable of the earth; and they neither can, nor will, resist the award. The opinion of society therefore is what in the long run determines and keeps up the rate of recompense in this class as well as in the other; and, though there may be individual exceptions, men in general will break, sooner than not live up to what is expected from them. The difficulty is not in finding men who will live up to this mark, but in finding men who will live within their means. The profits of stock, like wages, may be momentarily elevated or depressed by the fluctuations in the proportion between the business to be done and the men who are to do it. When business is scarce, the competition may to a certain degree induce traders to do it at a cheaper rate; and the contrary. But if the scarcity of business is permanent, traders will begin to go out by the horn gate of bankruptcy, and so the balance will be preserved.

---

in future,—if the gun would last only one year, he must expect from it a hundred additional deer within the year, and something more. If it would last two years, he might be content with the prospect of sixty a-year, the difference being a compensation for the delay; if four, with forty; if eight, with twenty-five; and if it would last for ever, or for a time to which he sees no end, he might be induced to consent by the expectation of six or eight. But in all these cases, what he expects is, the recompense of the labour expended in procuring the hundred deer, spread over a larger space.

This view of the subject is valuable as it applies to the question of *interest*. It throws light on the injustice of proposing to rob the fund-holder of his interest, after spending his principal; and on the absurdity of the notion of the dark ages, that taking interest for money is of the nature of extortion. Why is the hunter to give a hundred of his deer, and be cheated of his recompense? And why is he to give a hundred of his deer for nothing, or without making the best bargain he can for himself? It is clear that whoever proposes either, means simply, to defraud the hunter.

The Section on "Exchangeable Value" omits all notice of commodities produced under a monopoly, or for which the competition causes more to be given than repays the whole expenses with a living profit. Agricultural produce comes notoriously under this description; for the price not only pays the expenses and profits of the cultivator, but a rent besides.

'Cost of production, then, regulates the exchangeable value of commodities.'—*Mill*, p. 93.

This is only true in one direction. The exchangeable value of a commodity of ordinary consumption cannot long continue to be *less* than will pay the cost of production including the necessary profits; but it will be *more* to an extent limited only by the circumstances of the particular case, whenever the competition increases the price faster than the outlay increases the produce.

If there is any truth in the account that has been given of the origin and progress of Rent, an immediate corollary from it is, *that taxes upon the land fall on the landlord.* For if the land-owner united the characters of landlord and cultivator by keeping the land in his own hands, the charge must fall upon him. And what he cannot keep himself, he can never recover from others by the invention of selling it to them with their eyes open.

If it is urged that such land-owners might recover the tax from the consumers by raising the price of corn,—the answer is, that the operation of their individual interests will prevent it. If they raise the price of corn, it is manifest that less must be sold. A high price spins out the consumption of a deficient harvest, and would cause only a portion of equal magnitude to be consumed out of a plentiful one. But none of the land-owners would place so much confidence in the union among his brethren, as either to throw away corn already in his barns, when he had the option of selling it,—or to refuse to grow it, when by the sale of it he could obtain what he considers as a reasonable profit. The quantity of corn grown and sold, therefore, will not be diminished by any such combination; and if the quantity is not diminished, the price for which it is sold cannot be increased. If there was no monopoly gain, the case would be very different indeed. For then the tax would oblige the land-owners to contract their growth, till the price rose to what would pay them for their trouble; in the same manner as other producers do in similar circumstances. And the land-owners themselves will actually do this, with respect to that portion of their produce which will not pay them the necessary profits of stock.

If it is suggested that the landlords may raise the price by throwing the necessity upon the tenants, it is not difficult to see that the tenants will be equally unable to compass the end desired. To put the strongest case, let it be supposed that all the landlords resolve not to abate a fraction of rent on account of the tax, and that all the tenants have been previously bound by long leases which leave them no alternative but that of recovering the tax from the consumers, or losing the amount. The tenant then has made an improvident bargain, by which he is likely to lose

the amount of the tax for several years, unless it can be recovered from the consumers. But this will not produce in him any inclination to throw more away after it, either by omitting to sell corn which is in his barns, or by omitting to grow it to the utmost that will pay him a living profit upon the last sum added to the outlay. The outlay and the produce will therefore be the same as if the land-holders had held the land in their own hands; and consequently, as before, the tax will not be recovered in the price. The tenants therefore must put up with the loss, till they have the opportunity of recurring to the competition between landlords and tenants, when the tax will be thrown upon the landlords; for it is impossible that any resolutions of the landlords should induce the tenants to go on accepting less than a living profit.

The way then to determine the effect of any tax or charge upon land or agricultural produce, is to see what the effect would be upon landowners uniting the characters of landlord and cultivator, and what alterations would be made in the bargain which they would have to offer to the competition among tenants.

By the application of this principle, it will appear that the Section on "Taxes on Rent" (Mill, p. 248) is right in the conclusion delivered, but not for any reason that is there stated. The inability of the landlords to protect themselves by throwing the tax upon the tenants, who pertinaciously refuse to starve upon less than a living profit;—the inability of either landlords or tenants to raise the price of corn for their own convenience and throw the tax on the consumers;—are the reasons why taxes on rent, whether levied from the person of the landlord or of the tenant, must fall on the landlord.

The Section entitled a "A Tax on Profits" presents the following results.

'A direct tax on profits of stock offers no question of any difficulty. *It would fall entirely upon the owners of capital, and could not be shifted upon any other portion of the community.*

'As all capitalists would be affected equally, there would be no motive to the man, engaged in any one species of production, to remove his capital to any other. If he paid a certain portion of his profits, derived from the business in which he was already engaged, he would pay an equal portion, derived from any other business to which he could resort. There would not, therefore, in consequence of such a tax, be any shifting of capital from one species of employment to another. The same quantity of every species of goods would be produced, if there was the same demand for them. *That there would on the whole be the same aggregate demand is also immediately apparent.* The same capital is supposed to be employed in the business of production, and if part of what accrued to the capitalist, was taken from him, lessening to that extent his means of purchasing, it would be transferred to the government, whose power of purchasing would be thence to the same degree increased.'—Mill. p. 256.

The Profits here meant are manufacturing profits, as distinguished from agricultural; for "Taxes on the Profits of the Farmer" form the subject of a subsequent Section. It may, however, be useful to consider the two kinds in a different order.

When there is a monopoly gain behind, as there is in the case of agricultural profits, it will be found by application to the case of a landowner uniting the characters of landlord and cultivator, that the effects of a tax on profits, upon the cultivator, will be the same as those of a reduction of price. On the landlord the effects will in the first instance be, that the tax on the final amount of the cultivator's profits will be taken out of the rent. But at the same time there will be a reaction on the price of corn in the way of increasing it, in consequence of the partial diminution of produce; and of this increase of price the landlord will have the benefit. To recur, for example, to the case formerly taken, —If corn was at 55*s.* and a tax of 20 per cent was imposed on the profits of the capital employed, the first approximation to the result would be, that the cultivator, instead of cultivating all the land and making all the outlay that would return him 10 per cent, would stop at that which would leave him 10 per cent after payment of the tax, or which would return him in the first instance 12½. The effects of this on the outlay, on the amount of the cultivator's profits, and on the quantity of produce, would be the same as those of a reduction of the price of corn from 55*s.* to 44*s.*; for it would be the same thing in respect of the last 10*l.* added to the outlay, whether what was received for its produce was reduced one fifth by a tax, or by corn falling one fifth. The outlay would therefore be reduced from 1020*l.* to 1010*l.*, the annual amount of profits from 102*l.* to 101*l.* and the produce from 609 quarters to 605. The price received for the 605 quarters at 55*s.* would be 1663*l.* 15*s.*; so that after deducting 20*l.* 4*s.* for the tax on 101*l.*, the final receipts of the individual combining the characters of landlord and cultivator would be 1643*l.* 11*s.* And since what he could dispose of to a tenant would be simply the opportunity of making the outlay of 1010*l.* with the condition of retaining 1111*l.* out of the proceeds, what would remain to him in the shape of rent would be 532*l.* 11*s.*, instead of 552*l.* 15*s.* as it was before;—or the rent would be diminished by 20*l.* 4*s.*, which is the tax. But to all this there must be applied a correction, for the reaction on the price of corn created by the general diminution of produce which arises from the tax and is represented in this particular case by four quarters. If on an estimate like that entered into in a note in p. 410, the amount of this reaction might be stated at sixpence per quarter, the price of corn instead of 55*s.* would be 55*s.* 6*d.* And the effect of this increase of price would be in a small degree to increase the outlay, the amount of profits, and the produce. But the principal effect, neglecting inconsiderable fractions, would be, that the price of the 605 quarters would be increased by sixpence a quarter or 15*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.*, which would be added to the rent. A further correction might be made by calculating the effect of the small increase of produce last-mentioned upon prices, and similar corrections might be extended to an indefinite number; but their amount would be insignificant. The corrected rent therefore may be stated at 547*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.*

What in the case of a tax on profits makes the results so little prejudicial to the landlord, is that the reaction upon prices, and its effect in raising rent, are the same as if the rate was levied on the whole produce; while the actual levy is only on the profits. Thus in the case assumed,

the reaction upon prices is as great as would have been caused by a tax of one fifth or a double tithe; while the sum taken by the tax, or what falls on the other side of the landlord's account, is less than an eightieth, or than the eighth of a tithe. And what is thus saved by the landlord, is at the expense of the consumers.

There remains the case where there is no monopoly gain behind; or in other words the case of a tax on manufacturing profits. And here it is evident, that if the tax on the profits of the capitalists amounted, for example, to nine-tenths, the capitalists would not live upon the tenth without doing all in their power to throw the loss on other persons. It lies therefore on the affirmant to prove, that they *can* throw the tax on nobody else.

If the difficulty of bringing silver from the mine, should, from the failure of the mines or other natural causes, be increased till it approached to the difficulty of procuring gold,—the producers of silver, if there was no monopoly gain behind upon which the difference could be thrown, must of necessity raise its price, and consent to the diminution of the extent of their sales which would be the consequence. For nothing, can long continue to be produced and sold, for less than what will replace, with a living profit, the payments which must be made by the producer. But precisely the same effects would follow, if the increased difficulty of bringing silver to market arose from a tax instead of a natural impediment. For example, if what the capitalists accounted a living profit was 10 per cent, and the tax amounted to 20 per cent on their profits, the capitalists, to live, must demand the prices which would leave them in the first instance $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent instead of 10,—or for the silver which costs them 100*l.* and which they used to sell for 110*l.*, they must now ask 112*l.* 10*s.* And the effects of this on the quantity of silver produced and sold, would be the same as if the necessity for selling the silver for 112*l.* 10*s.* instead of 110*l.* had arisen from its costing ten-elevenths of 112*l.* 10*s.* or 102*l.* 5*s.* $5\frac{1}{2}$*d.* instead of 100*l.*,—or as if from natural causes the difficulty of producing silver had been increased by ten-elevenths of $2\frac{1}{2}$, or $2\frac{3}{11}$, per cent.

If the tax, instead of being confined to the profits of the producers of silver, extended to manufactures in general, the same consequences would ensue in all; or the prices of all the commodities must be raised to the point which would give the producers their living profits after deducting the tax. The producers before demanded such prices as left them 10 per cent, and no business was done without it; and for the same reasons and by the same processes that this took place with respect to the 10 per cent, it would take place with respect to the $12\frac{1}{2}$, when the $12\frac{1}{2}$ was made the lowest by which men could live. And the effect of this on the production and consumption of manufactured goods in the aggregate, would be the same as if an ordinance of nature had suddenly determined that the difficulty of every kind of operation connected with manufactures, should be increased by $2\frac{3}{11}$ per cent; for the prices at which the goods could be sold, and consequently the quantities finally sold and consumed, would be the same in the two cases. But of such a physical visitation, the consequence would be, that of a given quantity of manufacturing industry and intelligence exerted by the community, the produce would in

the aggregate be diminished in the proportion of 100 to 102$\frac{3}{11}$. The consequence, therefore, of the tax would be the same; in addition to the abstraction of the tax.

Under such a visitation, the labouring classes would proceed to bring about a return to the same substantial rate of wages as before, by their painful but irresistible resource of reducing their numbers. But though they could by this method effect a return to the same *rate* of wages, they could not effect a return to the same *quantity of employment* at that rate. Their numbers, therefore, must finally be diminished.

The manufacturing capitalists would go on increasing their prices, though at the expense of diminishing their sales, till they secured to themselves their living rate of profits as before. But, like the labourers, though they secured to themselves the substantial enjoyment of the same *rate* of profits, they could not secure the same *quantity* of profits at that rate; for they can never get over the fact, that there is a positive diminution of the production and consumption of the community. Hence the number of persons engaged in trade must be finally diminished also; either by men's abstaining from adding to the population of traders, or by the shorter cut of bankruptcy.

On comparing the effects of a tax of 20 per cent on manufacturing profits with those of a tax of 20 per cent on agricultural profits as stated in a former place, it will be perceived that the loss or prevention of production is of very different comparative magnitude in the two cases. In the first it is necessarily equal in value to the tax; and amounts in the instance stated, to about 2$\frac{3}{11}$ per cent on the whole produce. In the other, it depends on the accident of there being land that will be thrown out of cultivation, and outlay that will be cut off; and its absolute magnitude in the instance stated amounts to less than $\frac{2}{3}$ per cent on the whole produce, being to the percentage in the other case, only as about 2 to 7. The difference between the effects of taxes on agriculture and on manufactures, will be further illustrated on arriving at the case of Tithes.

A tax on the profits of manufacturers, then, will be taken by the government once, and there will be an additional loss or prevention of an equivalent quantity of production besides, which will be lost to the community without advantage to the government or anybody else, in a manner analogous to what would be the result of a deterioration of the powers of nature. The tax falls on the consumers, and the gratuitous loss on the capitalists and labourers. And this last gratuitous loss is measured by, and is in fact identical with, the losses arising to the manufacturing capitalists and labourers from the diminution of the extent of their business.

The assertion that there would on the whole be the same aggregate demand, points to an inaccurate notion of the nature of demand. Demand is spoken of as if it was something to which all other things must bend, —as if men began by determining that they *must* and *would* have a certain quantity of commodities, and the consequence was that they had it. Whereas the truth is that effectual demand, the demand of those who are willing to pay the whole of the price necessary to secure them the possession of the commodity under the existing state of competition and

of the quantity in the market,—is a floating or variable quantity, that alters with every change of price or variation in the facility of production. It is by means of this connexion between the increase of price and the diminution of effectual demand, that a deficient harvest is made to last till the arrival of the next; and the contrary. In this and other passages, demand appears to be confounded with desire,—or with that kind of demand which, in the language of Adam Smith, a very poor man may be said to have for a coach and six.

The Section entitled "A Tax on wages" omits, as before, to give any reason for their absolute magnitude. And in consequence much of it is expended in reasoning upon a case which never exists. It is never true physically, that "wages are already at the lowest point to which they "can be reduced; that is, just sufficient to keep up the number of la-"bourers and no more." It is always true virtually, or including the effects of habit and opinion; with the exception of such temporary fluctuations as, when they are in the way of increase, it may be conceded will be immediately put down by the appearance of a tax. "When wages "are so low as barely to keep up the number of labourers, wages must "rise to the amount of any tax imposed upon them, because there is a "continual diminution of the supply of labourers till the rise is effected." If this might be construed as alluding to the virtual instead of the physical boundary, the conclusion would to a certain extent coincide with what have been represented as the just inferences with respect to Wages and Profits. Two consequences however remain; both of them contrary to the conclusions of the author. One is, that taxes on the wages of labourers employed in agriculture, will in the end be taken from the landlord in the rent. The other, that taxes on the wages of manufacturing labour will be recovered from the capitalists, and finally from the consumers, so far as that will be done by the restoration of the old substantial *rate* of wages; but that there will still be a gratuitous loss to the capitalists and labourers conjointly, in the shape of a diminution of the *quantity* of their business, over and above the loss of the tax by somebody else besides, in the same manner as was noted under the head of Taxes on Profits.

To the recovery of Taxes on Wages from the capitalists, Mr. Ricardo has objected, that "the rise in the price of goods will again operate on "wages, and the action and reaction, first of wages on goods, and then of "goods on wages, will be extended without any assignable limits*;"—which he represents as an "absurd conclusion," that makes "the principle indefensible." But the supposition that any absurd conclusion arises, is founded on inattention to the nature of infinite series. Because a series is endless in its number of terms, it does not follow that the sum of the whole is infinite†. If a man was to proceed to calculate all the successive actions and reactions of wages and prices upon each other, he might find himself engaged in what the mathematicians call the method

* Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.—p. 301.

† The most familiar example is the series $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} +$ &c. *ad infinitum*; which is the foundation of the sophism of Achilles and the tortoise. The sum of the terms *ad infinitum* is manifestly only equal to 1.

of approximation; which, though he could never positively arrive at its end, he might carry to as minute a fraction of a farthing as would satisfy the most scrupulous accountant. But there exists a palpable cause which would prevent the effect of these actions and reactions, not only from being infinite—for that they could never be,—but from rising above an amount which may easily be specified. And this cause is, the impossibility of money prices rising above what can be conducted by the circulating medium. The nature of the process is the opposite of that by which an excess of circulating medium causes a depreciation of the currency and an increase of money prices. And this process and the other, will go on at the same time without interfering with each other; as the pieces on a chess board are carried forwards or backwards with relation to one another, though the board and the ship in which it is contained are all the time moving in some direction of their own. On the whole therefore, there is nothing that is absurd; and the error charged upon Adam Smith a few lines further on, resolves itself into the defectiveness of the writer's own conclusion respecting the origin of Rent.

The next Section, entitled "Direct Taxes which are destined to fall equally upon all sources of income," commences as follows.

'Assessed taxes, poll taxes, and income taxes, are of this description. After what has been said, it is not difficult to see upon whom, in each instance, the burden of them falls.

'*In as far as they are paid by the man whose income is derived from rent, or the man whose income is derived from profits of stock, the burden of them is borne by these classes.* No additional demand arises from the tax; and, *therefore*, neither can landlords raise their rents, *nor capitalists the price of their commodities.*'—Mill. p. 267.

Either the words "In as far as they are paid by the man" &c. mean "In as far as the burden of them is finally borne by the man" &c., which makes a truism;—or it is intended to infer that the burden is borne by certain individuals, because the tax is paid by them in the first instance. If nothing was required towards determining on whom a tax finally fell, but to ask at whose door the tax-gatherer knocked for the money, the science of taxation would be wonderfully simplified. The assertion that capitalists cannot raise the price of their commodities because no additional demand arises from the tax, exhibits the same inattention as in a former instance, to the nature of effectual demand. If they cannot increase the demand, they can diminish the supply; and they *must* do it, whether the difficulty of production is increased from a physical cause or from a tax, or else go on manufacturing with less than a living profit. And at the same time that the price is thus raised, the effectual demand—the demand of those who are willing to pay the expenses and profits necessary for bringing the commodity to market—will not only not be increased, but will be diminished. All this is nothing but what takes place on every occasion of a rise of price from increased difficulty of production.

With respect to "assessed taxes, poll taxes, and income taxes," the truth seems to be, that such of them as are levied from the landlords,

and from individuals who are living upon some kind of previous accumulation without being engaged in trade, will be finally paid by those persons and affect nobody else; for to the manufacturing and commercial classes, the expenditure of these sums by the government will be the same thing in the aggregate as if they had beeen left to be expended by the original owners. Such as are levied from agricultural capitalists or labourers, will finally fall on the landlord in the rent; with the comparatively small alterations in outlay, produce, &c. which have been stated. Such as are levied from manufacturing capitalists or labourers, will produce the effects stated under the heads of Taxes on Profits and on Wages; among which the most important is the gratuitous loss in the shape of the destruction of employment, which arises in addition to the tax.

The section upon "Taxes on Commodities" is true with respect to only one of the two great divisions into which commodities are to be classed; and only partially true with respect to that.

When a tax is laid on any commodity that has not a monopoly gain behind, it rises in price, "and the dealer or producer is re-imbursed for "what he has advanced on account of the tax. If he were not re-im-"bursed, he would not remain upon a level with others, and would dis-"continue his trade." And if the tax was laid upon all commodities, it would still "fall upon purchasers." Such—with the exception of the limitation relating to monopoly produce—are the admissions of the author. It would be curious to know how he convinces himself, that this is true when the tax is demanded from the producer under the title of a tax on his commodities, and would not have been true if the same sum had been demanded from him under the title of a tax on his profits.

The omissions are, First, The distinction into commodities which are produced under a monopoly, and commodities which are not; or in other words into raw produce and manufactured goods*. For in the case of the first kind, the tax will be recovered from the residuary proprietors, who are the landlords.

Secondly, the gratuitous loss or prevention of production, analogous to what would take place from a deterioration of the powers of nature, which will necessarily attend a tax on manufactured goods, in the same way as if it had been levied by an impost of a different proportion upon the profits of the individuals engaged in the production. For example if the rate of profits be 10 per cent, it will be the same thing whether a tax of 20 per cent is levied on the profits, or a tax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the prime cost, or of $2\frac{2}{11}$ on the selling price. The effect of any of which will be, in addition to the infliction of the tax, to cause a gratuitous loss

* All commodities must contain some raw produce; and this part must follow the laws of its own class. By manufactured goods must therefore, in strictness, be understood only that part of the goods or of their quality, which is the effect of manufacturing industry and not raw produce. For example, if a halfpennyworth of iron ore is made into a watch-chain worth twenty shillings, one halfpenny-worth of the chain is always raw produce, and the rest manufactures.

or prevention of manufacturing production, amounting to a reduction in the proportion of 100 to 102⅔.

'A tax, therefore, on manufactured goods, is taken by the government once, and there is a gratuitous loss or prevention of production besides, equal in value to the tax. The tax falls on the consumers, and the gratuitous loss on the capitalists and labourers.

On the first of these omissions is founded the fallacy in the next Section entitled "A Tax upon the Produce of the Land."

'A tax upon the produce of land, a tax upon corn, for example, would raise the price of corn, *as of any other commodity*. It would fall by consequence, neither upon the farmer, nor upon the landlord, but upon the consumer. The farmer is situated *as any other capitalist, or producer*; and we have seen sufficiently in what manner the tax upon commodities is transferred from him that produces to him that consumes.'—*Mill.* p. 282.

The first fallacy is in the conclusion of the preceding Section *that all commodities are alike*; or that there is no difference between those which are produced under a monopoly and those which are not. The next is in the inference, that a tax on corn will raise the price *because it is a commodity*.

What follows is equally remote from being correct. The farmer is *not* situated as any other capitalist or producer; for he precisely differs from them in the capital point of having a monopoly gain at his back from which he may recover. To say that he is situated as any other capitalist or producer, is like saying that a man in a house on fire is situated as a man in a ship;—when the most notable fact about the whole case is, that he has a back-door by which he may escape, and the other has not.

'The landlord is equally exempted. We have already seen that there is a portion of the capital employed upon the land, the return to which is sufficient to yield the ordinary profits of stock, and no more. The price of produce must be sufficient to yield this profit, *otherwise the capital would be withdrawn*.'—*Mill.* p. 282.

The fallacy here is in the assumption that the tenants *can* raise the price of corn, to gratify either themselves or the landlords, and that capital cannot be withdrawn. The tenant must be indemnified for the tax; but not out of the price of corn. A portion of capital will be withdrawn, in the shape of a diminution of outlay as detailed in page 310; though it will be comparatively small. So far is there from being any difficulty in capital being withdrawn, that it is what happens on every diminution of demand. The idea of there being any difficulty in its happening, must be referred to the opinion before mentioned of the existence of an unalterable demand.

'If a tax is imposed upon produce, and levied upon the cultivator, *it follows that* the price of produce must rise sufficiently to refund the tax. If the tax is 10 per cent or any other rate, upon the selling price, corn must rise in value one-tenth, or any other proportion.'—*Mill.* p. 282.

It follows that *something* must be altered. But it no more follows that it must be the price of produce, when it may also be the rent,—than

it follows that because a man's brother is dead it is Thomas, when he has also a brother named John.

The real effects on the landlords and tenants, of a tax on agricultural produce, will, with the exception of a small reaction, be the same as those of a reduction of price of equal amount. To recur, for example, to the case stated before,—If corn was at 44*s.*, and a tax was imposed of 4s. per quarter, the first approximation to the result would be, that the outlay would be reduced from 1010*l.* to 1000*l.*, the produce from 605 quarters to 600, the annual amount of profits from 101*l.* to 100*l.*, and the rent from 220*l.* to 100*l.* For it would be the same thing to the land-holder, both in his character of cultivator and of landlord, whether a loss of 4*s.* per quarter was occasioned by a reduction of price or by a tax. But the effect of the tax will not be to cause a loss of precisely 4*s.* per quarter; for there will be a certain reaction on the price of corn in the way of increasing it, in consequence of the diminution of produce which arises from the tax and is represented in the particular case by five quarters. If on an estimate like those formerly entered into, the amount of this reaction might be stated at fourpence per quarter, the price of corn instead of 44*s.* would be 44*s.* 4*d.* And the effect of this would be in a small degree to increase the outlay, the amount of profits, and the produce. But the principal effect, neglecting inconsiderable fractions, would be that the price of the 600 quarters would be increased by fourpence a quarter, or 10*l.*; which will be added to the rent. The corrected rent therefore may be stated at 110*l.* A further correction might be made by calculating the effect of the small increase of produce last-mentioned upon prices, and similar corrections might be extended to an indefinite number; but their amount would be insignificant. The tax therefore, with the exception of the reaction amounting to 10*l.*, is taken from the rent.

On referring to the case of taxes on Agricultural Profits it will be readily discerned, how much more prejudicial to the consumers would have been the raising of a given sum by a tax of that description, than by a tax on agricultural produce.

The next Section, which is on "A tax upon the Profits of the Farmer, and upon Agricultural Instruments," concludes that

'It would in the first place *raise the price of raw produce; because that price is determined by the produce of the capital which pays no rent, and which, if it sustains a tax, must rise like any other taxed commodity, to indemnify the producer.*

'*In consequence of this rise of price, it would increase the rent of the landlords.*'—Mill, p. 284.

This is the great aboriginal fallacy, which assigns the produce of the capital that pays no rent, as the regulator of the price of corn, instead of the price being the regulator of the addition that can be made to the capital. There is also the same inattention to the nature of effectual demand, that was formerly noticed. The produce of the capital which pays no rent, if it is to sustain a tax *and continue to be produced,* must rise in price to indemnify the producer. But the fallacy is in assuming that it *will* continue to be produced; the truth being that the outlay will

always stop at the point where the last sum added to it will be returned with a living profit, clear of all deductions.

The real effects of a Tax on the Profits of the Farmer have been shown under the head of Taxes on Profits.

'A tax upon the instruments of agriculture, is the same thing in effect as a tax upon the profits of the farmer. *It raises the value of produce, without affecting the quantity which goes as rent to the landlord.—Not only, therefore, does the whole of the tax fall upon the consumer, but he is charged with another burden, the additional rent which is paid to the landlord. The community is taxed, in part for the use of the government, in part for the benefit of the landlords.*'—Mill. p. 285.

If the Tax on Agricultural Instruments is of such a nature that its amount varies in proportion to the magnitude of the produce, it is a tax on produce; and the tax, with the exception of a small effect of reaction upon prices, will be taken out of the rent, with sundry small alterations in outlay, profits, and produce. If the amount does not vary at all with the produce, it is a dead charge upon the cultivator, and will be taken out of the rent without affecting anything else. If it does something between both, the effects will be of some intermediate nature, according to the circumstances of the case.

The next Section is upon "Tithes and Poor Rates."

'Tithes are a tax upon the produce of the land; a tenth of the produce, perfectly or imperfectly collected.

'The operation, therefore, of this tax, has been already ascertained. *It raises the price of produce, and falls wholly upon the consumer.*'—Mill. p. 286.

That tithes are a tax upon the produce is clear. The consequence therefore will be, that with the exception of a small reaction, they will be taken from the rent; with certain small alterations in outlay, profits, and produce, as before stated. The truth of this or of the opposite representation, depends on the existence or non-existence of a fallacy in the Section entitled "A Tax on the Produce of the Land."

The great engine of confusion and fallacy on this part of the question, is the introduction of the reaction upon prices and rents which arises out of the accident of there being land and capital that will be thrown out of activity; and representing what is true of this small accidental part, as true of the whole. And the way to escape from the effect of this fallacy, is to attend in the first instance to what would have been the consequences, if there had been no such thing as the accident of different qualities of soil and different modes of cultivation; and to attain to a clear conviction of the infirmity of the argument, which would represent the existence of this accident as essential to the existence of rent;—and *then* to calculate the real effects of the existence of the accident, without confounding them with what is left unaltered by it.

The *cheval de bataille* of those who believe that taxes on agricultural produce fall on the consumers, is the malt tax. If a tax is laid on malt, the price of beer rises till the tax is recovered to the dealers; and it

would do the same if the tax was laid on barley. What then, they say, so clear, as that the tax falls on the consumers?

The fallacy here is in bringing forward only half the case. If a tax is laid on barley, the quantity of land laid down with barley will be diminished, in such a manner as according to the guesses of the growers will cause the price to rise to what, after paying the tax, will make it as advantageous to grow barley as anything else. And though the guesses may be rough and imperfect the first year, they will be better in every succeeding year, and will in the end attain to the greatest exactness that can be desired. But if the price of barley is raised through the quantity grown being diminished, the prices of some other kinds of produce must fall, through the quantity grown being increased; for the land will be employed in growing something else. The land-owners therefore furnish the tax, and in the first instance recover it from the consumers of barley in the price. But on the other hand they suffer a reduction of the prices of other kinds of produce; which makes a deduction from their recovery of the tax, and a set-off to the consumers of agricultural produce against the increased price paid for the article taxed. The consumers of beer pay a higher price for their barley, and consume less; but the consumers of wheat or of something else, pay a lower price for what they consume, and consume more. There is some loss of business to maltsters, brewers, and publicans; but there is an increase of business to millers, bakers, or whoever are the dealers in the articles whose consumption is increased. And as no man lives on beer alone, the tax will be compensated, at all events in a certain degree, not only to the consumers of agricultural produce in the aggregate, but to every individual consumer of beer also. And if it should turn out in the end, that the aggregate gains of the consumers by the reduction of the prices of other things, are equal to their losses by the rise of barley,—or in other words that they have paid the same sum for the whole produce as before,—the consumers will be just where they were, with the exception of the altered proportions which have been forced upon them, and the land-owners will have furnished the tax without recovery.

In the absence of taxation altogether, the distribution of the land to different kinds of produce would be regulated by the tendency of individual interests to create such a supply of each kind, as would induce a state of relative prices that made it impracticable for an individual to gain anything by growing more of one kind and less of some other. The question whether in any particular case the land-owners would receive more or less for the whole produce, after the natural distribution of crops had been altered by a tax on a particular article,—is the same as the question whether they would obtain more or less if it were possible for them to alter the natural distribution by a combination among themselves; and is one to which a general answer cannot hastily be given. But whatever might be the answer in the case of a tax upon one particular kind of produce by itself, it is clear that if the taxation was extended to *all* kinds in such a manner as to leave no inducement for altering the relative proportions of different crops, the sum received by the land-owners would be the same as before the tax. For as there

would be no inducement to alter the relative proportions, so there would be no general diminution of the growth of all kinds; because it would be prevented by the absence of sufficient union among the growers, as was shown in demonstrating the impossibility of land-holders recovering a tax by raising the price of corn. But if the quantities grown were in all respects the same as before, the sums received for them must be the same; for there is the impossibility just alluded to, that any act or wish of the growers should induce the consumers to give more for a given quantity of produce than they were obliged to by the competition among themselves. The land-owners therefore in such a case, would receive from the consumers in the aggregate, and from every individual consumer also, the same sum for the same produce as before. But if each and all of the consumers paid the same sum for the same produce as before, the consumers would be just where they were, and the land-owners would have furnished the tax without recovery.

In the case of a general tax either *ad valorem* or in kind like a tithe, the taxation *does* fall on all kinds of produce so as to leave no inducement for altering the relative proportions; and consequently the landlords will furnish the tax without recovery. Whether, therefore, the loss of the landlords and the compensation to the consumers be complete in the case of the taxation of, a single article like malt, or not,—they are complete in the case of a general taxation either *ad valorem* or in kind like a tithe.

If, to view the thing in another light, the taxation described is supposed to be extended to the different kinds of produce in succession, each kind will at one period have its price raised and growth diminished in consequence of being taxed itself, and will at other periods be among the kinds whose prices fall in consequence of the increased growth of them which takes place through something else being taxed. In which there is no difficulty in seeing, how the end is to bring the prices and growths of all kinds to what they were at first; while at every step a levy equal to the new tax, or at least one which in conjunction with all the successive levies is finally equal to the sum of the successive taxes, is made upon the land-owners.

If the above are the consequences to the land-owners when they keep the land in their own hands, they will equally result when it is let to tenants; as has been proved before.

The difference between laying a tax on barley and laying it on malt, —if barley was grown only to be made into malt, which is not very far from being the case,—would be that the tax-gatherer would knock at the door of the maltster instead of the grower, and the grower would have to deduct the tax from the price he charged to the maltster, instead of paying it to the tax-gatherer himself. And there would further be a small saving to the consumers in the price of malt, in consequence of the maltster not being obliged to advance the tax during the time occupied in converting the barley into malt.

Another argument brought to prove that tithes fall on the consumers, —and which is indeed no other than the theory formerly noticed of an unalterable demand,—is, that if a tax or tithe has a tendency to

throw a certain belt of land out of cultivation or cause a certain diminution of outlay, and thereby create a diminution of produce, the price must be raised till it makes the produce the same as before, *because men cannot go without the produce.* And this assumption is probably at the bottom of the frequent introduction that has been made of the subject of demand*.

The fallacy here, as has been mentioned already, is in the inattention to the nature of effectual demand, and the assumption that the produce cannot be diminished. It is not true that men say, "We must and will have such and such a quantity of corn whatever may be the price." But they say, "We will have as much as it is more convenient for us to pay for at the price for which the grower will grow it, than to do without." It is a question of equilibrium, between the inconvenience of paying a high price, and the inconvenience of economizing in the use of corn; and whatever may be the laws by which the magnitude of these two inconveniences severally vary, there must be an equilibrium somewhere, at a point short of consuming the old quantity. That men cannot live without a certain quantity, meaning thereby *some* quantity, of food is true;—but it is not true that men are living on a *fixed* quantity, which will not be diminished on an increase of price. At the siege of Gibraltar General Elliott ascertained by experiment upon himself, that a man can live on four ounces of food per day. If this is assumed as the smallest quantity on which life can be sustained, it is still, in the first place, not true that the community, or any considerable portion of its members, are living on four ounces of food per day;—and secondly, even if it was true, the result of an increase of price would be, not that the same quantity of food would continue to be bought by the consumers whatever was the price, but that the population would begin to decrease by all the modes consequent on insufficient food, and that for this decrement there would be no food bought at all. So far from there being any necessity that the same quantity of food shall be bought, it does not even follow that the buyers shall all live to buy. But there is no necessity for pushing the argument to this length. It is sufficient to attend to the fact, that when there is a necessity for the consumption being diminished because the corn is not there to be consumed, an increase of price is the engine which carries it into effect;—a clear proof that increase of price diminishes consumption.

The real magnitude and effects of the increase of price consequent on a tax or tithe, have been shown under the head of "A Tax upon the

---

* This argument is advanced in very plain terms by Mr. M'Culloch.
'Suppose no tithes are levied, and that the wheat raised on the *poorest* lands, 'or with the capital last applied to the soil, and which determines the price of 'the whole crop, yields a sufficient profit to the cultivator, and no more, when 'it sells for 70*s.* a quarter—the price must rise to 77*s.* before the same pro-'fit can be obtained after tithes are imposed. In this case the tithe cannot 'possibly occasion any diminution of rent; for this produce pays no rent; so 'that if it were not compensated to the cultivators by an increase of prices, they 'would withdraw their capital from cultivation, and the necessary supplies 'would no longer be obtained.'—*Supplement to the 4th and 5th Editions of the Encyclopædia Britannica. Art.* TAXATION. p. 629.

Produce of the Land." There will be a certain diminution of produce, which will cause a certain reaction on the price in the way of increasing it; and this increase of price will cause the diminution of produce to be finally something less than it would have been without it, and make a small deduction from what would otherwise have been the loss of the landlord. But to suppose that it can go the length of destroying the diminution of produce altogether, is like the story of the two cats that ate up each other. Whatever was eaten, there must have been something left to eat it. Whatever may be the effect of the increase of price, there must be some diminution of produce left, to cause an increase of price to exist. The truth therefore is, that there will be a reaction; but one far short of restoring the produce to its original magnitude, or throwing the tax on the consumers. If the accident of there being land of inferior qualities, and ways of increasing the produce by increased outlay, had not existed, the tax or tithe would have been taken from the landlords *simpliciter*. But in proportion to the degree in which this accident exists, there will be a reaction, of small magnitude, arising from the land and outlay which are of such a nature as to be thrown out of activity by the tax.

An article in the WESTMINSTER REVIEW, No. II., has been profuse of arguments on the subject of Tithes; and it may be worth while to follow them.

'We now come to the important conclusion. This may be stated in a few words. The lowest soil in cultivation pays no rent [*to the landlord.*] Every soil from which produce is extracted pays tithe [*to the clergyman*]. Rent therefore [*to the landlord*] and tithe [*to the clergyman*] are not identical [*Who ever thought they were?*], but altogether different. But tithe, not being a portion of the rent of land, [*Here shift the meaning of rent, from the net payment to the landlord, to the total residuum left after paying the expenses and necessary profits of the cultivator.*] can only be a tax on produce, and in the language of Mr. Ricardo, "like all taxes on produce falls wholly on the consumer."'—p. 413.

The fallacy here, is manifestly in shifting from one meaning of the word "rent" to another during the argument*.

'We think, however, there is a simpler mode of arriving at the same conclusion.'

'If tithes are not paid by the consumer, as it is contended, they are portion of the rent of land [*that is, of the total residuum left after paying the expenses of cultivation; not, it may be presumed, of what is*

* A still more extraordinary fallacy on the same basis, appears in the Supplement to the 4th and 5th Editions of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

† 'But, independently of these considerations, the fact that tithes and other taxes 'on raw produce do not form a deduction from rent, but go to increase the price 'of produce, is obvious from the circumstance that the tithe of expensive crops, 'and which require a great expenditure in their cultivation, frequently amounts 'to *four* or *five* times the rent of the land. The Rev. Mr. Howlett, by far the 'ablest advocate of tithes, and whose authority cannot, therefore, be questioned, 'informs us that the tithe of an acre of hops, raised on land worth 40*s.* or 50*s.* an 'acre, is, after deduction of drying and duty, generally worth from 3*l.* to 4*l.*; and 'he further states, that he had known 7*l.* or 8*l.* paid for the tithe of an acre of car-

left after themselves are paid.] This is admitted. It will also be granted, that every acre in England not specially exempted, whatever it may yield under the name of rent [*to the landlord after the tithe is taken*], returns to the clerical incumbent a tithe of its gross produce. It follows, that the lowest possible rent [*total residuum*] of land in England—for tithe is [*taken out of the*] rent by the supposition—is a tenth of its gross annual produce. [*This is quite true. The tithe will prevent the land from being cultivated, except where nine-tenths of the gross annual produce will pay the expenses and necessary profits of cultivation; or where, after the payment of these, there will be a residuum of at least one-tenth.*] If this be the case in England [*where there is a tithe*], it must be so universally, wherever land is appropriated and brought into cultivation [*whether there is a tithe or not. Such is the argument.*]. It is well known that the farmer on the banks of the Ohio, so far from paying a tithe of his produce as rent [*either to the landlord or to the tithe-owner*], pays no rent at all. The same might no doubt be observed of lands much nearer home. The lowest rent [*residuum*] of land, therefore, [*in places where no tithe is taken,*] is not the tithe of its produce [*Who ever thought it was?*]; and [*consequently, for such is the argument,*] where such a portion is extracted by provision of law [*that is, in places where tithe is taken,*] that portion is not rent of land, but a tax on produce.'—p. 413.

The fallacy here—if the term can be applied—consists in arguing, that tithe is not taken out of the residuum where tithe exists, because tithe is not taken out of the residuum where there is no tithe at all.

'Again: Assuming, as before, that tithe is portion of the rent [*residuum*]; we will take, for the sake of argument, the case in which the tithe and the remainder of the rent shall together amount to less than a fifth of the gross produce; or, in other words, in which the portion of rent [*residuum*] paid under the name of rent [*to the landlord,*] shall be less than the portion paid under the name of tithe [*to the clergyman*]. Of land in this condition we will suppose two contiguous parcels. Such land will, of course, be all of the same fertility. If the legislature raise the tithe on one parcel to a fifth, [*It is impossible. The whole residuum is not a fifth. The land must cease to be cultivated if it were enacted. It is ordering five quarts to be taken out of a gallon.*] but make no alteration on the other, it is plain that from the former parcel the church alone will extract a rent of a fifth of the gross produce; [*The church will extract nothing at all; for there will*

'rot-seed where the land was not worth 20*s.*] In such cases, it is plainly as great 'an absurdity to affirm that tithes fall exclusively on the rent of the landlord, as 'it would be to affirm that a *part* is greater than the *whole*.'—Art. TAXATION. By J. R. M'Culloch, Esq. p. 630.

The whole of this is a confusion of ideas arising from the two meanings of the word rent.

When a tax or tithe is said to form a deduction from rent, this manifestly means from *the rent as it would be without the deduction of the tax*, and not *as it is after the deduction*.

Nobody ever said that the 8*l.* which is the tithe of an acre of carrot-seed, is taken out of the 20*s.* which is left for the landlord afterwards; but that it is taken out of the 9*l.* which is the residuum after paying the expenses and necessary profits of cultivation, and that it is because 8*l.* is taken for tithe, that only 20*s.* is left for the landlord.

be a stop put to the production altogether, in consequence of the demand being greater than will leave the expenses of cultivation.] whilst from the latter parcel, the landlord and church together will receive something which will be less than a fifth. Here then we should have two parcels of equally fertile land, paying two different rents, at one and the same period; which is absurd. Tithe, therefore, as before, is not of the nature of rent, but of a tax on produce.'—p. 414.

The fallacy here consists in arguing on what would come to pass, if out of a gallon the legislature should take five quarts. It is John Cade declaring that "the three-hoop'd pot shall have ten hoops."

'To conclude, if tithe be rent, the American government by imposing it on the lands in the back settlements, which now yield no rent at all, or a nominal sum which is next to none, may at once *create* a rent equal to the tenth of the gross produce. Advancing another step, it may *create* rent to the amount of half, or even the whole of the gross produce—a supposition too absurd to be insisted on.—p. 414.

If the American government were to impose such a tax, it would put a stop to the cultivation of lands in the back settlements altogether; with the exception of those where nine-tenths of the produce were sufficient to give a living profit to the cultivator. There would be a certain reaction on the price of produce, which would in some degree increase the quantity of land that would be able to resist the tax; but the effect would be in the main to check the cultivation of the back settlements, in the same manner that would result from a diminution of one tenth in the productive powers of nature there. The fallacy therefore, is in supposing that the American government would *get* the tax, tithe, rent or whatever else it may be called, because it *enacted* it.

"Let us suppose," it has been said [by a writer on the opposite side, in the Quarterly Review for December 1823,—Art. ECCLESIASTICAL REVENUES], "that the produce of a given quantity of the least fertile soil, which is said to pay no rent, sells for 40*l.*, and that the claim of the tithe-owner now amounting to 4*l.* were abolished, would the whole produce which now sells for 40*l.* be in that case sold for no more than 36*l.*? 'Yes,' say the political economists. 'No,' says common sense and experience; if the 4*l.* now received for tithes ceased to be exacted, another claimant to an equal amount would instantly start up in the person of the landlord."—p. 414.

This the reviewer says would be true, if the remission of the tithe was confined to this particular portion of soil, but would not be true if the remission was general. Which is what remains for him to prove.

'Instead of remitting the tithe of that particular portion, we will suppose it to be remitted universally. The produce of that same portion which formerly sold for 40*l.*, would now fetch only 36*l.*'

'For: If the capital employed by the farmer on the particular portion of soil referred to in our case were 31*l.*, and the common profits of stock on that sum were 5*l.*, he would sell *his* produce for 36*l.* and no more, whether it consisted of 10 quarters or of 9. [*He would not; the competition among the consumers of corn would be such as to enable*

him to get 40l. for the produce as before. And even if the sellers were so dull as not to find this out, there would be a necessity for the price being raised in consequence of the rapid consumption of the stock in hand. Corn sold for 4l. a quarter before, because nothing less than that price would induce the competitors to agree in such a division as would spin out the consumption to the needful length; and the same necessity would exist afterwards. But the landlord will immediately come down on the tenant for 4l. increase of rent; or, if he refuses to pay it, find another tenant who will.] If the whole produce of the land he occupied were 10 quarters, of which he paid one to the parson, he must sell the remaining 9 quarters for 36*l.*, because he must have the ordinary rate of profits on his capital. [*They are not sold for 36l. because this is necessary to his having the ordinary rate of profits; but it is because they can be sold for 36l. in consequence of the state of the competition, that the tithe-owner or the landlord can lay hands on the other quarter and still leave him a living profit.*] If the tithe were abolished, and he continued to sell the 10 quarters at the same rate per quarter as he had formerly sold the 9 quarters, his gains would exceed the ordinary profits of stock by the price of the tenth quarter [*and therefore the landlord will take advantage of the competition among farmers, to take the excess from him in the shape of rent.*] This would be speedily corrected by the competition of other growers. [*It would not; because it is corrected already by the interference of the landlord, and because other growers are in the same situation with respect to their own landlords.*], which would compel him to reduce his price till he gained no more than the ordinary profits of stock. The 10 quarters, therefore, the whole produce of the particular portion of soil referred to in our case, and which formerly sold for 40*l.*, would now be worth only 36*l.*'—p. 415.

The error here, is in overlooking the necessity there is for the corn continuing to sell for 40*l.*, whoever may have the benefit of it. But this necessity being established, the landlord will put the 4*l.* into his pocket, by the ordinary process of competition among tenants.

In opposition then to all these arguments, the conclusion is, that Tithes fall on the landlords, but have also a certain effect in preventing the cultivation of poor soils, and diminishing the outlay upon others; which in return must cause a small reaction upon price, but one far short of throwing the tax on the consumers. And it becomes of importance to ascertain the magnitude of this last effect, and to compare it with what would have been the result if the support for the clergy had been raised by a tax on the produce of manufactures instead of agriculture.

In England the waste lands have been estimated at a seventh of the whole. Hence if it may be assumed that the quality of this seventh varies uniformly, from that quality where the expenditure of a given sum will return enough to pay the expenses with the necessary profits and a ninth of all this besides for tithe, to that where it would produce nothing,—the abolition of tithes, in calling into cultivation all the land down to that which would return the expenses and profits without the tithe, or furnish nine-tenths of what was formerly the lowest produce, would call into cultivation one tenth of the waste, and increase the quantity of cultivated land by one sixtieth. And if three quarters of corn per acre is a fair average produce for the whole of the cultivated

land in the country, and one quarter per acre for the worst,—the produce of the new land called into cultivation by the abolition of tithes would be a hundred-and-eightieth part of what existed before*.

Again, the rents in England are supposed to be in the aggregate a third of the produce. Hence the case so often assumed as an example,—with corn at 55*s*.—is not very far from an average case. And in it, (as may be collected from the calculations in page 434), the diminution of produce consequent on the reduced outlay on the land already cultivated, arising from a tax of one tenth or a tithe, would be less than two quarters of corn out of 609, or than the three-hundredth part†. Adding therefore this effect to the other, the whole diminution of produce effected by tithes in England, supposing them to be universal, may be estimated at less than the hundred-and-twelfth part.

The value of the whole annual produce of agriculture in Great Britain, compared with that of manufactures, has been estimated as being as one to three. If then the support of the clergy were to be raised by a tax on the produce of manufactures instead of agriculture, the tax must be a third of a tithe, or $3\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. And the consequence of this would be, in addition to the tax being paid by the consumers, to cause a gratuitous loss or prevention of production, which, if 10 per cent may be assumed as the average rate of manufacturing profits, would be equal to ten-elevenths of $3\frac{1}{3}$ per cent on the whole amount of goods manufactured. And the value of this, would be to the value of the hundred-and-twelfth part of the agricultural produce, which is what is supposed to be kept out of existence by the system of tithe,—as $\frac{1}{100} \times \frac{10}{11} \times \frac{10}{3} \times 3$, to 1 divided by 112; or as $\frac{1}{11}$ to $\frac{1}{112}$, or something more than 10 to 1; an inequality not to be got over by any conceivable inaccuracy in the numerical assumptions. In which it is remarkable that the result is independent of the comparative values of the agricultural and manufactured produce, and will be the same whatever is their proportion. The explanation of which is, that if the manufactured produce is less, a greater portion of it must be taken.

Hence the real state of the charge against tithes is, first, that the tax, with the exception of a trifling reaction, is paid by the landlords, instead of being paid by the consumers as would have been the case if it had been levied on manufactures; and secondly, that there is a saving of more than nine-tenths of the loss or prevention of production which would have taken place by the other mode. When tithes are asserted to be a peculiarly pernicious and impolitic mode of taxation, these facts are always kept out of sight. The proof of the assertion falls to the ground upon examination, like the proof of many other popular outcries. As the woodpecker, the rook, and the goatsucker, have been persecuted time out of mind for imaginary injuries, so the ecclesiastical rook has been charged with collecting his subsistence in a manner peculiarly injurious to the public, through clear ignorance or concealment of the nature of the process. Some species of commutation might possibly be better still. But it is plain that the extended outcry has been made either

* This is what has in another place been called the "belt."

† This is what Dr. Chalmers (*Political Economy*. p. 312) has called the "stratum."

through ignorance, or a desire to direct the hostility of the community to a particular quarter by misrepresentation.

If a third part of the land is tithe-free (as is understood to be the case in England), one third must be deducted from the estimate of the effect of tithes. And the effect of the abolition of the other two-thirds would be, that the produce of the country would be increased by two-thirds of a hundred-and-twelfth part, or $\frac{1}{168}$; which, if it took place all at once, would cause the price of corn to fall by a quantity which, on account of the comparative smallness of the increase, would be at all events not very remote from the ratio of the increase,—or, if corn is supposed at 56*s.*, fourpence a quarter. But this fall of price—(being in fact the "small reaction" mentioned under the heads of "Tithes" and "Taxes on the Produce of the Land," and to which in those places also the same observation may be applied)—*will be only temporary.* And the reason of this is, (as has been alluded to in the Note, page 412), the certainty that any given permanent alteration in the quantity of corn will ultimately produce a corresponding alteration in the population that is to consume it, and so bring back corn to the old price.

On the landlords in the aggregate, the first effect would be, that as fast as they could renew their agreements with the tenants, there would come into their hands *the value of the tithes as it stood before the abolition, diminished by the total value of the increase of produce;* which last (estimated at $\frac{1}{168}$ of the whole produce, while the tithe abolished is $\frac{2}{3}$ of $\frac{1}{10}$, or $\frac{1}{15}$) may be assumed to be $(\frac{1}{168} \times 15)$ about one-eleventh of the value of the tithes. For as the small increase of produce is attended with an effect upon prices, not materially different from causing the increased quantity to sell for the same value as the old,—the full cost and value of this increase of produce, whatever it may be, must in the first instance (or within a trivial difference) be deducted from the rents that would otherwise have been obtained. But as the price of corn recovers from the fourpenny fall that has been inflicted on it, the landlords will gradually get possession, first of the missing eleventh of the tithes, and then of an addition of rents on account of the new land called into cultivation by the abolition. And as the rents of different portions of this new land will be of all magnitudes from a tenth of the produce down to nothing, half a tenth, or a twentieth of the whole increase of produce, may be considered as a fair estimate of the final increase of rents from this source.—If instead of the tithes being abolished at all once, the removal took place in different places one after another, results of the same import would ultimately be produced, only by imperceptible gradations*.

* In an article on the Corn Laws in No. 88 of the Edinburgh Review, some inferences on the effect of tithes are presented as derived from the fact of the impost being of partial application.

'—— it is obvious that *the price of corn must have been regulated by the price for which it can be raised on the last lands cultivated that are free from tithe,* and not for what it could be raised for on the last lands cultivated that are subject to that charge. It appears, therefore, &c.'

Corn *can* be raised on the sand above high-water mark, if anybody chuses to do it in defiance of the loss; but it is clear that it is not meant to say that this corn would regulate the price. What is meant therefore must be, that the

If it is true that a given permanent increase or diminution in the quantity of corn will produce an effect upon population that will ultimately bring back the old price, an immediate consequence is, that the price of corn at this moment, is exactly the same as it would have been at this moment if tithes had never existed. The effect of the existing tithes, may be compared to the effect of a convulsion which at some period of remote antiquity should have sunk the hundred-and-sixty-eighth part of the land of the country into the sea. Britain would at this moment be a less Britain than would otherwise have been the case, by a hundred-and-sixty-eighth part of her territory, population, and everything else. But it will not be contended that there would at this moment be any increase in the price of corn, compared with what would have been the price if there had been no such convulsion at all.

The removal of tithes, therefore, would be a positive good, and there is no reason why sensible men should omit any measure for obtaining it. But the existence of tithes, so far as is connected with the price of corn, is not a positive evil; and therefore sensible men ought not to make an outcry as if it was. The real mischief of tithes is reducible to their being a mode of collection peculiarly calculated to generate ill will; and therefore one which the church should be at least as anxious to get rid of as anybody else. To which may be added, that they produce the same political effect as if at some remote period, an average hundred-and-sixty-eighth part of the territory of the country had been buried in the sea; and their removal by commutation or otherwise, would produce the same effect as if the like quantity of territory of average fertility were to rise out of the water.

The most extraordinary circumstance connected with Tithes is, that the landlords and the clergy do not find out, that there is a value approaching in the end to two-thirds of the hundred-and-twelfth part of the agricultural produce of the country,—(worth probably at last not less than 500,000*l.* per annum),—which might be called into existence; out of which something like half a tithe, or 25,000*l.* per annum, would accrue to the landlords in the shape of rent on land that now pays none, and might be divided between the landlords and the church, if they could only agree upon the terms. For this would be the final effect of a commutation of any kind, which should prevent the ecclesiastical revenue from being raised, as at present, by a tax on produce. Two reasons

---

price of corn has been regulated by the price for which it can be raised on the last lands cultivated *with a living profit at the going price.* In other words, that the price has been regulated by the price; which is reasoning in a circle.

If it is urged that the price is regulated by the *necessity*, this necessity has no organ for expressing itself but through the price. Which makes the circle as before.

The whole is in fact the fallacy of inversion noticed under the Theory of Rent. The price of corn is neither regulated by one of the things mentioned nor by the other; but the state of competition first settles what shall be the price in proportion to the quantity in the market, and the price determines the quality of land on which it is worth while to grow corn, in tithed lands and tithe-free respectively. And no difference will be made to the consumers, by tithe being taken or not taken; except the slight alterations in produce and price which have been stated.

only can be given, why something of this kind is not done. First, that the landlords and the clergy are not generally aware of the fact; Secondly, that they have an indistinct dread of alteration. If the church could get over the dread, the landlords might. It is for the church therefore to consider, whether the contingent danger of increasing her revenues by the half of 25,000*l.* a-year, balances the present evil of being held out to the community as living on the price of bread. Such a sum might not make much show, subdivided as it would be. But it proves that there is enough to pay for greasing the wheels; and that it would be for the interest of the landlords everywhere, to allow the church to gain, and not lose, by the commutation. That the community at large would finally be benefited to the amount of 475,000*l.* per annum besides, ought also to be some reason; though the community at large are neither landlords nor clergymen*.

The next subject is that of Poor Rates.

'If the poor rate were levied in proportion to profits upon farmers, manufacturers, and merchants, it would be a tax upon profits. If &c. —But if a separate tax is laid upon the farmers, we have already seen *that it operates immediately to raise the price of corn sufficiently high to afford them compensation for the tax, and raises the rent of the landlords. It is to them a benefit, not a burthen.*'—Mill. p. 286.

The reasons for opposing the conclusion marked in italics, have been formerly stated.

A poor rate is commonly levied in proportion to the rent. In the case, therefore, of a land-owner uniting the characters of landlord and cultivator, it would be simply a tax on rent, and would alter nothing else. And the same will take place when the characters are divided.

If a poor rate was levied in proportion to profits or to produce, it would be a tax on profits or on produce, and its effects will be found under those heads.

The Section on "A Tax per acre on the Land" infers, that if the tax was levied only on cultivated land

'Such a tax would *raise upon the consumers, not only so much per acre to the government, but a great deal more for the benefit of the landlords.*'—Mill. p. 290.

and it founds this upon the former argument, that there is a portion of capital employed upon the land, the return to which is sufficient to afford the ordinary profits of stock, but nothing more,—and that

* If a commutation of tithes were effected under legislative regulation, it would be necessary to give the landlord a power of continuing the tithe in its present form till the expiration of the existing lease, in cases where the landlord and tenant could not agree upon the sum to be added to the rent. For without this, the landlord would be exposed to the loss of the amount of the tithe during the unexpired period of the lease. At the same time it is presumable, that such a provision would in very few cases cause any practical delay in the execution of the desired commutation. For it would always be the interest of the landlord to carry the commutation into effect, provided he could make a fair agreement with the tenant; and it would be the interest of the tenant to offer one.—Whenever there is a commutation of tithes, it is not likely that the landlords will forget to secure themselves upon this point.

'If any addition is made to the cost of producing, *a rise of price must afford compensation.*'—p. 288.

The fallacy of this, as before stated, is in supposing that this portion of capital will of necessity continue to be employed.

By application to the case of a land-owner uniting the characters of landlord and cultivator, it is plain that a tax per acre on the land, whether confined to cultivated land or not, will be taken from the landlord. In cases where the tax per acre should be greater than the rent, the landlord, if he could escape the tax by it, would keep the land out of cultivation, or even disown it altogether. But if he cannot by either of these means escape the tax, he will have no resource but to get all the rent he can, and make up the tax out of his own pocket.

To recapitulate, The Theory of Rent with its adjuncts is proved to be fallacious, First, by the infirmity of the conclusion that what it assigns as the cause *is* the cause; as demonstrated by the application of a similar conclusion in other cases;—and Secondly, by the results being contradicted by the evidence of experiment. The theory says, that no rent should be paid where land is of a uniform quality, and the art of forcing crops is unknown. The palpable fact is, that a heavy rent is paid in countries lying under precisely these circumstances. The theory says, that landlords lose rent by turnips and drill husbandry. Landlords quietly do all in their power to encourage both. The theory says, that taxes on agricultural produce are shifted on the consumers. Landlords and tenants both know, that no power on earth can induce the consumers to give more for a given quantity of corn than the competition obliges them to do. The theory says, that taxes on the farmer's profits, and on his instruments of agriculture, raise rent. Landlords know, that they pay for them out of the rent. The theory says, that rent is made higher by poor rates. Landlords know, that it is as snow by sun-shine. The theory says, that a land-tax raises a sum on the consumers, for the benefit of the landlords. Landlords are so dull, as never yet to have voted for a land-tax but under the pressure of necessity. When the measure of the truth of a theory shall be the hostility of its results with experiment, this theory may be believed on argument. Till then, it must be believed because it is a convenience to have the labouring classes told, that the clergy are supported out of the price of bread *.

---

* The Westminster Review has replied to the objections made to its conclusion upon tithes, by saying that 'they are not corollaries from the doctrine advanced on *rent*, but from a peculiar and altogether erroneous opinion on *profits*, which are conceived to be regulated, like wages, by the proportion between numbers and demand.'—No. XIII. p. 179, note.

A reference to pages 423-4, will be enough to show that no such opinion has been advanced on profits at all. What is advanced is, that they are *not* regulated by the proportion between numbers and demand; but "the force of opinion and habit" regulates the rate of profit necessary for living in the way which society pronounces to be respectable, and this regulates the number of traders, the excess being withdrawn by bankruptcy.

The statement, that what has been said of rent had moreover been said previously and much more clearly, in No. 50, p. 475-6 of the Quarterly Review, is no answer to anything; and is scarcely worthy of men professing to search after

The theory of "No General Glut" is in a certain degree connected with the rest.

'Every commodity is always, at one and the same time, matter of demand, and matter of supply. Of two men who perform an exchange, the one does not come with only a supply, the other with only a demand; each of them comes with both a demand and a supply. The supply which he brings, is the instrument of his demand; and *his demand and supply are of course exactly equal to one another.* —Mill. p. 232.

This is the rhythm of an argument, without the substance. The fallacy lies in assuming that the demand and the supply are equal. The supply of every individual is the *source* of his demand,—the storehouse from which his demand is taken;—but it is not his *demand.* Nobody ever doubted that the portion of an individual's supply which he succeeds in exchanging with a living profit, is the instrument of his demand; but the question was, whether he might not have a further portion behind, which he could not exchange, or could not exchange with a living profit. The sportsman's charge of shot is the instrument of his demand upon the covey; but it by no means follows that his demand upon the covey shall be equal to his charges of shot.

It seems to be abundantly clear, that if the manufacturing capitalists, who now demand a profit of, it may be, ten per cent on the capital they advance, and consider it as only a living profit, could be persuaded to advance it for four, their goods would be offered at a less price, and a greater quantity would from time to time be manufactured and sold. And if they could be induced to advance capital with no profit at all, a still greater increase of sales might take place. And it might be greater still if, for argument's sake, it were possible that they should consent to advance capital at four per cent loss.

By conversion of the argument it seems equally clear, that if the capitalists, from any cause whatever, proceed to manufacture at any of the increased rates severally specified above,—the quantity of goods from time to time produced will be such as could only be sold with a profit of four per cent, or with none, or with a loss of four per cent, respectively; and consequently such as it is impossible to sell with a living profit, when the living profit is ten per cent. The progress, therefore, of their attempt to manufacture these increased quantities, must be checked by the accumulation of what it is impossible to sell with a living profit, and the withdrawing of a portion of the producers by bankruptcy.

All that remains to be accounted for, is *why*, in a given state of manufacturing skill, all the manufacturers and shopkeepers in the country

---

truth. There was no question about who had said it, but whether *they* could answer it. The difference of clearness cannot be much, for the sentences into which the argument is compressed are almost the same; as may be seen by comparing the Quarterly Review, No. 50, p. 476, lines 5—16, with the similar passage in the "True Theory of Rent." And as this took place without a knowledge of the existence of the parallel investigation, it is to a certain degree evidence of the accuracy of both.

do not make and sell more than they actually do; as for instance, ten times as much. And here it will be found, that there is an ultimate reference to corn. For if they were to attempt such an increase, they must proceed to create a labouring population approaching to ten times the present number; because when a man is working twelve hours a day already, it is in vain to think of making him work ten times as much. And whether they set about effecting this increase by the shortest road, which would be by the introduction of adult workmen from other countries,—or waited for the slower progress of population at home,—it is clear that they must commence by advancing in the shape of wages the means of obtaining a supply of corn, which, first or last, is to amount to something like ten times the present supply. But since no prices could have the effect of making our agriculturists produce a ten-fold supply, the projectors must, to use a maritime phrase, be *brought up* by the impossibility of furnishing what would procure the corn required to go on. Hence, if they persisted in the attempt to furnish it, they would first discover that their profit was being eaten up in the contest, next that it was nothing, and next that they were continuing the struggle at a ruinous loss. The secret therefore lies in the slowness of the increase of the produce of land, compared with the increase of manufactures which might otherwise be created to tempt the agriculturists withal. It would be easy to double the quantity of goods manufactured, if the offer of them would teach the agriculturists to produce food for two men where they produce for one now, and leave a certain rate of profit for the manufacturing capitalists besides. But as it is imposible for this to take place, there must be a point where the increase of manufactures must stop.

There is then, in any given state of manufacturing skill and of the supply of corn, a certain quantity of all kinds of manufactures which can be produced and sold with a living profit. And if more are produced, they cannot be sold with a living profit; and this is a General Glut*.

* It does not seem to be very clear, whether the supporters of the impossibility of a General Glut intended to include corn under the term commodity, or not. If they did, it is only another form of the fallacy which consists in assuming that all kinds of production are alike.

If corn had been ever so distinctly included, it would still have been untrue that there could be no general glut. For under any imaginable state of the trade in corn, there might arrive a period when the quantity of manufactures and manufacturers would press against the quantity of food; and then the possibility of a general glut would ensue.

The strong peculiarity attending the production of corn and raw produce in general, is, that by the constitution of nature the facility of increasing the production diminishes with the quantity produced, in a way which does not take place in the operations performed on raw produce by manufacturing industry. A certain quantity of the labour of a husbandman produces a quarter of corn; and a certain quantity of the labour of a manufacturer turns a halfpenny-worth of iron ore into a watch-chain of great beauty and value. But there is this remarkable difference between the operations;—that if the labour of two individuals were to be employed in making watch-chains where one was employed before, two watch-chains would be produced instead of one; but if the labour of two individuals were to be employed in producing corn where one was employed before, the result would by no means be the production of two quarters

It is not true that there would be no glut, if there was only less of one kind of manufactures and more of some other. The cause of the glut extends to all kinds, and cannot be remedied by altering their proportions.

All manufacturers, if not restrained by foresight of the consequences, have the power of increasing their individual produce without reference to what can in the aggregate be finally sold with a living profit. They can do it through the operation of one agent, credit; by which is meant the practice of selling goods for the promise of future payment. There is no man of moderate respectability, who could not through this agency double his rate of manufacturing from the present moment till he appeared among the bankrupts in the Gazette, if he chose to take the consequences. Many foresee the consequences and avoid; some do not, and so create a glut. And this tendency to plethora is kept down from time to time by evacuations in the Gazette; which do not however take place with perfect continuity,—any more than a bleeding at the nose is spread over every minute of every hour,—but appear by fits and starts, as circumstances direct the eruption of the process. There appears therefore reason to believe, that the habit of giving credit, which in earlier stages of society may be a useful stimulant, is in more advanced stages a principal agent in producing something like a periodical return of commercial distress.

Agriculturists have also the power of making a mistake in the calculation of the last sum which can be added to the outlay so as to be returned with a living profit; and they doubtless do so occasionally in a certain degree. But the effects of such a mistake are confined to a comparatively inconsiderable sum, and are consequently of insignificant amount; which is the reason why little is ever heard about cultivation being carried to a ruinous extent.

There remains a subject which it is necessary to go through

con volto nè torbido, nè chiaro,

protesting against any inferences from the limitation of the commentary.

'Every body knows the fact, that in the greater number of countries, the population is stationary, or nearly so. But what does this prove, so long as we are not informed by what causes it is prevented from increasing. We know well, that there are two causes by which it may be prevented from increasiug, how great soever its natural

---

instead of one; for the constitution of nature by which the quantity of raw produce increases more slowly than the quantity of labour applied, would intervene.

It is not true therefore, that the difference between agriculture and manufactures, is only that one is the application of industry to one kind of produce, and the other to another. But there is a great and substantial difference arising out of the fact, that manufactures are the application of industry in a direction where the produce varies as the labour applied, and agriculture where it does not.

If the labour of two individuals would produce two quarters of corn where there was one before, as it will produce two watch-chains,—it might be conceded that there could be no General Glut.

tendency to increase. The one is poverty; under which, let the number born be what it may, all but a certain number undergo a premature destruction. The other is prudence; by which either marriages are sparingly contracted, *or care is taken that children, beyond a certain number, shall not be the fruit.*—Mill. p. 50.

'There are two modes in which *artificial means* may be employed to make population and capital keep pace together; *expedients may be sought,* either to *restrain the tendency of population to increase;* or to accelerate beyond its natural pace the increase of capital.'—Id. p. 57.

'The result to be aimed at is, to secure to the great body of the people *all the happiness which is capable of being derived from the matrimonial union, without the evils which a too rapid increase of their numbers involves.* The progress of legislation, the improvement of the education of the people, and *the decay of superstition,* will, in time, it may be hoped, accomplish the difficult task of reconciling these important objects.'—Id. p. 58.

'If we may thus infer, that human happiness cannot be secured by taking forcible methods to make capital increase as fast as population, and if, on the other hand, it is certain, that where births take place, more numerous than are required to uphold a population corresponding to the state of capital, human happiness is impaired, it is immediately seen, *that the grand practical problem is, To find the means of limiting the number of births.*'—Id. p. 65.

'If Mr. Owen means that population should not go on, and if *expedients* can be employed to limit sufficiently the number of births, there is no occasion for these [Mr. Owen's] establishments.'—Id. p. 67.

What is it "the new school of political economy" would be at? And where is it that *superstition,* above all things, interferes with their wishes? It cannot be unfair to allow the writer to explain himself, by extracts from others of his acknowledged works.

'It is perfectly evident, that so long as men are produced in greater numbers than can be fed, there must be excessive misery. What is wanted then is, the means of preventing mankind from increasing so fast; from increasing faster than food can be increased to support them. To the discovery of these means, the resources of the human mind should be intensely applied. This is the foundation of all improvement. In the attainment of this important end, it is abundantly plain that there is nothing impracticable. There is nothing which offers any considerable difficulty, *except the prejudices of mankind.*'—Supplement to the 4th and 5th Editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica.—ART. BANKS FOR SAVINGS, p. 93.

'As the tendency in population to increase faster than food, produces a greater number of individuals than can be fed,—as this is the grand parent of indigence, and the most prolific of all the sources of evil to the labouring portion of mankind, take all possible means for preventing so rapid a multiplication; *and let no mere prejudice, whether religious or political,* restrain your hands in so beneficent and meritorious an undertaking. *It would be easy to offer suggestions on*

this head, if we were not entirely precluded from going into detail. It is abundantly evident, in the mean time, that *indirect* methods can alone avail; the passions to be combated cannot *be* destroyed, *nor, to the production of effects of any considerable magnitude, resisted.* With a little ingenuity, *they may,* however, *be eluded,* and instead of *spending themselves in hurtful,* made *to spend themselves in harmless channels.* This it is the business of *skilful legislation* to effect.'—Id. ART. BEGGAR. p. 246.

'What are the best means of checking the progress of population, when it cannot go on unrestrained without producing one or other of two most undesirable effects,—either drawing an undue proportion of he population to the mere raising of food, or producing poverty and wretchedness, it is not now the place to inquire. It is indeed, the most important practical problem to which the wisdom of the politician and moralist can be applied. It has, till this time, *been miserably evaded* by all those who have meddled with the subject, as well as by all those who were called upon by their situation, to find a remedy for the evils to which it relates. And yet, *if the superstitions of the nursery were discarded,* and the principle of utility kept steadily in view, *a solution might not be very difficult to be found,* and the means of drying up one of the most copious sources of human evil, a source which, if all other sources of evil were taken away, would alone suffice to retain the great mass of human beings in misery, might be seen *to be neither doubtful nor difficult to be applied.*'—Art. COLONY. p. 261.

It may occur to some readers, that abstinence from marriage is the remedy intended. But this is inconsistent with the data; as will be proved by going through the passages marked with italics in the extracts. For "marriages to be sparingly contracted," is one way; but to "take care that children, beyond a certain number, shall not be the fruit," is another. Abstinence from marriage cannot be termed either "artificial means," or "expedients." The plan is to "secure to the great body of the people all the happiness which is capable of being derived from the matrimonial union," though "without the evils which a too rapid increase of their numbers involves;" which is something quite different from abstinence from marriage. What is found to oppose the plan, is "superstition;" and superstition was never understood to be opposed to abstinence from marriage. The evil of improvident marriages has long been known; but nobody ever entered before on the "grand practical problem" of "limiting the number of births" without diminishing marriages, by means of "expedients." The thing is stated to be easy, if it were not for the "prejudices of mankind," religious among others; and religious prejudices never hindered abstinence from marriage. "It would be easy to offer suggestions on this head," but there is something that "precludes from going into detail." There is nothing to prevent the going into detail to the utmost, on the subject of abstinence from marriage. The passions, it is declared, are not proposed to be "resisted;" but they are to be "eluded," and, by

the help of "skilful legislation," made to "spend themselves in harmless channels." Of all the occupations invented for skilful legislators, assuredly that which is here proposed is the oddest. The question, it is affirmed, has hitherto "been miserably evaded;" yet all has been said on abstinence from marriage, that can be said. "If the superstitions of the nursery were discarded," the solution might be found; and assuredly there are no nursery superstitions on the subject of abstinence from marriage.

It would be a painful thing to load any sect or school with a disagreeable misconstruction; but if anything like it should happen in the present case, the aggrieved have a remedy, which is, to explain what it is they *do* mean. Men are not always obliged to prove a negative; but when circumstances of reasonable suspicion have arisen out of their own act, the most innocent persons on earth must either do so, or remain under the imputation. There is no use in pretending not to know, what has been disseminated in full and disgusting detail by the instrumentality of the press. It is submitted, without violence or exaggeration, to the judgment of unprejudiced persons, whether in the absence of explanation, the passages extracted do not necessarily lead to the conclusion, that "the new school of political economy" intended what is alluded to above.

It may appear questionable to some, whether it is right to bring such a subject into notice. The objection would be valid, if the matter was really drawn out of obscurity. But when a theory has been published in Encyclopædias, recommended in octavos, dispersed in detail by the press, and urged, as cannot be doubted, on the acceptance of every new institution for purposes of education, to the extent of what the influence of the propounders can effect,—this objection seems to be gone by, and nothing is left but to examine the theory on the grounds, first, of morality, and secondly, of its adaptation to the attainment of the end proposed. And on the first of these, it may be conceded to the fullest extent, that the question shall stand solely on "the principle of utility," or the effect on the general happiness. What, then, is to be the situation of the women of the lower and middle classes, when in every street political economists go about seeking whom they may devour, under the assurance that they bring with them the "expedients" for evading the ordinary consequences of sexual irregularity? And what will be the purity of the wives and daughters of the higher classes, when in every room the footmen are neighing after the chambermaids, under assurances of like impunity? There is difficulty enough in keeping the passions of mankind in a state of decent repression, with all the existing checks on their irregular exhibition; and what is to be the case when one of the strongest checks, the fear of consequences, is removed. Society may and must struggle, with so much of men's passions as are connected with the great operations of nature and the continuation of the species; but it has long agreed to rid itself of the intolerable nuisance of struggling with any others, by referring them to a class of crimes which it is not usual to describe except by omitting to name.

And next for its adaptation to the end proposed. And here it is

plain, first, that as long as such expedients are not universal in the classes where population is proposed to be repressed, their adoption by one will only make room for the natural use of marriage by another, and consequently the reduction of population will be nothing. Secondly, that the ultimate effect must be the same as that of the permission of infanticide; which is well known to end in increasing the density of population, through men's entering into marriage with some view to the practice while it is at a distance, and shrinking from it afterwards.

To the first of these perhaps it will be objected, that the same reasoning would demonstrate the inutility of *moral restraint*. But there is this wide difference; that moral restraint,—meaning the determination to abstain from even legitimate indulgence, until a certain degree of provision has been made for the support of a family,—is capable of being extended, and actually does extend, in a certain degree, to all the individuals in the classes concerned, or at all events, to so great a proportion of them that the exceptions are insignificant. For all efforts to extend the influence of moral restraint, tend, either by the power of example or otherwise, to produce an effect of some magnitude or other on all the individuals of the community, even the least compliant; or at all events the number of recusants is finally inconsiderable. And it may readily be conceded, that moral restraint *does* only operate, by that portion of it which is finally extended to all the members of the class concerned,—or to so nearly all, that the recusants are unable to prevent the ultimate effect. But widely different from the case of moral restraint, is that of the expedients here supposed. They are incapable of degree; for they must either be employed entirely, or left alone entirely. And they are so revolting in themselves, that it is impossible that their influence can extend to all, or to anything like all; and consequently any effect in diminishing population which may be produced by them in one direction, must be compensated by the invitation held out to it in some other.

It is impossible not to notice the contrast presented by the purity and even elegance, of the author of the great discoveries on the subject of Population. *Virginibus puerisque canto* may, as far as the spirit of the author is concerned, be written on every page of the work of Mr. Malthus; and his illustrations, such as those of "the tree with its branches and foliage," and "the sunny spot in man's whole life where his imagination loves to bask," are the very poetry of science.

Though the instructors of youth are not bound to enter into the actual confutation of every unseemly error that men may fall into, enough has been said to show the importance of bringing the pursuits of political economy within the pale of academical education. When such efforts are made to teach the new *mumpsimus*, the least the universities can do is to teach the old *sumpsimus*. As long as the accredited guardians of learning stand aloof from a branch of science peculiarly adapted for the exercise of cultivated reason, it necessarily falls into the hands of those who have less power to distinguish fallacies, and less caution to avoid them.

POSTSCRIPT.

In 1829 (two or three years after the publication of the First Edition of this) M. Say took up the same ground on "Rent," and may be considered as having decided a doubt which constituted one of the few remaining *opprobria* of political mathematics.

His conclusions are contained in the following Chapter, entitled "On an opinion that has been advanced on the subject of the profits of landed property."

'In the Frst and Third Parts of this work it has been endeavoured to prove, that the exchangeable value of things rises in proportion to the want there is for them in consequence of the actual condition of the society concerned, without in ordinary cases exceeding the expenses of production of each article of produce. It has been shown how these expenses go to indemnify each of the persons concerned in the production, for his share in the effect; and to render these shares more distinctly visible, I have described the operative as producing by the application of his personal powers, the capitalist by the application of his peculiar instrument which is his capital, and the landed proprietor by the application of his, which is his right of property in a piece of land. And on coming to the estimation of the portion of the final results due to each of these several kinds of producers, it has been made by taking the quantity of recompense which each of them succeeds in making the others pay him out of the final result; for it seems very fair to conclude, that the value of the assistance which he clubs, is measureable by the expense which other men voluntarily go to, to procure it.'

'Such is, on the subject of this Chapter, the doctrine professed in the course of this work. It flows directly from that of Adam Smith, and is the only one, as far as I can see, that leads to applicable and practical results.'

'Some English writers, following the steps of David Ricardo, an author whose services and talents it would nevertheless be wrong to overlook, have thought that Smith had not assigned the true causes of rent; that he had not found the laws which determine its amount, and did not know in what manner it is affected by the progress of society. I shall dwell a little on their doctrine on this point; but considering it as I do, as a mere abstract opinion which does not explain practical facts and consequently is of no use, I shall confine myself to tracing the principal arguments on which it is supported, and shall take them from the Notes which Mr M^cCulloch has added to the last edition of Adam Smith, in which I apprehend they are presented in their most compressed form.'

'Mr. M^cCulloch thinks that the inequality of the expense of production attendant on the produce of different soils *is the principal cause and the measure of rent.* He grounds his argument on the bad soil costing more for cultivation than the good, and on the necessity there is for cultivating the bad, to obtain the quantity of produce, as for instance corn, which the society is in want of.'

'In the first place, it does not seem very easy to tell, how a differ-

ence can be a real and effective cause. And in the next, who is there that does not see, that the products of agriculture have in this respect nothing that is not common to all other kinds of produce; and that in fact there is no product of human industry that, with relation to its cost of production, is not in precisely the same situation? The products of foreign commerce cost more, when they come from a greater distance; but is that the reason why more is gained upon those which have not so far to go? If the producers who are next at hand are not sufficient to supply the wants of the public, the price of the produce in request rises, and so becomes sufficient to pay the expense of bringing to market that which has to come from a greater distance. When an individual manufacturer happens to have some particular advantage, as for instance a favourable local situation, he gains more than those who are obliged to go to greater expense to fit their goods for market. Everything depends on the strength of the demand. It is so plain that this is the cause which carries the price of wheat to what it is, that Mr. M'Culloch himself says in express words, that *the value of corn has a tendency to rise with the* INCREASED DEMAND *occasioned by an increase of population.* [Vol. iv. p. 105.]'

'Is not this conceding, that the price which furnishes a rent to the land-owner arises from the strength of the demand? Is it not agreeing with what is laid down in Adam Smith and the other parts of the present work? What new discovery is there in it at all? Can it be reasonably said, that the bad soils in a parish are the reason why the good ones give a profit? And is there any ground for announcing on the strength of this, that a discovery has been made of the real reason why land pays a rent, fee, or profit to the land-proprietor?'

'David Ricardo concedes in like manner, that it is the increase of the population, or in other words of the sum total of the public wants, which raises the price of corn to the height that makes it worth the farmer's while to agree to pay a rent*. His conclusion from this is, that "Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because corn is high." The case is the same with all products, of whatever kind. At the price to which the wants of the public raise a yard of cloth, this particular product has a value sufficient for indemnifying all concerned in the production. They are not paid from any necessity there is for paying the expenses of the previous production; for these expenses would not of themselves give any value to the product, if it had not an intrinsic use which caused it to be an object of desire.'

"No reduction," proceeds Ricardo, "would take place in the price of corn, although landlords should forego the whole of their rent." There is no doubt of this being true; because it is the strength of the demand which is the primary cause of value, and the abandonment of rents by the proprietors would have no effect upon the strength of the demand.'

'Ricardo tries to prove, in opposition to Smith, that rent is not a constituent part of the price of goods; but what he says does not prove it at all. If out of a quarter of corn at forty shillings six shillings go to the land-proprietor, the six shillings would still be included

* Principles of Political Economy, ch. ii.

in the price, even though the six shillings were paid to somebody else in consequence of the land-proprietor's refusing to receive them.'

'Besides this, Adam Smith had said long before David Ricardo, that *high or low rent is the effect of high or low price, and not the cause* [Book i. ch. 11.] 'It is true that he says at the same time, that the case is different with the recompense of labour and stock; which he says are the cause of the price, and not the consequence. My own opinion is, that in this last part, Smith himself is in the wrong; the wants of the public, exactly as in the case of corn, are what are the cause of the price of products of whatever kind, and what enable a speculator to pay the recompense of the labour and the stock, and sometimes a share for the monopoly besides, when the monopoly is an essential part of the production, as is the case with the produce of the soil.'

'Mr. McCulloch thinks that the principle on which he accounts for rent, is different from that which gives rise to the advantage of a monopoly; he admits that the owner of the land which produces Tokay has a monopoly; and he admits that his advantage is limited only by the price to which the demand for Tokay makes the produce rise. It is very hard to discover any difference between the monopoly possessed by the proprietor of a corn-field, and the proprietor of the vineyard that produces Tokay, except that the last has much the smallest number of competitors. Whenever the proprietor is in condition to appropriate to himself the gain which arises from the employment of the land, he exercises a species of monopoly. When he can get nothing from his property beyond the wages of his own labour and the interest of his stock employed upon the land, his monopoly gives him nothing, and it is the consumer that has the benefit of the productive power of the soil.'

'The same author, aware probably of the odd effect of putting forward the bad soils as the cause of a profit being given by the good, affects to treat the objection to it as 'a petty cavil,' and produces the same idea again under a different formula. Out of the whole of the capital employed in raising corn, there is one portion, he says, which yields no rent to the proprietor of the land [Vol. iv. p. 113], and this is what is the true foundation of the existence of rent. But this new formula is liable to the same objection as the other. Is it possible, that the *absence* of a profit in one case, can be a *cause* of profit in another?'

'It is but justice to Mr. Malthus to say, that he has seen into the weakness of this doctrine on rent, and has authenticated his opinion in a reply to a question before parliament. On being asked whether the bringing of new land into cultivation would not have the effect of raising the rents of the old, he replied; "The cultivating of poor lands is not the cause of the rise of rents; the rise of the price of produce compared with the costs of production, *which is the cause* of the rise of rents, takes place first, and then such rise induces the cultivation of the poorer land. That is the doctrine I originally stated, and I believe it to be true; it was altered by others afterwards*."

'What has been said appears enough to justify my opinion on the so called theory of rent, which has introduced no new truth into the

* Third Report on Emigration from the United Kingdom, p. 321.

science of political economy, and explains no fact that is not explained more naturally by the truths that had been previously established. I shall not go into any further discussions on the subject, that I may not run further risk of incurring the reproach made against those which have hitherto taken place upon it, of being prodigiously tiresome, and disgusting numbers with a study which is otherwise so attractive by its application to, and influence on, the lot of human kind. Who can calculate, for example, the immense consequences of that one principle so clearly established since the time of Adam Smith, and now adopted by all competent judges of the subject, that every nation and every individual has a distinct interest in the prosperity of all the rest, and that jealousies are only the result of ignorance? or how much good is destined to arise out of the demonstration, that a fall in the value of produce is tantamount to a positive augmentation of national wealth?'—*Say*, Vol. iv. ch. 20.

Here is a great step gained, or more properly two great steps; First that irresistible light is thrown on the nature of *monopoly produce;* Secondly, that there is shown to be nothing in this kind of production that is confined to particular articles, but all kinds of production are capable of taking place, and actually do in various instances take place, under circumstances of monopoly. It is two great New-Found-Lands, charted and laid down.

END OF "TRUE THEORY OF RENT."



If Noah had shut himself up in his ark, and let his family eat nothing but what could be grown upon his decks, he would soon have had an outcry against population, and an Emigration Committee; and Shem, Ham, and Japhet would have been 'distressed manufacturers.' It can make no difference except in the size of the experiment, whether men are confined to the corn of an ark or of an island.—*Catechism on the Corn Laws.*

CATECHISM

ON THE

CORN LAWS.

TWENTIETH EDITION.

(*First Edition published by* RIDGWAY, 22 *February* 1827.)

BY A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

"He would recommend him to buy a little Catechism which had been published on the Corn Laws, which would enable him to answer all the fallacies of the noble Peers opposite to him."—*Morning Chronicle. Report of* LORD KING'S *Speech; March* 2, 1827.

☞ *The Catechism on the Corn Laws having been reduced to its present price by the abandonment of all profit and the sacrifice of the expense of setting up the press, it is requested that persons pleased with its contents will buy one additional copy and give away, giving the preference to individuals possessed of the elective franchise.*

LONDON:

Published by EFFINGHAM WILSON, 18 Bishopsgate Street.

Price Sixpence.

PREFACE.

In a book of a few pages under the title of "The True Theory of Rent," an endeavour was made to demonstrate, that the cause of rent is nothing but what was long ago pointed out by Adam Smith, namely, the limited quantity of the land in comparison with the competitors for its produce.

The object of the present continuation is to trace the nature and consequences of the Corn Laws, as derivable from the true, or Adam Smith's, theory of rent; and to form a book of reference, for the solution of the fallacies advanced in their support.

By individuals conversant with the operations of the periodical press, most of the fallacies will be referred without difficulty to their authors, and will be found to have been copied without even verbal alteration. It would have presented a remarkable collection of men of different parties, orders, and political professions, if the name of every author had been attached to what is his own.

The Article on "Agriculture and Rent" in the Quarterly Review for October 1827, and the Articles on "The Corn Laws" and the "Emigration Report" in that for March 1828, have been distinctly referred to; because they may be considered as the latest manifestoes of the agriculturists, and in some degree a measure of their argumentative strength.

As neither the "True Theory of Rent" nor the present pamphlet was published with a view to profit, if any person should think it worth while to reprint either, he is at liberty to do so.

The necessity for extending an acquaintance with the points at issue, is established by the fact, that with one or two splendid exceptions, no public man has approached the question, without holding out some part of the truth and realty of the case as a conciliatory offering to the guardians of the wrong. It is not in this manner that extensive public mischiefs have been removed in other instances. If the Slave Trade, for example, had been so dealt with, it would have been an opprobrium to the national justice to the present hour. The precedent is not a bad one, in its application to the means of abatement; and the subjects altogether, have more traces of resemblance than might be supposed. A patient perseverance in keeping the question before the eyes of the community,—a moderate but firm protest against any palliative being accepted in lieu of removal,—an absolute disavowal of participation in any engagement to consider the subject as at rest,—a cheerful confidence that a wrong known is virtually a wrong deceased, however circumstances may retard the moment of its dissolution,—a rational degree of co-operation and mutual encouragement,—and a pledge for the unceasing employment of all legitimate methods to procure the mitigation and final Abolition of the evil,—were the instruments which effected the termination of one great scene of injustice and impolicy, and will in the end secure the same conclusion to the other.

Under the actual circumstances of the case, the motto of the Abolitionists should evidently be, "*Anything in point of gradual extinction: nothing in point of principle.*" Patience is a virtue; but not that patience, which accepts the dereliction of one portion of a wrong, as compensation for the eternity of the remainder.

T. PERRONET THOMPSON,
Queen's Coll. Cambridge.

CATECHISM ON THE CORN LAWS.

First Part, or Introduction.

"LET the case be supposed of a small number of settlers taking pos-
"session of a large and fertile island; and let the soil be so good, and
"their habits of agricultural energy so limited, that a slight scratching
"of the ground and throwing in the seed shall be all the cultivation they
"at first think of bestowing, as for ages together has been a picture of
"the agriculture of many tropical countries. If the land was unap-
"propriated, and every man might occupy at will, it is plain that in the
"commencement no man would pay another any rent, either for leave
"to cultivate, or for the grass, wood, &c. which might be the spontaneous
"produce. Or if instead of the land being entirely unappropriated,
"the right of property in it was vested in a number of owners, but who
"were without the means of bringing the land into immediate cultivation,
"it would be equally plain that the competition among these owners
"would in the commencement reduce the rent which any of them could
"obtain, to the lowest possible magnitude, which is in fact no magnitude
"at all. In such an establishment, the degree of each man's wealth,
"supposing him to possess the brief capital required for setting his in-
"dustry in motion, would be in proportion to the exertions of himself
"or of his family. He that by his activity could raise or collect much
"corn, fruit, sheep, furs, or whatever else were the objects of industry
"within his reach, would be comparatively rich. Such manufactures
"as he stood in need of, he must obtain either by the uneconomical pro-
"cess of employing part of his own labour or that of his dependents in
"their production, or by paying for them with part of his agricultural
"produce to such artisans as in the progress of the division of labour
"would make their appearance. But as he would have no alternative
"but either to pay the artisans their price, or have recourse to the un-
"economical and wasteful method of manufacturing the articles him-
"self, the recompense of these artisans would in the commencement be
"exceedingly liberal, and their lives easy. They would be a compa-
"ratively idle and insolent race, working when they pleased, and almost
"for what they pleased; as artisans are always described to be in newly
"peopled agricultural countries. But when population and cultivation
"had increased so as to begin to press against the limits of the soil con-
"tained in the whole island, and there was no longer new land to be
"had for asking, a very different scene would begin to arise. All
"the population which was not employed in agricultural labour, or
"supported without labour upon some kind of previous accumulation,
"must apply itself to manufacturing industry. And as the number of
"persons so employed increased, a competition would arise among them
"for the products of agriculture upon which they must live; and this
"competition would oblige them to give a greater portion of the results

"of their own labour, in return for a smaller and less luxurious quan-
"tity of agricultural produce than they had been accustomed to receive.
"It is true that the land must finally find food for all that live on it, as
"the vineyard finds wine for all that finally drink Tokay; but it does
"not therefore follow, that many of those who live on it may not, when
"their numbers have increased, live much less abundantly than they
"used to do, and give a much greater quantity of the results of their
"own labour in return for a given quantity of the produce. It is proved
"by the experience of all countries, that moderately good land is
"capable of producing food for many times the number of hands re-
"quired for its cultivation; so that all these numbers may be called
"into being, to assist in the demand. Hence if the exchange of com-
"modities was conducted by the intervention of a circulating medium,
"the money price of agricultural produce must rise in comparison with
"the money prices of other commodities. Whether this comparative
"rise would take place by an alteration in the money price of corn,
"or by an alteration in the money prices of other commodities, or by
"both these processes at once, would depend on the manner and degree
"in which the community had the opportunity of supplying itself with
"the metals employed in coins, or on other circumstances connected with
"the principles of Currency. But in whatever manner it took place,
"its effects would be virtually the same; so that it is sufficient to con-
"sider the case where the whole alteration is supposed to take place in
"the money price of agricultural produce. The land-owners, then,
"would begin to get rich, through the simple fact of their being the
"land-owners, and there being no more land to own. If it should be
"found some day that a contiguous island had sprung up of the same
"nature as the first, their prospect of increased wealth would drop at
"once; and everything would go on as it did at the commencement,
"till the new island had been cultivated and peopled like the other. But
"if this does not happen, the lucky land-owners will incontinently begin
"to swell into men of landed wealth. If they keep their land in their
"own hands, they will rise into what are termed gentlemen-farmers, or
"men who unite in their own persons the characters of landlord and cul-
"tivator. But as soon as what they obtain by the sale of their produce is
"sufficiently greater than the amount for which they can hire one of their
"less fortunate neighbours, who is heir to his own industry and no land
"beside, the greater part of them will hire a farming-man or overseer with
"part of the produce, and sit down in the enjoyment of the *otium cum*
"*dignitate* of landed gentlemen with the remainder. And from this step of
"the farming-man, they will soon proceed to the further one, of finding a
"farming-man who will advance his own capital, making an adequate
"deduction out of the produce in return,—or in other words, a farmer
"or tenant. The reason of this further step will be, their desire to get
"more completely rid of the trouble of superintending the employment
"of the capital; for a tenant has his own interest at stake in watching
"it with the utmost exactness, while a farming-man, having no such
"interest, must still be superintended in a considerable degree. And all
"the *residuum* left after delivering to the tenant the portion of the pro-

"ceeds which the competition among individuals of his class obliges "him to accept, will be rent. And what the tenant will be obliged to "accept, will be such a part of the price of the produce, as will return "him the capital he must lay out, with the lowest rate of profit for "which men under the existing habits of the society will consent to lay "out farming capital and superintend its employment. But of the "existence of this residuum, the primary cause is manifestly the in-"creased price of corn. As it has been accurately expressed by Mr. "Ricardo, 'Rent will be paid because corn sells high; and not corn "sell high because rent is paid *.'"

"If it should be objected, that a rise in the money price of corn must "create a rise in the money prices of other commodities,—the answer "is, that this is as far from following, as that a rise in the price of corn "must create a rise in wages, at a time when the fact avowedly is, that the "increase of competition among the labourers is such as to oblige them to "accept a diminished recompense. The cases are in reality alike."

"In all this there is no occasion for a word about different qualities "of land or doses of capital. The simple case is what is to be settled "first; and then the accidents are to be taken into the account, till the "whole is brought to the case presented in nature. This is the way "men proceed to reason in other instances; and must needs be the way "in this. To say that the simple case is not the practical one, would "be the argument of a man who had never contemplated such a pro-"cess as analysis. All complex cases are solved by dividing them into "simple ones; and almost all the cases of nature are complex."

"If it *happens* that in the supposed island there are lands of every "variety of downward quality, then as population, competition for "food, and prices increase, men will be enabled and induced to take "lower and lower qualities of land successively into cultivation, stop-"ping always at the quality where the produce will do no more than repay "the expenses with the lowest profit for which they will consent to lay "out capital and superintend its employment. At the same time the "value of the produce on all the superior lands will increase; and since "all the difference between the actual proceeds and what allows that "lowest profit, will be taken for rent at the first moment when the land-"owner is able to avail himself of the competition which is in his favour, "the rent, on all the qualities of land above the lowest, will increase "also. The quantum of inferiority with which new lands can be "brought into cultivation, will be determined by the rise in the price "of produce, which is what makes their cultivation practicable. The "increased quantity of produce brought into existence by the culti-"vation of this new land, will create a certain degree of reaction upon "the price of produce, and consequently upon the quantity of new land "finally brought into cultivation; but a reaction of this kind can never "go the whole length of reducing the price to its original magnitude. "For if it reduced it to this point, the quantity of cultivated land and

* 'Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, by David Ricardo, Esq.; p. 62."

"of produce would be reduced to their original magnitude also. But a "reaction cannot be created by an increase of produce which is nothing. "Hence if there is to be any reaction at all, there must be some increase "of produce to make it, and some increase of price to cause that in- "crease of produce. The price therefore must finally be raised, in "spite of the reaction. And it will not only be raised, but—since the "magnitude of the reaction altogether must depend on the magnitude "of the increase of produce compared with the magnitude of the whole "produce that existed before,—in all the cases which occur in practice, "the effect of the reaction will be comparatively small. But in all this, "*it is the rise in the price of produce,* (of which a rise in rent is a necessary "concomitant,) *that enables and causes inferior land to be brought into "cultivation; and not the cultivation of inferior land that causes the rise "of rent.* It is surprising that the author formerly quoted should have "discerned so accurately the fallacy of supposing that corn sells high "because rent is paid, instead of that rent is paid because corn sells "high,—and should not have observed the kindred fallacy contained in "the parts of the quotations which were given in italics above.'

"In the same manner, if it *happens* that the supposed cultivators pos- "sess sufficient habits of observation to discover methods of obtaining a "greater crop by means of a greater outlay and greater exertions, every "increase of price will enable and encourage them to make successive "improvements in their mode of cultivating any given portion of soil. "The operation of an increase in the price of produce in causing a greater "outlay to be made upon the land, and the mode in which the proceeds "will be divided between the landlord and the tenant, may easily be "traced. Let the case be supposed of a land-owner who unites the cha- "racters of landlord and cultivator; and let the lowest rate of profit "for which he and other cultivators are willing to advance capital and "superintend its employment, be ten per cent per annum*. And let "the amount of what he annually lays out on the land be 1000*l.* and "the final value of the produce 1200*l.* Now the reason why this cul- "tivator does not lay out annually on the land a *greater* sum than "1000*l.*, as for instance 1010*l.*,—is because he knows, either by actual "experiment or by that tact which enables him to do without it, that "the final value of the whole produce would be increased by less than "11*l.*, which is the lowest return for which he is willing to advance the "additional 10*l.*! And if he was to add a second 10*l.*, he knows, it may "be, that it would be returned with no profit at all; and that to add "a third would cause him a loss; so that no man in his senses would "do either. The reason why he does not lay out a *smaller* sum than "1000*l.*, as for instance 990*l.*,—is because he knows that the final value

* "This lowest rate of profit must always be something; for nobody will "incur the risk and trouble of employing capital for nothing. And in countries "where a certain rate of interest can be had from safe borrowers, consisting "either of private persons or the government, this fact is at once a proof that "in those countries men in general do not employ capital without a profit "greater than such interest, and a reason why no individual of ordinary under- "standing will ever designedly do so. For sooner than do so, individuals would "lend their money or buy stock, and receive the returns without risk or trouble.

" of the produce would be diminished by more than 11*l.*, and that con-
" sequently he should lose an opportunity of employing 10*l.* with what
" he considers as a fair profit. And for the same reasons that this cul-
" tivator will lay out exactly 1000*l.* upon the land, any other man
" desirous of laying out agricultural capital for a profit of ten per cent
" per annum will agree to do the same. The land-owner therefore may,
" if he pleases, find a man who will engage to lay out 1000*l.* per annum
" on the land on condition of receiving 1100*l.* out of the proceeds,—or in
" other words pay 100*l.* out of the produce as rent. If he was to offer
" it for a less rent than this, the farmer would only put the difference
" into his pocket and not increase the outlay on the land. If he was
" to demand a greater rent, he could not get it; because it would not
" leave the cultivator the rate of profit which, by the supposition, is the
" lowest for which cultivators will advance capital and superintend its
" employment,—or in other words, because the farmer could not live.
" Hence if the land-owner continues to keep the land in his own hands,
" he may with propriety consider 100*l.* per annum as what he makes by
" being his own farmer, and 100*l.* per annum as what he receives by
" virtue of his good fortune in being landlord. Or the annual gain of
" 200*l.* may be considered as dividing itself into two parts, of which
" 100*l.* is of the nature of profits of stock, and 100*l.* of the nature of
" rent. To find now the effects of an increase in the price of produce,
" let it be supposed that the annual produce of the land is 600 quar-
" ters, corn being at 40*s.* per quarter; and that the addition of 10*l.* to
" the present annual outlay of 1000*l.*, instead of effecting an increase of
" five quarters and a half in the annual produce, which is what would
" be required in order to bring in 11*l.*, will only effect an increase of
" five quarters. In this case it is evident that an increase in the price
" of corn of four shillings per quarter, would cause the five quarters to
" fetch 11*l.*, and make it worth while for the cultivator to add the 10*l.*
" to the outlay; and it would be added accordingly. But at the same
" time that the annual produce of the estate was thus increased by five
" quarters, and the part of the final gain which resolves itself into the
" profits of stock was increased from 100*l.* to 101*l.*,—the price of the
" other 600 quarters would be increased by 120*l.*, which would be
" rent, and make the whole rent 220*l.* And if the addition of a
" second 10*l.* to the annual outlay would produce four more quarters,
" then to make it worth while to add this second 10*l.* to the outlay, the
" price of four quarters must rise to 11*l.*, or the quarter to 55*s.*; which
" would increase the portion that resolves itself into profits of stock to
" 102*l.*, and make the rent rise again by 332*l.* 15*s.*, or the whole rent
" be 552*l.* 15*s.* It is true that while all this was going on, a certain degree
" of reaction would from time to time take place on the price of corn,
" in consequence of the increase of produce created by the operations
" of this and other cultivators. But, as was shown before, the reaction
" cannot go the length of restoring the price of corn to what it was ori-
" ginally; and when it is said that corn rises by four shillings or any
" other sum, this includes all reactions, and consequently no correction
" for reaction is required. And the sums thus stated to be of the nature

" of rent, are what the land-owner, if he chuses to let his land, would in " the long run be able to obtain in the several circumstances described. " If the landlord mismanages his own affairs,—if he hampers him- " self with leases which prevent him from taking a fair advantage " from time to time of the competition among farmers,—or if he " finds it impracticable in the nature of things, to regulate a contract " of the description concerned, with incessant and inviolable accuracy, " —these are not the defects of the theory, but of the execution. This " distinction is of the greater importance, because many of the difficul- " ties which arise on the subject of rent, proceed from confounding the " irregularities in its receipt which spring out of the absence of an in- " cessantly active system of operation on each other on the parts of the " landlord and tenant, with the amount which will be received in the " long run and upon the whole, and to which all the contracts between " landlord and tenant will tend as to a mean."

" It may be collected, therefore, that the effect of every successive " increase of price will be, in the first place, to make rent rise every- " where by the amount of the increase of price upon the previous pro- " duce, as fast as the landlords have the opportunity of adjusting their " agreements with their tenants. And in the next place, the effect will " be to bring a certain belt of new land into cultivation, *provided there* " *happens to exist* land so circumstanced in point of quality, as to be " capable of being brought into cultivation with a profit by the supposed " increase of price; and to cause a certain augmentation of outlay on all " the other lands in cultivation, *provided the cultivators are acquainted* " with the method of forcing a greater crop by a greater outlay. And " the consequences of these two operations, *if they take place*, will be a " certain increase of produce, and a certain reaction on the price of pro- " duce in the way of keeping it down, which must however fall far short " of keeping it down to its original state. In the same manner every " successive diminution of price will cause all the contrary results. " The most marked consequence will be to make rent fall everywhere " by the amount of the decrease of price upon the final produce; which " will take place as fast as the tenants have the opportunity of adjust- " ing their agreements with the landlords. And besides this, a certain " belt of land will be thrown out of cultivation, and a certain diminu- " tion of outlay be made on other lands; *under the provisoes stated in* " *the other case.* And the consequence of these two operations, if they " take place, will be a certain diminution of produce and a certain re- " action on the price of produce in the way of keeping it up, which " must however fall far short of keeping it up to its original height*."

What has preceded shows, that the rent of any object, either from year to year or for any other period which includes a fair average portion of the production, *is the difference between the living cost price of the produce during such period,*—(by *living cost price* being meant the price necessary to pay for the cost of production with a living profit to the producer),—*and the price for which the produce can be sold in consequence of the whole*

* " True Theory of Rent."

quantity in the market being less than there would be a demand for at the living cost price. The application of this to land, mines, and other objects where the produce is periodical, needs no explanation. In the case of the ground-rent of houses, the house is the produce, and the builder is in the situation of the cultivator or capitalist. Hence the sum for which the house can be built with a living profit, must be turned into the shape of an annuity for the number of years the house is calculated to last, at the existing market rate of annuities; to which must be added the annual repairs with a living profit. The difference between this and what in consequence of the situation of the house can be annually obtained by letting it, will be the annual ground-rent.

The difference which constitutes rent, may arise from natural or from artificial causes. The ways in which it may arise naturally to a certain extent, have in part been described already. The way in which it may be caused artificially, will be best illustrated by returning to the case of the island.

If, after the population of the supposed island had begun to press against the limits of the soil, a contiguous island should spring up of the same nature as the first, the prospect of increased wealth to the land-owners of the first would drop at once. One way only there would be, by which they could keep up the amount of prices and of rents;—for the rent is no other than the superfluity of price, or that part of it which is not necessary to pay for the production with a living profit. One way only there would be; and that is, to prevent the use of the produce of the neighbouring island, or in other words, enact corn laws. Of which laws, the effects are next to be traced.

If the island first cultivated had been the Isle of Wight, and the contiguous land the rest of the United Empire, it is clear that if the original land-owners had the power effectually to decree, that no food should be consumed but what was the produce of the Isle of Wight,—that though their descendants might wander into the wilds of Hampshire or the deserts of Middlesex, it should be against law for them to eat a fragment of agricultural produce except what had been grown within the licensed territory,—the consequence must have been, that the population, wealth, and power of the United Empire, must for ever have been confined to something bearing a near resemblance to the population, wealth, and power of the Isle of Wight.

If the land-owners should be disposed to deny this conclusion, they would be answered as regards the question of population, by showing that the food produced in the Isle of Wight, even though for argument's sake it could be extended by the cultivation of every nook and crevice to two, three, or four times its present amount, would only be a small portion of the quantity required for the present population of the empire. And as regards the question of wealth, they would be answered, by showing that the quantity of commodities which can possibly be manufactured and sold with a living profit to the producers, must in all cases have an ultimate reference to the quantity and price of food.

"It seems to be abundantly clear, that if the manufacturing capi-

" talists, who now demand a profit of, it may be, ten per cent on the " capital they advance, and consider it as only a living profit, could be " persuaded to advance it for four, their goods would be offered at a less " price, and a greater quantity would from time to time be manufac- " tured and sold. And if they could be induced to advance capital " with no profit at all, a still greater increase of sales might take place. " And it might be greater still if, for argument's sake, it were possible " that they should consent to advance capital at four per cent loss."

" By the converse of the argument it seems equally clear, that if the " capitalists, from any cause whatever, proceed to manufacture at any " of the increased rates severally specified above,—the quantity of goods " from time to time produced will be such as could only be sold with " a profit of four per cent, or with none, or with a loss of four per cent " respectively; and consequently such as it is impossible to sell with a " living profit, when the living profit is ten per cent. The progress, " therefore, of their attempt to manufacture these increased quantities, " must be checked by the accumulation of what it is impossible to sell " with a living profit, and the withdrawing of a portion of the producers " by bankruptcy."

" All that remains to be accounted for, is *why*, in a given state of " manufacturing skill, all the manufacturers and shopkeepers in the " country do not make and sell more than they actually do; as, for in- " stance, ten times as much. And here it will be found, that there is " an ultimate reference to corn. For if they were to attempt such an " increase, they must proceed to create a labouring population ap- " proaching to ten times the present number; because when a man is " working twelve hours a-day already, it is in vain to think of making " him work ten times as much. And whether they set about effecting " this increase by the shortest road, which would be by the introduction " of adult workmen from other countries,—or waited for the slower " progress of population at home,—it is clear that they must commence " by advancing in the shape of wages the means of obtaining a supply " of corn, which, first or last, is to amount to something like ten times " the present supply. But since no prices could have the effect of " making our agriculturists produce a tenfold supply, the proprietors " must, to use a maritime phrase, be *brought up* by the impossibility of " furnishing what would procure the corn required to go on. Hence " if they persisted in the attempt to furnish it, they would first " discover that their profit was being eaten up in the contest, next that " it was nothing, and next that they were continuing the struggle at a " ruinous loss. The secret therefore lies in the slowness of the increase " of the produce of land, compared with the increase of manufactures " which might otherwise be created to tempt the agriculturists withal. " It would be easy to double the quantity of goods manufactured, if " the offer of them would teach the agriculturists to produce food for " two men where they produce for one now, and leave a certain rate of " profit for the manufacturing capitalists besides. But as it is impos- " sible for this to take place, there must be a point where the increase " of manufactures must stop."

"There is then, in any given state of manufacturing skill and of the "supply of corn, a certain quantity of all kinds of manufactures which "can be produced and sold with a living profit. And if more are "produced, they cannot be sold with a living profit; and this is a "General Glut*."

The magnified case here given, shows by what precise process it is, that the limitation of the food of the United Empire to the produce of the Isle of Wight, would curtail in a corresponding degree the amount of British manufactures. That the amount must in some way or other be curtailed, is clear; because the food would be forbidden to exist, on which the manufacturers of the present quantity could live.

But if the population, food, and manufactures, would be reduced to something like those of the Isle of Wight, the power and wealth of the United Empire would be reduced in the same degree. For they can only be composed of some or other of these elements.

If the land-owners of the Isle of Wight should attempt to set up the increase of their rents from the supposed prohibition, as a national gain, and one that ought to be encouraged;—they would be answered by showing, that all that they could gain must be taken from somebody else in the price of food, which could make no national gain; and that the further result was to reduce the wealth and power of the United Empire to something like those of the Isle of Wight.

---

* "It does not seem to be very clear, whether the supporters of the impossi- "bility of a General Glut intended to include corn under the term commodity "or not. If they did, it is only another form of the fallacy which consists in "assuming that all kinds of production are alike."

"If corn had been even so distinctly included, it would still have been untrue "that there could be no general glut. For under any imaginable state of the "trade in corn, there might arrive a period when the quantity of manufactures "and manufacturers would press against the quantity of food; and then the "possibility of a general glut would ensue."

"The strong peculiarity attending the production of corn and raw produce in "general, is, that by the constitution of nature the facility of increasing the "production diminishes with the quantity produced, in a way which does not "take place in the operations performed on raw produce by manufacturing in- "dustry. A certain quantity of the labour of a husbandman produces a quarter "of corn; and a certain quantity of the labour of the manufacturer turns a half- "penny-worth of iron ore into a watch-chain of great beauty and value. But "there is this remarkable difference between the operations;—that if the "labour of two individuals were to be employed in making watch-chains where "one was employed before, two watch-chains would be produced instead of "one; but if the labour of two individuals were to be employed in producing "corn where one was employed before, the result would by no means be the "production of two quarters instead of one; for the constitution of nature by "which the quantity of raw produce increases more slowly than the quantity of "labour applied, would intervene."

"It is not true therefore, that the difference between agriculture and manu- "factures, is only that one is the application of industry to one kind of produce "and the other to another. But there is a great and substantial difference "arising out of the fact, that manufactures are the application of industry in a "direction where the produce varies as the labour applied, and agriculture where "it does not."

"If the labour of two individuals would produce two quarters of corn where "there was one before, as it will produce two watch-chains,—it might be con- "ceded that there could be no General Glut."—*True Theory of Rent.*

If they should attempt to represent the diminution of their rents by the admission of any food but what was produced in the Isle of Wight, as an injury done to themselves; they would be told, that since all they were to gain must be taken from somebody else, with the destruction of the general interests of the community besides, the policy of preventing such a mode of gain to individuals stood to a certain degree on the same grounds as the policy of preventing the industry of highwaymen.

If the land-owners should call the encouragement given to the cultivation of every nook and crevice in the Isle of Wight, by the name of the encouragement of agriculture;—they would be told, that the use of agriculture is to have corn, and that the limitation of the corn of the United Empire to that of the Isle of Wight, is not an invention to have corn, but *not to have* it.

If they should call the prevention of the cultivation of these nooks and crevices by the name of an injury to agriculture, and threaten the community with famine from the loss;—they would be told, that if the growth of corn is diminished in the Isle of Wight, it can only be because more and cheaper corn is procured elsewhere, which is not a cause of famine, but the contrary.

If the land-owners of the Isle of Wight should represent that they were great payers of taxes, and that if their gains were reduced it would be impossible they should pay the same taxes as before;—the minister, if there was one, would tell them, that the taxes which could possibly be levied from *them*, could only be part of what they were to receive from somebody else in the extra price of food, and could therefore just as well be levied from those other persons instead; and that besides this, there would be an accession of all the revenue, which would arise from the wealth and power of the United Empire being no longer limited to what could be supported on the food produced in the Isle of Wight.

If the bankers, if such there were, the monied men, the ship-owners, the lawyers, the professional men of all kinds, the expectants in every line, and the classes who in some way or other live through the expenditure of the public revenue, should be invited to become parties to such a representation of the land-owners;—they would consider whether their respective interests would be advanced by keeping down the wealth and power of the United Empire to those of the Isle of Wight, and whether there was any reason why they should promote a general injustice against their own interests. Or at all events they would be simpletons if they did not.

If there were occasion for putting the unreasonableness of such an invitation in a stronger light, it would be by supposing, that the land-owners of the Isle of Wight were at this moment found praying that the food, manufactures, wealth, and power of the United Empire might be cut down to what could be raised upon the cultivation of the Isle of Wight, and the increased taxes paid by the land-owners of the Isle of Wight accepted in return; and that the bankers, the monied men, the

ship-owners, the lawyers, the professional men, the expectants, and the public servants, were invited to concur.

Exactly the same kind of effects would be produced, if instead of Hampshire or Middlesex, the corn was to come from France or from Poland. In one case as in the other, the food consumed or consumable in the United Empire, would be curtailed by the quantity finally kept out; and the population, wealth, and power, would be curtailed in the degree and manner which have been shown to be the consequence.

It is true that in this case the additional supply of food would not be raised by the exertions of British agriculturists, but by the exertions of British manufacturers and merchants, acting upon the necessities of Frenchmen or of Poles. The prayer, therefore, of the agriculturists would amount to requesting, that nobody might make national wealth but themselves, or further than they were to have a profit from it. And the way to put the reasonableness of this prayer in a proper light, is to suppose, that the manufacturers, the merchants, and the ship-owners, were found praying that the eating of any British corn might be prohibited by law, in order that they the manufacturers, merchants, and ship-owners, might have the benefit of importing all from abroad.

If the agriculturists should represent this clashing between the interests of the agriculturists and the other classes, as an abstruse and puzzling matter, in which it required great political knowledge to determine the point where the two interests should rest;—the answer would be, that it was nothing but the question which mankind had already decided over and over again, by determining that all disputes whether John shall keep Thomas from coming to market, or Thomas shall keep John, shall be settled by both John and Thomas selling as much as other people choose to buy.

If the land-owners of the Isle of Wight should urge, that they were the great purchasers of manufactured goods, and consequently it was the interest of the manufacturers that they the land-owners should receive high prices, in order that they might expend them on the manufacturers;—they would be answered, that it could be no object of desire to the manufacturers, that the land-owners should receive high prices and expend the receipts upon themselves, if the result was to be that the food finally received was to be less than they could have got for the same quantity of manufactures elsewhere; and that besides this, there would be the loss of all that might have been obtained for the portion of manufactures and trade, which is prohibited from coming into existence by the limitation of the industry of the United Empire to what can be supported on the food produced in the Isle of Wight.

If there were occasion for putting the unreasonableness of such a plea in a stronger light, it would be by supposing the agriculturists of the Isle of Wight at this moment to ask the manufacturers of the United Empire to join them in procuring the prohibition of the corn of the rest of the empire, and offer them the expenditure of the increased revenues which would arise to the land-owners of the Isle of Wight in return.

If the land-owners of the Isle of Wight should endeavour to make

their monopoly more palatable, by proposing that monopolies of various kinds should be granted to the manufacturers by way of compensation, —or if they should appeal to certain monopolies of this kind in existence, as a reason why their own monopoly should be continued;—they would be answered, that the granting of monopolies to the manufacturers had no tendency to remove the main evil, which is the restriction of the industry of the country to what could be supported on the produce of the Isle of Wight; and that the whole plan besides, was only like proposing to remedy the evils arising from the occasional occurrence of highway robbery, by licensing every man to rob in his turn. And if the manufacturers allowed themselves to be led away by the hope of gaining or preserving this or that monopoly to their particular crafts, they would act like men who should be persuaded to vote for a general famine, by the promise of a halfpenny roll a-piece to themselves.

It would be evident, on view of such a proposal from the Isle of Wight, that the question of free trade rested mainly, and almost entirely, on the freedom of the trade in food; and that to discuss the use of the greater or less freedom of this or that branch of commerce, while the great commerce in food remained fettered,—was like inquiring how much a man's liberty may be advanced by letting loose his little finger, when the total fact is that he is tied together by the neck and heels.

If the land-owners of the Isle of Wight should have had the influence to a certain degree or for a certain time to prevent the eating of any corn but their own, and should represent the reduction of rents which would arise from the admission of other corn as the taking away of part of their lawful property;—this would lead to the discovery, of what is perhaps the sorest of all points to the land-owners, that rent is not property, in the sense in which mankind have bound themselves for its protection. The simple basis on which men have agreed to protect property, is that it is the reward of labour, and that without mutual protection to this there could be neither labour nor production. Rent is *not* the reward of labour; for it is the superfluity of price above what is necessary to pay the cultivator with a fair profit. The land-owners, as distinguished from the cultivators, are a race who toil not, neither do they spin; they live out of the wages of other men's spinning. They cannot receive a farthing of rent, except in consequence of the spinners paying a higher price for the produce than is necessary to pay the expenses of cultivation with a fair profit. The public, therefore, will protect them in the possession of the rent, as long as it is not raised by any violence done to others; but not a jot further. The public will interfere to see that the rent of the land, so long as it is not raised by violence, is secured to them and to nobody else. But it will not interfere to cause the rent to be raised by violence; either at their asking or the asking of anybody else. If the land-owners of the Isle of Wight advanced the claim supposed, there would be no getting rid of the dilemma. Either their rents are not property, in the sense in which other

men are bound to preserve them; or the land-owners of the Isle of Wight ought to have the monopoly of the United Empire as long as they found it convenient to desire it.

If the land-owners of the Isle of Wight, when struggling for the monopoly of the United Empire, should represent that of some taxes they paid the whole and of others a great proportion, and that therefore they had a claim to a monopoly as a compensation;—the first step towards an answer would be, that if they paid more than was right, it should be remedied by laying the taxes in a different manner,—and not compensation be made by restrictions, of which the effect is to keep down the wealth of the United Empire to what can be supported on the produce of the Isle of Wight. But there is a much sorer point than this; which is, that for taxation to fall upon rent, is just as it ought to be. If the community about to occupy the United Empire from the Isle of Wight, was in a situation to take a common-sense view of what would be for the general good of themselves and their posterity, they would clearly determine that no taxation should ever fall on the operations of industry, as long as it was possible for it to fall upon rent. And this for two reasons; First, because rent is nothing but a tax upon those who have laboured, for the benefit of those who have not; and Secondly, because when a tax falls on the produce of industry instead of falling on rent which is *not* industry, the tax is lost twice,—once by the consumers, and once more by the industrious in the diminution of their employment and means of gain*. The community, therefore, would determine that no such injury and waste should take place; in the same manner as it would determine that there should be no leaks in the public money-bags. Any individuals who could get possession of the rents, and procure the taxes to be laid on industry instead, would profit in the same manner as if they got possession of the money-bags; but it would be as much the interest and duty of the community to prevent one event as the other. If it was pleaded that the gains and losses would be all within the community, and therefore there could be no public loss,—the answer would be, that there was, in the first place, the taking away the reward of labour from those who had laboured, and giving it to those who did nothing in return, which is the only serious objection to taking the money-bags;—and secondly, that there was a gratuitous loss and prevention of an equal quantity of wealth to the community besides, arising out of the taxes being thrown on the produce of industry; which is a mischief the taking of the money-bags has not to answer for. The community, therefore, would pass a self-

* "A tax on the profits of manufacturers, will be taken by the government "once, and there will be an additional loss or prevention of an equivalent quan-"tity of production besides, which will be lost to the community without ad-"vantage to the government or anybody else, in a manner analogous to what "would be the result of a deterioration of the powers of nature. The tax falls "on the consumers, and the gratuitous loss on the capitalists and labourers. "And this last gratuitous loss is measured by, and is in fact identical with, the "losses arising to the manufacturing capitalists and labourers from the dimi-"nution of the extent of their business."—*True Theory of Rent*, p. 429 of the present Volume.—For the proof in detail see that work; also Lecture VII in page 395 of the present Volume.

denying ordinance on the subject of the rents, as well as of the money-bags. The United States of America, or some of them, have in fact done this to a certain extent, by setting apart a portion of their territory for the purpose of hereafter defraying the public expenses out of the rent. It is possible to conceive an order of men to arise, who should object to this arrangement, and represent the benefit that would ensue from giving the rents to themselves, and saddling the American community with the amount in the shape of taxes. But it is very unlikely that the American community should listen to them.

The land-owners in expectancy, would undoubtedly contend,—as in fact men always do contend, as stoutly as they are able, for everything they expect to gain by,—that the moment a portion of land came into any man's hands, it and all that could possibly be made by it, became his property, and from that moment all right in the community to interfere with it was gone for ever. But they would speedily be told, that rent altogether, is of that species of property which civilized communities have at all times undertaken to restrain, to prohibit, or to permit to such precise degrees and in such precise manners as appeared to be authorized by the consideration of the general good; and that if they will lay claim to any property except consistently with the ends and purposes for which civilized society has been formed, they must go out of the pale of civilized society to do it. If a man has a fishery through his lands, the law will not prevent him from fishing in it upon the mere ground that what he does not take may be taken by somebody else. This would be robbery, or an interference with that use and enjoyment of property which it is the object of society to protect. But if this man has a mode of fishing, the result of which is, that for every fish taken by himself, *two* are destroyed or prevented from existing in his neighbours' waters, the law will put him down directly. For this is precisely the use and enjoyment of property which it is the object of society to prevent. No man has a right to call on the community to assist him in securing a general loss. The question of resisting taxation upon rent, presents the same case. If the result merely was, that the taxation escaped by one individual must be paid by somebody else, something might be said against taxing rent in preference to industry; though there would still be the reply, that the fruits of industry are the produce of labour which is what mankind have combined to protect, and rent is not. But when the result is, that besides this, the amount must be lost a second time by the community in another form, it enters at once into the case of the fishery,—there are the two fishes taken from somebody else, for one that is to be caught by the owner of the waters. The owner may cry out against the hardship of interfering with what he chuses to call his property; but the naked truth is, that society has not united for the purpose of securing to him such property as he speaks of, but of preventing him from having it. All the claims made for the maintenance of abuses on the ground of their being property or what are technically termed vested interests, depend on this fallacy of calling on society to protect, what the fact is it was formed to prevent.

At the same time it may be a very serious question, in what manner

a community ought to proceed towards individuals, who through the ignorance or fault of the community, have been nursed and brought up in the receipt of revenues dependent on taking the reward from the producer and giving it to him who has not produced. A collector of "black mail," where his vocation has not been altogether of his own invention, but is in a certain degree wrought into the habits and sufferance of the public, has a right to be treated with some tenderness; and industrious and civilized communities, when they have grown up in the neighbourhood of similar incumbrances, have seldom been indisposed to offer a liberal composition for their quiet abatement. But there are two points which such communities can never give up. One is, that any composition shall be understood to be a sacrifice to policy, and not to right; and the other, that whatever they may pay for what their opponents have the present power to contest, they will pay nothing for expectations. From the moment, therefore, that one of these collectors from the industry of his neighbours, finds a civilized and intelligent community sufficiently strong to think of bringing him to terms, he will be a most lucky man indeed, if he can arrange for the quiet possession of whatever may be found in his hands when he submits to the general compact of society. Nothing can be more certain, than that the intelligence and power of his opponents, and consequently their indisposition to offer favourable terms, will increase and not decrease. He may talk loud, and appeal to ancient endurance, and times when men thought it an honour and felicity to part with their property; but the result will be after all, that the longer he contrives to defer his composition, the worse it will be.

On the whole then, the land-owners of the Isle of Wight would make an exceedingly good bargain for themselves, if they found a community willing to give up the examination into how far the owners of rent had a right to demand the taxation of industry at all, on condition that the land-owners in their turn would give up all idea of preventing the rest of the community from eating any food they could procure. And the community, on its side, would be unwise, if it did not reply to any unreasonable resistance on the more palpable of these two points, by making a scrutiny into the still sorer question, and pushing it to the extent which rigid justice should be found to demand, and the growing intelligence of the community enable it to enforce.

If, however, the land-owners of the Isle of Wight should be supposed to carry their point of preventing the eating of any corn but their own, it is important to consider by what precise means the result that must ensue would be carried into effect. The result has been seen to be, that a stop must be put to the increase of the wealth and power of the United Empire, at a point not far removed from the present wealth and power of the Isle of Wight. And the means by which this result would be produced would be, that the operative manufacturers would increase their hours of toil till human endurance could go no further, without finally obtaining more than the pittance of corn which would sustain life, and raise up the same number of equally wretched successors;—that all the children produced above this number, must be

worn down,—or, if anybody loves the term, *killed off*,—by the combined operations of misery and vice, with as much certainty as the population of the smaller domestic animals is kept within limits by drowning and other modes of death;—that the capitalists and traders of all kinds, with the exception of the owners of land, must see their profits reduced to the lowest rate with which it was possible to keep up the appearance demanded from them by society and escape bankruptcy;—that in consequence no man could exercise any manufacture, merchandise, or trade, with success, except in proportion as room was made for him by the disappearance of some one else, and hence the population of traders must be as rigidly kept down by bankruptcy, as that of the labourers by hunger;—and this evacuation by bankruptcy would appear like a frightful intermittent, where the intermissions barely give time to feel the terrors of the coming fit. In such a country there would arise the phænomenon, of men eager to work, but unable to find any employment by which life could be supported; and for this evident reason, that the avenues to food are shut up, and though men may work, it is against law for food to be procured for them in return. For such men to think to live by working, is as bootless as to think of living by working in a ship at sea without provisions. It is true that by their exertions they may make it the interest of those who have taken possession of the supply of food, to raise a little more by increasing their expenditure upon their land; but it is only like the shakings of the bread-bag, in comparison of the labour that must be given for it. For example, in the instance formerly assumed, which is not far from an average case, the payment of fifty-five instead of forty-four shillings per quarter for the produce, amounting in all to three hundred and forty-three pounds fifteen shillings, would effect the production of four more quarters, or an increase of a hundred-and-fiftieth part; being at the rate of eighty-six pounds per quarter, or thirteen shillings and sixpence per quartern loaf. And when this string has been stretched to breaking, it is plain that there is nothing to be done but die. In such a country there would be seen crowds of youths of the middle classes, attempting to maintain themselves in credit by industry, and only dispersing the accumulation of their fathers by a fatality that nothing could ward off; families lamenting the ruin of their hopes, and men looking on the faces of their children as pledges of coming sorrow instead of aid. In such a country there would be campaigns against starving manufacturers; and men who had fought nations' quarrels, would be called upon to finish the sufferings of dying artisans. There would be a law to determine that every legislator should be a land-owner; and a class of laws to make the poor die quietly, and without disturbing the higher orders by their efforts to escape. To be found houseless would be made a crime; because he that has parted with his house, has manifestly not starved when he ought. To be detected with horse-flesh in a bag, would be punished with fine or imprisonment; because a man who descends to such disgusting methods to save life, is evidently making efforts unfair upon his fellows. In such a country there would be troops of juvenile offenders in the

towns; and regiments of poachers in the fields, living desperately on pheasant because men are not permitted to buy bread. There would be "distressed manufacturers," and "commercial crises," and "a general glut," and "depravity of the lower orders," and "apprehensions for property," and "fears for establishments," and "danger to social order," and every man asking his neighbour how these evils had arisen. On one side would be seen the rich few, enjoying with trembling; and on the other, industrious and able-bodied men, dying because working would not support existence as it ought to do;—women and children trodden down in the mass of suffering, and retiring into corners to die without resistance, as is their nature;—woe, and want, and wretchedness, and wrong,—and all this, that the squire's bitch hound might whelp in safety. If any legislators ever had a heavy responsibility, it would be those who tolerated such a state of things an hour after they had power to remove it. If any ever had a claim to the support of a grateful people, it would be those who ventured power and place, by resisting the demands of the encroaching order, and putting themselves upon their country for their deliverance.

If it should be urged, that there must always come a time when population will press against food, and therefore there is no use in attempting to escape it; this would be like urging, that there is no use in a man's escaping from being murdered now, because he will not be immortal afterwards. There is all the difference in the world, between enduring an evil by the will of Providence, and by the act of man. Human life in the whole, is but the procrastination of death; but that is no reason why men should be killed just now, for other men's convenience. There may come a time when there will be no coal to burn, no iron to make tools, and perhaps no salt left in the sea; but this is no reason why something should not be made of the interval which must intervene. The time when population will press irremediably against food, must to a great manufacturing and naval people, be almost as remote as the time when there will be no salt left in the sea. And come when it may, it must always come gradually; which is by itself no small diminution of the mischief. The maximum of contingent evil in prospect, is only equal to what it is proposed to bring on at once now; and all the world must be cleared and peopled, before the evil can arrive.

If however, after all, the land-holders of the Isle of Wight had got the supply of the United Empire into their hands, the important question would be, how the evil must be removed. And here it is plain that the object must be, to produce the minimum of present suffering and the maximum of final good. The suffering arising during the process of a return to justice, must be set off against the removal of the recurring and perpetual suffering arising from the evil; always remembering, that the reason why the greater suffering is removed at the expense of the less, is not merely because it is the greater, but because it is unjust. And here it is plain, that the way to diminish the suffering on the defendants' side of the account, is to reduce the evil gradually. Not, however, so gradually as never to reduce it at all, as would be the

case if the defendants were left to remove it themselves; but by such a reasonable progression as shall at once hold forth a clear prospect of deliverance to the community, and divide the pressure upon those who are to disgorge. The existing scale of duties, for example, reduced in all its gradations by one-tenth annually till the whole was removed, would combine the two properties required.

The attempt to prevent one man from buying what another is willing to sell to him, and oblige him to buy from a third person with the avowed object of making him pay that third person a greater price, is so manifestly of the nature of robbery, that nothing can make it tolerable in a country where ideas of justice and civil liberty have made any considerable progress. And consequently this object is not generally avowed; but the plan is put forward under cover of some advantage that is to arise to the community from its permission, or some detriment from the contrary.

Of all the arguments of this kind, there is only one of a nature to make a serious impression on an impartial observer; and that is, the objection, that a nation which procures a portion of its food by barter, must be at the mercy of foreigners. There is no doubt that such a case is possible, and, whatever the political economists may say, has happened. A signal instance of it occurred at the conclusion of the last war, when the unfortunate country of Norway, growing little or no corn, and accustomed to procure it by the barter of iron and wood, was starved into submission by a squadron of gun-brigs. But the case of Norway and that of a great commercial and naval people, are as different as any two cases it is easy to imagine. Exactly as the power and communications are multiplied, the chance of being cut off from supplies is diminished. There may be a certain chance remaining after all; but the chance of the prevention of evil by the very proceeding in question, is infinitely greater. On the principle proposed, a man might abstain from walking abroad, lest he should be crushed by a falling house; and from eating solid food, lest he should be choked by a crumb. Both these are things which have sometimes happened; yet it is clear that on the whole, the chances of well-being are greatly increased by walking abroad and eating bread. It may fairly be doubted, whether the case of a great commercial and naval people being starved by foreigners, ever *did* happen; and the general tendency of the thing objected to, to extend a happy existence, is as clear as in the cases cited as parallel.

The substance of what has preceded may be collected into brief questions and answers. To which is added a list of fallacies advanced, with their solutions.

CATECHISM ON THE CORN LAWS.

Second Part.

What is meant by Corn Laws?

Answer. Laws which enact that the labourer shall not exchange his produce for food, except at certain shops, namely the shops of the land-owners; or not without paying a fine.

For whose benefit are these laws intended?

A. Manifestly, of those who support them,—the land-owners.

What are the effects of these laws?

A. The same in kind as would arise from limiting the food consumed in the United Empire, to what could be produced in the Isle of Wight.

What would be the consequences of such a limitation?

A. That the manufactures, wealth, and power, of the United Empire, must be limited to something like those of the Isle of Wight.

How would this be brought about?

A. First, By a general distress among the manufacturing labourers, arising from employment and wages being reduced to what afforded the smallest pittance of food upon which life could be supported;—as is the case now.

Secondly, By a general glut and stagnation of trade, arising from more goods being manufactured than could possibly be sold with a living profit;—as is the case now.

Thirdly, By the impossibility of any man's prospering in any new manufacture, trade, or project;—as is the case now.

Fourthly, by the population both of labourers and traders being limited in proportion to the limitation of food, the first by hunger, the second by bankruptcy;—as is the case now.

In such a state of things, could not able-bodied men support themselves by working?

A. No more than they could support themselves by working, in a ship at sea without provisions.

Could not they, by the offer of the produce of their labour, induce the growers to grow more corn?

A. In the same way as more milking will produce more milk from a given cow. There may never be a time when it is impossible to extract another drop: but nobody will live upon the difference.

Are not the increased rents of the landlords a national gain?

A. In the first place, all that they can gain must be taken from somebody else; which can make no national gain. Secondly, the effect is to keep down the wealth and power of the whole community, in the same manner as would take place if the wealth and power of the community were restricted to what could be supported on the corn grown in the Isle of Wight, to please the landlords there.

What is the difference between preventing men from buying food with the produce of their labour, and taking it from them after they have bought it?

A. That in one case they starve without working, and in the other with.

Are not the increased rents of the landlords their property?

A. No more than the increased prices which a shopkeeper might get, if he could forcibly prevent men from buying at any shop but his own.

So far from allowing rents to be increased by forcible means, a nation where the laws were determined only by justice and the good of the community, would allow no taxation to fall upon industry, as long as it was possible for it to fall upon rent.

How is the last proved?

A. First, because rent is nothing but a charge upon those who have laboured, for the benefit of those who have not. And secondly, because when a tax is allowed to fall on industry, instead of falling on rent which is not industry, the tax is lost twice,—once by the consumers, and once more by the industrious in the diminution of their employment and means of gain.

Is it not hard that the owner should not sell the produce of his land for the most that is possible?

A. Not so hard as that the manufacturer should not sell *his* produce for as much as he can get by a free sale. The case is like that of two men struggling to keep each other out of the market: and what justice and the public good demand is, that both should sell for as much as they can.

But it is not simply a contest whether one man shall sell or another. The demand of the landlord is, that

other men shall be prevented from disposing of the produce of their industry, in order that *his* wealth may be increased *without* industry; and for no reason that can be discovered, except that he is rich already. He has the same opportunities as any other man, of increasing his wealth by industry and by economy, if he chuses to exert them; but what he demands is, that without exerting either, a fund shall be provided for perpetually increasing the value of his property, at the expense of the industry of his neighbours. He is by profession, he says, a land-owner, and therefore it is his prerogative to be kept rich by the community.

Do not the landlords pay a number of taxes?

A. It is just that they should. They are not labourers; and all they can possibly have, is paid for out of other people's labour. Rent altogether, is nothing but the excess of the price above what is necessary to pay for the production with a fair profit.

Do not they pay the tithes?

A. No more than a man pays, what was left to his brothers and sisters by their common father. A man cannot be said to pay, what he never had.

If tithes were abolished, they might fall to the landlord; and if a man's brothers and sisters were out of the way, he might be heir to the whole of his father's estate. But this does not make a man *pay*, what is held by others by a right coæval with his own.

If the landlords have not their present rents, how are they to pay the taxes they do?

A. It is clear they cannot. But it is as absurd to keep down the wealth and industry of the community for the sake of the taxes that may be paid by the landlords, as it would be to keep them down to what could be supported on the food produced in the Isle of Wight, for the sake of the increased taxes that might be paid by the landlords of the Isle of Wight in return.

Is it not wrong to encourage the production of foreigners?

A. When a manufacturer produces goods and exchanges them abroad for corn, he may as truly be said to produce the corn, as if it came out of his loom or his flatting-mill. And if he is prohibited from doing this, it is *his* production that in reality is stopped.

Is it not the interest of the manufacturers that the landlords should have high rents, in order that they may consume manufactures?

A. Not if they are to consume them for less than could be had from other people, and oblige the manufacturers to diminish the quantity of their sales besides. The interest of the manufacturers is not that their goods should be consumed, but that they should be paid for.

How is such a state of things to be altered?

A. By waiting till it is generally known, how much all men except the land-owners, are interested in the removal of the injustice; and by taking all means to increase such knowledge.

What is the way for any man to know whether he is interested in the continuance of the corn laws or not?

A. By asking himself whether it would be for his interest, that the wealth and power of the community should at this moment be reduced to what could be supported on the corn grown in the Isle of Wight. If he finds that this would not be for his interest, he may be sure that it is not for his interest that the wealth and power of the community should be restricted as they now are by the corn laws.

Is it any new discovery, that the wealth and power of the community are restricted by restrictions on the importation of corn?

A. 'To prohibit by a perpetual law the 'importation of foreign corn and cattle, is in 'reality to enact, that the population and in-'dustry of the community shall at no time 'exceed what the rude produce of its own 'soil can maintain.'—*Wealth of Nations*, B. iv. c. 2.

If the law instead of being a perpetual prohibition, acts only occasionally or with a varying pressure, it will depress the population and industry proportionately.

What would be a sufficiently fair composition to offer to the owners of land?

A. That the community on its part, would give up the inquiry into the claim rent has to be only equally taxed with manufacturing industry; if the land-owners on their part, would give up the idea of preventing men from having as much food as they can buy.

How should the injustice be removed, so as to produce the greatest good and the least suffering?

A. By removing it gradually. Give them time. Give them ten years if they please; beginning with the present, and taking off a tenth yearly till it is gone. But remove it.

What should be done if anything short of final removal was proposed?

A. A discerning community would clearly take all that was offered, and not relax in its endeavours to get the rest. Such a proposal leaves untouched the body of the wrong, and all the dangers arising from a sense of injustice. It is like the generosity of the feudal lord, who instead of insisting on his *droit de seigneur* for the full tale of three nights, should graciously offer to compound for one.

Ought not the landlords at least to have a duty of 5*s*., by way of compensation for taxes?

A. By all means take off the taxes from them, whether it be just or not; but do not let five shillings worth of taxes be raised from the landlords, at the expense of fifty shillings to the rest of the community.

Let it be settled, that like the *noblesse* in France, the landlords shall pay no taxes; sooner than that what they do pay, shall be recovered by a tenfold loss on the community.

The English people have been in the habit of laughing at the French, calling them slaves and all kinds of names, because, before the revolution, their aristocracy paid no taxes. In the eighteenth century the French aristocracy paid no taxes; and in the nineteenth, the English aristocracy paid taxes, and recovered them through another tax that caused the community to lose the amount ten times over. Which side has a right to laugh?

We *are* prodigiously stupid. *Our* posterity will have very little to say about the wisdom of their ancestors.

What is the answer to the proposition,

1. That the agriculture of the country is the great basis of its wealth.—*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xvii. *p*. 790 *and following*. LORD REDESDALE; *May* 15, 1827.

A. It is not agriculture that is the basis, but *having corn*. If by agriculture is meant having two bushels of corn where there might have been four, it is not the basis of the wealth of the country, but of its impoverishment.

2. That the wealth and strength of Great Britain originated in the cultivation of its soil, and must always be dependent on that cultivation, whatever other advantages the country may possess.—*Id*.

A. They must always be dependent on *having corn*. But what is here intended by cultivation, does not mean having corn, but *not* having it, or at all events having less than there might have been.

3. That without cultivation there could be neither trade nor manufactures. We must exist as hunters of wild beasts, or keepers of flocks; for to the cultivation of land all the blessings that follow trade and manufactures are owing.—*Id*.

A. To *some* cultivation; but not necessarily to *their* cultivation. There cannot be corn without cultivation somewhere and by somebody; but it does not therefore follow that it must be bought of particular people, in a smaller quantity, and at double the price, that it might be had elsewhere.

It may be information to the home agriculturists to state, that there would be no physical impossibility in living without them altogether. Not that it would be either politic or just; for to put a prohibition or duty on home-grown corn, would be the same impolicy and injustice as to put one on the exchange of manufactures for corn grown abroad. But it

would be *no more*; the consequence would not be that there would be no corn. The corn produced by the exportation of manufactures, even though the whole of the raw materials should be of foreign production, is just as substantial, unvisionary corn, as what is grown at home. The home growers would seem to have some doubts of this, by the way in which they speak of themselves as if they were the *only* machines nature had created for effecting the apparition of corn.

4. That if the skill and intellect of man could make the deserts of Africa as fruitful as the plains of Egypt, they would be inhabited like them. And that if some visitation of Providence converted this country into a waste as incapable of cultivation as the African sands, its population must at once fly the kingdom, and our trade and manufactures must necessarily fall.—*Id.*

A. It does not follow. The visitation might be a very unpleasant one; but the inference does not follow.

If the other physical capabilities for manufactures and trade were left behind, it is clear that the people would have the power of exchanging their manufactures for corn and raw materials, as has been done by Genoa, Venice, and the States of Holland. The condition of things would in fact, be the same, as if the manufacturers had got a prohibitory duty on home-grown corn, for the sake of having to import more from abroad. It is not affirmed that this would be either politic or just, but that it would be possible; which is enough to show the fallacy of the tirades of the agriculturists about their being indispensable.

5. That the political economists describe it as folly to cultivate any but the most fertile lands.—*Id.*

A. The political economists describe it as folly, to grow corn at a greater cost than it can be had for elsewhere.

6. That according to the political economists, the operations for the production of corn should be confined to scratching the ground and throwing in the seed.—*Id.*

A. The words "scratching the ground and throwing in the seed" may be found in print; but in a totally different sense from anything like a recommendation that it should be so.

7. That estates in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land yield a rent when they are found to contain farm-houses, barns, orchards, gardens, and other requisites; and therefore improvement is the cause of rent.—*Id.*

A. There is no doubt that improvement may be a cause of rent. But it is not the cause of that increase of rent, which depends on the Corn Laws and would drop on their removal.

8. That according to the political economists, every expense in cultivating land is money thrown away.—*Id.*

A. Every expense is money thrown away, which ends in having for sixty shillings what might have been had for fifty.

9. That the system of cultivation is a complicated system, requiring a great capital; and to remove the restrictions upon corn would destroy that capital.—*Id.*

A. Complicated or not, to this it must come at last,—*Does it produce corn as cheaply as it might be had in other ways?* If it does not, it is all only making boots to cut them into shoes. If shoemakers ruled the state, it is possible they might think that method politic and wise; but it does not follow that anybody else should be of the same opinion.

10. That the wealth of the country is not alone to be considered; the strength of the country is also an important object.—*Id.*

A. The strength of the country must depend upon food, population, and manufactures; or upon some or other of them. And all these must be cut down together, by having two bushels of corn instead of four.

A country which permits a legal limit to be drawn about its quantity of food, and is surrounded with rival countries which either are not confined by similar enactments, or have not reached the point where such enactments are severely felt, must decline from day to day in relative importance;—because it cuts off by its own act, the means of preserving its position in the race. Neither France nor America needs be anxious to keep down the power of Great Britain, as long as its landlords can decide that it shall not be permitted to advance.

11. That our strength depends mainly on our agricultural population, and on the navigation laws.—*Id.*

A. The strength depends on the population, not on the *agricultural* population. If there are to be two bushels of corn instead of four, the population must be reduced one half; whatever may be the effect on the numbers of the agriculturists.

The navigation laws are a repetition of the same kind of fallacy; consisting in directing the attention to the increase of a certain kind of wealth or a certain kind of strength, and concealing that it is procured at the expense of a greater quantity of wealth or of strength in the aggregate.

12. That if the system of modern political economists were acted on, there would be nothing to carry on trade with but what was imported from other nations.—*Id.*

A. Supposing it was so, there would be no harm, if the new trade was a better one than the old.

But the fact must always be the opposite. For the principal article of the export trade of Great Britain would be her manufactures; which are her own produce, even though all the raw materials should be foreign.

13. That the cultivation of the soil of a country is a trade and manufacture; and is so far the most important trade and manufacture in every country, as every other trade and manufacture must depend upon it.—*Id.*

A. Other trades and manufactures depend, upon *having corn.* Which is precisely the reason why growing two bushels of corn in this country at the expense of keeping out four from somewhere else, is an injury.

14. That though the production of corn for the food of man is in Great Britain one of the most important objects of cultivation, yet the means of obtaining the production of corn, the quantity purchased, and the profit to be derived by the cultivator from the production, are all dependent on many other objects of production, and especially on the production of animals and of food for animals, and on the further produce or other benefit derived from such animals; and the general profit of the cultivator is the result of the combination of all the several articles so produced, each article contributing to the more profitable production of the rest, the amount of the whole production at the same time greatly depending on the capital and skill employed in fitting the land for the purposes of cultivation, and on the capital and skill employed by the cultivator; and it is the combined effect of all these operating causes, which gives plenty from cultivation, and renders cultivation profitable.—*Id.*

A. When the price of corn is kept up by restrictions, the prices of all other kinds of agricultural produce, whether vegetable or animal, are kept up in consequence of the demand for land to grow corn; and so the agriculturists gain on all sides at once. This is all. Anything more is only involution; or in plainer English, "roundabout for the sake of puzzle."

15. That the wool-growers complain, that in consequence of the importation of wool they have two years stock on hand. What then do we gain by importing wool?—*Id.*

A. The wool-growers forget that there are wool-wearers; and that the growers exist for the wearers, not the wearers for the growers. It is strange to see how the existence of the public is forgotten by everybody, if the public consent to forget it themselves.

To say that cloth is not, or will not be, cheaper than it would have been if wool had been dearer, can only have been done through inadvertence; and therefore needs not be commented on.

As say the dealers in wool, so say all the others in turn. In other words, everybody wants to rob everybody. There is no use in disguising the fact;—wool or anything else, to make a man pay eighteen-pence for what he could get for a shilling, is robbing somebody of two sixpences, and throwing away one.

16. That the increase in the price of corn has been caused by the in-

A. Supposing it granted, that these expenses increase the difficulty of growing corn;—it does not follow that the growers have a

creased expenses incurred in agriculture, and by the taxes.—*Id.*

right to recover them from the public, whether the corn is wanted or not; and least of all by preventing the public from having other corn.

The growers of corn seem unable to escape from the persuasion, that the first law of nature is that they shall grow corn, and men shall buy it whether they want it or not.

17. That the laws now in force, regulating the importation of foreign corn, are founded on the principles expressed in the preceding allegations; and therefore ought not to be altered.—*Id.*

A. If the principles are all fallacies, the laws should be altered *without* delay.

18. That what we produce ourselves, costs us, in one sense, nothing; while that which we import, of necessity costs us something.—*Id.*

A. It is difficult to say in *what* sense, a quarter of corn that costs sixty shillings, costs less than another that costs thirty.

A quarter of corn produced at home, brings in the value of sixty shillings to a landlord and various other persons, in the shape of rent, profits, or wages; which is all at the expense of the eater. Two quarters from abroad, bring in the same value of sixty shillings to the makers of the broad cloth, or whatever else it is, that has been given in exchange; which is at the expense of the eater as before. The fallacy therefore amounts to saying, that it is cheaper to give sixty shillings to a landlord for one quarter of corn, than to a maker of broad cloth for two.

19. That the increase of the price of grain is caused by the luxurious habits of the present generation, the excess of manufactures, wild-goose speculations in trade, and a sudden desire to grow rich.—*Id.*

A. Even if it was so, it would form no reason why the quantity of corn should be diminished to please the landlords. If the landlords say they want to increase it,—they want to increase it by keeping out twice as much as they add.

20. That to fix a price at which grain may be sold with advantage to the producer in all years, is impossible on account of the variation of the seasons.—*Id.*

A. It is the business of the producer of corn to arrange his production according to the probable price, as other people do; and to take such prices as other men will voluntarily give. If some years are unexpectedly bad, he has to set off against them an equal number that are unexpectedly good; for his judgment will be founded on the average of years, unless nature changes her course upon an alteration of the corn laws. Nobody else goes to parliament, and asks to have the public force employed to keep up his price.

21. That to permit foreign wheat to be entered for sale on a duty of 20*s.* whenever the average price of wheat shall amount to 60*s.*, with a scale of duties rising or falling as the price should be lower or higher than 60*s.*, would be in fact to keep the price of wheat at all times under 60*s.* a quarter, because foreign wheat can generally be brought to market for more than 20*s.* under the price of wheat at home;—and that this would be unjust.—*Id.*

A. All that can be said of the proposition as it stands is, that it proposes to take from the public *only* 20*s.* a quarter for the benefit of the agriculturists.

22. That the increased price of corn has not been caused by additional profits derived by the farmer, but by the increase of our cities and towns, and of dissipation and luxury.—*Id.*

A. It has been caused by the increase of the demand, and the artificial limitation of the supply.

23. That corn is, relatively speaking, one of the cheapest articles in the market.—*Id.*

A. Corn being relatively cheap or relatively dear, does not alter the fact of there being less corn, and less everything else, than there might have been.

24. That the very title of "A Bill for granting Customs and Duties on Corn," is an absurdity. It does not even profess to be for the encouragement of the growth of corn, or of trade.—*Id.*

A. The true title would be, "A Bill for diminishing the Prevention of Corn;"—by the substitution of a duty for a prohibition.

25. That the amount of the duty must be paid by the corn growers of this country, and by nobody else.—*Id.*

A. The prohibition is a grievous injustice, in favour of the growers. The duty is another, but a little less. And what the growers complain of, is the difference.

26. That if a million of quarters of wheat are imported from abroad, it must prevent the same quantity from being imported from Ireland.—*Id.*

A. A great deal might be done for the sake of Ireland. But it is too much to ask that the whole empire should be restricted and starved, that a small portion of what it loses may find its way into the pockets of the landlords in Ireland.

27. That a theory may be true in the abstract, and false in practice.

A. If a theory is not true in practice, it is not true at all; for it must at all events be a theory falsely applied. A theory, means an assertion that certain inferences are true or according to the dictates of common sense and experience. For instance, the assertion that two and two will make four, is a theory.

The object of this fallacy, is to disable human reason and common

sense,' for the benefit of the objectors; and to persuade us that nobody knows when we ought to be starved but themselves.

28. That if foreign corn is introduced, the quantity of home-grown corn will be diminished; by which nothing will be gained.

A. This must depend on whether the home-grown corn is diminished *as much* as the imported is increased. The quantity of home-grown corn can only be diminished in consequence of a fall of price; and a fall of price can only be permanently produced by there being more corn in the market on the whole. If, therefore, the quantity of home-grown corn is diminished, it can only be because there is more corn in the market on the whole; or in other words, because the imported is increased by a greater amount than the home-grown is diminished.

29. That if corn falls, wages must fall; and consequently cheap corn can be of no advantage to the labourer. —*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XVIII, p.* 1411.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; *March* 31, 1828.

A. This must depend on whether wages fall *as much* as corn. No foreign corn will be brought into the country, unless more can be had for a given quantity of industry than can be got from the growers at home. If, therefore, foreign corn comes in at all, there must be a greater share for the labourer; or in other words, wages will *not* fall as much as corn.

30. That if corn rises, the labourers must obtain the same *real* wages as before; otherwise their numbers would not be kept up. And by parity of reasoning they will only receive the same *real* wages when it falls.

A. It is not true that when corn rises, the labourers will obtain the same *real* wages as before. For corn can only rise in consequence of its being scarce; and to say the labourers get the same real wages when food is scarce as when it is plentiful, is to say they get as much food when it is not there as when it is. If the rise in the price of food is permanent, their numbers *will not* be kept up.

31. That when corn rises, everything rises; and consequently no man's property is diminished.

A. The value of a man's property depends on its *quantity*, as well as on its price. When the price of food is raised, and its abundance diminished, the manufactures and wealth of the community are ultimately diminished in *quantity*, whatever may be money prices.

When corn rises, the manufacturers are obliged to give more work for less reward. It is clear therefore that *their* property is diminished.

32. That only a certain quantity of corn is wanted for the world's

A. There is a fraud in the word "certain." A *fixed* quantity of food will no more do for the world now, than it would have done on

consumption; and the question is merely whether it shall be supplied by one people or by another.

the day that Noah came out of the ark. The happiness of the existing population depends not only on having *some* food, but on being at liberty to increase the quantity by its own exertions.

33. That if the trade in corn was free, foreign farmers would consume a quantity of goods which English farmers now consume; and the English would cease to consume them.

A. The foreign farmers would consume and pay for a quantity which is not now made or consumed by anybody. Or at all events they would give more corn for what they consumed, than was given for what was consumed before.

34. That it is the same thing to the manufacturers, merchants, and shopkeepers, whether prices are high or low; because they always put the same per-centage on what passes through their hands, and because they advance their prices in proportion to the advance of corn.

A. It is not the same thing to them, if the *quantity* of what passes through their hands is diminished.

35. That the community never can be injured by high prices; because it is only one man paying to another.

A. It will be injured if the whole *quantity* of what is produced is diminished.

It might as well be argued that a town never can be injured by a blockade; because the high prices "*are only one man paying to another.*"

36. That the labour of a hundred men in Britain at present employed to raise a given quantity of corn would be dispensed with, and exchanged for the labour of ninety men in France or Poland; and the hundred men of Britain would be reduced to want, while the labourers of France or Poland would be benefited.

A. What is kept out of sight is, that a thousand men in Britain would be introduced to employment and food; among whom the hundred who cease to be employed in agriculture, would have as good a chance as any of the others, with the exception of the difficulties arising from their change of occupation.

There is a reason, therefore, why the change should be gradual; but not why it should never take place at all.

37. That the manufacturers want great consumers; and therefore they should let the landlords consume.

A. The manufacturers want only great payers; and it is the same thing to them whether they find them in England or Poland. They have not the smallest wish that the landlords should consume for nothing, or for less than could be had from other people.

38. That as corn has fallen, the manufacturers have become more distressed; and it is obvious that their embarrassments will continue till corn shall rise.

A. Corn has not fallen, but risen; the appearance to the contrary being only the consequence of the price in the earlier periods being reckoned in depreciated money.

The only question, however, of importance in this place, is whether the wages of manufacturing labour have not fallen, in reference to corn. In 1815, when the Corn Laws were enacted, the price of wheat, by the annual average, was 63*s.* 8*d.*; and the wages for weaving "12 yards of the 60 reed,—6-4ths cambrics," were 6*s.* 6*d.* (*Marshall's Statistics of the British Empire.*) The depreciation of money in the same year was 16$\frac{7}{10}$ per cent, (*Mushet's Tables*); which makes the wheat 53*s.*, and the wages 5*s.* 5*d.*, of the present money. In 1829 the wheat was 56*s.*, and the wages for weaving the same quantity of cambric 1*s.* 10*d.*; so that the wages, measured in corn, were *less than a third* of what they were in 1815.

39. That if the landlords get improved prices, the expenditure of their improved rentals must carry improvement into every department of professional, mercantile, and manufacturing pursuits.

A. What is received by the landlords would have been expended with equal advantage to merchants, manufacturers, and professional men, of some kind, if it had been left in the hands of the owners.

This is the same fallacy as that which asserts, that expending the public money, on useless palaces or digging holes and filling them up again, is a help to industry. What is kept out of sight is, that the money would have been just as much expended with advantage to some kind of industry or other, if it had been left with the owners.

40. That Mr. Huskisson himself has declared, that four fifths of our manufactured goods are consumed at home and in our colonies. And therefore four fifths of our manufacturers must be injured by the depression of our agriculturists.

A. If four-fifths are consumed at home, it is because foreign commerce is virtually prohibited. Increase the total sale of manufactures by legalizing foreign commerce, and it will be of no consequence to the manufacturers what proportion of them is taken by the agriculturists.

41. That a landlord's treasure must be in England; a merchant's may be all over the world. And therefore it is impolitic to encourage merchants at

A. It would be just as wise to say, that the drone's treasure is in the hive, the bee's scattered all about the fields. The merchant sends abroad and brings home; the landlord produces nothing and consumes. And what the merchant or manufacturer asks for, after

the expense of landlords.

all, is only that he may sell his wares in a free market, and the landlord his.

42. That the operatives are a lazy race, and seldom go to work before Wednesday.

A. The landlords never go to work at all.

43. That their children are miserable and short-lived, rendered rickety by the unwholesomeness of their employment, and the excessive quantity of their work.

A. It is only too true. And therefore they pray to have leave to buy what they can, that they may eat more and work less.

44. That the agriculturist is the manufacturer's best friend.

A. The manufacturer's best friend is he that will give him the most of what he wants, in return for his goods.

If the agriculturist were to say to the manufacturer, "Give me three yards of twenty-shilling broad cloth instead of two, for a quarter of corn, and you will be the better for it,"—he would be laughed at. But he has only to say, "Give me sixty shillings instead of forty for a quarter of corn, and then I will buy three yards with it instead of two,"—and the manufacturer is to jump at the offer. *What difference* is there in reality between the two things?

45. That to remove the corn laws would be to put a maximum price upon grain.

A. It might as well be said, that to prevent one shopkeeper from forcibly putting down another, was putting a maximum price on goods. It is not putting a maximum on honest trade; but preventing one set of individuals from raising the price upon the rest of the community by violence.

46. That the manufacturers, by selling their goods to foreigners, destroy their home market.

A. They destroy it, by getting three bushels of corn for a yard of cloth abroad, instead of two at home.

47. That it is impossible for the manufacturers to increase their foreign sales so far beyond the value of the imported corn, as to balance the falling-off in the aggregate purchases of the agriculturists.

A. Let them try; and if they find themselves losing, they will not go on.

The greater quantity of the imported corn, is what must always more than balance the falling-off in the purchases of the agriculturists; because if it was not so, there would be none imported. The simple fact is, that the manufacturers would get more food by selling their goods to foreigners, than they would do if they were confined to the agriculturists at home; without which they would not trade with the

foreigners at all. All the rest is a juggle, dependent on directing the attention to the money which is the means of conveyance.

48. That if there is less business done between the land-owners and the manufacturers, there must be a contraction of the currency.

A. The only consequence would be, that there would be fewer shillings and more silver spoons. The time is past when men could be deceived by tricks upon currency.

49. That the heavy taxes are the cause of the dear corn; and it is impossible for the grower to compete with foreigners who are not taxed.

A. If the land-owners paid more than their share, it would be a reason why they should pay less; but not why they should be compensated by restrictions on the industry of the community, which cause the amount to be lost ten times over.

But if by taxation is meant taxation in common with other people, this, however heavy, is no reason for their monopoly, but the contrary. Suppose *A. B.* on one side of the Strand, should say, "I cannot sell stockings so cheap by 10 per cent as *C. D.* opposite. But then, I pay 40 per cent taxes; take these off me, and I will engage to undersell him by 30 per cent." Is there a man that wears stockings, who would not reply, "Your opposite neighbour pays 40 per cent too. Take off the taxes from both of you, and he will undersell you by 10 per cent as much as ever." Just so it is with the land-owner and the clothier. The clothier can procure the corn cheapest now, and would do the same if nobody paid taxes at all. It is not true, therefore, that the taxes are the reason why the land-owner cannot produce the cheapest corn; still less why anybody else should be obliged to buy of him.

50. That it is not true that corn can in reality be obtained cheaper abroad; because a great part of the price of English corn is composed of taxes, which if not paid by the landlord, must be paid by some other person.

A. They will be paid, and ten times more, in the productiveness of the taxes upon the liberated public. It would be senseless to keep down the wealth and commerce of the country to what could be supported on the corn grown in the Isle of Wight, because a part of the price of this corn would be paid by the agriculturists in taxes. The taxes that can be raised out of the wealth of the United Empire in a state of freedom, must always be greater than what can be raised out of the monopolists.

51. That the manufacturers want a market, but not particularly a foreign market. They may sell to the inhabitants of Staffordshire or Wales, as well as to the Poles or the Swedes.

A. The manufacturers want the market where they can get three bushels of corn for their goods, and not the market where they can get two.

52. That if there were no restraints on trade, England would be supplied with cottons and woollens from Mons or Jemappe, with iron from Sweden, with grain from Poland, Germany, the Crimea, or America, and with everything from everywhere.

A. None of these things will be given for nothing. Something therefore must always be produced to pay in. And nothing will be imported, unless that in which it is paid for, can be produced at home with greater final advantage than the commodity for which it is bartered.

Common sense therefore points out, that it is for the interest of the community that its industry should be directed to the production of such articles as are attended with greater final advantage, in preference to those which are attended with less. Which would be the result of leaving things to find their own balance.

53. That the people on the shores of the Baltic consume none of *our* commodities. They take our gold, and they proceed to France and the Mediterranean and purchase wine, brandy, and fruits. They buy none of *our* muslins. Linens they get at Hamburgh; and hats, hosiery, and woollens, in France and Holland.—*Watchman, Sunday Newspaper.*

A. Suppose they *do* take gold. The gold must be bought with *our* commodities; unless it can be shown that it is given to us without.

Put the case that the people of the Baltic would take nothing from us but *Turkey coffee.* What would be the result, but that English goods would be sent to Turkey for coffee, instead of being sent to the Baltic direct? A trade in gold is as good as a trade in coffee, or in anything else.

54. That our "*circulating medium*" will be sent away to pay.

A. If the coins in circulation are diminished, this must cause a fall in the money price of all articles, gold bullion included. It therefore incontinently becomes the interest of the government to buy more gold and coin it, and so the gap will be filled up. And the new demand created for British goods to buy this gold, is as good as a new demand for coffee or anything else.

55. That we import from the Baltic, and export *ballast* in return. —*Id.*

A. Does anybody believe that the goods are paid for with *ballast?* All that is proved then is, that the goods which finally pay for them, are not carried out by the Baltic merchants, but by some others. They may go in the shape of jackets for Portuguese labourers; but if this is done as the means of sending brandy from Portugal to the Baltic, it is the same as if the jackets went to the Baltic in person.

Nothing is clearer than that the imports and exports of a nation must

be eq al on the whole, however circuitous the route by which the payments reach their destinations. The nonsense of our ancestors about the balance of trade being in favour of a country or against it, arose from not observing that gold, like other things, must have been paid for by exports of some kind.

56. That it is proper to prohibit the importation of corn from any foreign country that refuses to act upon a system of reciprocity with regard to British ships and goods.

A. Reciprocity is having two good things, instead of one. But if we cannot have both the good things, it is no reason why we should reject the one we may. The fraud of "*reciprocity*," therefore, is like saying, "Don't take the half-crown you may, unless somebody will give you another for taking it."

The first government that will fearlessly announce, that it is not to be fooled by the fallacy of "reciprocity," will pull down commercial restrictions all over the world.

57. That such a prohibition is in fact necessary to obtain from foreign nations a return for the sacrifice of the exclusive protections of our own trade, shipping, and prosperity.

A. The loss is a gain. The thing called a sacrifice, is neither more nor less than consenting to give up the throwing a large amount into the sea.

58. That the system of free trade must ruin England if adopted by her alone; and she must either give it up, or enforce it universally.

A. When the draper buys bread, it may be very well if he can persuade the baker to buy clothes from him in turn. But if he cannot, it would be great folly to fancy he must be ruined unless he refuses to buy bread.

The Americans make a foolish Tarif by which they allow one half of their people to rob the other, with a general loss equal to the difference in question besides. But that is no reason why England should do an equally foolish thing in reply. If an American chuses to put out one of his eyes, there is no necessity for an Englishman's doing the same for reciprocity.

59. That the gold would be carried away to buy corn, and cause a run upon the Bank.

A. If the prohibition was taken off all at once, there is no saying whether it might cause a run upon the Bank. But if the alteration was gradual, it could no more produce this effect, than a trade with Petersburg for hemp. The grower of corn has not an appetite for gold, which is absent in the grower of hemp. If the corn trade had a tendency to create a want of gold, the hemp trade would do the same; and that it does not, is a proof, that either the gold is not carried away at all, or it comes back as fast as it goes.

60. That money failing, we should have no commodities at all.

A. If we got no iron from Sweden, we should be obliged to make iron at home as before. Our iron factories cannot at the same time be destroyed by getting iron from Sweden, and by not getting it.

61. That we are altogether in an artificial state; and therefore must go on as we are.

A. This only means that the community is losing by a great many hurtful monopolies instead of one. Men are agreeing to vote for a general famine, for the promise of a half-penny roll a-piece to themselves. Each sees the mischief of his neighbour's bargain, but fears to lose his own; and so all suffer like fools together.

What the land-owners really say, is, "Let *us* rob you all, and then you shall rob one another." This is the bargain they offer; and the manufacturers swallow it open-mouthed.

Of all the petitioners upon this subject, the men of Stroud appear to be the wisest; for they petitioned, that all the monopolies of the manufacturers might be taken away, on condition that the great monopoly of all went along with them. How the men of Stroud came by their wisdom, those who know them can best tell; but it is clear they are wise in their generation.

The amusing part of the proposed fraud is, that we are all to get rich by robbing one another. The leader of the administration himself does not pretend to believe it. He knows full well, that the plan is as stupid as it would be to attempt to double the strength of an army by doubling each battalion in turn by drafts from the others. Nobody believes it, but idiots. Rogues pretend to believe it, that they may feather their own nests.

62. That if everything was cheap, everybody would be ruined.

A. The great fallacy of the enemies of free trade. When the traders in any particular branch obtain high prices, they get rich; what then so plain, as that if the traders in all branches get high prices from one another and from the public, they must all get rich,—and the contrary?

This is the blunder of teaching a man to get rich by filling his purse out of his waistcoat pocket. If he fills either his purse or his pocket by itself, he may get rich;—but not if he fills one out of the other.

If John Adams, in his residence on Pitcairn's Island, were to propose, for example, to get rich by making and keeping a canoe himself, when he could obtain yams cheaper by paying the natives of some neighbouring island for bringing them in canoes of their own, and were to set down the increased expense bestowed on his canoe as a gain to the shipping interest of John Adams,—it would be plain that it was only John Adams making himself creditor by himself, and that what-

ever was the flourishing appearance of his shipping account, the real fact was, that he and his family lost and threw away all that might be saved by employing the cheaper mode. The case is the same in greater communities; except that it is one set of individuals that gain the shilling, and another that lose the pound.

If one man should be allowed to take a halfpenny a-piece from every individual in the United Empire, he would get rich. But if all people had liberty to do the same, they would not all get rich; still less if of all that was got by any person, he was obliged to throw half into the sea. Some men cannot understand this, and therefore go on crying out, "The shipping interest will be ruined, and the silk trade "will be ruined, and you will all be ruined together; by giving over "filling your pockets at the expense of one another, and trying to fill "them by having more of everything you want." And at the bottom of the whole will be found the land-owners; who are the only persons that have anything really at stake in keeping up the delusion.—This, therefore, may be called the *halfpenny a-piece* fallacy.

The Tories protest against this exposure; under the title of "crazy generalities." That every man gets a halfpenny from his neighbour, is clear; and for the rest, "*Give us none of your crazy generalities.*"

A time will come when the public will wake as from a dream, and ask who it was that persuaded them, that the way to be rich was for everybody to give as much as possible for everything. In the mean time there is nothing to be done, but to wait till the progress of knowledge makes men ashamed of being impoverished by such a fallacy.

The proposition of the enemies of free trade amounts to this—"Let "each man gain a shilling, at the expense of a pound to some of his "neighbours, and we shall all be richer for it in the end." This is *their* theory; and this is what we are asked to believe. This is the coarse and contemptible fraud which is attempted to be thrust upon us; and in support of which our adversaries have the insolence to talk of "the humbug of free trade," as pickpockets do of the "humbug" of honesty.

It is easy to collect the individuals who expect to be the gainers of the shilling, and cause them to halloo at the removal of a minister who has the sense to oppose himself to their designs. But it does not the less follow, that their project altogether is one of profound stupidity and dishonesty; and that the only wonder is how other men can be found fools enough—or as Mr. Cobbett would say "*brute beasts enough*" —to give in to it.

When the ship-owners, for instance, cry out for restrictions upon foreign shipping, what they really say is, that it is convenient and proper that some other men should be robbed to keep ship-owners; with a loss to the public equal to the whole sum in question besides. Of course every man who has a robbery to carry through in turn, is on their side. The whole dynasty stick together like burrs. Deep calls upon deep; and to rob and help to rob, is held forth as the true art of government.

63. That we are all to get rich by paying a halfpenny a-piece less to one another than we ought to pay.

A. We are to get rich by ceasing to take a halfpenny a-piece from one another *and throw the half into the sea.*

64. That prices must be high, in order that the taxes may be paid.

A. The *halfpenny a-piece* fallacy again. If one man can contrive to get high prices by himself, he will grow rich and be able to pay taxes; but all will not be enabled to pay taxes by getting high prices from one another. The ability of a country to pay effectual taxes, must depend on the amount of useful things brought into existence; and if the restriction upon food reduces the amount of these, it must reduce the substantial amount of what can possibly be raised by taxation. It would be odd policy to subject a town to a blockade, by way of keeping up the value of the taxes.

65. That though under a system of restriction a higher price is given for a particular article, yet all that is paid by one is given to some other person in increased employment and wages; which makes no national loss.

A. The fallacy is in concealing, that the price paid by the consumer would have been equally expended upon something and somebody, if the consumer had been allowed to buy the cheap article instead of the dear one; and consequently the loss to the consumer is balanced by no advantage in the aggregate to anybody.

For example, a man is made to buy wine produced in a hot-house, instead of buying it at a tenth of the price from Portugal; and the difference, it is urged, is expended on coals and colliers. But the nine-tenths of the price would have been equally expended on something and somebody, if everybody had been left to themselves. The final result therefore is, that the consumer loses nine times the natural price of the wine, without compensation in the aggregate to anybody.

When a highwayman takes a purse from a traveller, he expends it, it may be, at a tavern or a vintner's, and the traveller would have expended it somewhere else. But in this there is no loss in the aggregate; the vice of the transaction is only that the enjoyment goes to the wrong man. But if the same money is taken from the traveller by forcing him to pay for the fabrication of a dear article instead of a cheap one, he is not only despoiled of his just enjoyment as before, but there is a destructive process besides, in the same manner as if the loss had been caused by making him work with a blunt axe instead of a sharp one.

Whenever, therefore, anything is taken from one man and given to another under the pretence of protection to trade, an equal amount is virtually thrown into the sea, in addition to the robbery of the individual.

66. That whatever increases the market price

A. In the first place, whatever increases the price of a commodity, diminishes the

of any commodity, increases the amount of capital required to provide the public with the necessary supply, and consequently increases the amount of the profits upon that capital; —which must be so much national gain.

consumption; and, so far, does not increase the amount of capital required, but diminishes it.

Secondly, though the amount of capital and of profits in some trades should be increased by restrictions, this could make no increase of national wealth;—because all that was gained by one would be taken from somebody else.

The only test of the increase of national wealth, is the possession of an increased quantity of useful things in the aggregate.

67. That in every trade, all that is gained by one is lost by somebody else; and therefore this cannot be objected exclusively to the trade of the agriculturist.

A. It is not true, that in an honest trade all that is gained by one individual is lost by another. It is true of that petty portion of the price which is concerned when men haggle about a difference; but it is not true of the main body. The payer is compensated for the whole price by the possession of the article; which without payment of the necessary profits of production he could not have. He is therefore compensated for the part which consists of profits, as well as any other; and what he is compensated for, he does not lose.

If this was not so, commerce, instead of being the communication of mutual benefits, would be a succession of acts of plunder. By commerce being always meant *honest* commerce, or that which is carried on by voluntary consent, and not at the sword's point like the landlords' trade in corn.

68. That whatever men may think of free trade as applied to others, every man thinks it is going *a little too far*, when it is applied to himself.—*Country Newspaper.*

A. Men are always ready to make rules for the general advantage, and evade them when they are to be applied to themselves. But this does not prove the rules to be bad. All that is proved is, that men are not sufficiently advanced in intelligence, to pursue the common interest in concert.

Nobody denies that one man may gain, by robbing by himself. What is denied is, that everybody can gain by robbing everybody. It might as well have been urged in the Highlands, that if it was not for cow-stealing, no man would have any beef in his pot;—that cow-stealing is the procreation of beef.

69. That what no man can be found to vote for in his own case,

A. No man can be found to vote for hanging, in his own case; but it does not follow that thieves ought not to be hanged. Human

must be an evil generally.

laws, from the first "*Ne quis fur nèc quis adulter*" to the latest of William the Fourth, are nothing but efforts to promote the general good, by the application of what no man votes for in his own case.

70. That 'Apply the liberal and enlightened principles to all trades but mine,' has been the general cry. From which all trades may learn, that what is false with regard to their own interests, may be equally false in regard to the interests of others; and that the wisest policy they can pursue is to content themselves with the management of their own affairs, without pretending to know what ought to be done with the affairs of other people. — *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine.*

A. "Apply the principles of *justice* to everybody but me," has been a pretty general cry too. From which all men may learn, that the justice which is so inconvenient in regard to their own interests, may be equally inconvenient in regard to the interests of others; and that the wisest policy they can pursue is to content themselves with picking pockets themselves, without pretending to know what ought to be done with the pockets of other people.

Liberality— or as its enemies prefer calling it, Liberalism,—means honesty, means common sense. It is a struggle between those who have the sense to be honest, and those who have not. It is a great corporation of men of all castes and countries, for protection against swindlers.

The swindlers are of all kinds, and each follows his line. One man they rob in his religion, another in his bread; and another they sell, wife, children and all, into slavery. Their great object is to prevent mankind from making common cause;—from finding out that the fair gentleman who is robbed in Threadneedle-Street, has a joint interest with the dark one who is knocked down in the Minories. And to say the truth, men are very slow in making the discovery. It is the lesson which Providence has been teaching them these five thousand years, and they have not learned it yet. One man has an idiosyncrasy for disliking the flogging of women; but he cares nothing about the Corn Laws,—*That's politics.* Another would raise heaven and earth if he was touched in his religion himself; but thinks it quite natural that Jews and Quakers should be oppressed, because in his own person he swallows oaths and pork without retching. And so the common enemy rides every horse by turns.

The enemy, meanwhile, has no lack of instinct on his part. He knows that injustice is a common cause all the world over, whether justice is or not. Let a Pasha, for instance, carry off a ship-load of women from Greece; and he is all alive to his "vested interests." If the question is, whether England shall deal fairly between Spain and Mexico, it is discovered that the interests of slavery are at stake, and therefore the balance must incline.

The most important observation for an Englishman is, that in all the varieties of wrong, the agents are identical in the main,—it is the same robber caste throughout. The country is divided into two parties. The

Tories, whose system in all its branches is reducible to that of setting one man to live by the injury of another,—these are one party. And the other is, everybody else.

71. That if we diminish our home production in any branch, we shall be disappointed of the expected supplies from abroad, and so be obliged to return to the home production with loss.

A. This cannot happen if the alteration is gradual.

72. That it is a shocking thing to talk of diminishing our home production.

A. The question is not of diminishing our home production, but increasing it; for nothing can be had from abroad, but through the medium of something that must be produced at home.

To put the objection fairly, it should be stated, that it is a shocking thing to diminish our home production *in any branch, though the consequence should be that the home production on the whole was greater than before.*

73. That if our foreign commerce is to be instrumental to the diminution of our agriculture, there is no compensation that it can offer for the sacrifice.

A. The sacrifice, and the compensation, consist in having two bushels of corn where there was but one before.

74. That we cannot have the blessings of civilization and wealth, and the cheapness of provisions which is found in unimproved countries.

A. We cannot have them both at once *from our own soil,* and there was never any question of doing it. The question was, whether cheap corn is not best, wherever it may come from. It might as well be urged, that we cannot have the blessings of civilization and wealth, and the blessings of beavers' skins, which are found in unimproved countries.

75. That the countries where cheap corn is found, are very miserable.

A. The question is not whether those countries are happy, but whether having their corn would make *us* happy. The objection is like saying, "On no account let your ladies "wear furs. You have no idea what wretches "the North-Western Indians are; and above all, their women." The misery of the people quoted, proceeds neither from having corn nor having furs; but from totally different causes, which our buying their corn or furs is one step towards removing. They have all the qualities required in customers; which are, to want what we have, and have what we want.

76. That if we had corn cheap as in Po-

A. Poland is a country having no manufacture but corn; and we should not be

land, we should be what Poland is.

that. It might as well be said we should speak Polish.

The misery of the mass of the population in countries which produce nothing but corn, is easily accounted for. They have no source of demand upon the owners of the soil, except for their agricultural labour; and in this, their habits and numbers are such as to reduce their recompense to the lowest possible rate. The reason, therefore, why the Irish peasantry starve on potatoes in the midst of corn and beef, is the same that makes the negro in the West Indies drink water in the midst of all the materials for punch. There is no existing cause, why the master should give him punch. And if the exportation of sugar and rum was prohibited, it does not follow that the negro would get any more punch.

77. That in the countries where corn is the dearest, the manufacturing and trading classes are, in regard to both numbers and extent of business, beyond all calculation more rich and prosperous than they are in those where corn is the cheapest.

A. It would be very odd if it were otherwise. Corn being dear, means that a great quantity of the commodities of manufacturers and traders is given for corn; which can only happen where the manufacturers and traders have a great deal to give, and are so numerous as to make the competition great.

The argument is like saying, that where most is got by taking purses, it will be found there are most to take. It is the effect for the cause.

78. That an expense has been incurred on the inferior soils, and it would be waste to throw it away.

A. If some unwise gentleman, by raising grapes in hot-houses, had contrived to make wine equal to Port at the price of Tokay, the best thing his friends could recommend to him, would be to burn his hot-houses whatever had been the outlay, and take to drinking Port at four-and sixpence like his neighbours. There is no doubt that the outlay will be lost. It is lost already; and the only question is how much shall be thrown away after it.

79. That the landlords who have made the outlay, and the people who are to benefit by its being thrown away, are different individuals; and therefore one has a claim to compensation from the other.

A. If the gentleman supposed, had built his hot-houses in consequence of the existence of a law prohibiting the introduction of foreign wine, the case would certainly be altered.

The first question then would be, "Had the gentleman any hand in making the law himself?" If he had originated the plan, and voted in parliament after parliament for its support, he would clearly have no claim.

80. That indifferent spectators have vested

A. If they have vested their capital upon expectations injurious to the community, they

their capital in land, and therefore ought not to be prevented from making their expected profits.

must take it out again; as the law would direct in a similar case that came before it. It may be a reason why the removal of the evil should be gradual; but not why the evil should not be removed at all.

They always knew that their expectations were subject to the contingency of the law's continuing; and paid for them accordingly. A man might as well claim parliamentary compensation for an east wind. He always knew the wind would blow easterly some time or other.

81. That the landowners relied on the corn-law contract.

A. The corn laws were no more a contract, than the election of a member of parliament by a majority of one is a contract. They were an act valid till an opportunity offered for getting a majority on the other side. With whom did the landowners make the contract? Was it with themselves, who were the majority that made the law? Or was it with the minority, who were doing all they could to hinder it?

82. That the attacks on the Corn Laws are founded on the supposition that they are a system of complete prohibition. Whereas there is not a prohibition; but only a tax.

A. A tax is a prohibition, in respect of all that it keeps out.

83. That the evils of inconsistency and versatility are ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice. — *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine.*

A. A convenient doctrine for those who have a wrong to defend; but for nobody else. Change is not a good by itself; but change from bad to better is a good.

84. That plenty and cheapness were the offspring of the confidence of the farmers in the continuance of the prohibition.

A. Plenty and cheapness cannot have been the offspring of having a smaller quantity of food instead of a greater. And it is impossible for importation permanently to take place, except as it brings in a greater quantity.

85. That if the light lands are thrown out of cultivation, the price of animal food will rise.

A. No permanent change can take place, except in consequence of men finding that they are better off by it than before. What portion of their improved living will consist of mutton and what of bread, may safely be left to themselves.

86. That all things have gone well with us, and therefore nothing should be altered.

A. This is only saying, that things have gone on as they have; and because there has not been a total destruction of happiness, nothing must be mended. Distressed manufacturers and commercial stagnation, are to be no proof that anything should be altered; but because all the manufacturers are not starved, and all commerce is not at an end, nothing is to be changed. So in Ireland men doubtless said, "Potatoes have grown when they were planted; therefore plough on with your horses' tails."

87. That when the country was in its greatest prosperity, things were high in price.

A. During the war the annual expenditure was doubled by borrowing, for twenty years together, as the expenditure of a spendthrift is doubled by dint of mortgaging. This was the merry time. And when the expenditure ceased, as cease it must, then came the woeful time; and all the population and interests which had been raised up by the anticipation of expenditure, necessarily perished. If any man wants to know *how* people perished of the funding-evil, let him read the reports of charitable institutions during the years that succeeded the war. Many fell by the earlier symptoms; but those in whom the disorder went its full length, died of a collapsion of the intestines. This is the history of the connexion between prosperity and high prices.

88. That as we introduce foreign corn, we lessen the value of our own.

A. The use of corn is to have corn to eat. It might as well be argued, that corn ought not to be introduced into a town blockaded, because it would reduce the value of what was there already.

89. That foreigners will always buy what they want to buy, and sell what they want to sell, whatever may be our laws with respect to corn.

A. What foreigners will want to buy, will be that which they can get by giving something which they want less. To refuse, therefore, to take what they can best part with and we want, is the sure way to hinder them from buying and us from selling.

90. That to seek out foreign customers in preference to those who are upon the spot, is absurd.

A. The superiority of a customer depends simply on whether he will give more than another, of that which we want to receive.

91. That our own manufacturing workmen should have the means preserved to them of buying our own corn.

A. That is to say, they should have the means of buying two bushels, where it is determined there shall only be one.

92. That there is no limit to the corn that can be produced at home, if people will pay for it.

A. This is like saying there is no limit to the milk that can be produced from a single cow, if people will pay for the keep. There may never be a time when it is impossible to obtain another drop. But in the first place, it is clear that the quantity is limited after all. And next, that there is no reason why people should pay for feeding a cow on green peas, when by sending across the brook they may have as good milk from one fed on grass.

93. That the produce of Great Britain and Ireland is equal to the support of their inhabitants. And that our being able to supply ourselves, is proved by the fact that we *have* been supplied.

A. This is only saying, that there have never been more inhabitants than were fed. It would have been equally true if nine-tenths of the present inhabitants had been starved. All that is proved is, that we were never more than were kept alive.

94. That corn will be got so cheap from Ireland, that the Corn Laws will be a dead letter in respect of foreign corn, which will be no longer wanted.

A. If Ireland for a time produces an influx of cheap corn, wise men should seize the opportunity to get rid of the Corn Laws, while there is less of immediate interest concerned in their support. There is no use in waiting for the mischief to get up again.

95. That if a country can supply all its inhabitants with food, the importation of foreign corn is a robbery on the farmer, without benefiting the consumer.

A. In the first place, Why is the consumer to pay twice as much for his food as he need? Why is the man who might have had a little bread and a little cheese, to give all for the bread and go without the cheese?

Secondly—as before—Every country will supply all its inhabitants with food, if none is allowed to come in from other quarters;—by the token that there *can* be no more than are supplied. It would be true of a mouse-trap, if it was the pleasure of the agriculturists to limit us to one.

96. That the mischief arises from a superabundant population.

A. A superabundant population means only a population which it is not convenient to the land-owners to allow to live by exchanging its industry.

97. That people ought not to want to populate so much.

A. If Noah had shut himself up in his ark, and let his family eat nothing but what could be grown upon his decks, he would soon have had an outcry against population, and an Emigration Committee; and Shem, Ham,

and Japhet would have been "distressed manufacturers." And instead of reading lectures on not multiplying, his remedy would have been to let in foreign corn.

A commercial and manufacturing nation, has or ought to have, like Noah, no limit but the world. What *he* was to do by digging, *it* can do by spinning and inducing other men to dig. The steppes of Tartary and prairies of America, are so many pledges that it need be yet but in the youth of its existence. What is to come next, when the world is filled up, it does not seem necessary to determine in this present parliament. What is clear is, that the felicity of the existing generation depends upon progression, as it did with Noah. It can make no difference, except in the size of the experiment, whether men are confined to the corn of an ark or of an island.

There is no doubt of the general truth, that men may multiply faster than the means of support. But they have a right to demand a fair field for finding their support. They are not bound to exercise the *Malthusian* continence, upon an artificial limitation to please the landlords.

Mr. Malthus has described to a hair's breadth the consequences of a population increasing beyond the limits of its food; and no man has been able to gainsay a word of his discoveries. He has demonstrated everything relating to the caged birds, except one thing—*why there should be a cage.* He has omitted to point out, that when God said "Increase and multiply," it was not added "And let there be landlords "upon the earth, to make corn laws for them that dwell therein;"—that manufactures and commerce are God's solution of the difficulty, and were given to be a dispensing and equalizing power, whereby the inhabitants of old countries should be partakers in His design of universal replenishment, with as much comfort as the more immediate actors in the process. And truly a fearful thing it is, that any men or set of men should be allowed to stand between us and God's mercies, saying to us and to God, "Hitherto shall ye go, and no further; and here shall ye be stayed for our unjust gain."

All the evils produced among us by the pressure of population, are of corn-law formation. The landlords said Be—*καὶ ἐγένετο.*

98. That the excess of population should be relieved by emigration. — *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol.* XVI. *p.* 993. Mr. WILMOT HORTON; *Dec.* 7, 1826.

A. To pay a million for preventing the people from keeping themselves, and a million more for carrying part of them away, is paying twice for poverty.

Emigration may have a tendency to let off the evil at a certain point; but there can be no right to inflict the evil till men ask for transportation as a relief. Emigration is a valve; the pains of transportation the weight upon it; and the landlords have the benefit of the high pressure.

Every English manufacturer, therefore, who is driven to emigrate, is an innocent man condemned to transportation for the interest of the landlords.

In Ireland the same principle has been at work, under somewhat

different circumstances. Two millions of Protestants, kept six millions of Catholics, in the same state of oppression and systematic irritation, that might possibly have been inflicted on the Protestants if the Catholics had been the potential majority. And they did this through the instrumentality of twelve millions of Protestants on the other side of the water; who, principally through ignorance, allowed the others to have their way. All manner of mischief arose in consequence; and the twelve millions of people went to the expense of an army,—to say nothing of the hazard of worse contingencies,—for no purpose but that the two millions might enjoy the pleasure of oppressing three out of four of all the men they met. For to assert that there could be any other reason, why fourteen millions should keep six in a state of political depression,—even if it was certain that the first use they would make of their liberty would be to vote for the Pope being put in possession of Windsor Castle,—would be a manifest absurdity. But as it is easier to manage five millions of discontented men than six, emigration was encouraged as the means of getting rid of the million.

In both cases, therefore, emigration acts as a valve to let off the evil at a certain point; the purpose being to have the greatest quantity of evil consistent with the safety of the actors. In England the object has been money; in Ireland, ascendancy.

The people of Ireland have got their Emancipation; and it remains to be seen whether the people of England can obtain their own. But, like the Irish, they must make themselves heard. They cannot expect that it should drop into their mouths.

99. That emigration is no evil, because it is voluntary.

A. And so is a man's cutting his throat. But there can be no right to inflict misery on an innocent man, till he is driven to cut his throat.

100. That if the manufacturers are already in such a state of distress as calls for emigration, to throw a number of agriculturists out of work must increase the evil.

A. Not if for every man thrown out of employment in agriculture, two are brought into employment in other ways. While ten men are kept in employment to raise fifty quarters of corn at an unnecessary price, twenty are prevented from being employed in what would bring in a hundred quarters at a lower price.

101. That the agricultural labourers are suffering as much as any others. Which is a proof that the evil does not arise from any cause peculiar to the manufacturers.

A. The complaint is, that a general stop is put to the progression of industry and wealth; by which the agricultural labourers suffer in the end, as well as the manufacturers. If the path for manufacturing industry was open, half their children would live by manufactures, instead of being starved as now. The plague is general; and agricultural labourers die of it as well as others.

There must always be a balance between the conditions of the agricultural and the manufacturing labourers;

because if any striking difference arises between them, there will be a transfer from one class to the other. It may not take place among the grown labourers; but it will take place among their children, which comes to the same thing in the end. There may not be a migration, either of grown persons or of children, from Sussex into Yorkshire, or *vice versâ;* but there will be a migration from one neighbouring county into another,—and from the next county into that,—and so on till it reaches from Yorkshire to Sussex at the last. Hence if the manufacturing labourers are reduced to misery by the corn laws, the agricultural ones must needs go shares.

The same reasoning will prove, that the farmers have no substantial interest in the preservation of the monopoly. It is true, that in the first instance, they have an interest; of the same kind as would the shopmen of a class of shopkeepers which had the power to exclude the rest. But if they have no outlet for their children in the advancing industry of the community, they must starve one another, and be a most beggarly race in the end. And the same conclusion will be applicable to many classes of the land-owners, and of the clergy. It will be applicable in fact to all, except those who can quarter their children on the public for support.

102. That the distress of the artisans is caused by production increasing in a greater ratio than consumption.

A. It is caused by the efforts of men to produce,—or in other words to do something which they may exchange for food,—increasing faster than the food. The way therefore to diminish the distress, is to allow men to exchange for food all that they can.

103. That the distress arises from a disproportion between the demand and the supply of labour.

A. The absence of demand for labour means, that labour is prohibited from exerting itself in the direction in which there is a demand. Allow labour, or its produce, to be exchanged for what the labourer wants; and he will find a demand. There are thousands of capitalists waiting to give him employment, and millions of men waiting to give him food in return for his labour; and it is the pleasure of the agriculturists that they shall not.

104. That if the manufacturing labourers had free trade, it would be of no use to them; because they could never keep pace with power looms.

A. The manufacturers must at all events be better with power looms and free trade, than with power looms without it.

105. That the suffering arises from the use of machinery.

A. There would be no suffering from machinery, if the trade in food was free; but on the contrary great benefit. The cause of the suffering, therefore, is not machinery, but the refusal to allow the produce to be exchanged for food.

That the use of machinery is detrimental in the long run to the ma-

nufacturing labourers, is an error which they ought to out-grow. Compare, for example, the extent of the stocking trade in the time of Queen Elizabeth,—when silk stockings were made with men's fingers and sold for their weight in gold,—with its present state; and ask the five thousand labouring silk stocking weavers, whether they would wish to see the trade reduced to what it was then. All the difference has been caused by machinery.

Experience has proved, that when the production of any commodity is facilitated by machinery, the increase of consumption consequent on the reduction of price, in a state of freedom and under the existing circumstances of the world in respect of the desire to consume, is such as in the end to increase the demand for labour in the production *of that particular commodity*. If power looms could bring down the price of broad cloth to a shilling a yard, and the corn of foreigners might be taken from them in return,—so many people in different parts of the world would wear broad cloth who now do not, that there would be more employment for makers of broad cloth in the end than ever. If men cannot exchange the cloth because the agriculturists will not let them, the case is certainly altered. But then the fault is not in the machinery.

106. That the manufacturers are not dying through the high price of corn, but through want of employment.

A. The want of employment, is simply because their pots and pans are not allowed to be sold to those who would buy them and give corn instead. The land-owners say they will give corn; but not enough to keep soul and body together. Thus one set of men are prevented from buying food, that another may have high prices.

107. That the distresses of the manufacturers are only temporary; and therefore cannot arise from restrictions on corn, which are permanent.

A. The sufferings of the manufacturers show themselves by fits, like an ague. But an ague may be a permanent evil, and have a permanent cause.

108. That corn is not so high as it has been at other times, when there was less distress; and therefore the price of corn is not the cause of the distress.

A. The money price of corn may be lower; but the money price of labour is lower in a still greater degree. It is not the absolute price of corn, but its relative price as compared with the price of labour, that measures the distress.

109. That if we receive corn from other countries, we are not

A. They will receive what we have to give, or else not give us corn.

If our manufactures are not bought now, it

sure that they will receive our manufactures in return. Foreign markets are glutted with our manufactures already.

is because we refuse what our customers have to pay in; though we ourselves are starving for want of it.

110. That the prices of foreign corn may be raised upon us, not merely by the cupidity of foreign merchants and speculators, but by the exactions of foreign governments.

A. The fear of the cupidity of foreign merchants, is childish. All merchants are individually anxious to get the most they can; but the competition among different merchants is always sufficient security against their cupidity. If it was not so, there would have been an end of all trade long ago.

If foreign governments should try to exact, they must exact from their own subjects, not from us. Suppose Portugal was to try to exact from us, by taxing the exportation of wine. The only consequence would be, that the Portuguese wine-growers would be ruined, and we should buy wine elsewhere.

111. That it is the interest of a country to support its own population with the produce of its own soil.

A. Not if it can support them better with the produce of another. It might as well be said that it is the interest of a country to supply its wine-drinkers with the produce of its own soil by means of hot-houses.

112. That it is degrading to a country not to support its population on the produce of its own soil.

A. All that a country can have, must directly or indirectly be the produce of its own industry. The objection is only like saying that it is degrading to make woollen cloth and buy Port wine, instead of making wine in hot-houses.

113. That England would be converted into a work-shop for the boors of Poland.—*Watchman.*

A. An affirmation that it is disgraceful to trade;—that for the honour and glory of this nation, trade must be kept down by Act of Parliament.

114. That cheapness of bread can only be permanently obtained by the produce of our own soil.

A. It would be as true to say the same of the cheapness of wine.

115. That it would be absurd to employ the soil in the production of wine, or of su-

A. The only difference in the absurdity is in its numerical amount. To pay ten pounds for the wine or sugar that might be had for one, is allowed to be absurd. *Therefore* it is

gar; because it is not adapted to them. But that this does not apply to corn.

wise to pay sixty shillings, for the corn that might be had for thirty.

All that is meant by the soil not being adapted for wine or sugar, is that they cannot be produced here so cheaply as they can be purchased somewhere else. And it is the same with the corn.

116. That to increase the growth of corn, is surely the way to afford a supply.

A. Not if for every bushel added to the home growth, two are taken away from what might be procured by another course.

117. That the most effectual security, both in peace and war, against the returns of scarcity, must be derived from our maintaining ourselves habitually independent of foreign supply.

A. This is only saying, that the most effectual way to lose nothing, is to have nothing to lose.

Such independence, in the words of the Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford*, "is to be independent of the foot-path, by walking in the kennel."

118. That plenty is dangerous, because we may be deprived of it.

A. Two legs are dangerous, for the same reason.

119. That the free admission of foreign grain is a bounty to foreigners to extend their agriculture at our expense; and is therefore a premium on foreign rivalship.

A. It extends our own manufactures in an equal degree. To refuse it, is like a draper's refusing to sell cloth and buy bread, lest he should raise up a rival in the baker.

If nations are natural rivals, it is only the more important to preserve our position in the race. America and France, either have not similar prohibitions, or are not arrived at the point where they are felt. The power of increasing our wealth and population by exchanging manufactures for food, is what God has given us to hold our ground with; and this leg we determine to cut off.

The true statement would be, that a tax on foreign grain is a bounty on foreign manufactures. It is so much cut off from what foreigners would gladly give us in exchange for our manufactures, and added to what they must give, though on worse terms, to manufacturers of their own.

---

* "Three Lectures on the Mercantile Theory of Wealth, delivered before the University of Oxford; by Nassau William Senior, A. M., Professor of Political Economy." Murray, 1828. The ablest and most entertaining publication on a question of political economy, that has appeared since the time of Adam Smith.

120. That to permit importation would be to inflict barrenness on a fruitful soil, in the same manner as would be the result of a deterioration of the powers of nature; and render it doubtful whether the day might not come when England should no longer produce a sufficiency of food for its inhabitants.

A. It is as the importation of wine would inflict barrenness on a fruitful hot-house. If *the supply failed from abroad, hot-houses might begin again.*

121. That the high prices of the last thirty years have changed millions of acres of worthless land into land of average fertility; and have thus practically given to the nation for ever, millions of acres of fertile land in addition to what it previously possessed.

A. It was all only building hot-houses to make wine; if the produce could have been had cheaper by importation. If the land has been brought into such a state as to be worth keeping, it will not be thrown out of cultivation by free trade.

122. That a high price of corn is at once cause, symptoms, and consequence, of the progress of a country in wealth and civilization; and *vice versâ.*

A. It only shows, that people want a great deal more corn, if they were allowed to get it.

123. That granting that each member of the trading part of the community may pay annually 10*s.* more for his quarter of wheat, and that this may amount in the aggregate to five or six millions yearly; still, if in its own operation it has the effect of giving to the nation half a million additional acres of fertile land yearly, it must be an immense national benefit.—*Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine.*

A. If a higher price is paid for corn under the prohibition, it can only be because the quantity is diminished on the whole. The position therefore is, that it is an immense national benefit, to have more acres and less corn.

124. That the high price of bread is the result of commercial prosperity; not the cause of national distress.

A. It might as well be argued, that in a town blockaded, the price of bread is a proof how prosperous men are.

125. That corn would be of a high price, even though the landlords should agree to take no rent.

A. The tenants would become the landlords. Which proves nothing against the admission of foreign corn.

126. That the money price of corn is not the test of its real price.

A. The test is, the labourer's receiving a greater quantity of corn for a given quantity of labour.

127. That though we get our corn apparently cheaper than it is grown in England, it may turn out that we measure that cheapness or comparative value, by a merchandise which is worth more in one country than it is in another.

A. Leave the dealers to settle this. The whole trade, craft, and business of a dealer, is to see that nothing of this kind takes place.

128. That the assertion that commercial prosperity depends on the low price of food, is disproved by the fact, that in India rice is so cheap that a workman can live on twopence a day; and yet English muslins are exported to India, and undersell the others.

A. If a labourer in India only gets for his day's work as much rice as he can eat, it matters not whether it costs two pence or two shillings. If, however, he really gets more food for his day's work, it only proves that the skill of the British workman, aided by machinery, more than makes up for the difference.

129. That the landlord receives only what his property is fairly worth, or what others feel it to be their interest to offer him.

A. The shopkeeper who should forcibly put down all other shopkeepers in the town, would receive no more than men felt it their interest to offer him. The question is, whether forcible measures shall be allowed, which *oblige* other men to offer him an unnecessary price.

130. That the rent is the value which circumstances over which the landlords have no control, give to their land.

A. The landlords make laws to create famine prices, and then say the rent is produced by circumstances over which they have no control.

131. That the rent depends on the value of the land.

A. The value depends on the rent; not the rent on the value. It is impossible to say what is meant by the value of land, except as it depends on the rent. If land will sell for anything, it is because it is capable of yielding a rent.

132. That the rent is only the fair profit of the price paid for the land.

A. If a Roman emperor offered the perpetual pillage of a province for sale for a present sum, the sum given would be calculated on the same principles as in the case of any other annuity, and the annual pillage would be only the fair market profit of the price. But this does not prove the whole proceeding just.

133. That the rent depends on a contract voluntarily made between

A. True, as regards the contract between landlord and tenant; but not true, as regards the effect on the community. There might

the landlords and the tenants. And therefore any unfairness or greediness on the part of the landlords, would be corrected by the tenants.

be a perfectly fair bargain between the Roman emperor and his contractor; but this does not justify the pillage of the community which was at the bottom.

134. That the rent is only the price of the land, paid by instalments.

A. It is a price dependent *on an unjust law.*

135. That the rent is only the natural price of the use of the land.

A. It is the natural price of the use *under an unjust law.*

136. That the rent is the just payment for the improvements made on the land.

A. Land on which money has been laid out gives a rent, only because it gives an increased produce. If the money had been laid out without increasing the produce, there would have been no increase of rent. The rent therefore, as before, is the price of the produce *under an unjust law.*

137. That if the gains of the landlords were unreasonably high, there would be a rush of capital towards land; which would correct it.

A. Not if the land must be paid for to the present holders at the full value of what is expected from it. There is no rush to five per cent stock, more than to three; and for the plain reason, that each must be paid for proportionably.

138. That the property in the rent of land, is the origin and foundation of all other property.

A. The origin and foundation of property, is labour. The proposal to keep up rent by restrictions, virtually includes the essence of personal slavery; which consists in obliging one man to labour for the benefit of another without an equivalent. The landlords may have a property in their honest rent; but they have not a property in the power of adding to it by violence.

139. That the proprietors of land have *a right* to the protection of the state.

A. They have *a right* to sell their produce to all who chuse to buy it, and to let others do the same.

If by protection they mean a protecting duty, a protecting duty means everywhere, giving men other people's money which they have no right to. It means giving a tailor two-and-sixpence for his work instead of two shillings, for the tailor's convenience. Honest trade means voluntary exchange; and protecting one side of a voluntary exchange, is only a circuitous expression for violence.

140. That it would be worse than madness to abandon the protection of the agricultural interests of the country.

A. What is really meant is, that it would be worse than madness to destroy a monopoly, of which the object is to cause there to be two bushels of corn where there might have been four.

141. That in destroying the agricultural interest of the country, we should obviously and certainly destroy that country itself; for to its prosperity or adversity must Great Britain look for the prosperity or adversity which she is to enjoy or suffer.

A. The fraud is in talking of the agricultural interest, as if it meant having corn; whereas it means *not* having it. The words "agricultural interest," mean a combination for the prevention and prohibition of corn;—for causing there to be two bushels where there might have been four. It is the same thing as if the owners of wells should prohibit the use of streams and rivers, and call themselves the "watering interest."

142. That the first duty of government is to protect the interest of the home grower of corn; its second, to provide for the people so much food as the home grower could not supply, by measures the most reasonable and consistent with the safety of the British agriculturists.

A. The first duty of government, is to see that one order of men does not commit injustice on another. And the first duty of a free people, is to keep an eye on the proceedings of their governors in this respect.

143. That if the growers have not a right to protection, it would follow that if foreign corn could be sold in this country at a price that would strip them of every farthing of income, and nearly of every farthing of property, they would have no right to a protecting duty.

A. It would follow so, precisely. There might be reasons why any alteration should take place gradually; but none why it should not take place at all.

The agriculturists appear to have persuaded themselves, that there is some necessity for their being supported in a state of wealth at the expense of others, quite independently of the question whether their produce is wanted by other men or not.

Suppose, for argument's sake, that corn could be obtained for positively nothing, like water. There would be no more reason why the price of corn should be kept up for the advantage of the landlords, than why the price of water should be kept up for the advantage of men calling themselves water-lords,—by prohibiting streams and rivers, and forcing the public to buy the water of wells, from which by dint of digging, water was obtained for half as many people as there otherwise might have been. If such an abuse was in existence, there might be reasons why it should be reduced gradually, but none why a fragment of it should finally be left.

All the fallacies advanced in the case of corn, might be repeated in such a case of water. The diligence of the water-lords to grub for the

last pint, they would call improvement and zeal for the multiplication of water. They would descant on the capital they employed, and the industry they set in motion; and be pathetic on the fate of the well-digging population, if the government should restore the liberty of drink. They would assert that it was clear the country had been supplied; and if any complained that they were dying from want of water, they would tell them they were a superabundant population, and ought not to exist. They would declare that it would all be easy, if it was not for taxation; but as long as taxes were to be paid, it was impossible that water should be free.

144. That they ought to be shielded from the experiments which theorists desire to make upon their property and comforts.

A. The man who takes my purse, has the same desire to be sheltered from theorists; *especially the theory of justice.*

145. That they are a devoted class.

A. All men who live by the injury of the community, are of necessity a devoted class. Society exists only for the purpose of "devoting" them. It is all their own fault, in insisting upon running their heads against other men's right to enjoy the fruits of their industry.

146. That they are marked out for spoliation.—*Watchman.*

A. They are marked out for the operation which is performed on a horse-leech by dipping its tail in salt. And they may think themselves well off that this is all. They will have their tails salted yet, they may depend upon it; as certainly as the manufacturers would, if they had been all this time laying a duty on home-grown corn.

147. That they have a right to stand up for the interests of their order; and will do so as far as they are able.

A. No person doubts that they will. Shoemakers would do the same, if they saw any chance of keeping up the price of upper leathers. Every other order would do so too. But they are each checked by the just interests of the other parts of the community; and so must the agriculturists.

148. That prices are already such as to ruin the farmers, and oblige them to turn off their labourers.—*Watchman.*

A. This must always be the consequence of any fall of price; and would equally have taken place if corn had been raised to its weight in gold. It would take place with the farmers of wells, if water had been sixpence a pint and should fall to fivepence. It is therefore no proof either that prices are higher than they ought to be, or that they are not.

149. That corn is now selling for less than the cost of cultivation, and therefore the "operatives" ought to be satisfied.—*Watchman.*

A. Cost of cultivation, means cost upon the worst lands. It no more follows, therefore, that the "operatives" should be satisfied, than that they should be satisfied to pay sixpence a pint for water, because the owners of the worst wells were losing by its not being sevenpence. Nothing ought to satisfy them, but having the full liberty of getting water where it can be had.

150. That corn would be brought to 20*s.* a quarter.

A. It is like the owners of wells urging, that if rivers were free, water would be brought to a halfpenny a gallon. It is precisely because it would be so, that it ought to take place. If the owners of wells urged that they had a right to compensation, the answer would be, that they had themselves been the authors of the unjust law, and no man has a claim to be compensated for the loss of a wrong of his own making. They might have a claim to being allowed time, on the ground of humanity; but to nothing else.

At the same time, it is not true that corn would be brought to 20*s.* a quarter. It might, if the Corn Laws were removed all at once; which is precisely what nobody has asked for. But if the removal was gradual, an increase of population and demand would grow up with the removal, and prevent the price from ever falling so low*. The land-owners will undoubtedly make all the outcry they can; but they have no right to make an outcry on what would never happen to them.

151. That if the result of free trade is the impoverishment and distress of the people, it will be ill compensated by an adherence to philosophical maxims and sentimental conceptions.

A. The philosophical maxims are, that we shall not be the richer for gaining a shilling at the expense of a pound. The sentimental conceptions, that one man ought not to be starved to please another.

152. That we ought not to follow the conceits of theory.

A. Conceits of theory mean, believing that two from four leaves two. If a man avoids running against a post, it is out of a "conceit of theory" that it would probably do him harm. Conceits of theory mean everywhere, following the dictates of common-sense, in opposition to the interest of somebody who had rather we did not.

"Theory" is from *θεωρέω* "to see;" and means seeing further than a man's nose. There may be false theories; and then the remedy is to show where they are false. But the outcry against theories in the abstract,

* See "True Theory of Rent," Note in p. 412 preceding.

is only an outcry of knaves against what is getting the better of them. It is a huge conspiracy against common-sense, for the advantage of the monopolists. Common-sense is getting the better of the world fast. The dunces will be *ci-devants* in another generation; and it will be difficult to make April-fools of a whole people that can read and write.

153. That what are called abstract principles are not matter of experimental truth, but merely the OPINIONS of individuals; and therefore ought not to be acted upon. — *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine.*

A. It is hard to say what any principles are, but the opinions of individuals. The Liberals are of opinion that two and two make four. Their opponents are of opinion that they do not. And the only question is, which party will persuade the public they are right.

154. That if this empire in the first year of peace had given to the leading political, trade, and currency projectors, one million of pounds sterling each, on condition that their schemes should never be named or acted upon, it would at this moment have been richer than it is.—*Id.*

A. There may be no doubt that the possessors of the wrongs have lost the sums they mention. It is the thieves counting their losses by the true men. Which may be truly said to be the true men's gain.

155. That the fine frenzy of abstract doctrine is far less trustworthy than the rough and vulgar reason of daily experience.—*Id.*

A. The rough and vulgar reason of daily experience happens to be all on the side of those who say four bushels of corn are better than two; and the fine frenzy with those who maintain that they are not.

156. That the only safe guides a nation can follow in the management of its concerns are, plain fact, physical and arithmetical proof, sober reason, and humble expediency.—*Id.*

A. All of which the nation is desired to believe, are in favour of having two bushels of corn instead of four.

After all the outcry that has been made against abstract doctrines, the truth is, that those who follow abstract doctrines are the wise, and the rest the ignorant. The moment a thing is established by "plain fact, physical and arithmetical proof, sober reason, and humble expediency," it becomes abstract doctrine, and not before. It is abstract doctrine that carries a ship round the Cape of Good Hope. What are called "abstract" truths, should be called "universal" truths, or truths which can be demonstrated to be of universal application.

157. That free trade is nothing but the greediness of the manufacturers.

A. It is the greediness of those who labour, in desiring to have *something*,—that prevents those who never labour, from having everything for nothing.

158. That free trade means prohibiting the agriculturists from obtaining prices that will secure them from loss, the shipowners from obtaining freights, the silk and glove manufacturers from living by their trade; and consequently what is called free trade is only a mass of restrictions and prohibitions.—*Watchman.*

A. The shopkeeper who forces the public to pay twice as much for his goods as they could be bought for on the other side of the street, complains that to alter this is "prohibition." It is the prohibition of a public wrong.

159. That free trade means repealing the laws which protect the native industry of the country.—*Id.*

A. There is an industry of the native buyer as well as of the seller, which has a right to fair play. A labouring man is told, that he must give five shillings' worth of the produce of his industry for a given article instead of four, and this by way of "protecting native industry." Now, industry against industry, why is not a shilling's worth in the hands of the rightful owner, as good as in the hands of the man who wants to take it from him on the pretence of protecting native industry? There is no use in pretending to protect one man's capital and industry at the expense of another man's capital and industry; it is a fraud. There is no increase of wealth in the aggregate, from the existence of the dear article instead of the cheap one; but on the contrary, a loss equal to the whole difference of price. Any plan for increasing national wealth by such means, is as fallacious as one that should propose to increase it by giving every man in his turn a license to go out and rob, with the further condition that he should throw half into the sea. To take the sum of the booty and call it an increase to national wealth, would be the same blunder as doing so with what is gained by certain dealers in consequence of restrictions.

A washerwoman is told that she is to give sixpence more for soap, in order that the kelp-gatherers *may be protected against foreign alkalies.* Now in the name of justice, why will nobody protect the washerwoman? Simply because washerwomen are not represented in the House of Commons.

It must be "collective folly" of the highest order, that does not see that all similar demands amount only to *rob that rob may.* If Thomas was told that an Act of Parliament should be passed to enable him to take twenty shillings from his neighbours, it is very likely that Thomas would think it a good joke; and that John would be anxious to know whether his turn was not to come next. But it would be an extraordinary specimen of collective wisdom that did not find out that its first duty was to send both John and Thomas about their honest business.

160. That it has always been a leading principle with the old system of trade, to establish and protect in this country any trade

A. When any trade or manufacture can be introduced with final advantage, private enterprise is competent to its accomplishment. To ask for more, is only to ask to have a finger in the public purse.

It may be possible to conceive an individual

or manufacture, or the production of any articles, calculated to be a source of national benefit. The splendid fruit is by far the greater portion of the manufactures—and the manufacturing superiority and opulence of this country.—*Blackwood's Ed. Magazine.*

case in which it might be politic for a government to give an advantage for a limited time and for a specified object; as has sometimes been done in the foundation of a new colony. But this is nothing like the case in hand. The demand made is, that the public shall be obliged to support *all* trades, upon no proof but that they cannot stand by themselves and are never likely to do so.

If no trade can be "protected" but at the expense of some other trade first, and of the consumers a second time besides, it will be very difficult to make out a case for "protection."

161. That Free Trade has evidently injured several trades, without yielding any perceptible benefit to trade generally.—*Id.*

A. If it has prevented anybody from robbing to the extent of sixpence, it is evident that the sixpence must be left with some other persons, however it may be subdivided. The fallacy therefore is like saying, "Here is a highwayman, poor man, who is to lose five hundred a-year; and where can you show anybody that will gain the like?"

162. That the plain, comprehensive, powerful, and majestic common sense of JOHN BULL ought to be heard. —*Id.*

A. The object is to persuade him that he is to get rich, by filling his purse out of his waistcoat pocket. When will "John Bull detect himself a fool;" and cease to be at the mercy of every man that strokes him down the face, and calls him by his name Beast to flatter him?

163. That the Agricultural Interest—the different Colonial Interests—the Shipping, Mining, and Monied Interests—the Silk Manufacture, and various other Manufactures—the Aristocracy—and the Church—are all opposed to the free system; and that these make an overwhelming majority.—*Id.*

A. They are all eager for their own particular injustices. But it does not follow that there is common sense in the system, or even that it is for the ultimate advantage of any of the separate parties.

If the Church does not bestir herself, and that quickly, she is a gone Church. The land-owners have their eye on her, as what is to be first given up, to put off their own day of reckoning. The Church first, then the fund-holders. If any attack is made upon the Church, the fund-holder who does not take the warning, deserves what he will get.

164. That because the silk and glove-makers, &c. cannot sell as cheap

A. Therefore they are to be made to turn their hands to something else. They may not be able to do it all at once; which is

as foreigners, *therefore* they are to be ruined and starved.—*Id.*

a reason why the alteration should be gradual. But do it they must; either by themselves or their posterity.

Why is not there an Act of Parliament to make every man wear a wig, for the benefit of wig-makers? It would be just as reasonable as making men wear silk or gloves they would not voluntarily buy.

If tradesmen are to be supported upon some other principle than that of their goods being wanted, incomes must be dispensed by parliament, and society turned into one great poor-house.

The great remedy for all the failing trades, would be the removal of the Corn Laws. An English glove-maker cannot compete with a French one; and how should he, when he is made to keep the landlords?

165. That it is hypocritical cant to state, that cheap bread would be afforded the people by the introduction of foreign corn. Every cargo of foreign corn brought into the country is a cargo of foreign labour, and has the effect of driving British labour out of the market, and of making the labouring men paupers; and instead of affording cheap bread to the people, would be the means of starving them.—*Watchman.*

A. The agriculturists know, that it is only because bread will be cheaper, that they are afraid of freedom. The hypocritical cant, therefore, is all with themselves.

It might just as well be urged, that every cargo of water admitted into a country where rivers were prohibited, was a cargo of foreign labour, and had the effect of driving domestic labour out of the market. It is nothing to us whether it is a cargo of foreign labour, or of no labour at all. All that we are concerned in is, that we get it for a less quantity of *our* labour. And the labour it drives out of the market, is the labour of well-diggers,—the labour of men who are employed only in consequence of a tenfold diminution of wealth and employment to the community at large.

166. That the agriculturists demand no more than a fair profit.

A. A man has no more right to demand that his trade and his *quantity* of profits at 10 per cent shall be doubled at the expense of his neighbours, than he has to demand that his *rate* of profit shall be increased to 20 per cent. But even this would be no statement of the demand of the agriculturists. Their demand is, that they shall have 10 per cent upon land which of itself would not pay its own expenses, *and an addition of* 10 *per cent to their former profits on all their better land besides.*

167. That the manufacturers are bound to proportion their production to the demand.

A. They are not bound to submit to an unjust limitation of the demand.

168. That if the freedom of trade is curtailed upon one point, it is only throwing more capital and exertion into other directions.

A. It is of no use to allow freedom of trade in pocket-handkerchiefs and court-plaister, if the great trade in what every man must consume whether he blows his nose or not, is to be forbidden to advance. That portion of the benefit of foreign trade which consists in exchanging one luxury for another for the gratification of the classes that live without working, is retained; but that portion which consists in increasing the quantity of the first necessaries of life which is attainable by the working classes, is cut off by act of parliament.

169. That it is necessary to preserve the land-owners in their relative position.

A. The other classes of society are growing rich by working; and in this the land-owners see a necessity for their being preserved in their relative position without working. There might as well be a petition from any other class of men who have the love of living without working, praying "*to be preserved in their relative position.*"

170. That supposing every man to consume a quarter of corn yearly, and the price of corn to be reduced by the freedom of trade twenty shillings a quarter, the benefit could at most be only twenty shillings a year, or three farthings a-day. — *Blackwood's Ed. Magazine.*

A. He will not only have paid less by twenty shillings a quarter for whatever he may have had, but he will also have had a plentiful supply instead of a scanty one. He will not only have paid three farthings a-day less for his daily loaf, but he will have had a larger loaf. And besides this he will have had all the increase of comfort, in the way of increased employment and, otherwise, which arises from the wealth of the community being in a progressive state instead of a stationary one.

But suppose the thing were true. Twelve millions of men would save twelve million pounds a-year. And why is the community to subscribe twelve millions a-year to serve the landlords?

171. That when men say they want more corn, it is a most ridiculous thing to begin by diminishing the produce of the home growers.— *Id.*

A. Just as ridiculous as it would be to diminish the produce of wells, by allowing men to drink at streams and rivers.

172. That no man living will question, that if the agriculturists cannot obtain a price for their corn sufficient to pay the cost of its production, it must be no longer grown.

A. It can only happen in consequence of more and cheaper corn being obtained from other quarters.

173. That the importation of a comparatively small quantity of corn at a low price, might produce a frightful declension in the price of corn; and so cause the corn grown at home to be diminished by more than the quantity imported.

A. The reason why corn sells for 40*s.* or any other price, is because nothing less than that price will make men agree about the division. Hence if a place should be found where corn could be loaded for nothing, like ballast,—it would not make the price of corn fall, unless the quantity on the whole, home-grown and imported together, was increased.

174. That it is absurd to say the produce of manufactures is restrained, when it is manifest that no restriction is put upon exporting.

A. Two things are necessary to the completion of an act of commerce; first, that we should have what others want; secondly, that we should be at liberty to receive what they can afford to pay in, and it will be worth our while to take.

A merchant in the actual state of things can afford to sell a piece of Leeds or Manchester goods in Prussia or Poland for a hundred crowns. If he could afford to take eighty, he might sell two pieces where he now sells one. If he was allowed to lay out the eighty crowns in corn, and bring it to England to a free market, he could sell the corn for as much as would give him a profit on the whole; and consequently he would accept the eighty crowns, and sell two pieces instead of one, and get two profits for himself, and give two profits to the manufacturers. He is restrained from selling the corn; and therefore he is restrained from doing all the rest.

175. That laws preventing the landing of corn at London, cannot be the cause of bankruptcies at Liverpool.—*Blackwood's E. M.*

A. Bankruptcy is the check to the indefinite multiplication of traders, as the evils arising from diminished food are the check to that of the inferior classes of labourers. Both take place where they do, in consequence of the limitation of commerce; and the engine of the limitation is the Corn Laws. He that was in the Gazette yesterday, came there by the Corn Laws.

176. That only the foolish and idle are bankrupts. If they had been as careful as Mr. A. and Mr. B., they would not have failed.

A. It is certain the weakest will fail; but whether they were weak or not, somebody must fail. The case is like that of a hundred prisoners, among whom there should be thrown half enough for their daily food. The weakest will be those who starve; but whether they were weak or not, somebody must starve.

177. That it is not the interest of the manufacturers, but the in-

A. The interest of the manufacturers and the interest of the public coincide. If the manufacturers had procured a law to prevent

terest of the public, that should be considered.

the sale of any home-grown corn, in order that all the corn consumed might be bought with their manufactures abroad, then the interest of the public would coincide with that of the agriculturists. The interest of the public is, *justice.*

178. That the manufacturer may have foreign trade and welcome, provided he do not thereby ruin domestic industry. But the moment he requires the nation to live upon imported food, in order that he may have ability and opportunity to undersell the Continentalist in his own market, chain him up with strict fetters, as an unprincipled monopolizing knave.—*Blackwood's E. M.*

A. "Domestic industry" here means the industry of highwaymen. It means the industry of those who are to live by robbing somebody else. The moment the manufacturer requests to put down these, "*chain him up with strict fetters, as an unprincipled monopolizing knave.*"

179. That any measure which is beneficial to one class of the community, must be productive of good to all.

A. Not if the benefit to that class is derived from a corresponding injury to others. Still less if the benefit is effected at the expense of a tenfold injury to the rest of the community, as is the case with the Corn Laws.

It is no more necessarily true, than that it would be productive of good to all, to remove the police-men from the Strand. There is a class that would be benefited by it; but the question is, whether it is *an honest* class.

Put the case that the manufacturers had got a tax on home-grown corn; and see what the land-owners will say to the argument in that form.

180. That the petitions against a free trade in corn, are more numerous than those for it; which shows that the sense of the community is against it.

A. The agriculturists petition by squads, the manufacturers by regiments. The agriculturists in every parish, have the squire to lead them on; who is always alive to his own interest. The manufacturers and the rest of the community are only half awake; they are still rubbing their eyes under the effects of the *halfpenny a-piece* fallacy.

Wait till the case is a little better understood. There is no hurry to close the poll. Those who call for it know that the out voters are not half up yet.

181. That the duty on imported corn goes to the public account.

A. This is only saying, that the land-owners do not take both the high prices and the duty.

Raising a revenue by occasionally relaxing the duties on imported corn, is the Crown permitting the landed aris-

tocracy to plunder the people, but sometimes giving the aristocracy a squeeze in turn. There is no doubt that the people will gladly help the Crown to give the squeeze. But it is a disgraceful state of things after all.

182. That the Corn Laws are at the present moment inoperative; because prices are such that the actual duty is nothing or inconsiderable.

A. The Corn Laws act, not only by what they do, but by what they are ready to do. It might as well be urged that the sentries at St. Helena were inoperative, because they never fired upon Napoleon. They only stood ready to fire, if he attempted to escape.

The Corn Laws enact, that corn shall never be cheap to the manufacturer, though it may be as dear as it pleases. They stand by to fire upon the foreign grower, if he presumes to grow corn for the English market. The way to try the justice of the plea, is to suppose that the manufacturers had got a scale of duties on home-grown corn, being nothing when corn was 5*s*. a quarter; and that when corn was at 5*s*. the agriculturists were told it was the act of heaven, and the duties had nothing to do with the result.

183. That the fair and equitable consideration is, whether the ordinary amount of rent at this time, bears a just relation to the circumstances of past and of present times.

A. The fair and equitable consideration is, whether rents are such as are consistent with justice, or with allowing every man to enjoy the fruits of his own labour without hinderance. If rent is to go beyond this, a collector on the high road might as well request to have it considered, "*whether his ordinary "receipts bear a just relation to the circum- "stances of past and of present times.*"

184. That a certain price is necessary to *remunerate* the agriculturist; and it is just that he should have it.

A. The demand of the agriculturist, is to be remunerated for what nobody wants him to produce, because it can be got better elsewhere. The manufacturer might as well require the agriculturist to wear two stockings on one leg, or one stocking at the cost of two, and demand to be remunerated.

The agriculturists will always be remunerated for all they produce; by the token that they will not produce what they are not remunerated for. What they desire is, to produce what nobody wants from them, and to be remunerated for that. The way to judge of the reasonableness of the request, is to suppose the manufacturer making a similar demand on the agriculturist.

A tells *B* that he must pay him for a certain article. *B* says he will not, because he can buy it for half the price elsewhere. *A* replies, that he cannot make it for less, and he must be "remunerated." *B* answers, that he has nothing to do with that. Whereupon *A* locks him up, and gives him the alternative of starving or surrender. Will not *A* be convicted of robbery with violence, in any court in Christendom?

But this is not all. *A* not only insists that his goods shall be bought,

but that they shall be bought when made out of the most unpromising and consequently most expensive materials which he may think fit, *and that the same price shall be paid him for all the rest.* For example, *A* can make sugar out of beet-root for five shillings a pound. *B* refuses it, because he can buy sugar cheaper elsewhere. *A* offers to prove before parliament, that if *B* is allowed to do as he pleases, he might buy sugar for tenpence a pound, and what an iniquity would *that* be. And when this is done, *A* will make sugar out of turnip tops, at, it may be, fifteen shillings a pound, and demand that it shall be bought. And if *B* objects, *A* will go to parliament, and ask to have a custom-house officer set over him, with soldiers at his back if need be, to see that he eats no sugar till he consents to pay *A* fifteen shillings, *not only for what is made of turnip tops for fifteen shillings, but for what is made of beet-root for five shillings also;* and the difference, saith *A*, is "my rents."

There is no denying that this is the process of the agriculturists; and that if other men followed the same, the world would be one scene of mutual spoliation.

The truth is, that what other men will voluntarily buy, is the only measure of what any man has a right to sell; and that all which goes beyond this, is of the nature of the manœuvre of the foot-pad, who should present a basket of gingerbread at your coach-door, and require, with an armed force behind the hedge, that you should pay with your purse for its contents.

185. That when the agriculturists can barely obtain a remunerating price, it is a proof that the market is plentifully supplied; and consequently foreign corn should not be allowed to depress that price.

A. The landlords' theory of remunerating price is a bottomless pit. When they talk of their barely obtaining a remunerating price, they mean *on the worst land on which the present price makes it practicable to grow corn.* Hence they would equally be found talking of a remunerating price, if corn had risen to its weight in gold.

Since, then, in every imaginable state of the supply there must be some land or other that is paying a barely remunerating price, this proves nothing with respect to the market being plentifully supplied, or the propriety of prohibiting foreign corn.

186. That the landlords want nothing but to be barely paid, or with the lowest possible profit, on their poor lands; than which nothing can be more reasonable.

A. They want to be paid with a profit, for growing corn on the sand above high-water mark if it suits them; and to have an equal price for all they grow elsewhere besides.

187. That it has not been proved, that under the Corn Laws, wheat

A. It has been dearer than it might have been; and therefore dearer than it ought to be. The poor might as well cut down the

in ordinary years has been dearer than it ought to be.

incomes of the rich and say, "It has not been proved that their incomes have been smaller than they ought to be." What a man's income ought to be, is what he can honestly get. And it makes no difference whether the robbery is effected by cutting down the nominal amount, or by diminishing the quantity of what he shall substantially receive for it.

188. That no man can complain as long as the quarter of corn is not above sixty shillings.

A. It might as well be said, that no man can complain as long as he is allowed to have a hundred pounds a-year.

The poor have as much right to tell the rich that a hundred pounds a-year is money enough for any man, and therefore the mob will take the difference,—as the rich have to tell the poor, that sixty shillings a quarter is cheap enough for any man, and therefore the rich will take the difference.

It may be a less evil that the price of corn should be raised to sixty shillings than to ninety; in the same manner as it might be a less evil that the mob should limit the income of an esquire to a hundred pounds a-year than to fifty. But the principle of injustice and mob government is the same in both.

189. That the poor ought to have corn *at a reasonably cheap rate;* and if they have this, they ought to be satisfied.

A. The poor ought to have corn at the cheapest for which it can be got; and if they have not, they are to blame if they *are* satisfied.

If the poor were to tell the rich, that they ought to have a "reasonable" income, as for instance one or two hundred a-year, and if they had this they ought to be satisfied, and they, the poor, would take the difference,—it would be pronounced to be clean *jacobinism* and spoliation. The poor have as much right to do this, as the rich man has to tell the poor that sixty shillings is a "reasonable" price for his quarter of corn, and therefore the rich will take the difference. Much has been said of the jacobinism of the poor against the rich, but very little of the jacobinism of the rich against the poor;—though one is only matter of speculation and alarm, and the other meets every man three times a-day when he sits down to eat.

Jacobinism, according to Burke's definition, "is the revolt of the "enterprising talents of a country against its property." Corn Laws are the enterprise of the rich against the property of the poor. They are a struggle between the "have-somethings" and the "have-nothings;" for the purpose of taking from the latter, in the scriptural phrase, even that which they have.

190. That putting out of sight the ignorant

A. The price of corn ought to be, what men will voluntarily give for it in the absence of

multitude, a general unanimity exists as to what the price of corn ought to be.

restrictions. No trader has a right to say his goods shall be bought from him at a certain price whether the buyer wants them or not. If one trader has the right, another has; and where would be the end?

191. That it is a very difficult question to determine what is a fair remunerating price.

A. A fair remunerating price is what other men will voluntarily give. It is the dealer's business to see that the supply is accommodated to the demand; not, to use violence to make the demand equal to the supply.

192. That the clamours for cheap corn do not prove that corn can be produced for the price to which they wish to sink it.

A. Not perhaps by one set of dealers; but it can by another. Men have not clamoured for having corn cheaper than it can be had; but for being allowed to buy it cheap where they can.

193. That a *bread-tax* is the most odious and abominable of all taxes, being at once an injury inflicted on the people, and a direct robbery as it regards the agriculturists;—*and therefore there ought to be a prohibition instead.*

A. There is no doubt that a bread-tax is odious and abominable; but it is less so than a prohibition, and it was called for by the community accordingly. The argument is like saying, "It is an abominable thing to steal a man's cloak. Therefore take his jerkin too."

By robbery of the agriculturists is meant in this place, that it is robbery in the community to save the jerkin, and lose only the cloak.

194. That the real question is, whether the country shall be cultivated or not.

A. The question is, whether the country shall be cultivated to the extent which it is for the interest of the community to pay for, or whether it shall be cultivated to a greater extent, for the advantage of the landlords and the injury of everybody else. The counterpart of the fallacy would be, if the manufacturers had got a duty on home-grown corn and said, "The question is, whether the country shall have manufactures or not."

195. That the price of corn ought not to be allowed to rise or fall *beyond a fair average.*

A. Suppose the manufacturers were to state that it was important that the price of broad cloth should not rise or fall beyond a fair average; and therefore they must have a duty on home-grown corn, rising and falling with the price of foreign corn.

There could be no doubt of the tendency of this to keep broad cloth steady,—*at an unjust price.*

196. That in proportion as you deprive the home grower of the advantages resulting from high prices, you are equally bound to protect him against prices that are too low.

A. In other words, because a man is prevented from inflicting injustice at some certain times or places, he has a right to inflict it at some other times or places, by way of compensation. When corn is at sixty shillings a quarter, the land-owner is not allowed to inflict the injustice of raising it to ninety. *Therefore* he shall be allowed to inflict the injustice of raising it to sixty, though one half of that price is avowedly taken against the consent of the buyers.

It might as well be urged, that because a man is prevented from robbing at Hounslow on Sundays, he has a claim to being allowed to rob at Blackheath on Mondays.

197. That the evil of prices that are either too high or too low, we are bound by law to prevent.

A. The world is better constructed, than to leave the prevention of too high and too low prices to acts of parliament. A poor manufacturer who should take the same idea into his head, would be shut up as insane.

198. That the choice of all Corn Laws is but a choice of evils.

A. All that is wanted is to have no restrictions at all; or in other words, to oppress *nobody*.

199. That the landlord stands in the place of the master manufacturer or capitalist.

A. The farmer finds the capital, and deducts for it out of the produce. It is the farmer therefore who represents the master-manufacturer or capitalist; and not the landlord.

200. That the landlords add to the production, and much of the improvement of the land proceeds from them.

A. Wherever it is for the good of the community that the land should be brought into cultivation in preference to importation, it will be done without any necessity for giving the landlords a monopoly. All cultivation beyond this, is only making English Port at the price of Tokay.

201. That the landlords are the golden-egg-laying goose.

A. They lay no eggs at all.

202. That the man who made two blades of grass grow where there was one before, was always held to be a public benefactor.

A. The thing really meant is, making two bushels of corn to exist where there might have been four.

203. That the landlords will suffer by the permission of a free trade in corn; and no man ought to suffer.

A. When the question is, whether one man must suffer by a return to the rule of justice, or ten for want of it, the last must carry it. What the landlords mean by suffering, is losing what they ought never to have had.

204. That the farmers and servants in husbandry, who are unquestionably real labourers, will suffer also.

A. It is true that some of them must change their occupation; either in their own persons, or those of their children. But it is impossible to condemn ten men to the privation of the common right of all men to sell the produce of their labour, that one may not be obliged to change the mode of his. The fallacy of bringing forward the sufferings of the agricultural labourers from change, consists in keeping back the fact, that ten times as many are unjustly suffering much more for want of it. And the suffering altogether, is only part of the consequences of the original injustice. It is in the nature of injustice to produce suffering, both during its continuance and at its removal; but this is not a reason why injustice should not be removed.

It is at the same time worth while to notice the comparative smallness of the loss, which is brought upon the real capitalists and labourers in husbandry, so soon as they are clear of the bargains they have entered into on speculation upon the continuance of the public wrong. For instance, in the case formerly taken as an example, which is not far from being an average case, a reduction of price from 55*s.* to 44*s.* per quarter, while it relieved the public from the annual payment of 332*l.* 15*s.*, would only diminish the profits of the capitalist or farmer by 1*l.* per annum from the moment that he had the opportunity of making a fair arrangement with the landlord, and his outlay or expenditure by 10*l.* What is contended for then is, that the public should pay 332*l.* 15*s.* per annum, in order that the farmer and his servants may have employment to the amount of 11*l.* by selling what the public can better buy elsewhere; and that the public wrong should be continued for ever, because the farmers have entered into a speculation upon its continuance.

The further reasons why the farmers and agricultural labourers will in reality be no substantial gainers by the monopoly in the end, have been given in the answer to § 101.

205. That the petty shopkeepers and others, who have the custom of the occupiers of land, must be ruined.

A. Not if they have an equal chance of selling to somebody else instead.

206. That there will be a falling-off in the brown stout and Christmas pies, in the formerly hospitable butler's pantries of the landlords.

A. Brown stout and Christmas pies are paid for too dearly, when one man gets them, and others lose ten times the amount.

207. That the Corn Laws were not passed as temporary expedients, but as perpetual laws.

A. So men say all, with respect to laws they wish perpetual. The truth is, that all laws, not involving the receipt of a *quid pro quo* that implied perpetuity, were made to last during the pleasure of the makers.

208. That when a capital has been invested, parliament has no moral right to abrogate laws by which such capital is affected.

A. This would amount to proving that parliament can make no laws at all. The very law by which the land-owners hold their monopoly, must have put down a mass of interests that were hostile to such a law; and no law can ever be made that does not.

209. That the Bills for removing restrictions on foreign corn are founded on principles of robbery and wrong.

A. Robin Hood would have said the same of a Bill for clearing out "merry Sherwood." The only question is, *who* robs?

210. That if the fact is, that a manufacturer, from advantages in machinery, capital, fuel, and geographical situation, is able to undersell all the world; and that a farmer, from difference in manner of living, olimate, &c. can be undersold by the whole world; it would be a horrible crime and wickedness to make the distinction between man and man, which would be the consequence of exposing them alike to foreign competition. — *Blackwood's Ed. Magazine.*

A. If the fact were as described, the only inference would be, that men should be encouraged to become manufacturers and not farmers.

The crime and wickedness of doing what is stated, would be much the same as that of allowing the owner of a fruitful field to come into competition with one who should insist on growing corn on the sand at high-water mark.

Farmers do not exist that corn may be grown at high-water mark; but that other men may buy corn from them, to the extent of what it is their interest to buy. If the farmers are to do more than this, they must carry on their trade at the sword's point; as in fact they do, under any system of legislative prohibition. The people must be taxed, to pay soldiers, to keep them from exchanging their own produce for bread; for to this it comes in the end.

211. That rents were reduced one fourth by the return to cash payments, and the property of annuitants increased in the same proportion; and therefore the rents ought not to be diminished.

A. The change in the value of rents was purely nominal. The reason why rents were paid with three pounds instead of four, was because the three pounds were worth the four. If the property of the annuitants was increased in the proportion of three to four, it was only because they had been defrauded of a fourth part before.

212. That it is necessary to keep up prices, in order that the fund-holders may be paid with a small quantity of corn.

A. Paying the fund-holders with a small quantity of corn, means simply, cheating the fund-holders. It is no reason why the community should allow itself to be defrauded, that the fund-holders will be defrauded also.

213. That it is unreasonable in the annuitants to wish to preserve their annuities untouched, at the expense of the landlords.

A. There is no reason why the annuitants, whose annuities are the recompense of past labour, should give up anything to preserve the landlords, who never laboured, in the possession of an unjust gain.

214. That the manufacturing interest ought to be conciliatory.

A. It is not conciliation that is wanted, but justice. When Thomas is kept from selling in the market to please John, there is no use in telling Thomas he ought to be conciliatory. Give him justice and the common right of all men. He must be an idiot, if he licks John's feet, to obtain permission to sell the fruit of his labour to such as chuse to buy it.

To put the question fairly, it should be supposed that the manufacturers had got a duty on home-grown corn,—and a law that every legislator should be the owner of a cotton-mill, by way of keeping it. It would be seen then, how far the land-owners would be conciliatory.

215. That the landlords are amiable and well-conducted; — and their daughters handsome.

A. It may be true; but other men have handsome daughters to take care of too.

216. That the annuity of the annuitant will be doubled, if the price of corn is reduced one half.

A. This only proves, that if the price of corn has been unjustly doubled, the annuity of the annuitant has been unjustly reduced one half.

217. That the annuitants live in luxury.

A. The annuitants have laboured, or somebody for them; and therefore it is just they should live in luxury if they can.

218. That the *fund-holders* ought to be robbed.

A. To rob the fund-holders of their interest, after having spent their capital, would, besides all the evils of breach of contract, have the hardship of an *ex post facto* law, with the unique addition of being made in the teeth of the invitation of an existing law. The nation which should do it, would virtually declare itself incapable of contracting any national engagement, or performing any national act. A community must either acknowledge the possibility of being bound to-morrow by its act of to-day or it must

dishand; for if it declares its own incompetency, it will be treated with as a community by nobody. And for anything that could be gained by such a proceeding, it might as well be proposed to gain by robbing all the individuals who had red hair. The individual robbers might gain by it, but the community could not gain; because the red-haired men are themselves part of the community. If the principal expended could be called back again, it would be a different case. But nobody can seriously believe, that by what has been called applying a sponge to the national debt, the community would be one shilling the richer; or that by robbing one individual of five pounds per annum in order to put it into the pocket of another, the smallest progress would be made towards recovering the hundred which was spent thirty years ago. A man might as well try to repair the loss of a leg, by shifting the deficiency from one side to the other. If every individual was a fund-holder in the same proportion that he is a tax-payer, it would be clear that the attempt was only shifting the leg. And it is the same, when the case is as it is; except that the fund-holders are the smaller party, and therefore might possibly be robbed.

And this is not the fallacy of saying that a national debt is no evil. It is a very great evil; and the worst thing about it is, that there is no getting rid of it. When a million is borrowed and spent, the evil is inflicted *then*; and not by the shifting of the interest from one pocket to another afterwards. It is not the *evil* that is denied; but the possibility of getting rid of it by refusing to pay the interest.

The magnitude of the evil or punishment, is the same as if there had been inflicted a judicial necessity for throwing the amount of the interest annually into the Thames. For if the money had never been borrowed, the man who is now the fund-holder would have had the principal in his pocket; and the tax-payer would have saved the interest, which is the same thing to him as saving it from the Thames. But there is a special provision of Providence, that when money has been thus raised, no possible dishonesty shall get rid of the burden. If the principal had been borrowed from Prester John, the community might possibly gain by cheating him of his interest. But since the interest is owed to a component part of the community, it is in the constitution of things, that the community, however inclined to the practice of larceny, can gain nothing by robbing itself.

The fact is—and it is a melancholy one—that money once taken from a nation through the medium of funding, is irrecoverable. If the Holy Alliance were to invade Great Britain, remove the legitimate sovereign and substitute a pretender, and then levy a sum by funding, under the title of Indemnification,—it would be past the art of man to get rid of it, except by taking it in the same manner from the enemies in turn. If the wheel ever comes round, the people of England may try.

To propose that the fund-holders should contribute, in their separate character, to any imaginable object of national expenditure, is as unjust as to propose that certain of the creditors in a case of bankruptcy, should suffer the average loss of the creditors in general, and have a sum struck out of their original account besides. The fund-holders pay all

taxes like other men; and to attack the amount of their claims upon the public besides, is precisely the operation supposed in the case of the bankruptcy. They make no objection to paying at the same rate as other people to a property-tax, or to any other. What they object to, is being taxed and plundered too.

The depreciation of the currency caused by the issues of superfluous paper, and which existed from 1800 to 1821, was a fraud upon the fund-holders and the holders of the circulating medium; and as the fund-holders suffered in both characters at once, it is no diminution of the distinctness of their claim in the first character, that the whole community was suffering in common with them in the other. The amount may be calculated to sixpence with as much ease as a bankrupt's account; provided only the bankrupt will surrender facts. The depreciation was at its height in 1814; and as it was reduced, the fund-holders began to gain upon such sums as had been borrowed when the depreciation was greater. But if the losses of the fund-holders had been from time to time put into a bag, and then put out to interest and the interest made principal, as an honest man would do with the property of a ward,—and if the fair interest or annual value of the amount is calculated for the year 1821, and compared with what the fund-holders have gained and are gaining annually now by the increase of the value of money,—*the first will be the greatest.* This is matter of arithmetic; which nothing but arithmetic can destroy. (*See Jushet's Tables for every Year. Baldwin & Co.*) Hence after all that has been said about an equitable adjustment,—if there is to be one, it will be in favour of the fund-holders.

That people have been miserable cheated, nobody doubts; but not by the fund-holders. The fund-holders have lost and not gained, in their character of fund-holders; and they have borne, and do bear, their share of the general suffering besides. How the suffering is to be diminished, nobody seems able to tell. A gone-by government indulged itself with an unjust war; of the expense of which it never paid a shilling, and has left the whole for us. The immediate defendants are out of reach; they are where nobody will go to fetch them. All that is left for us in the way of recovery, is the possibility of recovering something from the interests in favour of which the fraud was enacted. And to this, if Corn Laws go on, it will come at last; though probably not till the necessity is such as to be equally convincing to all parties.

The case then stands as follows. A debt has been contracted, which, in the present state of the nation's ability to bear it, is overwhelming. To rob the individuals to whom the interest is due, would only be robbing Peter to pay Paul; and could no more create an increase of national ability or wealth, than licensing one member of a family to take five pounds from another member, can enrich the family. And to diminish the debt by buying it up, can only be done by inducing a suffering equal to the evil that is removed;—by paying for it, in short, with exactly what men determine to be of the same value in the market. On this side, therefore, we are shut up; neither gods nor men can help us. But there is one way Providence has left open to us; and that is,

to outgrow the evil. Allow the wealth and ability of the nation to double themselves, by removing the Corn Laws; and the debt which is now overwhelming, will be comparatively insignificant,—in the same way that the load which buries a vessel of one hundred tons, will be only comfortable ballast for one of two hundred. "*And all this at our expense,*"—say the agriculturists. "*All this by the putting down of your injustice,*"—is the answer. If the manufacturers were keeping down the wealth of the country by a tax on home-grown corn, the agriculturists would see clearly the propriety of allowing it to expand to its natural dimensions, by the removal of such an enormity. It is but reversing the parties, to see that the case applies equally to the agriculturists.

If up to the present moment the land-owners of the Isle of Wight had been able to prevent the eating of any corn throughout the empire but their own, and the country in this state of artificial depression was sinking under a load of debt bearing about the same proportion to the actual debt of the British empire that the population, wealth, and power of the Isle of Wight bear to those of the whole empire,—it would be difficult to prevent a minister from perceiving, that he had it in his power to annihilate the pressure of the debt, by the simple process of allowing Great Britain to be Great Britain instead of being the Isle of Wight. Just the same opportunity is offered, by the removal of the present monopoly. That a government who were themselves part and parcel of the monopolists should not find this out, is conceivable. But why a minister who had been the architect of his own fortunes, and had achieved his greatness by leading and not by being led,—should shut his eyes to such a truth, and insist on being the minister of the Isle of Wight in preference to being the minister of Great Britain; why *such* a man should repress the natural desire to be at the head of a powerful country rather than of a weak one, and should cultivate a gross injustice with only national poverty for his fee and national debility for his reward,—is among those inexplicable things which it is not necessary to enlarge upon, till there is greater experience as to the existence of the fact.

219. That money may as well be taken from the fund-holders as from the landlords.

A. This is saying that it is the same thing to defraud a just creditor, and to prevent a shopkeeper from raising his prices by a forcible monopoly.

220. That if expediency is to be the rule, away go all corn laws and public annuities together.

A. Justice is expediency. The payment of the public annuities is just, and therefore expedient. The corn laws are unjust; and inexpedient in all other ways besides.

221. That the landlords, however, wish for no sweeping measures; they only wish to be let alone.

A. When a man has possession without right, this is commonly what he wishes.

222. That the alteration is revolutionary and dangerous.

A. Not a word was said of revolution, when the alteration was the other way.

The danger is not so much in doing the thing as in leaving it undone. Everybody knows, that if it is not done, it is because a disproportioned share of the representation is in the hands of the landlords. Everybody knows too, that for the rich not only to have the natural influence of their riches, but to have a monopoly of the representation besides, is in point of naked justice as unreasonable, as if they were to claim not only to have the benefit of their riches in the market, but to have the poor kept out in addition;—and that if the system stands, it is only because things go on tolerably well under it. If one order of individuals takes advantage of it to make the others keep them, things do *not* go on tolerably well; and men will call out for a change. The middle classes in this country have an insuperable aversion to unnecessary changes; but if they find out that their distresses, though not coming absolutely in the shape of want of bread, but in the shape of the bankruptcy of their sons and of their daughters' husbands, the general stagnation of trade and the impossibility of rising in the world by honourable industry, are traceable to a common cause,—they will join the others, and make a mass of opinion which it will be impossible to resist. If the land-owners insist on thrusting the reasons for radical reform into every man's ledger and meal-chest, they must take the consequences;—one thing or the other will give way. At the same time the danger of change is on all sides greatly exaggerated. Under a despotic government nothing is done without an explosion; but in a country so far advanced in freedom and habits of order as Great Britain, as soon as a sufficing majority believes that a measure ought to pass, all opposition sneaks off.

It will be interesting to see, how long a nation that can read and write, will go on believing that the way to be wise is to do nothing that looks like common-sense. If one part of the nation complains that it is unrepresented and consequently robbed, the other party comes forward to declare, that it shall never be represented at all, unless their own voices are increased in an equal degree. If one calls for a purge, the others cry out, "Oh, but it will be unfair if you do not give an astringent too." And it never seems to occur to anybody that the question is not of keeping up an equilibrium in the bowels of the patient, but of doing something that shall do him good.

If any man desires experimental proof of the senselessness of what is termed virtual representation, let him take it in one word—Corn Laws. The manufacturing and commercial interest is robbed, because its opponents have contrived to arrange matters so that they shall have many voices in making the laws and the others shall have few; and the fraud of virtual representation consists in maintaining, that the few are as good as the many. How this came to be the state of things, is accounted for by the fact that the earliest state of a nation is the agricultural; and therefore manufactures and commerce have a prepared organization of barbarism to struggle against. But to be in this manner in the power of another, is in reality what is meant by slavery; and people may sing

"Never will be slaves" as long as they please, without altering the fact, that whoever has not a voice in the election of his law-makers, has no right to the title of free man. Our ancestors—and there is no reason why we should be less wise than they—were so well aware of this, that they applied the term "freeman" to a man that had a vote; and the rest were thralls. It is only when everybody is equally represented, that wealth of all kinds has its just weight; and the wealthy members of the manufacturing and commercial interests will perhaps at some time find out, that the resistance to the universal right of suffrage is nothing but a contrivance for depriving *them* of their just influence, and plundering them of their wealth; a new form, in short, of the old contest between the Highland cow-stealers and Glasgow weavers. Wealth should be represented; but then it should be everybody's wealth;—and the only way to do this, is to let every man's influence tell for what it will fetch, whether it be little or much, as it does in the market. The assertion that representation ought not to be coincident with population, is only an assertion that there are parts of the population which it is desirable to keep from having what they can buy. And the injury is not confined to the poor (for nobody cares about *them*), but by God's providence it extends to all by whom they are influenced or employed. When a man is deprived of his suffrage and the suffrages of those under his influence, there is no more doubt about what is ultimately intended, than when a pistol is clapped to his breast in a crooked lane on a dark night. That a body of manufacturing labourers, by dint of having no votes, are oppressed and starved, is what might have gone on for ever; but that their employers annually lose thousands by it, is what some day or other will be heard of. In the case of Great Britain, the limitation of the right of suffrage is merely an invention for giving power to the landed interest to abuse; and if the poorest man in England wants to know what he personally suffers by it, he has only to weigh a penny roll. So much for the assertion that common men have nothing to do with the laws but to obey them. It amounts, in fact, to an assertion, that they have nothing to do but take what the landlords chuse to give them.

Everybody knows that this is the common-sense view of the question; and that the objections on the ground of practicability, are like those of the boy that combed his hair once a-week, and wondered how people did that combed it every day. But the world is not sufficiently advanced in mental puberty, to act upon the knowledge. Like mankind in the dark ages, we start on beholding "the twilight of sense and heresy," and hasten to involve ourselves again in the gloom of orthodox servility. The operative delusion is, that if common men were protected from having their pockets picked, gentlemen would have no security for their own;—that their safety depends on its being exclusive. The manufacturing and commercial interests will be robbed, till they can discover this to be a cheat; and it is right that it should be so. Nothing is more fitting, than that men should go to school to oppression themselves, till they can find out that to have justice it must begin with the lowest.

There is always a common-sense view of a question,—and one that is

not common sense, for a sinister purpose. If such things had been, reported by Captain Basil Hall, we should say "What fools there were in Loo Choo!"

The common people, by dint of gallows and tread-mill, have been pretty well beaten into a persuasion that for them honesty is the best policy. But great masses of the higher orders, with some allowance for change of times and places, are nearly at the same point in respect of morals, that they were in the days of cow-stealing. To get all they can at the expense of somebody else, is with them the law and the prophets. This is one of the "true truths," whose very shadow, according to Lord Byron, would work strange changes if it got abroad.

223. That the petitions against the Corn Laws generally end with a request for Parliamentary Reform. (*laughter.*)—HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT in 1828.

A. It is difficult to say what there was to laugh at. The French say, *Rit bien qui rit le dernier.* Twenty men, or twenty millions, combine for a common purpose; and a part stand up and declare, that *they* are the only people who know anything about the business; and the result is, that they make the others keep them. Such laughers deserve to have it said to them, "Thou shalt see the day when thou shalt go into an inner chamber to hide thyself."

This *laughter* is now an invaluable piece of history. It shows the connexion between some things and some other things.

224. That it is like the French revolution, in being an invasion of property.

A. It is contrary to the evidence of facts, that the French or any other revolution was founded on a plan for the invasion of property. The most numerous classes, which are the industrious ones, contract every where a profound reverence for property, by the difficulty they have in amassing it themselves, and their dread of losing it. It is not the poor, but the rich, whose besetment it is to hanker after the property of others.

The French revolution had no more connexion with a design to invade property, than the English revolutions of 1640 and 1688. Like them it originated in a desire to escape from oppressive institutions; and when certain classes in France took part with foreign invaders, they brought on themselves the vengeance of the others, and lost their property, as would have happened in England or anywhere else. There might be instances in which advantage was taken of the state of things to plunder; as there were men who stole blankets in the No Popery riots of 1780. But it would be as irrational in one case as in the other, to say the invasion of property was the object of the commotion.

In the same manner Luddites, Rockites, United this and that, have all been men acting under an impression, wrong or right, that they suffered injustice, and that the course they took was the way to remove it; and much damage has occasionally befallen the rich in the course of

their evolutions. But none of them were ever actuated by an original design, to enrich themselves by appropriating the property of others.

All history proves that it is as true now as in the days of Harrington, that "a people never will, nor ever can, never did, nor ever shall, take up arms for levelling."

225. That it is like the Agrarian Law.

A. The Agrarian Law was a dispute about the division of conquered lands. It was a dispute of the same nature as if the sailors of the fleet had a claim for prize-money, on the ground that the admirals and post-captains had taken the whole; and was therefore anything but what many are in the habit of supposing it, an attack on the rights of property.

Hear Livy;—no favourer of the commons, as himself will show.—"Spurius Cassius and Proculus Virginius were next made consuls. A "treaty was concluded with the Hernici, and two thirds of their land "taken from them. Upon this, the consul Cassius was going to divide "half among the people of Latium in general, and half among the "commons of Rome. To this donation he joined a quantity of land, "which he stated to have been unjustifiably taken possession of by in-"dividuals, though the property of the public. This alarmed many of "the Senators, who were themselves the individuals who had taken pos-"session; for fear of their personal interests. But the Senators were "under great concern too on the public account, being apprehensive "that by this grant the consul was laying the foundation of powers dan-"gerous to liberty;"—(in other words, they raised the cry of danger to the constitution). "This was the first time the Agrarian Law was pro-"duced in public; which was never afterwards brought into discussion at "any period of our history without occasioning the greatest commotions. "The other consul opposed the grant, at the instance of the Senators, "and without in fact all the commons being on the other side; for at "first they had begun to take it in scorn, that the donation by being "made general should have gone from the citizens to the allies*;" (that is, they kicked at the proffered division, on the ground that they ought to have had more).

It was not till eighty years after this, that the Roman soldiers had any pay†. So that the division of lands stood for both pay and prize-money.

When nineteen or twenty years had passed over, the occupiers of the

---

* Sp. Cassius deinde et Proculus Virginius consules facti. cum Hernicis foedus ictum. agri partes duae ademptae: inde dimidium Latinis, dimidium plebi divisurus consul Cassius erat. Adjiciebat huic muneri agri aliquantum, quem publicum possideri à privatis criminabatur. Id multos quidem Patrum, ipsos possessores, periculo rerum suarum terrebat. sed et publica Patribus sollicitudo inerat, largitione consulem periculosas libertati opes struere. Tum primum lex agraria promulgata est: nunquam deinde usque ad hanc memoriam sine maximis motibus rerum agitata. Consul alter largitioni resistebat, auctoribus Patribus, nec omni plebe adversante: quae primo coeperat fastidire, munus vulgatum à civibus isse in socios.—*Livii Hist.* l. 2, c. xli.

† — ut stipendium miles de publico acciperet, quum ante id tempus de suo quisque functus eo munere esset.—*Liv. Hist.* l. 4, c. lix.

land, and the Senators, began to call the division "giving away other "people's property*;" as the officers of a fleet might be conceived to do under like circumstances. The tribunes, or representatives of the people, endeavoured to bring the senate to justice by hindering the levies†, or in modern parliamentary language, stopping the supplies. And the senate, on its side, had recourse to involving the people in war‡; as is the approved resource in cases of popular demands.

A hundred and twenty years after the commencement of the contest, the commons, after an intense struggle, in which the senate twice attempted to put down their claims by appointing a dictator or commander-in-chief with unlimited powers, obtained an approximation to redress, in the shape of a law "*on the scale of division* §," by which it was settled that "nobody should have more than five hundred acres;"—being just such an approximation as the sailors would obtain, if they procured a law that no officer should have above 50,000*l.* The nature of the measure is evident, both from the description of the law, and from the language employed in the course of the debate. "Had they the "assurance to demand," said the tribunes, "that when two acres a-piece "were served to the commons, themselves should be allowed to have "more than five hundred acres?—that each of them should possess the "land of three hundred citizens, and a plebeian's ground be hardly large "enough for a roof to cover him or a place to bury him in‖?" All this is clearly a quarrel about division, and not an attack upon property.

Livy calls the Agrarian Law "the tribunes' poison¶;" and says distinctly, that the parties who were for keeping the land to themselves had the advantage in point of right, as much as the others had in the inclinations of the people**. All of which only makes his account the more to be trusted.

The Agrarian Law is an instance of the way in which men make for themselves an ideal history, which is no more like the real one, than St. James "the killer of Moors" is like St. James the fisherman.

---

* — largiendo de alieno popularem fieri querentes.—*Liv. Hist.* l. 3, c. i.

† —Sp. Licinius tribunus plebis, venisse tempus ratus per ultimam necessitatem legis agrariae Patribus iujungendae, susceperat rem militarem impediendam.—*Liv. Hist.* l. 2, c. xliii.—Et hic annus tribunum auctorem legis agrariae habuit. Ti. Pontificius fuit. is, eandem viam, velut processisset Sp. Licinio, ingressus, delectum paulisper impediit.—*Id.* c. xliv.

‡ Invisum erat Fabium nomen plebi propter novissimum consulem: tenuere tamen Patres, ut cum L. Aemilio K. Fabius consul crearetur. Eo infestior facta plebes seditione domestica bellum externum excivit: bello deinde civiles discordiae interruissae.—*Liv. Hist.* l. 2, c. xlii.

§ — leges—unam &c.—alteram *de modo agrorum*, ne quis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret:—*Liv. Hist.* l. 6, c. xxxv.

‖ Auderentne postulare, ut, quum bina jugera agri plebi dividerentur, ipsis plus quingenta jugera habere liceret? ut, singuli prope trecentorum civium possiderent agros, plebeio homini vix ad tectum necessarium, aut locum sepulturae, suus pateret ager?—*Liv. Hist.* l. 6, c. xxxvi.

¶ — tribuni plebem agitare suo veneno, agrariâ lege.—*Liv. Hist.* l. 2, c. xli.

** — et, quanto jure potentior intercessio erat, tantum vinceretur favore legum ipsarum latorumque.—*Liv. Hist.* l. 6, c. xxxviii.

226. That it is opposed to the wisdom of our ancestors.

A. The fallacy of "the wisdom of our ancestors," is the mistake of thinking that a hundred years ago school-boys had beards. They might have had them if they had lived till now; but at the time spoken of, they had no more beard than school-boys of our own.

An individual who was born many years ago and is living still, is wise or ought to be. But the men in general who lived and died a hundred or five hundred years ago, instead of being wiser and better-informed than the men who are living now, were inferior to them by exactly the difference, that the moderns are in possession of the experience of the ancients and their own too. In the aggregate therefore, it is the ancients that are the young and inexperienced generation, and we the old; and our posterity will be one older still.

The only reasonable inference to be drawn from a practice having been established by our ancestors, is that its continuance till now is a proof that it contains less evil than was required to make men alter it. But this is a most hungry argument; for it amounts only to saying, that a thing ought not to be altered because it has not been altered before. It would apply equally to every alteration that ever took place since the creation. If a thing *was* good, *is* good, and is *likely to be* good, it is capable of being demonstrated to the satisfaction of the existing generation. Men do not believe in Euclid because it is the wisdom of their ancestors; but because it is demonstrable now. Our ancestors may have been wise; but it is our wisdom, not theirs, that must enable us to judge of it.

227. That the French revolution was introduced by calling for a free trade in corn.

A. All popular revolutions begin with an opposition to some crying injustice. Which is a reason why crying injustices should be removed; not why they should not. If there was not something of this kind to begin with, there could be no revolution. The people never began an unnecessary revolution in the world; though some have been carried beyond the point of necessity after they were begun.

228. That the London Corresponding Society called for "Liberty, Equality, and No Corn Laws."

A. Liberty, equality, and no corn laws, may be all great evils; but it is not enough that the London Corresponding Society called for them, to prove it.

229. That the tendency of demanding a free trade in corn, is to overturn the altar and the throne.

A. Every removal of injustice is objected to in the same terms. If the objectors could establish their general assumption, they would overturn the altar and the throne in six months.

230. That the tendency is to excite dissatisfaction with the laws.

A. It is one thing to resist the laws, and another to desire the improvement of the laws. The object of a free people, is by the law to amend the law. If it was otherwise, the law must always have remained in its worst estate.

231. That it is dangerous and wrong to tell men they are injured.

A. The danger and the wrong, are in injuring them.

The assertion that people are not to be told when they are injured, is as insulting to honest men, as if thieves ventured to bully them in the streets, for daring to inform their neighbours when their pockets were in danger.

232. That the tendency is to teach men they are wronged, who never found it out before.

A. The tendency of all extension of knowledge is to do the same. Most men who are permanently wronged, are so because they do not know the extent of the injury. Nothing so convenient for wrong-doers as the dark; and most of all, that darkness, which prevents men from even knowing they are injured.

The argument amounts to saying, that any man may be robbed to the extent of what his ignorance will allow; and that the ignorance shall be kept up for the sake of the robbery.

233. That the nation is dividing itself into two parts; the *conservative* and the *revolutionary.—Blackwood's Ed. Mag.*

A. The *conservative*, mean those who having got what does not belong to them, intend to keep it; and the *revolutionary*, mean those who would take it from them. All men who take what is not their own, are conservative the next day.

234. That the consideration of the question is too deep for the people at large.

A. Not too deep for those who are to live or die by the result. All people are taken care of, exactly in proportion as they take care of themselves; and the power of doing this, is what makes the difference between a comparatively free people and others. From the creation hitherto, all mysteries have been frauds.

And after all, the question, like most pieces of state-craft, is of no depth at all. It is nothing but whether John shall be allowed to keep Thomas out of the market, or Thomas to keep John. Which mankind have solved long ago by determining, that both John and Thomas ought to sell for as much as they can get.

235. That it is necessary for the maintenance of the constitution, that the aristocracy should be supported in splendour.

A. The people of England have made up their minds, that in as much as there exists an aristocracy already rich and powerful, it is useful that they should support a king in splendour, that he may keep the aristocracy in order. But it is not so clear that they have made up their minds to support the aristocracy too; or that their sense of the utility of monarchy would be increased by finding it in such a combination. It is charging them for a prop to support their roof, and a weight to lay upon their prop. It is paying for a cat, and mice for it to catch; and representing this as necessary to keeping up the existing happy constitution of the pantry.

But to enrich an aristocracy by corn laws, is not only to enrich them at the expense of the community, but at an expense many times greater than would arise from putting the same sums into their hands by assigning each of them an alimony from the public purse. Hence the minister who should propose paying each of the members of the aristocracy an alimony from the public purse, would make a modest proposal in comparison with one who should propose to enrich them by means of corn laws.

And what is contended for after all, is not the *preservation* of the natural wealth of the landed interest, but its enlargement. Because certain individuals possess from 1000*l.* to 100,000*l.* per annum to begin with, it is stated to be necessary and just, that provision should be made for doubling their incomes at the expense of the industrious part of the community, and in the most burthensome way.

To say that the removal of restrictions would *reduce* the incomes of the land-owners, is at most only saying it would take away from them what they ought never to have had. And there still remains the question, of whether they would be any real losers in the end. *Is this clear enough to them, to go to war with the rest of the community?* It may be very possible for them to draw money from the public loss, and be no gainers after all; just as a pond may draw water from another pond, and lose more at some other end than it takes in. And this other end, is found in the impossibility of finding profitable employments for their sons, or marrying their daughters to the sons of other people who can do the same. A landlord is no gainer though in spite of poor-rates he has 600*l.* a-year instead of 500*l.*, if the consequence is that he has eight sons and as many daughters to keep as miserable annuitants. This reason therefore applies to all except those who calculate on quartering their children on the public.

236. That the decline of the Roman Empire was in a great measure owing to dependence on foreign supplies of corn.

A. The Romans, "*les plus déterminés brigands qui aient jamais paru sur la surface de la terre,*" robbed foreign countries of corn, under the name of tribute; and upon this corn the people were supported. When their power to rob declined, the sustenance of the people declined with it. All of which is very different from allowing

the people to purchase corn with the produce of their manufacturing industry.

237. That the system of free trade has a tendency to enrich the world at large; and it is only by an exclusive system that Great Britain has arrived at her present state of riches and power.

A. The fallacy of John Adams's canoe. All that he pays in consequence of not taking the cheapest mode, is evidently impoverishing himself.

238. That the consequence of free trade must be new taxes.—*Watchman.*

A. Taxes that are new, perhaps; but not additional. On the contrary, the probability is, that the impulse given to the public prosperity, would increase the productiveness of the remaining taxes, so as to obviate the necessity even of a shift.

239. That it is enough for *us* to legislate for British interests. We are not of those new lights who profess to be concerned for the interests of all mankind.

A. The question is only, whether the interests of Britain and of other countries do not coincide. If a man professed that for his part he was content to legislate for the interest of Southwark, or of Yorkshire, he would be laughed at; not for desiring the advantage of the division to which he belonged, but for not knowing that its interests were coincident with those of all the others.

Men have made this discovery with respect to towns and counties; and it only remains for them to make it with respect to nations. In fact they *have* made it, to a considerable extent. The probability is, that there will never be another commercial war;—or an extensive war of any kind, except between what *Jomini* has called "*les deux grands intérets du monde*," despotism and freedom.

What are here called British interests, mean the interests of particular knots of dishonest men in Britain, at the expense of the interests of the public. Thus when a statesman is said to be a true supporter of every British interest, it means that he keeps open shop for anybody who will buy a fragment of the public injury and give his own adhesion in return.

240. That there is a deep-laid conspiracy among the rich Bankers and Traders of the country, to put down the landed interest; and that it is necessary to resist these attempts at innovation, and save the constitution.

A. The rich Bankers and Traders are happily beginning to open their eyes to the injustice that is done them, and will not be easily induced to shut them again. When the traders and manufacturers ask for a tax on home-grown corn, it will be time to begin to talk of their wanting to oppress the landed interest.

If there was really in any country a constitution which directed that one order of men should be supported by the plunder of another, it would be a

constituted nuisance, and the only question would be how it should be abated.

What is meant by "the constitution," in the mouths of the greater part of those who are continually appealing to it, is all manner of constituted wrong. It is an incarnation of all the evil that has either descended to us from our forefathers, or accumulated during our own possession of the estate. Let a man be oppressed in any conceivable way; and it is "the constitution." Let any proposal, however remote, be made for relieving him; and "the constitution is in danger." In the West Indies the flogging of women is denominated the constitution; in Ireland the oppression of the Catholics. When such men cry out for "the constitution, the whole constitution, and nothing but the constitution," they mean "our dishonest gains, the whole of our dishonest gains, and nothing but our dishonest gains." By "matchless," they mean that any alteration would diminish their power of doing wrong, and therefore they are best as they are. If things were as bad as the devil could make them, they would be "matchless" for somebody. By "social order," they mean *that* order, in which they are to be the robbers and somebody else the robbed; and by "revolution," that kind of change by which a pilferer finds himself upon the tread-wheel. Their "birthright" means the birthright of West-Indian planters, the slavery of others. Their idea of the constitution is, that it is a cunningly devised engine for effecting the maximum of oppression with the minimum of risk. Whereas if it means anything and is worth anything, it means a ready-made machinery for putting down such men as themselves, as fast as they can be found out.

Paley said it was a proof of the divine benevolence, that in the human body there were no glands for the secretion of gout, nor any express contrivances for the production of evil. When the persons in question speak of the constitution, they mean *nothing but* the glands for the production of disease,—the contrivances for enabling one man to inflict injustice on another,—which through the supineness, or divisions, or ignorance of the community, unhappily exist.

Innovation, means the novelty of justice. All rogues cry out against innovation; particularly the new drop. There never was a case in which the outcry was raised of innovation, in which the truth was not, that there were some dishonest profits to defend.

The "constitution has been destroyed" so often now, that it is like the witness who stated herself to have been "seduced again yesterday." Everybody knows by the evidence of reiterated experiment, that by "saving the constitution," is only meant preserving some intolerable wrong.

241. That they wish to gain their object by intimidation.

A. All justice comes by intimidation, more or less diluted. If men have any one right enjoyment, or security, it is through somebody's being afraid of taking it away. In free countries the intimidation comes through the medium of a vote; in despotic ones, a bow-string.

242. That the assertion that the landed interest ought to be put down, must be met by universal indignation.

A. The landed interest, like everybody else, must be put down when they insist on doing what is unjust.

243. That the mischief proceeds from defects in the system of currency. — *Hansard's Parl. Debates*, vol. xvii., *p.* 1410.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT; *March* 31, 1828.

A. The system of currency may be good or evil; but its effects in either way cannot alter the fact, that the land-owners are putting restrictions on the industry of the community. A man may have suffered by bad shillings; but that was not what broke his leg.

244. That the evil might be remedied by fixing a *minimum* of wages.

A. No more than men could be made to eat by fixing a *minimum*, in a ship at sea without provisions. Men cannot eat what is not there. The effect of a *minimum* would only be, that the price of corn would rise in proportion.

245. That the evil may be diminished by voluntary contributions, or charity.—*Mandate for Collections in Churches, &c.*

A. An increased quantity of corn can no more be created by voluntary contributions, than it could be created in a ship at sea. The voluntary contributions, therefore, are a mere tub for the whale, thrown out by the party that designs to keep possession of the wrong.

246. That the extreme opinion on one side is that there should be a constant prohibition, the extreme opinion on the other that there should be none; and that the point of justice and moderation lies somewhere between.—*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xvi., *p.* 761. MR. CANNING; *March* 1, 1827.

A. The extreme opinions are mis-stated. The extreme opinion on one side is stated to be, that John should keep Thomas out of the market; the extreme opinion on the other, that he should not; and therefore what justice and moderation require is, *that he should keep him out every other day.*

The extreme opinions truly stated would be, on one side, that the agriculturist ought to have a duty against the manufacturer; on the other, that the manufacturer ought to have a duty against the agriculturist; and therefore the just medium is, that each should sell for what he can get, without having a duty against the other at all.

The way to examine the position as it stands, is to see how it would look if the same statement, *mutatis mutandis*,

was advanced on the part of the manufacturers, in support of a duty on home-grown corn instead of foreign, or in support of a bounty on imported corn.

247. That no man has ever maintained either of the extreme opinions, that there should be a constant prohibition, or that there should be none. —*Id.*

A. All men maintain either one or the other; except those who are anxious to get half because they despair of the whole. None else, believe in the *mezzo termine* proposed.

248. That we must reconcile conflicting interests.—*Id.*

A. There can be no conflict on a wrong. When the question is of a purse unjustly taken, it is a fallacy to say we must reconcile conflicting interests and give the taker half.

249. That the warmest advocate of free trade will not deny that some protection is due to the agricultural interest.—*Id.*

A. If the manufacturers were to assert that the warmest advocate of free trade would not deny that some protection was due to the manufacturing interest, meaning thereby a duty against the agriculturists,—they would be laughed at. No cause can be shown why the claim of the agriculturists to have a duty against the manufacturers, is a whit less unreasonable.

Protection, in the mouths of these men, always means, giving people something which is not their own. It means robbing somebody, for the benefit of somebody else. A fair trader wants no protection, but to be protected in the right of selling what others are willing to buy.

250. That the differences between the parties are infinitely less wide than they are stated to be in argument.

A. Whatever may be the absolute magnitude of the difference, the principle is not the less important. If the question were whether the takers of purses should be allowed to keep the half or none,—it would be no answer to say, the whole sums taken in a twelvemonth were under six millions.

251. That it is mischievous to represent the agricultural and other interests as in opposition.—*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xvi., *p.* 784. Mr. BROUGHAM; *March* 1, 1827.

A. True, if they are both kept within the rule of right. Not true, if one of them is in the act of plundering the other.

252. That land and trade must wax and wane together.—*Id.*

A. True, as long as they go on honestly in company. Not true, if one is endeavouring to wax by the robbery of the other.

253. That the manufacturing interest ought not to use harsh terms.

A. There is nothing like calling things by their right names. The manufacturers will eat their brown loaf if they are obliged to it; but the devil and St. Dominic will not make them call it a leg of mutton.

254. That the landed and commercial interests are not opposed to each other.—*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xviii. *p.* 1410.—Sir Francis Burdett; *March* 31, 1828.

A. They *are* opposed to each other when one is in the act of plundering the other. And there is no use in attempting to conceal it.

255. That the matter in dispute between them is, after all, of no great magnitude.

A. If this is said with a view to persuading the agriculturists to give it up, it will fail, like other attempts to carry an honest point by deception. It is like inviting a powerful freebooter to come and be hanged, on the ground that it will not hurt him much.

Great mischief has arisen from this species of shuffling; which is the besetting sin of the public men of the day on the liberal side. They never present themselves with any *aplomb*; but always with some lurking recognition of the power of their adversaries. They seem unable to content themselves with the possession of the truth, unless they come by it by some kind of misrepresentation. Depend upon it, their opponents are too cunning, to be cheated out of their stolen goods.

256. That it is wrong to join in *insults to agriculture.*

A. Insults to devils and spinning-jennies—by the same rule would mean, saying they ought not to work when the produce will not be bought without compulsion.

257. That agriculture ought to be held in honour.

A. The art of having corn ought to be held in honour. The agriculturist who can make inferior land produce corn, or good land produce an increased quantity, *subject always to honest competition on the part of those who can produce corn out of their looms and flatting-mills*,—has the same claim to honour as Arkwright and Watt. If Arkwright and Watt had invented machines *for making broad cloth at double the price that it might be had in other ways*, their claims to honour would have been like those of the modern agriculturists.

258. That wealth emanating from land, has a right to certain privileges above that which emanates from other sources.

A. This amounts only to saying, that the wealth of the community should be diminished, that the wealth of the agriculturists may be increased by a fraction of the difference.

259. That it is very desirable to have cheap corn, provided it is English.

A. It would be just as true to say the same of wine.

260. That it is only *the manufacturers* whose interests are opposed to the demands of the agriculturists.

A. The bankers, the monied men, the merchants, the ship-owners, the lawyers, the professional men of all kinds, the expectants in every line, and the classes who in some way or other live through the expenditure of the public revenue, are all as much interested as the manufacturers. The way for them to convince themselves of this, is to ask what the consequences to themselves would be, if the wealth and power of the United Empire were cut down to what could be supported on the agricultural produce of the Isle of Wight.

To all these may be added at the present moment, the church; which is in a fair way of being plundered, for no reason but to prevent the landlords from being brought to justice.

261. That it is not true in the main, that the landlords have never laboured. If one man vests 100,000*l.* the fruits of his labour, in land, and another in the funds, the receipts of one are as much the recompense of past labour as of the other. And by far the greatest part of the land in the country, through changes of ownership, is in the hands of those who have paid for it with the fruits of their labour.

A. Changes of ownership can never introduce any man to more than the right that was there at first. Everything beyond that, is at the risk of the buyer. The right, therefore, of every landlord at the present moment, can be no greater than that of the landlord who should have grown upon the land from the commencement of its occupation.

262. That if the followers, for example, of Columbus, fitted out ships and took possession of a new country, the rent is the recompense of their labour in doing this; and that all occupancy of land must have had some similar beginning.

A. It is possible the rent may have been among the things they went to seek; but it does not therefore follow that they are to have it, except under regulations consistent with the ends and purposes of the society that is to be. The people of England are not bound to submit to the restriction of their wealth and the diminution of their happiness *in secula seculorum*, because such a thing might be within the contemplation of the Gaulish or other adventurer, who laid the foundation of landlordship in England.

263. That the land is *an instrument, and the rent its hire.*

A. To say, I have an instrument, and you *shall pay me 100l. for it, though you could get the use of it for 50l. elsewhere*,—is robbery. To say, you shall lose 500*l.* in order that I may be paid 100*l.* for my instrument,—is the same robbery multiplied by ten.

Though land is an instrument, it is not the creation of labour;—and therefore, if we are driven to that, it has not a claim to be only equally taxed with instruments that are. Still less has it a claim to have its profits artificially increased, at the expense of a tenfold loss to the community at large.

264. That persevering efforts are made to persuade the public that the prosperity and wealth of the empire owe their origin and increase principally, if not exclusively, to our manufacturing and commercial industry. Upon which misrepresentation of the sources of public wealth, is grounded an attempt to elevate the interests of manufactures and commerce on the depression, if not the ruin, of those of agriculture.—*Quarterly Review, No. 72. Article on Agriculture and Rent; p.* 391.

A. What the Abolitionists wish to persuade the public is, that the wealth and power of a nation are diminished by having two bushels of corn instead of four; and that to allow the agriculturists to prevent men from selling their goods for corn to foreigners, is as impolitic and unjust as it would be to allow the manufacturers to lay a duty on home-grown corn.

265. That the results of the capital, the skill, and the perseverance applied to British agriculture, from about the middle of the last century down to the present time, are as important as the advantages derived within the same period, from the capital, the ingenuity, and the energy employed in manufactures and commerce.—*Id. p.* 393.

A. So far as the improvements in agriculture were the consequence of restrictions upon importation, they were only like the capital, skill, and perseverance which might be applied to digging wells, in consequence of prohibiting the water of rivers.

266. That the community is split into parties and factions; each of which is taught to view its own interest as distinct from the good of the whole.—*Id. p.* 393.

A. It is only divided into two parties; those who wish to be unjust, and those who wish to prevent it. If the manufacturers had got a duty on home-grown corn, then *they* would be the oppressors, and every man's hand would be against *them*.

267. That the corn-grower and cotton-spinner are trained to re-

A. The corn-grower has his hand in the pocket of the cotton-spinner. If the cotton-spinner had got a duty on home-grown corn,

gard each other as rivals, if not as enemies. And that nothing can be more unreasonable. —*Id. p.* 393.

then *he* would be the culprit; and we should see whether the corn-grower would be talked into a belief, that it was unreasonable to consider him as an enemy.

268. That every inquirer, whose mind is not enslaved by the most invincible prejudices, may be convinced, that the cultivation of the soil is more important to the community at large than the most ingenious operation of the manufacturer, or the most successful speculations of the merchant. —*Id. p.* 393.

A. If a landlord was stripped of everything that is the result of manufactures, and turned into the street with a manufacturer without corn, how much would there be to chuse between their conditions?

But perhaps what is meant is, that corn is of more importance than anything else, because its quantity is the measure of the extent to which either the manufacturers or the merchants can carry their operations. That it is so, is perfectly true; and the fallacy is in substituting "the cultivation of the soil" for "the possession of corn." Corn is of the highest importance,—its quantity is the measure of everything else,—*therefore have half as much as you might.*

269. That a child might perceive the absurdity of the notion, that manufacturers make an addition to the quantity of food. That the most ingenious machinery for the fabrication of cotton or cloth, never can, by any possibility, add one grain to the quantity of corn grown upon an acre of land.—*Id. p.* 394.

A. No man can eat Sheffield goods, or dress broad cloth into a fricassee. But the question was, whether he cannot exchange them for foreign corn, and eat *that.*

270. That no proposition can be clearer than that the fruits and vegetable productions of the earth constitute the fundamental riches of any country; and that all states owe infinitely more to agriculture than to any other profession of life.—*Id. p.* 394.

A. Turn out the landlord without doublet or hose,

'And ask if fundamental riches,
'In such a case, are not his breeches.'

271. That art stands indebted to the husbandman for materials to work upon.—*Id. p.* 394.

A. And therefore we ought to have as much *of the materials as possible. The fallacy is in saying, that we ought to have half.*

272. That "Turnip Townshend" was the

A. His use, like that of all the other men *of* turnips, depends on whether the turnips were

greatest modern benefactor to the community.—*Id. p.* 326.

produced through the medium of restrictions and artificial prices.

273. That since the commencement of the last century, upwards of six millions of acres have been inclosed and brought into a state of tillage, and that no less than eleven parts in twelve were inclosed in one reign—that of George III.—*Id. p.* 401.

A. If this took place in consequence of restrictions, it would be just as rational to boast that six millions of wells had been dug in consequence of the prohibition of river water, and that eleven out of twelve had been dug in the reign of George the Third.

274. That an addition, equivalent to eight millions of quarters of wheat, has thus been made to the agricultural produce of the country, and of one million and a half of persons to its population.—*Id. p.* 401.

A. Not if it has prevented an addition of *sixteen* millions of quarters, and *three* millions of population.

275. That the highly-vaunted theory of Rent (*— meaning what is called the Ricardo theory,*—)is a delusion; *—from which the inference intended is, that the argument against the Corn Laws is a delusion.—Id. p.* 406.

A. The argument against the Corn Laws has no dependence on the Ricardo theory of Rent; as may be proved by inspection. It is nothing but an inference from what was pointed out long ago by Adam Smith. The Ricardo theory of Rent may therefore be entirely true or entirely false, without affecting it.

It is easy enough to show the error of the Ricardo theory of Rent. The fallacy is in the assumption of an occasional consequence for the general cause; and it has been encouraged with the purpose of persuading the poorer classes, that tithes are paid out of the price of bread. The intention was, to annoy the church; the result has only been, to frighten the church into taking the side of the landlords. If tithes were abolished to-morrow, they would be paid to the landlords in the rent as fast as there were opportunities of making new arrangements with the tenants; and something more besides. (*See True Theory of Rent.*) The wonder therefore is, that the church does not get rid of the odium, by promoting a composition that would be profitable to all parties.

276. That the agriculturist who reclaims a waste, or who, by improved husbandry, adds to the produce of land already cultivated, does not quite deserve to be sent to the tread-wheel.—*Id. p.* 407.

A. If there was no other water, then the man would be to be praised who improved the digging of wells. But not if the improvement is to be built upon prohibiting the water of streams and rivers.

277. That the rent which accrues to the owner of an allotment of land reclaimed from a state of nature, seldom, or perhaps never, exceeds the annual return justly due to him for the capital, or labour expended in preparing it for the purposes of husbandry.—*Id. p.* 410.

A. Even if this were true, it would be no reason why the amount of such capital and profits should be increased by restrictions. *The manufacturers* can make no more than a living profit on their capital; because their competition with each other will prevent it. But the land-owners would not perceive this to be a reason, why the manufacturers should increase the amount of their capital and profits by a tax on home-grown corn. And as regards the public, it is all only the case of wells; even though the well-digging should be carried on till the profits were only three per cent.

But the whole proposition is radically untrue; and the fallacy consists in putting forward what is true of the land last reclaimed, and representing it as true of the whole.

The land last reclaimed is always such as, upon the best calculation the reclaimer can make, will finally do no more than return the capital laid out, with the lowest profit for which anybody will take the trouble; but it must always be expected to return this, because nobody will reclaim it without. And if the competition for the produce does not increase, it never will make any greater return.

But if competition and prices increase, either through the agency of corn laws or otherwise,—the profit must be increased too, and must consequently be greater than a simple living profit. And since the very best land must have been the land last reclaimed once, the rent on the very best land must have arisen through this kind of process.

For the rent on the better kinds of land to return no more than a living profit on the capital laid out, either by one landlord or by all the succession of landlords, is impossible. Suppose the fact was, that every landlord without exception, at all times and seasons, laid out in improvements the greatest sum of which he could foresee the return with the lowest possible profit, as for argument's sake with three per cent, either in the shape of annuity or otherwise. And suppose the sums thus laid out from time to time, should be equal to the whole of the rent, or even more. The consequence would still be, that the landlord gets the *augment* of the rent for nothing, and a profit of three per cent on what he chuses to lay out besides. There must always be an augment, arising out of the increase of competition and prices, which was what caused inferior lands to be brought into cultivation; and the certainty of the landlord's receiving this augment, will be in no degree prejudiced by the fact, that what he has laid out on the land besides, has been returned to him with three per cent. The truth is, that he gets the augment, and the three per cent too; and the fallacy is in putting forward the three per cent, and concealing the augment. Let it be assumed, for example, that the landlord foresees or calculates, that upon due consideration of the state of things around him, a piece of unreclaimed land may in the course of a certain period be made to bring a rent of 100*l.* and that this

rent, after all necessary allowances for delay and risk of every kind, will be equivalent to the expense of reclaiming, with a profit of three per cent; and on this speculation he reclaims the land, and obtains the rent according to his expectations. If through the increase of competition and prices the rent afterwards rises to 500*l.*,—which is nothing but what may take place through corn rising from 40*s.* to 55*s.*,—the landlord will thenceforth be receiving an annuity of 400*l.* for nothing, which is what has been called the augment; and if he subsequently expends a thousand pounds, or ten thousand pounds, or ten hundred thousand on the same land, which is returned to him with three per cent, he will just as much be receiving the 400*l.* a-year as ever, and the three per cent besides. And in the same manner *augments* will arise upon the subsequent expenditures, in proportion to the rise of prices which takes place after the sums are respectively laid out. The landlord makes his calculations, upon the existing state of things, which is before him; and not upon the rise of prices, which is not. So that all the augments are clear gain to him;—which is what the fallacy conceals.

278. That it has become the fashion to represent rent as an extortionate exaction wrung under the colour of law, from the pockets of the poor;—*Id. p.* 411.

A. Not *honest* rent; but *dishonest*. Honest rent, is that which arises without restrictions on the industry of others. Dishonest, is that which is created by saying to the poor man, "You might live if you could exchange your "industry for food; but you shall starve to "please *me*."

279. —and the landowners themselves as a set of useless, selfish, and greedy drones, whose only service to the state is the consumption of a large and increasing revenue, which would otherwise be added to the earnings of the industrious classes.—*Id. p.* 411.

A. Possibly the drone may have been injured in the comparison. It would have been more exact, if the drone had been in the habit of resisting the entrance of honey into the hive, as the means of enforcing a provision for himself.

280. That it may be proved to the perfect conviction of every rational mind, that rent injures no member of society—that it has no effect whatever on the money value of agricultural produce, which would sell for the same money-price in the market, or exchange for the same quantity of other commodities, if rent were entirely abolished:—*Id. p.* 411.

A. True of honest rent,—*without prejudice however to the question of whether rent has a claim to be only equally taxed with the produce of industry.* Contrary to the hourly sensations of every man, when applied to dishonest. The way to abolish dishonest rent, would be to remove the restrictions which keep it up;—*and would that make no difference in prices?*

281. —and, moreover, that taking every country wherein rent accrues to the owner of the soil as a whole, it never will be found to exceed a fair average return for the capital, or saved labour, embarked by him in the production of corn.—*Id. p.* 411.

A. Fallacy No. 277, put forward with less reserve. In the first instance, there might have been some doubt, whether it was meant to be asserted of *all* land.

282. That he who invests capital, saved either by himself or his forefathers, in the cultivation of the soil, and derives a return for it under the denomination of rent, can no more justly be represented as a drone, than his neighbour who employs the capital saved either by himself or his ancestors, in the manufacture of cotton, or shoes, and derives a return for it under the denomination of profit.—*Id. p.* 411.

A. First, there is the fallacy, that the return is limited to anything like a fair profit; except upon the land last reclaimed.

Secondly, as far as the investment is the consequence of restrictions, it is the same thing as investing capital in wells. What is kept out of sight is, that this capital is invested in consequence of river water being prohibited.

283. That the production of corn is, in fact, a manufacture.—*Id. p.* 411.

A. An attempt to dive under a term. The question in dispute was, whether it is just that the production of corn at home should be increased by the prohibition of any other. It might as well be stated, that the making of wells is a manufacture, and therefore river water should be prohibited.

284. That the owner and the occupier of land form a co-partnership for the production of the commodity. The owner finds the raw material, the soil—which, in a state of nature, and before it has been prepared for tillage by human industry, is of little or no value. The buildings, the hedges, the gates, the ditches, the drains, the roads, &c. &c.,—these must all be prepared at the expense of the owner.—*Id. p.* 411.

A. It might with equal justice be said of the wells, that the owner and the occupier form a co-partnership for the production of water. The owner finds the raw material, the soil—which, before there was a well, was of little or no value. The spades, the shovels, the carts, the pullies, the buckets, are all at the expense of the owner. *The secret being all the time, that the well is only dug at all, because the owner has contrived to prohibit the running streams.*

285. That the capital advanced by the landowners for this co-partnership, is rather more considerable in amount

A. No man thanks them for it. Every man execrates them for it. It would be as reasonable to thank "Turpin" for wearing two watches. The magnitude of the amount is precisely the measure of the injury. The

than the demagogues, who describe our landowners as drones subsisting upon the earnings of the people, have any inclination to admit. —*Id. p.* 411.

community pays for wells, instead of drinking river water; and it is told by way of consolation, that they cost *so many* millions.

If by demagogues are meant men disposed to lead the people to the knowledge and pursuit of justice, then the judges are demagogues in one kind of wig, and the chancellor in another.

All men are demagogues, who are not rogues; or they are ready to be so upon occasion. The man who cries Stop thief, is a demagogue. And being a demagogue means crying Stop thief.

286. That if an estimate could be formed of the expense incurred in reclaiming the soil of this country from a state of nature, and preparing it for the operations of husbandry—of the sums expended in building, draining, clearing, fencing, irrigating, road and bridge making, by the successive owners of estates, it would not fall very far short of the present value of the fee-simple of the land.—*Id. p.* 412.

A. Fallacy No. 277 again.

287. That if the landowners had not, from time to time, laid out their capital in the amelioration of the soil, the produce of land would not have exceeded its amount in a state of nature; and the increased population which, in this country, finds profitable employment in agriculture, as well as in manufactures and commerce, could not have been subsisted. —*Id. p.* 412.

A. It might as well be urged, that if the manufacturers had not, from time to time, laid out their capital in improvements, there would have been no manufactures; and the increased population which now finds employment in manufactures and commerce, as well as in agriculture, could not have existed. The whole of which is true; but is no reason why the manufacturers should have a duty upon home-grown corn.

If it was intended to represent, that unless the agriculturists had done as they have, there would not have been corn,—then the fallacy is in representing the agriculturists as increasers of corn, when the fact is, they have caused there to be two bushels where there might have been four.

288. That while the man who builds a cotton-mill with its attendant machinery, and receives an adequate return for the capital which he has advanced, shall be lauded to the skies as a public benefactor, who makes a valuable addition to the stock of national wealth—his neighbour who has expended a capital of equal amount in agricultural improvements,

A. Simply because what the one gets, is taken from the rest of the community by violence through the medium of restrictions, with an immense additional loss to the community besides; and the other's is not.

which double or treble the previous produce of the soil, is, it seems, neither more nor less than an unprofitable incumbrance upon the industry of the community!—*Id. p.* 412.

289. That as far as the interests of the working classes are concerned, it cannot admit of dispute, that a capital of 10,000*l.* expended in improvements which double the produce of a given quantity of land, is at the very least as beneficially employed as a capital of equal amount invested in mechanical improvements, which double the quantity of wrought commodities fabricated by a given expenditure of human labour.—*Id. p.* 413.

A. To the individuals immediately employed, it may be the same; as it may be the same thing to a porter, whether he carries the bag of a true man or a thief. But there is this behind,—that all that is expended on the working classes by the agriculturists in consequence of restrictions, is squeezed from the bones and muscles of the working classes in some other place. And not only this quantity, but one many times greater;—the fact being, that for every shilling returned to the working classes, they in reality lose a pound.

290. That if one man, assisted by machinery, can execute what required before the labour of two men, the food necessary to support one labourer will, in consequence, be saved, and in the end be added to the amount of rent already paid to the landlord;—the operation of which principle furnishes the only key, which can enable us to account in a satisfactory manner, for the extraordinary and rapid rise of rents in modern times.—*Id. p.* 413.

A. "*The only key,*"—when it is notorious that the landlords have been passing laws to double the price of corn, and defend them now upon the ground that their removal would make it fall one half.

Note also, that it is admitted that there *has* been an extraordinary and rapid rise of rents in modern times. It is sometimes affected to be denied.

291. That the true solution of the rapid increase of rents in modern times, is that in former times, very nearly the whole produce of the soil was expended in feeding and clothing the men and the cattle engaged in the operations of tillage; but now, the improvements of husbandry, and the partial substitution of machinery for hands, enable the cultivator to perform the same labour, with the consumption of half the quantity of food.—*Id. p.* 417.

A. Take away the Corn Laws; and leave the landlords to their "true solution."

292. That the introduction of a more skilful and economical system of husbandry, and the application of machinery in abridging the quantity of food previously consumed in

A. If men would only forget, that the price of corn has been doubled artificially by way of aiding.

fabricating the clothing required for agricultural labourers, constitute the true reason why it has been found profitable to carry on cultivation in districts which had been formerly neglected.—*Id. p.* 418.

293. That it is perfectly clear that the extent to which the manufactures of any country can be pushed, except by rendering the population habitually dependent for food upon the produce of a foreign soil, must correspond with the amount of the surplus produce which remains beyond the food required for the sustenance of the men and the animals engaged in the cultivation of the land.—*Id. p.* 420.

A. The same might have been said to Noah, if he would have shut himself up in his ark and lived upon what could be grown upon his decks. But the difficulty is to show, *why he should shut himself up.*

294. That it is this surplus, which forms the basis of trade and manufactures: without this surplus they could not even exist; and in proportion to the increase or diminution of this surplus will manufactures and commerce flourish or decay.—*Id. p.* 420.

A. This will be all true, if Noah is so foolish as to shut himself up. But the difficulty still is, *why he should shut himself up.*

295. That this is the only fund upon which the artisans and mechanics of any country can permanently rely for subsistence.—*Id. p.* 420.

A. It might as well be urged, that wells are the only source on which they can permanently rely for drink. The only objection to it is, that the other sources never did fail, and never will.

So far from its being the only fund, it is clear that there have been countries of permanent power and wealth, which had no reliance upon this fund at all. Experience and history prove, not only that a country may be in the habit of obtaining a *part* of its food by foreign commerce, but the *whole;* without any of the consequences threatened by the agriculturists. Their argument is in fact equally good against foreign commerce universally. "Of all things keep clear of foreign commerce. Resist it; keep it "down by act of parliament. It will ruin you; it ruins everybody. If "you get rich by it, all you have will be at the mercy of foreigners. "You will be as poor as rats. Foreign powers will dictate to you. You "will be weak because you are strong. You will be starved to death; "and all by foreign commerce."

296. That every discovery which augments the gross produce of land in a greater ratio than the food consumed in cultivating it, or which reduces the quantity of food consumed in agriculture while the gross produce is not diminished, must add to the surplus which can be expended on manufactures.—*Id. p.* 421.

A. Every discovery, *except such as augment the gross produce of land at home by keeping out twice as much from other quarters.*

297. That so far is the existence, or the rise of rent from being inimical to the interests of manufactures and commerce, that it forms the very basis on which they are founded.—*Id. p.* 421.

A. Having corn, is the basis. Honest rent is not opposed to having corn. Dishonest, depends on shutting it out.

298. That the large amount of this surplus constitutes, in truth, the real basis of the manufacturing prosperity of this country; and is the true reason why other nations are so much behind us in this important branch of national industry.—*Id. p.* 421.

A. The portion which arises from superiority in agricultural processes, may be a basis; but not the portion which is raised by dishonest restrictions.

299. That the commercial operations, and the foreign trade of the country, are equally dependent with our manufactures upon the surplus produce of our internal agriculture.—*Id. p.* 422.

A. They are so, if Noah consents to be shut up.

300. That the different articles imported into this country from the various quarters of the globe, are brought hither to be exchanged for the produce of our own soil.—*Id. p.* 422.

A. They are brought to be exchanged for some kind of British industry; but that is not tantamount to the produce of our own soil, unless Corn Laws make it so.

301. That when a pound of pepper, or a pound of tea, is sold by a shopkeeper in an English village, it is merely an exchange of a certain portion of the produce of Surinam, or of China, for an equivalent quantity of the beef or corn produced in some English field.—*Id. p.* 422.

A. No more than it is for an equivalent quantity of books out of Mr. Murray's shop. That is,—no more *exclusively and necessarily*.

302. That it does not, in any respect, alter the nature and effect of the transaction, that money or manufactured goods should be the commodities, in the first instance, given in exchange for these foreign luxuries. Whether the corn and beef of the English farmer be ex-

A. If the landlords have the power of preventing anything from existing except what is raised upon their own corn and beef, it is true enough that, in their sense, everything that is brought from abroad must be exchanged for the produce of their soil. It is like telling us that we must all be hanged with the landlords' rope, because there is no other. But there still may be asked the question, why we must be hanged at all.

The landlords are quite wild upon this

changed directly for pepper and tea, or indirectly—in the form of manufactured cotton, or any other article in the fabrication of which his beef and corn have been consumed—the result is exactly the same.—*Id. p.* 422.

point. They think a forcible exchange makes identity.

303. That by a law of nature, which no effort or ingenuity of man can counteract or modify, the extent and intensity of our demand for foreign commodities must be regulated by the excess of our agricultural produce over our internal consumption.—*Id. p.* 422.

A. For "a law of nature" read a "law of landlords." Try.

304. That if this excess was destroyed, foreign commerce must be instantly and completely annihilated; and, in the exact proportion that this excess increases or diminishes, will our foreign trade flourish or decay.—*Id. p.* 422.

A. The excess might be absent altogether, and foreign commerce go on. And for every addition made to it by the Corn Laws, foreign trade and everybody's trade, is injured by many times the amount.

The fallacy is in putting forward what will be the case if Noah consents to be shut up, and concealing the possibility of any other state of things.

305. That the weaver who exchanges a bushel of wheat, or what is the same thing, pays the market value of a bushel of wheat, for a pound of tea, is only parting with some of the surplus produce of the land, which he had previously received from the farmer as wages for weaving a piece of cloth. —*Id. p.* 422.

A. True enough, so long as the weaver is by law incapable of obtaining any property except as the instrument of gain to the landproprietor. But then the consequence is dependent upon this awful state of law, and not upon any natural necessity.

The coincidences noted between the effects of corn laws and of slavery, are the deportation, the forced labour, and lastly the incapacity for obtaining property except as the instrument and by the permission of another. It is notorious that the two things go together; and the defenders of the one, are so of the other also. There is a unity of principle; both systems being founded on the oppression of the weak for the advantage of the strong.

306. That nothing can be more fallacious, more unphilosophical, more mischievous, than the notion which has been actively propaga-

A. It is difficult to surmise what can have been seen in the conduct of the manufacturing and commercial classes, that should have led to the expectation that they can be talked out of their common-sense and feeling. To be robbed is human, but to admit an

ted, that on many occasions the interests of the manufacturing and commercial classes are diametrically opposed to those of the agriculturists.—*Id. p.* 423.

identity of interest with the robbers, is only for idiots. If the manufacturers had got a duty upon home-grown corn, they would probably do their best to keep it; but they would never commit themselves by advancing with a demure countenance, that it was unphilosophical to believe they had any difference of interest with the agriculturists.

There might be two Manchesters and two Birminghams, or, which is the same thing, Manchester and Birmingham might be twice as great and prosperous as they are; but the agriculturists make a law to hinder it. The manufacturers might at this moment have been manufacturing for the whole continent of Europe; but the landlords made a law in 1815 to prevent it, and now the continent manufactures for itself. The way they effected this, was by determining that three houses in Old Sarum should send a member to parliament, and Manchester and Birmingham should send none. The object, and the way of compassing it, were intelligible to every man that can bait a mouse-trap; and to this day an outcry is made about maintaining the balance of the agricultural interest.—And in all this the manufacturing classes are to find no opposition of interests.

307. That it should be recollected that the manufacturer does not create wealth; he merely modifies that which has been already produced by the labours of the agriculturists.—*Id. p.* 423.

A. Fallacy, three deep.—First, it is not true that the manufacturer does not create wealth. He creates all the difference between the coat, and the wool on the sheep's back. If he eats and drinks during the process, the coat is as good to the wearer, as the meat and drink to *him;* and there is created, meat and drink and a coat.

Secondly, to modify is to create. It is to create the mode; which in a doublet is something, as any man may prove by trying to do without it.

Thirdly, though what is modified may be produced by *some* agriculturists, it does not follow that it must be produced by one particular set of agriculturists and no other. Which is what we are expected not to think of.

308. That while a manufacturer is preparing the cloth of which a coat is afterwards made, or building a house which is to be afterwards occupied, he must be subsisted in every stage of the process by the wealth or food produced by the agriculturist.—*Id. p.* 423.

A. Produced by *some* agriculturist. But not necessarily by the home agriculturist.

309. That houses, manufactories, ships, machines, and other fabrics required for the accommodation and convenience of the community, are the representatives of the quantity

A. From *some part* of the bosom; but not necessarily from that part which is occupied by the home growers.

of food drawn from the bosom of the earth, which has been consumed in constructing them.—*Id. p.* 424.

310. That it is therefore not a little surprising that political economists, and even practical statesmen, should appear frequently to forget that the reward of manufacturing and commercial industry must depend upon the produce raised by the cultivation of the soil.—*Id. p.* 424.

A. It is not that they forget, but that they remember. It is precisely because the reward of manufacturing and commercial industry must depend upon the produce of the soil—that is, of *some* soil,—that they demand to have four bushels instead of two. And the landlords embark themselves upon the shallow hope, that the word soil will be understood as meaning nothing but their own.

The claim of the landowners to attention on the ground of being "practical" men, is a fallacy from beginning to end. The only thing of which they have a practical knowledge, is that they are gainers by the wrong. And those who are starved, who are in the Gazette, or are obliged to emigrate, are the men of practical knowledge on the other side.

The boasted wisdom of the "practical" men, is only the wisdom of the spendthrift, the drunkard, and the thief; and consists in grasping at a present enjoyment, without considering that at some time or to somebody, the enjoyment is overbalanced by a greater practical suffering. It is financial *immorality*;—which means bad logic. And for such a defect in their logic, knaves are hanged.

311. That about sixty millions of quarters of wheat,—which at sixty shillings per quarter will be worth one hundred and eighty millions sterling,—are annually expended upon the manufacturers and artisans of this country.—*Id. p.* 425.

A. This can be matter of small joy to them, if they ought to have had twice as much. Still less can it be matter of exultation to them, that it is worth a hundred and eighty millions because the quarter is at sixty shillings. The landlords would apparently have expected their gratitude to be doubled, if instead of sixty shillings it had been at a hundred and twenty.

312. That however large and important our foreign commerce may appear, when examined by itself, it must sink infinitely in our estimation when contrasted with our domestic trade. —*Id. p.* 425.

A. There is no contrast in the question. The fallacy is in stating, that because one account may be great and the other small, it is profitable to add a quarter of corn to one, at the expense of taking two quarters from the other.

If the commercial interest is small, it is because it is robbed. The highwayman says to the man he has stripped, "Which of us has "the heaviest purse? And which, do you "think, should be attended to by a sagacious government?"

313. That the capital actually invested in the cultivation of the soil by the landlords and farmers of this country, amounts to the sum of *two thousand* millions. —*Id. p.* 426.

A. If it was two *hundred* thousand, it would only be so much the worse, as far as it is the consequence of Corn Laws. It is like answering an objection to wells, by saying the capital invested in them will be two thousand millions.

314. That to encourage draining, inclosing, manuring, canal and road-making, or any other process which tends to augment the produce of the soil, or abridge the labour required in tilling it, is the surest and most efficient means of promoting the growth and extending the prosperity of manufactures and commerce. And yet how little favour does this very obvious view of the true interests of the community appear to find in the policy of modern statesmen.—*Id. p.* 426.

A. Encourage draining; but not by Corn Laws, which is what is meant.

Why does not that eminent modern statesman Sir Richard Birnie*, ask the practical men who are brought before him, for an "obvious view" of the true interests of the community? Obviously, because he thinks their "obvious view," is what he is there to prevent.

315. That bounties, drawbacks, immunities, privileges, and other forcing expedients, are very commonly employed to promote manufactures and commerce, while the staple manufacture of almost every country, the cultivation of the soil, is too frequently overlooked.—*Id. p.* 426.

A. Bounties and the rest, have had their day. The family is drawing to a close. But it is quite fair that the mercantile men should have the tables turned upon them. The great cure for follies, is to let men try them upon one another.

316. That Colbert prohibited all exportation of corn, and did not succeed;—*from which it is intended to be inferred, that we should prohibit all importation.—Id. p.* 427.

A. Colbert meddled, and burnt his fingers on one side. Which is no reason why we should burn ours on the other.

317. That the neglect of agriculture ruined Spain.—*Id. p.* 428.

A. What should have been proved is, that the want of Corn Laws ruined Spain.

318. That the interests of the manufacturers and the landlords, when properly examined, will be found exactly to coincide: no

A. True, *if things were in a state of justice;* but not when the agriculturists are in the act of using violence. Suppose a collector on the high road, to tell a manufacturer, that their interests when properly examined, will

* Then chief police magistrate.—*Added in* 1841.

measure injurious to the one can ever be introduced, which will not, in the end, be found to inflict an equal injury upon the other. It is the interest of the great body of agriculturists to render their land as productive as possible; but in this result the interests of the manufacturing classes are precisely as much concerned as theirs.—*Id. p.* 432.

be found exactly to coincide;—that all he gets, he means to expend upon manufacturers;—that it is the interest of the great body of collectors to render their road as productive as possible, but in this result the interests of the manufacturing classes are precisely as much concerned as theirs. There is not an individual manufacturer on earth that would acquiesce in such reasoning; and it remains to be seen whether the manufacturers as a body will be more easily imposed upon. Is what is intended to be impressed upon them, *that the more they are robbed, the better for themselves?*

When money is taken from a tradesman's till, and expended with himself, he recovers the profit on the goods, but he loses the prime cost. The agriculturists say, not; and it remains to be seen whether the manufacturers will allow themselves to be persuaded of it.

Upon the same principle one of the "Ultra Tories" said lately, that it would be a good thing to pay for the Turkish fleet, because the Turks would expend the money on our manufactures. Good keeping the manufacturers' purses would be in, in such hands. Why do not our tradesmen scatter their money about the streets? It would all come back to their shops; which upon "Ultra Tory" principles would be enough.

The truth is that Toryism is one great money fraud; and the Whig of Whigs is the multiplication table. Words change their meanings, and there is no use in quarrelling about what they used to be. What Toryism means now, is a determination to do all that can be *safely* done, here and everywhere, *towards keeping up the robbery of one set of men for the advantage of another, with the loss of nine-tenths by the way.* And the reason why robbery is not to be interfered with abroad, is "If other nations should do so too, what is to become of our robberies at home?"

319. That admitting, for the sake of discussion, that certain classes in this country would derive profit from a free trade in corn; that a greater number of manufacturers would be employed, clothed, and fed, if the ports were open to the free admission of foreign grain, still this advantage, whatever might be its amount, would be infinitely counterbalanced by the impolicy and danger of making this island the seat of numberless

A. Not a whit more dependent upon foreign countries, than foreign countries are dependent upon *them.* If we get the corn, we do not get it for nothing; we give clothing. And foreigners can as ill do without the clothing, as we can without the corn. If foreign trade is to be kept down by act of parliament because it makes men mutually dependent, the agriculturists had better take to their moated castles again, and let us be *adscripti glebæ.*

Experience proves, that it is not the improved and manufacturing nation, but the growers of rude produce, that are the dependents. Thus England can do without the trade with Russia, better than Russia without the trade with England. When the Czar

establishments, where foreigners may bring their surplus corn to be consumed in fabricating the manufactures they require. Let us imagine that the opening of our ports to the foreign grower might end in bringing into this country a permanent annual supply of 10,000,000 of quarters of corn; this would ultimately bring about an increase of our manufacturing population to the amount, we will say, of 3,000,000 workmen, employed in fabricating commodities to be exported in exchange for this corn. We should thus have, within the limits of this country, 3,000,000 manufacturers entirely dependent upon foreign countries for employment and subsistence.—*Quarterly Review, No.* 74, *Article on the Corn Laws, p.* 426.

attempted to stop the supply of naval stores, he was off his throne in an instant. And ten years afterwards, the inability of the Russian government to enforce the execution of a treaty in opposition to the commercial dependence of Russia upon England, was the cause of the ruin of Napoleon.

320. That this necessary supply of foreign corn might be partially, or even totally, cut off by natural causes—by deficient crops or bad harvests—or by political estrangement and foreign caprice.—*Id. p.* 426.

A. The argument is like saying to a shopkeeper, "Be careful not to allow your concerns to increase. Do not you see that you "will be at the mercy of your customers;—"that they can ruin you at any time, for mere "estrangement or caprice? Besides, they "may be cut off by natural causes; they may "break their necks, or get into the list of "bankrupts." To which the shopkeeper would only reply, "They will not all break "their necks at once. And as for caprice, as long as I give good articles, "if one will not buy from me another will."

321. That the increase of our manufacturing system has, unquestionably, effected already a considerable revolution in the morals and habits which had previously characterized the bulk of the inhabitants of this country; the confined and crowded state of manufactories has a decided tendency to shorten the average duration of human life, and to corrupt the feelings of the workmen employed in them. We, therefore, doubt whether any augmentation of profit to be expected from a great extension

A. Suppose the manufacturers were to say, "We do not like bumpkins. They are a "stupid race. They are moreover immoral; "and get innumerable bastards. They must "not be allowed to multiply. We will have "an Act to put a tax on home-grown corn."

Suppose, again, part of the land-owners were to say, "It is quite clear that our mountain lands are healthier than the others. "Men live longer on them. Pass an Act to "prevent the men of fens from selling their "crops. It is charity."

Upon such pretexts as these it is, that the legislature is called upon to cut off a large proportion of the public from the common right of all men to sell the fruits of their industry; and for the personal profit of the demanders.

The legislature is called together, to do men justice; and not to determine who, upon

of our manufacturing system would, in the eye of an intelligent and humane legislator, compensate for the moral and social evils unavoidably connected with it. —*Id. p.* 427.

the representations of his enemies and rivals, is a fit subject to have justice done him.

Instead of the manufacturing and commercial system being productive of moral and social evil, it is what has made the great difference between the modern and the ancient world. With the ancients the road to wealth lay in the robbery of others; with the moderns, in industry and freedom. The predilections of the agriculturists are all in favour of antiquity.

322. That a deficient crop, or a bad harvest, would cause prices to rise very rapidly on the continent, and the clamours of the common people would speedily compel the continental governments to prohibit the exportation of corn.—*Id. p.* 427.

A. The common people on the continent would not clamour to be deprived of clothes. The only consequence therefore would be, that the price of corn would rise, and the price of cloth fall. The British manufacturers must give a greater proportion of cloth, for a scantier meal of corn; and be content to live less plentifully than usual, till the next year brought relief. And the foreigners on their part must economize in the use of corn, that they may have wherewith to buy clothes; and in the use of cloth too, that they may have less diminution in their meal of corn. The consequences will be equally shared; and the relative deficiency will be no greater on the whole, than it would have been if the supplying of the British manufacturers had never entered into the calculations of the foreign growers. No increased danger of famine arises out of the system. It would therefore be just as reasonable to affirm, that there ought to be no people at all, because heaven only knows whether there may come a year when they will all be starved.

323. That another cause of more extensive operation would gradually diminish, and in the end cut off entirely the supplies which under a free trade in corn, would be sent to the English market. We will suppose that

A. When Prussia wants no more manufactures, we must try Tartary; and so on till the world is filled up. As to what may take place then, it is like saying to Noah, "Never "think of going out of your ark. You have "no notion how soon the world will be filled "up. Show some prudence and economy, "and stay where you are."

Prussia should send into this country corn sufficient to maintain 20,000 workmen employed in manufactures; and that the Prussian government should eventually succeed in establishing manufactories at home, wherein this corn would be consumed in fabricating the wrought commodities which the Prussian people now obtain from abroad. The 20,000 workmen employed here to supply the manufactured goods required by Prussia, would then be thrown out of work, and cast upon the community in a state of destitution.—*Id. p.* 427.

324. That we may, in imagination, conceive this country to have become, under a system of free trade in corn, the general workshop of Europe. But this state of things could not endure—other nations would, sooner or later, turn manufacturers, and consume their corn at home; and the people in this country who depended upon this foreign trade, would, sooner or later, be thrown out of work, and reduced to a state of starvation.—*Id. p.* 428.

A. This is like saying to Mr. Whitbread, "Do not brew. It is clear that other people "will, sooner or later, turn brewers and drink "their own beer; and what *will* then become "of *your* miserable family?"

The answer to all this is, that everything on earth is temporary; and that if we are to quarrel with every good we cannot prove eternal, we may all set about hanging ourselves because we are not likely to live for ever. The self-denial of the Stoics was nothing to this; and we are all to be thus stoical, that the landlords may have double rents.

325. That this is the true reason of the declension of Venice, Pisa, Florence, and the Hanseatic towns, in wealth and population. These *were* the workshops into which the surplus corn of Europe was poured to be consumed in manufactories.—*Id. p.* 428.

A. It is something to have been Venice, instead of a groupe of muddy islands in the mouth of the Brenta. It is better to have been Venice, than to have been always mud. The weakness and folly of Venice, it would appear, lay in chusing to be mistress of the Adriatic, instead of some score of fishing-boats, as the owners of the mud would have counselled.

If Venice had been confined to the corn of the islands by a blockade, an illustration would have arisen of the benefits attributed to a high price of corn. Corn Laws are only a blockade by a home enemy, instead of a foreign.

326. That nothing forms a more singular feature of the clamour recently excited against the Corn-laws, than the blind zeal with which the manufacturing workmen have joined in the cry. It is alleged that the repeal of the Corn-laws would reduce the price of bread; and it is on this ground that the poor weavers have been prevailed upon to bellow for their abolition. But granting that this effect should result from the

A. It is a matter of some consequence to him, whether his trade and craft is in what Adam Smith calls the "progressive state," or whether it is in the "stationary or the declining." It makes to him all the difference of happiness or misery.

It is quite true, that there is a constant *tendency* in the wages of labour to bear a certain proportion to the market price of corn. But when trade is increasing, wages are always a little ahead of what would otherwise be the point, and when declining, a little behind; and this makes all the difference. To speak in mathematical terms, the Happiness at any given period, varies as the velocity of increase of the Trade; *H* varies as the fluxion of *T*. And it is simply this increment of wages and of comfort, that enables the manufacturers to

repeal of these laws, how would that benefit the labouring mechanic? Does he not know that it is a law of political economy, as unchangeable as any even of nature's laws, that the wages of labour must, upon an average of years, bear an exact proportion to the market price of corn?—*Id. p.* 429.

increase their numbers when their trade increases; and the contrary.

It is this self-same increment of the trade too, which enables the middle and higher classes at one time to make fortunes by commerce, and the want of which at another time sinks them into the Gazette. It would be a great mistake to think, that it is only the made-to-be-cut-down-by-yeomanry sort of people that are concerned. Their case would be hopeless enough, if it was. But luckily for them, their betters are in the same boat.

All the uncultivated portions of the world are so many provisions of nature for causing this salutary increment to be perpetual, at all events till the world is filled up. And to resolve to be miserable now, lest we should be miserable when the world is filled up,—is the same folly that it would be with an American settler, or with Noah. Let *posterity* make cheap soups. What better will they be, for our having made them too?

327. That the cry of "cheap bread" has imposed upon the understanding of our labourers.—*Id. p.* 430.

A. No more than the cry of "dear corn" has imposed on the understanding of the landlords. Each party knows perfectly what it is about. It remains only to be seen which in the end will be voted the unjust.

328. That latterly a species of spurious philosophy has gained ground among the members of a particular school of political economy, which justifies the promotion of the advantage of one class of the community at the expense of another; which justifies the crushing of an individual, or a body of individuals, provided some plausible theory can be advanced to show, that from his ruin an advantage will result to the rest of the community. They admit, for instance, that a free trade in corn would, at least for a time, prove injurious to the owners and oc-

A. The reason for taking away the monopoly of the landowners, is *because their possession of it was founded in injustice from the beginning.* If the manufacturers had got a duty upon home-grown corn, for the sake of increasing the quantity which should be purchased with their manufactures from abroad, the agriculturists would see clearly, that for the manufacturers to whine and say, "Is it "just, is it moral, to deprive one man of his "property in order to confer it upon another," —would be like a highwayman saying the same on the destruction of his trade, and asking who was to compensate him for the capital laid out in his pad nag. The answer of the agriculturists to the manufacturers would be, "The thing is *unjust.* It is what men "are vulgar enough to call robbery. It is "what they are weak enough to call pillage. "Crushed you must be; as surely as a caught "sheep-biter." And the case is the same when the parties are reversed.

If the manufacturers were to ask for justice to themselves, without considering anybody

cupiers of land in this country; that it would in all cases cause a considerable loss, and in many instances occasion an absolute sacrifice of the capital vested in the soil by the cultivator. But on the principles by which they profess to be guided, they contend that such a measure is justifiable, because it will produce an advantage to the rest of the community. Granting, for a moment, that the view which they take of the subject should turn out to be correct; that the loss, which they are prepared to inflict upon the agriculturists, should prove a gain to the other classes of society,—we beg to ask them, is it just, is it moral, to deprive one man of his property, in order to confer it upon another? Shall it be said of any English statesmen as Cato said of some of his contemporaries—*Liberalitas* hoc demum appellatur *aliena bona* largiri?—*Id. p.* 435.

but their opponents,—they would ask to have a bounty on imported corn, for as long as the agriculturists have had a duty. It would be only simple compensation; and would be attended with no greater loss to the community than the previous system. What the manufacturers should impress upon themselves and upon their children is, that *this* would be justice; and that if they do not ask for it, it is for the sake of the community, and not of their opponents.

The Latin quotation purports, that "Liberality in these days means giving away other people's property;"—being word for word the pretext of the Patrician robbers in the case of the Agrarian law. (See § 225.) Men first take what is not their own, and then raise an outcry about property.

329. That whoever asserts that a foreigner fabricates commodities at a smaller cost than the English manufacturer, because the former pays his workmen lower wages, maintains a gross fallacy. The reduction which the application of machinery makes in the quantity of labour required to manufacture a given quantity of wrought goods is kept entirely out of sight.—*Id. p.* 439.

A. The English manufacturer has a right to have the advantage of his machinery, and *all* the advantage. Instead of which, the agriculturist thinks he is doing a gracious act, if he leaves the manufacturer enough to place him on what the agriculturist is pleased to consider equal terms with foreigners, and puts the rest into his own pocket.

330. That more harm would accrue to every other class of the community from an impolitic disregard even of the prejudices of the agriculturists, than could possibly spring from conceding their most unreasonable de-

A. Trust to the agriculturist for growing corn whenever it is his interest to do so; and nobody wants him to do more. The quantity grown will not be diminished, unless prices fall; and prices will not fall, unless the grain obtained, either by importation or otherwise, is increased.

The way to estimate the importance of the danger, is to suppose that there was a bounty

mands.—If the corn question should be disposed of, without regard to the wishes, or even the prejudices of the class engaged in agriculture, the result would be an alarming reduction in the quantity of grain annually grown in this country.—*Id. p.* 442.

on imported corn, and the community was threatened with a dearth of manufactured goods "if the question should be disposed of "without regard to the prejudices of the ma- "nufacturers."

331. That one thing is clear. That it is unquestionably and most urgently needful that we should have the laws regulating the admission of foreign corn placed upon a steady and permanent basis.—*Id. p.* 446.

A. There will never be any permanent basis, but that of Abolition. It may not come all at once, any more than in the case of the Slave-Trade; but it will come as certainly. It may be essential to the prudent removal, that it should be done gradually; but this will not prevent its being done effectually. The progress which public opinion has made and is making, seems to put it as much out of the limits of probability, that there should be Corn Laws in Great Britain ten years hence—except in part process of legal extinction,—as that there should be a Slave-Trade.

Any attempt on the part of the monopolists, to make what they have been pleased to speak of under the name of a "Corn-law contract,"—or to represent a partial concession as binding the rest of the community not to demand more in future,—would be met with the same feelings, as a proposal on the part of the majority to expel the minority, or which comes to the same thing, to lay it under an engagement not to become the majority to-morrow. Any such attempted engagement, however supported, must on every principle of reason and law be *ipso facto* void. An individual may promise for himself, that he will not use the legitimate means for the removal of a wrong; but it is impossible that he can promise for another. The commercial interest would probably engage, not to ask for a bounty on imported corn for a longer period than the agriculturists have had a duty; but they would be fools if they engaged for anything else.

Finally, if an intelligent and honest elector were asked what he required that his representative should undertake to press upon the legislature in his place, it would be, that whatever duties, or scale of duties varying with the price of corn or otherwise, should be laid on importation, he should move as an amendment, "That the sum of [ ] "shillings per quarter, or such sum of inferior magnitude as shall in "any case be equal to the whole of any amount or quantity from which "deduction is hereinafter directed to be made, be deducted from the said "duties, or from every respective article or degree of the said scale of "duties, on the first day of January next following; and that the like "sum of [ ] shillings per quarter, or sum of inferior magni- "tude in case as aforesaid, be in like manner deducted from the actual

"remainder of remainders, on every succeeding first day of January, "till the whole shall be removed." This would be a permanent basis; and any other, it may be prophesied, will not. Such a motion might not make much way at first; but like the motion against the Slave-Trade, it would end in being carried. And whoever makes it, will be the father of the Abolition.

When this shall have been accomplished, the next thing is for the commercial and manufacturing interest to ask for compensation for past wrongs;—not in the shape of a bounty on imported corn for a period equal to that for which the agriculturists have had a duty,—but in the shape of a gradual removal of taxation from industry to rent, of such a magnitude as on the principles of the comparative value of perpetual and temporary annuities, shall be equivalent to the other. This is justice; and as long as this is not done, justice is not obtained.

If the landed interest protests against the magnitude of the surrender, the answer is, that if the case was reversed and the commercial interest was the oppressor, the agriculturists would see clearly, that the magnitude of the surrender was the measure of the injury,—and that to protest against it on that ground, was like a highwayman's protesting that he shall lose good five hundred a-year by the establishment of the horse patrole.

332. That the pressing necessities of the present time—have arisen, in a great degree, from an overgrown trade.—*Quarterly Review, No.* 74, *Article on the Emigration Report, p.* 539.

A. The pressing necessities have arisen, from trade being prohibited to please the landlords.

333. That in proportion as improvements in machinery are effected, the competition [*for making cheap goods and underselling one another*] becomes greater; over-production is the sure result; the increase of population goes on; increase of pauperism, and all its attendant evils follow; and who can tell where the misery, and the danger, and the ruin, are to end?—*Id. p.* 548.

A. Over-production only means, producing more than it is the interest of the landlords to allow to be sold for what is wanted in return. A superabundant population only means, a greater population than it is the interest of the landlords to allow to keep themselves. Pauperism and its attendant evils, are the instruments by which the population is kept down to the landlords' mark. And the misery, the danger, and the ruin will end, in the abolition of the Corn Laws.

All the misery and wear-and-tear of the Poor Laws, are a portion of the system of restrictions upon food. Nothing is heard of Poor Laws, in a country that is allowed to grow.

At the same time it is not clear that the Poor Laws are not to be our salvation after all. When the poor-rates have eaten up all the rents, *quære* how much will the landlords bid for

the removal of the Corn Laws? It is plain that without the Corn Laws, they might have *some* rent. They ought therefore to bid the difference.

The remedy may be a painful one; like cutting off a leg. But if there is no other way, the sooner it is over the better. It therefore becomes a question, whether it is not for the interest of the community in the actual state of things, to encourage by all means the increase of a pauper population. There will be employment enough for them all, the moment the prohibition on industry can be broken through.

If this is the case, no man ought to be ashamed of taking the support the law assigns him. It is his compensation for being prevented from working for himself; and there is no more disgrace in taking it, than in a man's receiving his expenses when summoned as a witness. It is his property, by the same law that gives the landlord his estate; and like the landlord, he has a right to raise up as many heirs as he finds agreeable.—There is hope in this. As the tall priest says in *Erasmus*, "Courage, my friends; I feel the land*."

334. That a regular as well as a regulated system of emigration is required in the stage of society which we have attained: it becomes as necessary in the economy of a state as of an ant-hill, or a bee-hive. —*Id. p.* 577.

"*A.* The necessity for emigration altogether, is created by the landlords and their Corn Laws. It is therefore nothing but a fraud in favour of the agricultural interest;—a contrivance for giving them a *valve*, to enable them to carry on their plans to the greatest extent consistent with their safety.

It is acknowledged, "that the condition of "the poor is so terrific, that no man of com- "mon humanity can refuse to lend an ear "to any measure for their relief." When a man is found dying by strangulation, people do not say "Help him to "emigrate," but "Take away the rope that is choking him." If the individuals of known humanity who declare themselves friendly to emigration, saw the thing in its true light, they would say to the suffering classes, "Do not emigrate. Stay at home, and ask for the removal "of the Corn Laws. Do not do the very thing your enemies wish you "to do. Things will mend. It is no more likely that there will be "Corn Laws a few years hence, than that there will be a Slave-Trade. "The country would be worth staying in, if industry was free; and it "will have freedom by-and-by. Do not give up everything you love, "because there is a majority in parliament this year, which may be a mi- "nority the next. Every day is opening men's eyes; and the wealthier "classes, who have more power and more means of removing a mis- "chief than you have, are coming over to you, and finding out that "your interests and theirs coincide. And they are not all so insensible "to better motives as you may think. They remember the time when

* All this was written before the New Poor Law. The landlords had the genius to alter the Poor Law, and leave the Corn Law behind; and the people were fools enough to bear it.—*Added in* 1841.

"they climbed into the same apple-tree, and swam in the same brook; "and they would think it a sin and a shame, knowing you were "wronged, not to move to your assistance. Be patient, if you can; "and we will all draw together. A time will come when a poor man "may sell the labour of his hands and buy bread; and then you will "be better. If you must go, you must; for a man must not be starved "while he can get away. But if you can contrive to hold out, stand "by the old house a little longer. Let your children be born where "you were born yourselves; and see if you do not get access to that "fine green world of corn-fields you are now shut out from. Be per-"suaded of one thing; that your opponents have just as much right to "ask to have you shut out from it, as you have to ask that they shall "grow no corn here;—that they have just as much right to request to "have you prevented from selling the produce of your industry for corn, "as you have to request to be allowed to take their parks and corn-fields "because it might be convenient to you. Do not go away; the thing "cannot last;—it is by many degrees too bad."

The end and bearing of the whole plan is to force the people of England to breed for exportation, like the negroes in the southern states of America. The people of England are fond of their own country; and what right has any order of men to make a law that shall end in obliging them to leave it? They might be happy in increasing at home; but it is the pleasure of one order that they shall neither be happy nor increasing, and therefore they shall be taxed to pay for being transported.

335. That the average price of corn is of no importance to the working classes.—*Mr. Joplin.*

A. What is of importance to them is, that the *quantity* of corn should be always increasing as rapidly as their industry can make it.

336. That a permanent increase in the supply of food is of no importance to the working classes.—*Id.*

A. What is of importance to them is, that the increase should be continually increasing. Their comfort at any moment depends upon *the rate at which the increase is going on.*

337. That except for a comparatively limited period, the comforts of the poor cannot be increased by an additional supply of corn. That it cannot be denied that an importation of foreign corn would be immediately beneficial to the poor; but that benefit would be limited to the time population would take in increas-

A. It is true that a given addition to the annual supply of corn, will only be beneficial to the poor during the time population takes in increasing to its level;—just as it is true, that a given addition to a man's stock of food will only be useful to him during the time he takes in eating it. But what we claim, is the right of further increasing the supply to-morrow, and the next day, and the day after that. We say, that no man has a right to hinder us from running a constant race with hunger if we can; and that if some thousands of years hence, running is of no use, our repre-

ing up to a level with the increased means of subsistence.—*Id.*

sentatives will only be in the condition we are invited to be in at present. We say, in short, that these comforts which we are invited to go without because they are "for a comparatively limited period," make our *life*, our *all;* and that we have no more notion of going without them if we can help it, than Noah had of shutting himself up in his ark lest he should be accessory to filling the world *choke*-full.

338. That nature points out that a tax on foreign corn is the best mode of keeping prices at a particular level.—*Id.*

A. It keeps them at a particular level of injustice.

If there would be fluctuations, it is better to have the good with the fluctuations, than the evil without. Much might be said, in favour of a uniform state of tolerable ill health; yet no man hesitates to enjoy as much health as he can.

339. That nature evidently intended every man to be fed by the land he lives on; for she has made it as a general rule, the interest of all classes to totally exclude foreign corn.—*Id.*

A. What is to become of men of water-borne businesses? And who told them all this about nature; was it "nature," or the landowners?

There is no more evidence that nature intended every man to be fed by the land he lives on, when she has made provision for his being fed better by the produce of some other, —than that she intended every man to use no iron but what was dug in his own back garden. It is a baseless effort to cut men off from mutual assistance and the division of labour, for the advantage of a few monopolists.

340. That a tax on foreign corn is not paid by the people of this country, but by the foreign consumers of our manufactures.

A. The people of this country suffer a restriction on their honest industry to the amount of the corn kept out; and furnish the tax in the first instance on the corn let in, besides. The foreign consumers of our manufactures replace the tax; and the loss of business equal in value to the corn kept out, is what remains.

341. That foreign corn cannot be imported into this country under, at least, 6*s.* per quarter freight and charges,—which is a natural corn law, that we cannot repeal. A rise of six shillings would, according to some of the opponents of the Corn Laws, be equivalent to a duty of 14,400,000*l.*, three

A. The loss created by Corn Laws, which we *can* alter, is confounded with the difficulties imposed by the natural constitution of things, which we *cannot* alter. If any man could contrive to make foreign corn come to us without freight or charges, there would be a gain equal to the amount intended by the 14,400,000*l.*

fourths of which might as well be thrown into the sea. The sale we have for our manufactures gives rise to our demand for foreign corn; and consequently a sale for our manufactures which should enable us to import in spite of the natural corn law of six shillings, would, according to the authorities alluded to, create a loss equal to three-fourths of 14,400,000*l.*, and would therefore be best prevented by throwing the manufactures into the sea.

342. That the agriculturists are entitled to protection equal in amount to the difference between the necessary charge of producing corn in the home and in the foreign market, and to no more.

A. Producing corn, always means producing corn on their worst land. They are no more entitled to it, than the diggers of wells would be entitled to the difference between the cost of producing water from their worst wells, and of procuring it from streams and rivers.

343. Let it be supposed that a manufacturer of calico can sell his goods at a shilling a yard, of which one penny is profit. If he sell to the foreign corn-merchant 1000 yards, and debit his account with 50*l.*, he gets back 20 quarters of wheat at 50*s.*, which balances the account, and his profit is 1000 pence, or 4*l.* 3*s.* 4*d.* But suppose he should deal with farmer Giles at home, not being allowed to import foreign corn at 50*s.*; in that case, as wheat is then 60*s.* and the given quantity 20 quarters, he debits Giles with 1200 yards at 1*s.*—60*l.*; and he credits him 20 quarters of wheat at 60*s.*—60*l.* The account stands balanced, and his profit is 1200 pence, or 5*l.* Now until it can be proved that the 5*l.* gained in the home market is less valuable than the 4*l.* 3*s.* 4*d.* gained in the foreign market, the manufacturer must be the gainer by the first.—*Blackwood's Ed. Magazine.*

A. The tricks here attempted on the manufacturer are two. First, to cause him to overlook, that though he gets 50*l.* for 1000 yards in one instance and 60*l.* for 1200 yards in the other, the 60*l.* are, or soon will be if the new price of corn is permanent, only equal in value to the 50*l.* So that what he really does, is to give away 200 yards for nothing. Secondly, that it is impossible there can be as much calico sold by all the manufacturers to all the farmer Giles-es, as they used to sell when they sold to the farmers and to foreigners too. And of this reduction of the whole trade, each individual manufacturer must in the end bear his share.

344. That the suffering is caused by taxation; and would be relieved by removing it.

A. Supposing taxation to be the cause why the evil is felt *just now*, it is not the radical cause, and the effect of its removal would be brief. Suppose Noah had shut himself up in his ark, and his family complained that there was a dearth because he took up so much of the deck with his state cabin. It is true, that removing the state cabin might

improve matters for a time; but still the radical cause is *his shutting himself up.*

But it is not true that taxation is the cause of the sufferings of the poorer classes at all. As it is a fallacy to say the expenditure of money raised by taxation is a relief to the labouring classes, so it is a fallacy to say its cessation would be a relief; the fact being, that in either case, the question is merely whether the money shall be expended on them by one set of persons or by another. This may make a difference to some particular labourers in some particular places; but it cannot make a difference to all the labourers in the aggregate.

The effect of this fallacy therefore, is only to distract men's attention from the real source of relief, which is the removal of the Corn Laws.

Those who pay taxes would certainly gain individually by paying less. Tithes—which are a particular kind of tax—diminish the whole produce of the country so as to raise the price of corn by, on a wide allowance, perhaps sixpence a quarter *; and therefore it would be a gain to the landlords and to everybody else, if the amount was levied by a tax on rent instead. But it is not true that either taxes or tithes are what starve the poorer classes.

By taxation in this place must be understood taxation in its simple form. When besides the mere taking of the money, a tax is a trick to effect some further purpose,—as is the case with the duties on foreign corn,—the *tricky* part of the business comes under another head.

A tax upon foreign corn is a trick to make two bushels of corn where there might have been four, in order that the landholders may get a higher price. If the same amount was raised by a tax on home and foreign corn alike, the loss of the money would be comparatively nothing. The difference of evil, therefore, is the consequence of the trick in the mode of laying, and not of the simple taxation.

345. That dangerous consequences might result, if the powers from whose dominions our supplies were to be derived, should lay a heavy tax upon their exports.

A. It might with equal reason be urged on the other side, that *our* exports would give us a powerful influence over other nations. The Czar, for example, experienced the power of such an influence; and the supply of naval stores during the current of an actual war, was an object for which Great Britain was more decidedly dependent upon Russia, than she could ever be on any single nation for corn. The argument is as good in one direction as the other; and therefore amounts to nothing either way.

346. That the principle of a duty varying in an inverse ratio to the price of corn, maintains an impartiality towards the two conflicting interests.

A. It maintains just such an impartiality as would be maintained, if the manufacturers were to get possession of parliament and give themselves a bounty on imported corn, varying in the direct ratio of the price.

* See "True Theory of Rent," p. 441 preceding.

347. That one class of the people has unhappily conceived the notion that its feelings and interests have been sacrificed to those of another class.

A. Suppose the manufacturers had got a bounty on imported corn instead of a duty; and ask whether the agriculturists would not conceive the same.

348. That it would be undoubtedly very delightful to carry at all times just principles into effect; but it is impossible to carry unbending maxims into execution without reference to the demands of a complex and artificial system when it shall be found to exist.

A. In plain English, it would be very pleasant to do what is just and right, if it was not that there are some people whose interests are the other way.—Does the Old Bailey ever hear of "complex systems," which prevent the carrying "unbending maxims into execution"?

349. That the relation between the landlords and others is a source of kindly feelings and mutual virtues.

A. Exactly the same was said of slavery. It was a *status*. It was one of the machines of Providence for training men below. It exercised the generosity and self-command of the master, the patience and looseness-to-worldly-things of the slave; and fitted both for heaven. Just as well might a highwayman preach all this to the man he robs. In all the cases alike, the object is to cover injustice with a sermon.

350. That the race of English country gentlemen, English farmers, and English yeomen, is worth preserving.

A. Not if they are to be kept at the public expense. As long as they keep themselves, everybody is glad to see them.

351. That a bold peasantry is their country's pride.

A. The bold peasantry must keep their country; not the country them.

352. That the landlords are the Corinthian capital of society.

A. And must therefore of necessity be supported by the rest.

353. That they are a source of light and knowledge to the lower orders.

A. They teach them what they are anxious they should learn; and others do the same.

354. That they have sound political principles.

A. They take the side they think best for themselves; and others do so too.

355. That they fought the battle against the Jacobins.

A. Which other people are to pay for.

356. That all they get they expend.

A. Most other people do the same.

357. That they are supporters of the fine arts.

A. Wealth would produce the same effects in any other hands.

358. That they feed fat cattle.

A. And are paid for them.

359. That they keep up rural sports.

A. Men have no claim to be paid, for amusing themselves as they like best.

360. That they kill foxes and others.

A. The mole-catcher would do it better.

361. That they sit at quarter sessions.

A. And strange things they sometimes do there. For instance, in Buckinghamshire, they sentenced John Doe to five months imprisonment for intending to assault the lord's hen pheasant, and Richard Roe to three for assaulting the serf's daughter.

362. That they are the unpaid magistracy.

A. If they demand to be kept, they are not.

363. That they are good moral characters.

A. Other men are so too. But it is impossible for all moral men to be kept.

364. That they are generous, brave, and humane.

A. All Englishmen from time immemorial, by their own account have been so too.

365. That nobody could do without them.

A. Nobody could do without everybody. But everybody cannot be kept at the public expense.

In conclusion then, glut, commercial stagnation, distressed manufacturers, and the accumulation of bankruptcies, are all portions of one phænomenon, namely the artificial production of what Adam Smith calls the "stationary time." "It is in the progressive state, while the "society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has "acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the la- "bouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest "and most comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in

"the declining state. The progressive state is in reality the cheerful "and the hearty state to all the different orders of the society. The sta- "tionary is dull; the declining melancholy*." A great commercial and naval people could never arrive at either of these undesirable points,—or never under a period which is out of human ken,—except by the invention of Corn Laws. The continual relief given to the wants of the industrious, by bursting through the circle which limits their present supply of food, has been nature's instrument from the creation, for the improvement of the globe; and the people which permits a line to be drawn about its industry which it shall not pass, has no right to complain of the sufferings which nature has connected with the infringement of her plan.

* Wealth of Nations, B. 1. c. 8.

(In addition to the other materials in a similar form on the same subject, contained in these volumes (Vol. I, p. 489, &c. and Vol. III, p. 178, &c.) a running commentary on the anti-commercial fallacies of the day was kept up in the *Spectator* London weekly newspaper between the dates of 15 Feb. and 28 June 1834, and in the *Sun* London daily newspaper between the dates of 11 Sept. and 31 Dec. 1838, to which reference may be made; making a total of upwards of a thousand forms of fallacy, with their answers. Of these the first was republished by Effingham Wilson, 18 Bishopsgate Street, at the end of the First Series of "Letters of a Representative," and the other in a pamphlet by itself, with a dedication to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.—*Added in* 1841.)

END OF THE CATECHISM ON THE CORN LAWS.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EFFECTS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE WHICH CONSTITUTE THE *MIRAGE* OF THE DESERT; DISPLAYED ON A HEATED WALL.

(Intimated in Note in p. 345 of Vol. III.)

13th May 1841, 1¼ P. M. Examined the reported *Mirage* on a wall in Greenwich Park. The wall is the one on the south side of the Naval School, with the Observatory in its front; and may further be recognized by being in a kind of hollow, and having a door in the middle, leading by an underground passage to the Naval School. The wall itself is nearly 200 yards long, and fronts, as nearly as could be judged from the sun and the time of day, to the true SSE, and consequently bears about true NNW from the Observatory, or a little to the eastward of North by compass. At its eastern end it turns circularly backwards in consequence of the carriage-road crossing in the perpendicular direction; and it is on the objects which pass this corner when the wall is heated by the sun, that the effects are to be remarked.

The best situation for the spectator is from 100 to 150 yards from the corner; with his eye within two or three inches of the wall.

The appearances observed on the day mentioned were, that if an object (as for instance a man walking on the carriage-road) passed behind the corner, when he was at the distance of about four of his own paces from the point where he would disappear, an image of himself started out from behind the corner, having its face the contrary way to his, and moving at the same speed with himself met him half-way, the image and the real object there merging in one another; after which no more was seen of the image, but the real object was seen to pass round the corner as in ordinary cases.

And conversely (though the facts were more difficult to settle, in consequence of not knowing the precise moment at which the passenger was to appear), when the man who was to be the object came round the corner from behind, nothing extraordinary was seen till he had made about two paces from the corner, where a duplicate of himself was seen to start from him, with its face the contrary way to his, and moving at equal speed disappeared round the corner when the real man had arrived at the distance of about four paces from it.

Hence if the real man halted at about three paces from the point where to the spectator's eye he would be hidden by the corner, and with his face towards the corner, an image was seen standing between himself and the corner, as if in conversation with him. And if he afterwards turned round, and moved to the front, the image also turned round and hurried behind the corner like a guilty thing. It would therefore be within the range of possibility, for a whole troop of gend'armerie at once, if their eyes were brought to a proper distance from the wall, to depose to having seen an accused person hold a colloquy with another individual, and both of them, on being observed start off in opposite directions. And the chances of discovering the mistake would be diminished, if the accused wore a dress common to large descriptions of persons, so that no cause of mistrust should arise from the two being dressed alike. There is clearly enough to make the foundation of a melodrame.

The appearances were not dependent on the sun's shining at the moment; nor did it make any difference whether the passing object was nearer or farther from the wall, as the appearances equally took place when the objects were on the causeway close to the wall, or were on the other side of the carriage-road.

The effect is doubtless common to all long and straight walls when heated by the sun. A wall fronting the true SW, on the same day produced very little effect at 1 P. M., but a great deal more at 2 P. M., when by the help of an assistant to play the part of object, the appearance was very distinctly produced of two men near the corner of the wall, communing together as if lying in wait for the spectator, and rushing different ways on perceiving themselves observed; the difference between the two periods, consisting in the distance to which the image advanced to meet the object, being scarcely perceptible in the first. When the same assistant walked along the wall, swinging his hand so as to touch it or nearly, a hand was seen projecting from the wall to meet his, as stated in the Note in p. 345 of Vol. III. referred to. The cause of the whole phænomenon is intimated in the text to which that Note is appended.

END OF VOL. IV.

London: Printed by W. CLOWES and SONS, Stamford-street.

00027575

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 09 March, 2016